whatever to make of what I have referred to as the controversial tone of the reply of the Prime Minister. I fully recognise that some inconvenience may have been caused to him, and perhaps also to the public service, which might have been avoided if my resignation had been sent in at the same period as that of my colleagues; and if this was so, I desire to express my extreme regret for any want of judgment or any want of decision which may have been the cause of such inconvenience.

My colleagues, who have already made personal explanations, Mr. Ritchie and Lord George Hamilton, were perfectly justified in the statement they have made, that at the time when they resigned their offices they had every reason to believe from the communications which had passed between us that I intended to have taken the same course at the same time. I do not think it is necessary that I should enter at all fully into the reasons why I formed that intention. Those reasons were, in the main, identical with those which have been fully stated by my colleagues. I perhaps could not have formulated so distinctly as they did the reasons for their action, because I had not at the time, and I have not even now, a very clear idea of what were the measures to which we were asked at that time to give our assent, or of what was the policy to which we were asked to commit ourselves. It may be enough for me to say that both the action and the language of the Prime Minister and of some of his colleagues since the first opening of this question had been to me a cause of great anxiety and doubt. I felt myself obliged to dissent from much that was contained in the pamphlet which has been published by the Prime Minister, and from some of the contents of the Memorandum which was circulated to his colleagues at the same time. I also had in my mind that two only of my colleagues had prepared for the Cabinet Memoranda dealing with the proposals which had been put forward by our colleague the late Colonial Secretary, and had made criticisms of those proposals with which I was on the whole in entire agreement.

At the Cabinet which met on 14th September it was clearly indicated that in the opinion of the Prime Minister the opinions of these members who had expressed themselves in these Memoranda were such as to make it impossible that they could give their assent to the policy which he was about to propose, and that it was not likely that it would be possible for them, with satisfaction to themselves, to remain members of his Government. Sharing as I did in the main the views which had been expressed by my colleagues, I did not see how, if in the opinion of the Prime Minister they could not with advantage remain in his Cabinet, the same considerations should not apply also to my own case. But there was, however, another reason, which was not referred to in the letters of resignation of my colleagues, but which had a great influence upon me, and I think must have had some influence also with them. I think we were, none of us, quite clear as to the nature of the declarations which the Prime Minister might think it necessary to make in his forthcoming speech at Sheffield; but what I felt, and what we all felt, was that, whatever might be the nature of these declarations, it would be impossible for us to continue to be members of a Cabinet in which the Colonial Secretary would be free to advocate principles which we knew he had adopted, which we also knew it was his intention, either in or out of the Cabinet, to advocate publicly throughout the country. Such a state of things would, I think, have been highly unsatisfactory to us, and contrary to the best interests of the public service. It would have been necessary in such circumstances for me either to remain silent

which would have been an intolerable position for myself-or to have taken an open part in combating a policy which my colleague was advocating, which, I think, would hardly have been a course that would have been decent to colleagues in the same Cabinet.

It is quite true that at the Cabinet to which I am referring some mention was made of the possible resignation of Mr. Chamberlain. My recollection, however, agrees with those of my colleagues who have already stated their views on the subject, that that resignation had not been definitely tendered, still less that it

had been, or was likely to be, accepted without protest on the part of the Prime Minister. It is also true that on the evening of the same day, after the Cabinet, I had an interview with the Prime Minister, in which he again referred to the possibility of the resignation of Mr. Chamberlain. But, even at that time, it was not presented to me in such a manner as to lead me to understand that a definite tender of resignation had been made, still less that it was likely to be accepted. At a further interview the next day the subject was again referred to, and the resignation of Mr. Chamberlain was spoken of as being extremely probable, if not certain; but it was not until the third day, the Wednesday of that week, that I learned definitely and finally that that resignation had been tendered and had been accepted. I admit that this communication appeared to me to make a very great difference in my position.

As I have said, I was not even then clear as to the scope and nature of the declaration that the Prime Minister

intended to make at an early date; but I understood that it was to be mainly on the lines of his pamphlet, with which your Lordships are all acquainted; and from passages in that pamphlet, and also from communications which took place between myself and the Prime Minister, I thought I was justified in the statement

which I made in the letter in which I finally tendered my resignation. The passage is very short, and perhaps your Lordships will allow me to read it—

"I had hoped to have found in your speech a definite statement of adherence to the principle of free trade as the ordinary basis of our fiscal and commercial system, and an equally definite repudiation of the principle of protection in the interests of our national industries."

I thought, from the reasons which I have endeavoured to indicate, that I was justified in forming that opinion as to the general character of the statement which the Prime Minister intended to make. I thought at the time, very wrongly I am afraid, that it was possible that my continued presence in the Cabinet might have the effect of, in some degree, restraining that body from any very wide departure from the principles of free trade to which I still adhered. Still my

position, I acknowledge, I felt to be an extremely difficult one. But from that moment when I was definitely assured of the resignation of the Colonial Secretary my difficulties were mainly of a personal and not of a public character. I pointed out to the Prime Minister that the effect which the fact of Mr. Chamberlain's resignation had on my mind would in my opinion probably be similar to the effect which that fact would have on the minds of those other colleagues who had already tendered their resignations and whose resignations had been accepted. I understood, however, from him that, whatever might be my decision, there was no intention of asking those colleagues to reconsider theirs, or in fact that any reconsideration on their part would be admitted. My difficulty, therefore, was mainly of a personal character; it was whether I should be wanting in loyalty to those colleagues with whom I had been in communication, who had consulted me as to their course, and whom I had consulted as to mine. My first inclination, I admit, was to insist on being permitted to lay this new fact before my colleagues and consult again with them, and, in fact, to place myself to a great extent in their hands. On reflection, however, I considered that, as nothing which I could do would alter their position, I had no right to ask them to take any responaffected myself alone, and that my desibility for my own conduct, which cision must be made solely upon public grounds. I therefore decided that under these new circumstances it would be my duty to remain a member of the Cabinet, and to exercise what influence I might possess in endeavouring to guide or restrain the action of the Cabinet.

There is one further explanation, or perhaps I ought rather to say one further confession, which I have to make. It is quite true, as was stated in the Prime Minister's letter of reply to me, that I saw before I finally gave my decision the letter in which he had accepted Mr. Chamberlain's resignation. I think if I had at that time fully grasped the significance of that letter my decision would have been a different one. But I can only plead in excuse that the letter was only read to me, that I had no opportunity of considering its terms

Minister has written a pamphlet and he has made three speeches; and in those, up to the present time, we must find the materials for forming an opinion on the policy of the Government and on the lead which he desires to give to his Party. In the pamphlet the most definite expression that I find is that he pleads for "freedom to negotiate in order that freedom of exchange may be increased." In the speech at Sheffield I find also the definite declaration that he intended to reverse the fiscal policy of the last two generations. That declaration would seem to imply that as the fiscal policy of the last two generations had been one of free trade the Prime Minister's intention was to revert to protection. But we have been assured that that is not the present intention of the Government, and therefore we have to fall back on the freedom to negotiate in order that freedom of exchange might be increased. That does not appear to me to be so much a declaration of policy as the expression of a sentiment; and until that sentiment is reduced to concrete proposals I maintain that we have not got and the country has not got the lead which we have the right to expect.

If the complexity and difficulty of this position could have been increased I think it would have been increased by the speech of my noble friend Lord Selborne last night. Lord Selborne told us that it was impossible to explain the details of a policy which was not yet born. I ask, how are we to accept as the policy of the Government or the lead which the Government have promised to give to the country a policy which, in the words of one of his colleagues, has not yet come into existence. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not strange that we have not derived very much enlightenment from the debates which have taken place in the other House of Parliament. We have to-night one more chance of obtaining that enlightenment. My noble friend who leads the House holds a position only second in authority to that of the Prime Minister himself, and it may be-I hope it may be-that he will be in a position to throw some light upon this perplexed condition of things. He told us the other day, in words spoken with some deliberation, that the Government

presented a solid front on that part of the policy which they had examined and to which as a Government they were committed. What we want to know is, What are the results of that examination which has been given? I trust that I do not put this question in a hostile spirit to the Government. As I have admitted, while I was a member of the Government I was perfectly ready to enter myself into an examination of certain proposals; but while I was a member of the Government certainly no examination of this policy had yet been undertaken, and if I had remained in the Government I should have expected that such an examination would be made before the meeting of Parliament, and that its results would be communicated to Parliament.

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tion of the policy of the Government than We have never got nearer to a definithat which was given to us by the noble Marquess at the opening of the session. "The policy of the Government," he said, negotiation and retaliation." It is per"might be summed up in the words fectly possible that a policy which has been fully and adequately explained may be summed up in two words; but there never was a policy-and I do not think that there ever will be a policy-which, in the absence of such adequate explanation, could be summed up sufficiently for the consideration of Parliament or the country in a couple of words. Though we have often heard this summing-up of the policy of the Government we have never received any indications whatever as to the manner in which those principles

are

to be applied to our future fiscal policy. As to negotiation, the Governfree to enter into negotiation. ment have always, in my opinion, been

The Prime Minister says that we deprived ourselves of the means of successfully conducting negotiations, and the other night, in the House of Commons, Mr. Wyndham attributed the failure of certain negotiations with France which took place in 1880 to the absence of any fiscal inducement which it was in our power to offer. I think Mr. Wyndham was not quite accurately informed with respect to that negotiation. It is not the fact that in that negotiation we had nothing to offer. Parliament had already been asked, and had assented, to a