recourse to a stratagem; and this required the utmost promptitude and coolness in the execution, lest before the enterprise succeeded the deceit should be discovered. The English vessels therefore approach ed the mouth of the river under French colours; and so completely were the enemy deceived that a pilot came on board them: by their direction and assistance the ships were anchored after dark near the batteries at the mouth of the river. Captain Barrie then dispatched three boats from the Diana, which were seconded and supported by four from the Semiramis. Still the enterprise was hazardous and of doubtful success; because it did not depend so much upon the bravery of those employed as upon, their promptitude and secrecy. The convoy which the boats were sent to attack and destroy lay about four miles higher up the river: at first the tide was adverse to the progress of the boats; about the middle of the night, however, it became favourable; and the convoy was captured. Still there was a difficulty to be encountered and overcome in getting the captured vessels and the boats safe to the ships, as they were much higher up the river than the gun-boats. Captain Barrie, therefore, in the morning resolved to attack the gunboats; but, at the same time, to keep up the artifice he had hitherto so successfully practised. And in this latter part of the enterprise he was equally fortunate; for he deceived the enemy so completely, that the captain of the port, who also commanded one of the armed brigs, came on board the Diana to offer his services, and was not aware that it was an English ship till he was actually on her deck. In a very short time the two armed

brigs were captured; and captain Barrie in his official dispatch mentions an incident most descriptive of the character of British seamen. "It adds (says he) to the lustre that the officers and men achieved, the humanity they displayed to the overpowered captives in putting them below without the force of arms and an unnecessary effusion of blood."

It was utterly impossible now for the enemy to be longer deceived: accordingly the batteries opened their fire upon the ships; but the Semiramis, as if in contempt of their fire, pursued and drove on shore, and there burnt under their very guns, the armed brig the captain of which had been decoyed on board the Diana. In the whole of this transaction we had only three men wounded. Five vessels of the enemy were taken, and one was burnt.

In narrating the particulars of the action off the island of Lissa in the Mediterranean, we did justice to the skill and bravery displayed by the French squadron: we have now to notice another nɩval engagement, in which, though they did not exhibit the same skill, they displayed equal intrepidity. Soon after the capture of the Isle of France, three French frigates, full of troops for its protection, were known to be in the Indian seas, and at first it was hoped that, being ig norant of the capture of the island, they might enter its harbour, and thus become an easy and bloodless prey. This, however, This, however, did not happen: still there were wellgrounded hopes that they would ultimately fall into our hands ; since, being destitute, or nearly so. of water, it would be absolutely necessary that they should proceed somewhere in those seas to procure

that

that article before they could think of returning to Europe. Three frigates, therefore, the Astrea, Phebe, and Galatea, and the Racehorse, a brig, were dispatched in quest of them for a long time their search was fruitless, notwithstanding they spread themselves widely over the Indian seas. At last it occurred that the island of Madagascar was the most likely place to find them, or rather that it was the only place to which they could resort for a supply of water. On the 19th of May the enemy were discovered off the coast of that island they were immediately chased, but it was upwards of ten hours before they were come up with. The English seamen, in the mean time, manifested their usual impatience for battle; and many of them expressed a wish, that during the chase the Racehorse might be outsailed, in order that there might be an equality in point of force and numbers between them and the French! At last the Astrea came up with them, and sustained the fire of two, before the Phebe and Galatea could join and support her. The weather was very favourable to the enemy; for, by falling calm every now and then, it left first the Astrea, and then the Phebe and Galatea exposed to their whole fire. The Galatea was so much damaged as to be obliged to make the signal for immediate assistance: while the other two ships were affording her this, the enemy made sail in order to escape. As the Galatea was unable to renew the attack, the Phebe and Astrea, after assisting her, went again in pursuit of the French. Upon comg up with them they found that the force on each side was still equal; for the Nereide, one of the enemy's squadron, had been as

completely disabled as the Galatea, and had, like her, gone out of the action. The battle recommenced by the Astrea pouring a dreadful broadside into the French commodore's ship (La Renommée): instead of returning it, she made an attempt to board the Astrea; which if she had been able to effect, she most probably would have carried her, as she was full of soldiers. This, however, was prevented by the skilful manœuvres of the Astrea.

The scene now was truly awful: the night was dark and dismal, interrupted only by the flashes and noise of the four ships; for the Phebe by this time had come up, and attacked the French commodore under the stern. After a very gallant resistance she struck; and the Clorinde (the name of the third ship) soon followed her example. But in this case, too, the want of principle and honour, too often evinced by the French of the present day, was manifest; for the Clorinde, perceiving that the English had not a boat that was in a condition to be sent to take possession of her, made all sail away: she was pursued for three hours, but the Astrea and Phebe were both too much disabled to carry on the pursuit. The slaughter was very great on board of the French commodore's ship, La Renommée, there being upwards of 100 killed and wounded; amongst the first was the commodore himself: he was wounded early in the engagement, but refused to quit his quarters; when another shot killed him. On board the Nereide there were 130 killed and wounded; her captain also was killed. The action from first to last continued seven hours, during which the attack was renewed four times; yet on board the Asthere were only two men

trea

killed and fifteen wounded. This comparatively trifling loss seems to have proceeded from the circumstances of the enemy elevating their guns too high, and of our seamen being very attentive to the manoeuvring of their sails. On board of the Phebe there were twenty-four killed and wounded. The Galatea, not having been engaged in the night action, it might have been supposed would have escaped with but little loss. This however was not the case, for she had sixteen killed and forty-five wounded.

On the Saturday after the action the Nereide was discovered lying in Tamatave bay, in Madagascar. As the entrance to this bay is extremely dangerous; and as, besides, she was under the protection of a battery, and moored across the entrance, it was thought imprudent to attack her. A flag of truce was sent in, to summon them to surrender: this they agreed to do, on condition they should not be considered as prisoners of war, but should be sent to France: with these terms the English commodore complied, and the Nereide was taken possession of.

In the opinion and judgement of some of our readers, perhaps we may seem to have dwelt too fully and minutely on the particulars of these naval actions; more so, they may allege than either their own merits deserve, or than is pro. portioned to the space and notice we have allotted to other portions of British history. This objection certainly wears the appearance of being appropriate and forcible; but upon a close examination it will be discovered not to be wellgrounded. The state of maritime warfare between Great Britain and France is become of such a nature,

that no actions on a grand scale, where fleets are engaged, or bring ing after them most important and decisive results, can now be expected. The times of their occur. rence are gone by. France can meet this country on the sea, now, only with a few detached vessels. But though engagements between a few frigates do not strike the mind so much as naval actions be tween numerous and formidable fleets, yet they are perhaps more advantageous for the exercise and display both of nautical skill and enterprise, and of real courage. We must also do the enemy the justice to acknowledge, that they generally fight better when their single frigates, or at least when a few ships are opposed to us, then when they meet us on our element with a large fleet. large fleet. As therefore there can now be no instances of our naval superiority displayed in engagements on a large scale, we must keep an attentive eye upon those that do occur, as they give proofs that our superiority still continues, and that we still have in our navy both officers and seamen, who, when the occasion called for it, and the opportunity occurred, would rival the heroes of Trafalgar.

Besides, an attentive perusal of the details of these actions between our frigates and those of the enemy is more adapted, as we have already remarked, to bring out to particular and distinguished notice nautical skill and enterprise, and also to render them more perfect. In the action between the French squadron and ours off the island of Lissa in the Mediterranean, the French had an opportunity of executing that particular maneuvre, on which many are disposed to think that our naval superiority and success mainly, if not entirely,

depend;

Dutch possessions also in the Indian seas. The first object of attack was the Isle of France. The fol. lowing account of this island will fully point out its advantages, and may properly be given here as forming an appropriate introduction to our account of the expedition against it.

The Isle of France, according to the admeasurement of the abbé de la Caille, is not more than thirtyone leagues in circumference, about eleven in length, and seven in breadth, having a surface which measures 432,680 acres. It is described as extremely healthy, fertile, and abounding with the most romantic scenery.

The population of the contiguous isles of France and Bourbon is said to have been 121,000 in the year 1799, of whom a great proportion are negro slaves; and the military force consisted of 5,000 men. Raynal informs us, that in the year 1765 the population of the Isle of France was as follows:-1,469 white people, besides the troops; 1,587 Indians or free negroes; and 11,881 slaves. Since that period the population has probably very considerably increased.

The principal harbour of the island is Port Louis, which is situated in 20° 10' south lat. and 55° long. east from Paris. The tides are not very perceptible, those of the equinox rising not more than three feet.

With regard to its produce, the following are the most recent details. The soil of the island is very diversified. Although by its climate it is adapted for all colonial productions, it has not equally answered all the different kinds of cultivation which the inhabitants have endeavoured to naturalize. The plantations of coffee were the

first adopted; but other objects of cultivation, such as cotton, having appeared more profitable, coffee has not become so general as it would otherwise have been. The natives pretend that their coffee is superior to that of Mocha. The cotton, in its turn, has likewise been neglected, because the cultivation of indigo was become more popular. Several sugar plantations have succeeded. One of their governors, M. Poivre, formerly found means to introduce plants of the nutmeg, cloves, &c. from the Dutch spice islands. This experiment, however, did not prove successful; for Raynal tells us that most of the plants died, and the rest were not likely to bear fruit.

The principal advantage which the French derived from the island was, that it served as a point from which our commerce might be successfully annoyed in the Indian

seas.

The fatal experience of the East India company, and of the private traders on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, has proved that nothing could be better adapted for attaining that object. It served as the place of rendezvous for French frigates, where they could be refitted, and where they might retire with their plunder. It was a depôt of captured produce, and in this view was resorted to by American traders, who brought that produce to Europe which the French were unable to convey in their own merchantmen. The destruction of such a nest of marauders is the principal advantage that we can derive from the conquest. In our hands it is impregnable as long as we command the seas, and perhaps may be rendered a station of some importance.

The abbé Raynal gives the following view of the political and

com