by the best writers on the subject, that a declaration of the Government is not necessary to shew that war had taken place; and in the present instance, the treaty of peace that followed between the two countries was a distinct recognition by both, of the previous exist ence of a state of war. It may be true that Sweden may have entered into it unwillingly, or under the control of a superior power; but that is a matter wholly out of the consideration of the court; it has no business to enter into an examination of the Swedish Government's motives; it is sufficient to take the fact, that a state of war actually existed at the time, and was afterwards superseded by a treaty of peace, signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the respective Governments, who were invested with full powers so to do cum libera potestate, as the diplomatic writers term it. It has been again contended, that as the treaty was signed by the Plenipotentiaries before the seizure in question, the pacific character of the two countries was re-established so as to entitle the vessels to liberation; but it appears, that according to modern practice, the ratification of the contracting powers is necessary to perfect the treaty, and finally give it legal and effectual operation. The Plenipotentiaries, it is true, have full and ample powers to concede to or make stipulations, and determine upon the terms of the treaty; but still it is not complete without the ratification: such, indeed, is usually one of the stipulations, and in this respect, therefore, the authority of the Plenipotentiaries is circumscribed. It has also been said, that when the treaty is once ratified,

it's operation is referred back to the time when it was agreed upon and signed by the respective Plenipotentiaries: the words in the treaty, however, upon which this assumption is founded, that there shall henceforth be a cessation of all animosity and hostility, &c. are merely descriptive, and do not become binding upon the contracting parties till ratified by them.-Vattel, book 4. chap. 2. A treatty of peace can be nothing more than a compromise of interests; and these expressions in it are merely an admission of the parties, that they wave all consideration of the original motives of the war; for were the treaty to be framed upon principles of justice, with a view to determine what was due to each party, it would be impossible to carry it into effect: there must be compensation made for every act done throughout the war, renumeration for its expenses, &c. on both sides, and this would revive every hostile feeling. It was perfectly clear, in this case, that the Swedish Government considered the treaty in this point of view, because Anholt was afterwards suffered to continue in the possession. of Great Britain, and the same degree of conduct observed. It only remains, then, to inquire, whether the territory in which the seizure was made was that of Sweden. Now the British flag, which had been hoisted there, remained so undisturbed; it was considered as a British port, and occupied by a British force: and the very motive for which the Americans went with the vessels in question to the bay of Anholt, viz. for convoy and protection, shews that they considered it a British station. Its

mere

mere vicinity to Sweden does not confer a territorial right which other circumstances concur to deprive it of, any more than the occupation of Gibraltar by the British confers on it similar rights with regard to the Spanish territory. The Learned Judge was therefore of opinion, that the claim failed in both its essential points, and condemned the vessels; but with respect to the private adventures on board, he observed, it rested entirely with the Crown, as the Order in Council imposing the embargo limits the extent of each adventure to 200l. This question, therefore, stands over to the next Court-day.

Lancaster Assizes. Before Sir Simon le Blanc and a special Jury. -the King, upon the prosecution of Robert Kirkpatrick, Esq. against Thomas Creevey, Eq. M. P. Mr. Park, the Attorney-General for the county, stated, that this was a prosecution against Mr. Creevey, a Member of Parliament, for having published in the Liverpool Mercury a most scandalous and defamatory libel, highly injurious to the character of a Gentleman of the name of Kirkpatrick, filling the important office of Inspecior General of Taxes. He did not mean to deny the Hon. Member's right to state what he pleased in the House of Commons,-the exercise of that privilege, however, it might affect the feelings of individuals, could not be called in question, but he contended, that if a Member of the House of Commons afterwards sent to the editor of a newspaper his own report of his speech, he was answerable if it contained libellous matter just the same as of the publication of a

libel of any other description. The Learned Counsel then stated, that the libel purported to be the report of the Hon. Member's speech, made upon the occasion of presenting a petition to the House of Commons against the East India Company's monopoly. He seemed to have gone wholly out of his way, in order to vilify the prosecutor, for he represented. the distresses of the people of Liverpool as having been aggravated by his appointment to the office of Inspector-General of Taxes. He designated the office of Mr. Kirkpatrick as that of a common informer, and insinuated that he received a large annuity for undertaking to screw up persons' assessments to the extent of his own imagination. The Learned Counsel added, that the libel went on to insult the memory of the late Mr. Perceval, by asserting that he had given Mr. Kirkpatrick this appointment, merely in consequence of having been his client. The Learned Counsel then referred to the case of the King v. Lord Abingdon, to shew that the publication of a libel against an individual was not to be justified by the circumstance of its being the report of a speech made in parliament. He concluded by expressing his conviction that the verdict would confirm the doctrine for which he contended.

The publication from Mr. Creevey's manuscript having been clearly proved,

Mr. Brougbam first submitted to his lordship, upon the authority of the case of the King v. Wright, that he was not called upon to address the jury. He insisted, generally, that a member of parlia ment could not be held accounta

ble

Sir Simon Le Blanc over-ruled this point-and the learned gentleman then addressed the jury. He said, that Mr. Creevey had been urged by many members of both houses, justly alarmed at this prosecution, to insist upon his privilege but the learned judge having decided against him, he should now proceed to the other ground of his defence. He then, in a very eloquent and ingenious speech, contended that there was nothing libellous in the publication; that matters reflecting in a much higher degree upon the characters of individuals had been published, as the speeches of Mr. Burke, Mr. Pitt, Mr Windham, and other eminent parliamentary characters. He inferred the injurious operation of imposing any restraint upon the publication of reports of what pass ed in parliament, and on this ground principally trusted his client would be acquitted,

Sir Simon Le Blanc stated his clear opinion, that it was no extenuation of a libel, to say that it was the report of a speech in parliament: the publication in question was one which tended to vilify the prosecutor, who was in the execution of a public trust, and he was thefore bound to say it was a libel answering the description given of it in the indictment.

The jury were of the same opinion, and without hesitation, pronounced a verdict of guilty.

Mr. Brougham said, he wished to tender a bill of exceptions, but he was informed by the learned judge he could not do so in a criminal prosecution; and, besides,

fore he had taken the chance of the verdict being in his favour.

A motion was afterwards made in the court of King's Bench for a new trial, when, after the matter had been fully argued by Mr. Brougham, the judges were unanimous in refusing a rule.

The sentence pronounced on Mr. Creevey was a fine of 1001.

Dublin, July 27.- Court of King's Bench, July 26.-The King v. John Magee.

Mr. Kemmish opened the indictment.

The Attorney-General." My Lord and Gentlemen of the Jury, it is a very painful part of the duty of the office which I hold under the crown, to bring before you the present case. This is an indictment against the traverser, John Magee, for a libel on his grace the Duke. of Richmond, the lord-lieutenant of Ireland. It will be my duty to explain to you the meaning and motives of this libel, in order to justify this prosecution. I must be aware of the jealousy which your minds must entertain for the invaluable privilege of a free press; but I trust, I know the value, and venerate that privilege, no less than' any other man in the community : within its legal and proper bounds, it is the security of the subject against the government, and of the government against faction in the state: but when it transgresses those bounds, it is peculiarly incumbent on those who administer and dispense the law, to correct its abuses. Every subject of the land has a right to carry a staff in his hand; but if he will use that

staff

staff to commit assault and battery on every man who may excite his enmity, or be the object of his spleen, it is necessary that the law should interfere, not to take away his privilege, but to correct the abuse, and punish the offender. That, gentlemen, being the true liberty of the press, which it is the duty of us all to preserve inviolate, if every ruffian in the community who throws off those restraints which a regard to truth imposes on other men, takes upon him to slander and revile, and deal out his malignity upon every character, however exalted, pure, and honourable, which may excite his envy or his malice-it then becomes necessary to apply the corrections of the law, lest that liberty of the press should be turned into an engine of public calamity. The publication, gentlemen, is in a newspaper entitled "The Dublin Evening Post, of which the traverser, Mr. Magee, is the printer and publisher-we will shew you that, by proving the affidavit of his registry, and that is the only fact we have to prove. I do not know whether it is intended on the part of the traverser to deny the fact he is at liberty to disprove it. The fact of publication being once established, the question for you will then be on the libel itself, which must speak for itself. I call your attention to this matter principally, because an attempt was made to postpone this trial, on allegations which this unfortunate young man has been imposed upon to make the subject of affidavits-namely, that he was advised and believed that the evidence of Mr. Pole, Mr. Peel, Mr.

Fitzgerald, and Sir Charles Saxton, was material and necessary to his cause. Could I suspect for a minute, that their testimony was admissible on the trial of this libel, I should not have resisted the postponement of the trial to a future day; but, being satisfied be has been advised to make the assertion, I could not consent to the delay of public justice. Gentlemen, it would be a melancholy thing that a man should be put upon his trial every day of his life, if some libeller should choose to assail him, and that such libeller should be admitted to prove the truth of it, even if he could, or that the government of the country should submit to a form or course of examination, for the purpose of furnishing fresh libels for the Dublin Evening Post. I will now proceed to call your attention to the publication in question. It is entitled, “A Review of the Duke of Richmond's Administration." Here the Attorney-General read the publication, as it appeared in the Evening Post of the 5th of January; and on coming to the passage," They insulted, they oppressed, they murdered, and they deceived," he said, Thus does the author accuse the Viceroys of Ireland. But, gentlemen, this is not the first time that the imputation of murder has been made against the Duke of Richmond, in his public and official capacity. That was the very libel that now stands convicted in the "Statement of the Penal Code," The charge was there explained and elucidated; you will find the charge but reiterated in the present libel. The charge there was, that in consequence of the penal laws,

under

under which the lord-lieutenant of Ireland must be a Protestant, where Protestants were found guilty of a violation of the law, they received a pardon, because they were Protestants; and that, on the contrary, the Catholic is suffered to be persecuted because he is a Catholicand this libellous publication upon the office of the Lord-lieutenant of Ireland, is founded on the reason ing I have mentioned, and likewise is attempted to be illustrated in that infamous and convicted publication, by stating that "at the Summer Assizes of Kilkenny, 1810, one Barry was convicted of a capital offence, for which he was afterwards executed. That the man's case was truly tragical,-he was wholly innocent, he was a respectable Catholic farmer, which the Duke of Richmond knowing, suffered him to be executed, becanse he was of the Catholic religion;" and, therefore, gentlemen, the imputation in this newspaper, is but an adoption of the libel in the "Statement of the Penal Code." If any thing was to confirm this being the true object and meaning of this libel, it is only necessary to read further. (The Attorney-general then read the pubiication further.) The Lordlieutenant is here charged with being a murderer: because he must be a Protestant gentleman: it will be for those who are to defend the traverser to interpret this libel in a mild and inoffensive sense. Happy is it for every subject of our free constitution, we are protected from the arm of oppression by the Great Charter-the Bill of Rightsthe Habeas Corpus Act-and the Trial by Jury. These are the protection of the subject against arbi

trary power from any quarter; and I will say this, that such are the habits of the people, resulting from our free constitution, that even the disposition to oppression does not at this time exist. I may safely say to you, Gentlemen of the Jury, after your long experience of the character and conduct of the Duke of Richmond, that it is not in his nature, if it was in his power, to be guilty of oppression to any man. What, then, is the meaning of this collection of abuse, this combination of audacious libel and outrage, against him and his predecessors? It has only one object-you may see to whom it is addressed. It is appealing to the religious prejudices of that part of the community, which has been already too far misled by misrepresentation, and calculated to disaffect the population of the country in their obedience to their lawful governmentto excite in their minds hatred against those whom the laws have appointed to rule over them,— and prepare them for revolution, by exciting them to a civil and religious war. I say, no less atrocious are the motive and malignant purposes of this publication. Another part of the libel is in the words (the Attorney-General then proceeded to read the rest of the libel. He then proceeded to observe)

"Gentlemen of the jury,This is the language of a subject to the representative of Majestyin such audacious and seditious language does this ruffian traduce and vilify the public functionaries of the state, so as to threaten the public peace, and the security of the government. How can we