Abraham, William (Cork, N. E. Boland, John Brigg, John Broadhurst, Henry Campbell, John (Armagh, S.) Dalziel, James Henry Devlin, Chas. Ramsay (Galway Douglas, Charles M. (Lanark) Gladstone, Rt Hn. Herbert John Harmsworth, R. Leicester NOES. Hemphill, Rt. Hon. Charles H. MacNeill, John Gordon Swift Hayter, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur D. Rea, Russell And, it being after Midnight, the Chairman left the Chair to make his Report to the House. Resolution to be reported upon Monday next; Committee to sit again upon Monday next. NEW BILL. VAGRANT CHILDREN'S PROTECTION. Reckitt, Harold James Redmond, John E. (Waterford) Rose, Charles Day Thomas, Abel (Carmarthen, E.) TELLERS FOR THE NOES-Mr. brought in by Mr. Claude Hay, Mr. Spear, VAGRANTS' BILL. "To provide for the further protection of the Children of Vagrants," presented accordingly, and read the first time; to be read a second time upon Thursday next, and to be printed. [Bill 98.] Adjourned at twenty-eight Minutes Speech indicates revision by the Member. An Asterisk (*) at the commencement of a HOUSE OF LORDS. Friday, 26th February, 1904. PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS. Mid-Cheshire Tramways Bill [H.L.]; Clyde Valley Electrical Power Bill [H.L.]. Read 2, and committed. The Committees to be proposed by the Com mittee of Selection. pro Newcastle and Gateshead Water Bill [H.L.J. Read 2 (according to order), and committed. The Committee to be posed by the Committee of Selection. Llanelly Harbour Bill [H.L.]. Read 2a (according to order), and committed. The Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection. Ticehurst and District Water and Gas Bill [H.L.]. Read 2a (according to order), and committed. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Bill [H.L.]: Withnell Gas Bill [H.L.]; Matlock and District Gas Bill [H.L.]; Cambrian Railways Bill [H.L.]; Barnard Castle Gas Bill [H.L.]; Tyneside Tramways and Tramroads Bill [H.L.]; Newcastleupon-Tyne Corporation Bill [H.L.]; Isle of Thanet Light Railways Bill [H.L.]. Report from the Report from the Committee of Selection, That the Earl Fitzwilliam be proposed to the House as a member of the Select Committee on the said Bills in the place of the Earl of Verulam; read, and agreed to. Dumbarton Tramways Order Confirmation Bill. Read 3 (according to order), and passed. RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC. CROFTER COLONISATION. Fourteenth Report of the Commissioners appointed to carry out a scheme of colonisation in the Dominion of Canada of crofters and cottars from the Western Highlands and Islands of Scotland; with appendices. ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSION. Fifty-sixth Report from the Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England; with an appendix. VOL. CXXX. [FOURTH SERIES.] THE MISSION TO TIBET. *LORD REAY, who had given notice “To call attention to the Papers on Tibet, and to move for further Papers," said : My Lords, the very interesting and rather formidable Blue-book relating to Tibet can be divided into three parts. There is first the period when Lord Elgin was at the head of affairs in India. I need say very little about his policy, because it was essentially a policy of peace. Mr. Cuningham's letter, dated 4th March, 1896, my noble friend's policy is clearly laid down in these words In "The policy to be adopted towards the Tibetans should, therefore, be one of conciliation, and all action likely to produce friction should be carefully avoided. . . . The Governor-General in Council would deprecate recourse to threats." With this attitude I am in cordial agreement. There is one other feature 2 P of his administration to which I must call your attention. In the letter mentioned above it is stated that— In respect to territory near Giaogong, the Tibetans probably possess claims which it would not only be impolitic but inequitable to ignore." Those words contain the admission by the Government of India that the demarcation under the Treaty of 1890 was open to objection and to revision. I now come to the second period, the administration of Lord Curzon. Lord Curzon is prepared to leave to Tibet those lands to which Lord Elgin had declared Tibet had claims, but he is only prepared to do so on condition that Phari is thrown open to native traders from India. He attaches a condition to the surrender of these lands to the Tibetans, but he is warned in a letter of the 13th of September, 1899, of the Government of Bengal, that the Tibetans would never consent to the opening of Phari to Indian traders except under compulsion. Three reasons are given for that resistance in the first place, because it would injure an existing monopoly of Tibetan traders; and, in the next place, because the Tibetans were afraid that friction might arise with the British Government which they wanted to avoid, and because they have an inveterate dislike to the entry of any foreigners, Chinese as well as English, within their territory. The next point to which I wish to call attention is that relating to the attempts to enter into direct correspond ence with the Dalai Lama. Three attempts were made, but all three failed. Ugyen Kazi, the Bhutan Vakil, was employed for that purpose on two occasions. Hearing that the first and second attempts had failed, the LieutenantGovernor of Bengal pointed out, in a letter of the 22nd of December, 1899, that it would be useless to make any further endeavour at present to open direct communication, through an agent, with the Tibetan authorities. The Dalai Lama could not take a letter without consulting the Council and the Chinese Amban, and he knew they would not agree, and he could not write a letter without first consulting the Amban. Ugyen Kazi says that"The Dalai Lama is a clever man, and is really sorry that he was unable to accept the Viceroy's letter or send any letter." In the account of Ugyen Kazi's visit to Lhasa it is stated that the Dalai Lama went on to say that he was precluded from writing any letter to any foreign Government, as during the time of Tangya Iling Demorin pochi an agreement was entered into by the Lamas, Sehaffis, and Ambans that no letters should be written without first consulting the Ambans. The Dalai Lama added that this agreement was not made by him but by his predecessor. This shows clearly that the proper method of communication was with the Chinese authorities, and not to attempt these useless representations to the Tibetan authorities, who were unwilling to receive them. The next difficulty is that with regard to the removal of boundary pillars. Indian administrators are well aware that boundary pillars in inaccessible regions are very likely to be removed, and that we cannot hold the Native Government in every single case responsible for such removal. Here, again, I would call attention to the view which Lord Elgin took as to the removal of boundary pillars. stated in his despatch of the 25th of June, 1895, that— "No serious practical inconvenience had apparently arisen through the frontier being undemarcated," and he mentioned this very important fact, that— "Demarcation was not provided for in the Treaty of 1890." That treaty gave us no right to insist on demarcation. The next controversy had reference to the grazing question. In a despatch dated the 8th of January, 1903, the Viceroy states that— the border, which had been usurped by the "The grazing rights on the Sikkim side of Tibetans, are, in fact, balanced by similar rights which are conceded to the Sikkimese across the Tibetan border, and that the status ment in the interest of both parties." quo is probably the most convenient arrange The grievance with regard to grazing rights is therefore considered to be nonexistent. Dealing with these three points -the refusal to receive or to send letters, the removal of the boundary pillars, and the usurpation of grazing rights I cannot see advance of a mission into the heart of that they justify an Tibet. I now turn to the correspondence in the Blue-book, and, in the first place, to the despatch of the 13th of February, 1902, from Lord Curzon, in order to see what were the other difficulties with Tibet which could justify this mission. The Viceroy states that they were "Informed by the Government of Bengal that an attempt which was made last year by the Indian Tea Association to introduce Indian tea into Tibet was rendered fruitless by the obstruction of the local Lamas and officials." This was an attempt to push the tea trade into Tibet notwithstanding that the Tibetans prefer an inferior kind of Chinese tea and do not wish to change their usual habits. I do not see why we should insist on the Tibetans giving way on this point. There is in the despatch a very interesting passage about retaliation. The Viceroy says— "Another possible and legitimate course would be to stop all Tibetan trade with India, and all intercourse between the two countries. Such a step would, doubtless, prove a serious obstacle to Tibetan trade, and might tend to force the authorities to enter into negotiations with us," desirable that it should be brought to an end with as little delay and commotion as possible." I quite agree that it would be desirable to put an end to such a situation if you could do it without any commotion, but that certainly has not been the case; and a good deal of commotion is created by our attempt to force the Tibetans out of an isolation to which I hold they have a perfect right. The next very important despatch is that of January the 8th, 1903, in which the Viceroy puts forward another reason for his policy. He says "The second combination of circumstances that has materially affected the situation is the rumoured conclusion of a secret Agreement by which the Russian Government has acquired certain powers of interference in Tibet." The Viceroy himself points out in another sentence, in which he says— "It is unnecessary for us to remind your Lordship that the Russian border nowhere even touches that of Tibet, and that the nearest point of Russian territory is considerably more than a thousand miles short of the I would especially call your Lordships' Tibetan capital, which is situated in the attention to what follows "but it would also entail hardship upon our own traders, and might ultimately result in the diversion of the Tibetan trade to Nepal." The Viceroy therefore desists from retaliation. Retaliation would have injured our own traders and Nepal would have been the tertius gaudens. These are the usual results of retaliation. I almost regret that this experiment was not tried, because, if he had followed that course, we should have had an object lesson in retaliation, and the present situation would not have arisen. The Viceroy gives a further explanation of his policy. He says 66 The policy of isolation pursued by the Tibetan Government is one that, from its own point of view, it may not be difficult to comprehend. But it is not compatible either with proximity to the territories of a great civilised Power at whose hands the Tibetan Government enjoys the fullest opportunities both for intercourse and trade, or with due respect for the treaty stipulations into which the Chinese Government has entered on its behalf. It is indeed the most extraordinary anachronism of the 20th century that there should exist, within less than 300 miles of the borders of British India a State and a Government, with whom political relations do not so much as exist, and with whom it is impossible even to exchange a written communication. Such a situation cannot in any case be lasting. But it seems extreme south, and in close proximity to the northern frontier of the Indian Empire." How remote is the direct contact of Russia with Tibet. Now, anyone who has read the fascinating account of Dr. Sven Hedin's attempt to get into Tibet through the desolate country which separates Tibet from Russia will have seen how incredible it would be that Russia should advance into Tibet from that side. But in the Bluebook we have important and positive. declarations of the Russian Government. Count Lamsdorff informs Sir Charles Scott on July the 8th, 1901, that the mission of the Tibetan visitors "Could not be regarded as having any political or diplomatic character." With regard to a rumoured Agreement, between Russia and China concerning Tibet of which the terms are given in the Blue-book. In the first place two Chinese ministers told Sir Ernest Satow on September the 8th, 1902 or with anyone else, nor had the Russian Government any Agents in that country or any intention of sending Agents or missions there." I cannot conceive that any declaration could be clearer or more definite than this declaration of the Russian Government, which is contained in a despatch from the noble Marquess to Sir Charles Scott of April the 8th, 1903. The only link between Russia and Tibet is the large number of Buddhists in the Russian Empire who venerate the Dalai Lama as was pointed out by Count Lamsdorff to Sir Charles Scott on the 8th of July, 1901. There is a very important despatch from the noble Marquess to Mr. SpringRice of the 17th November, 1903, in which it is stated that the Russian Ambassador said "It was most unfortunate that, at the present moment, when the Russian Government were, as I was aware, disposed to enter into an amicable discussion of our relations at the various points where British and Russian interests were in contact, an event of this kind, so calculated to create mistrust on the part of Russia, should have occurred." My Lords, that is an extremely important statement. It is inherent to our political position that, whenever we advance, there should be mistrust in Russia, and whenever Russia advances, there should be mistrust in England. Therefore the statement that the Russian Government was disposed to enter into an amicable discussion is most satisfactory, and I trust that the noble Marquess will inform us that on his part there was the same amicable disposition to enter into that discussion and to attempt to remove, once and for all, the causes of reciprocal suspicion of motives which ought not to exist between two Powers having such enormous-not necessarily conflicting-interests in Asia. I return to the Viceroy's despatch in which he proposes to accept the Chinese proposals of having a Conference, but he adds the the most extraordinary condition that the Conference shall take place, not upon our frontier, but at Lhasa. Now it was obvious that such a proposal could never be accepted by the Lamas. In that same despatch there is an interesting extract from a despatch from Sir Thomas Wade to Earl Granville. No one knew China and the methods of the Chinese better than Sir Thomas Wade, and great weight must, therefore, be attached to what he says. He stated "If the trade (i.e., between India and Tibet) be worth the effort, I think that it might possibly be opened, were a mixed official and commercial mission pushed forward without reference to to declare that in this or in any other matter the Court of Peking, which is always careful Tibet may act as she pleases, and if that mission were authorised in the first instance to spend money rather freely.” But the Government of India of that date, who were asked for their opinion on this suggestion by the Secretary of State, replied in an unfavourable sense, not being impressed, as our records show, with the trade prospects. And when I look at the figures which are given in the Blue-book with regard to our present trade with Tibet, I am bound to say that I am not impressed by the prospects of that trade; and it seems to me that it is hardly worth while forcing unwilling Tibetans to take our merchandise. I think that we must use those means which Sir Thomas Wade suggests and "spend money rather freely" and avoid anything which has the appearance of a hostile act. With regard to the suzerainty of China, the Viceroy used this extraordinary expression "We regard the so-called suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction-a political affectation which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties." This strikes me as an extremely impolitic assertion that a situation which our Government had always recognised, which is founded on law, history, and tradition should be considered a constitutional fiction-extremely impolitic when we realise what suzerainty means to us in India. The Viceroy continues— "Our proposal therefore is that, assuming it to be decided by His Majesty's Government to respond in a favourable sense to the overtures of the Waiwupu, the Chinese Government shall be informed that we can undertake the negotiations nowhere else than at Lhasa, and that a British Commercial Mission will start for that place at a suitable date in the forthcoming spring, there to meet the Chinese resident and a duly appointed high official of the Tibetan Government. We propose that the negotiations should cover not merely the small question of the Sikkim frontier, but the entire question of our future relations, commercial and otherwise, with Tibet; and we think that they should culminate in the appointment of a permanent British representative, Consular or Diplomatic, to reside at Lhasa.” That was a most imprudent proposal, and one which I am happy to say the |