are also numerous and great obstacles to their advancing so far. On almost the whole of the frontier of Portugal, nature has raised formidable barriers for her protection; and even if these are passed, an enemy cannot proceed far, before additional obstacles to this progress appear. But the most important point is the situation of the capital of Portugal: though a country is not necessarily subdued when its capital is in possession of the enemy, yet till that event takes place, the enemy cannot possibly be said to have conquered it. The French, aware of the éclat and impression produced by their being able to occupy the capital of the different countries which they have invaded, have regularly pushed forward against them; and have, in fact, in almost every instance, made their occupation of the capitai the means of subduing and bringing to terms their adversaries. In most countries, the capitals are so situated as to become an easy prey to the invaders in Spain, Madrid soon fell; but Lisbon is most fortunately situated both for defence by an army, and for that army, while defending it, being supplied by a naval power such as Britain. It is also to be remarked, that the French, by the very act of drawing near to attack Lisbon, necessarily remove themselves to a much greater distance from their reinforcements and supplies, while they enter into a tract of country very ill calculated to support a numerous army.

In the second place, the friendly disposition of the Portuguese to wards the English, to which we have already adverted, has pro, duced one important public effect, besides drawing together the indivi, duals of the two nations. While the Spaniards will neither receive

our councils, nor permit our officers to discipline their troops, Portugal may be said to be actually governed by British statesmen, while her armiles are in every respect under the command of British officers. It is almost needless to dwell upon the beneficial consequences resulting from this: there is not only more vigour, and more uniform and hearty co-operation, but the Portuguese soldiers must ultimately, though necessarily very slowly, assume much of the character of those with whom they are thus associated. It is impossible not to look further for the effects which this system must produce; and to indulge the hope, that whatever be the ultimate issue of the contest in the peninsula, the Portuguese national character will be much benefited, both by intercourse with Britons, and by being forced to the exercise and display of more activity and vigour than the political circumstances under which they had antecedently been placed either called for or permitted.

If we naturally were apprehensive that the desultory and irregu lar mode of warfare in which the greater part of the inhabitants of Spain were engaged, would produce on their character not the most desirable effects; we may, on the other hand, anticipate, from the state into which the Portuguese nation are now brought by the efforts of the British, and by intercourse with them, a very great amelioration of their character.

Whether, therefore, we look forward to the probable issue of the war in Spain and Portugal, or to the effects which, whether successful or not, it will probably produce on the character and disposition of the inhabitants of the two countries respectively; we shall find much X 4

more

more reason to anticipate good from the latter than from the former. When Spain, like Portugal, shall so far discover and acknowledge her real interests, as to accept this country for her friend and ally without scruple or jealousy; when she will cordially adopt the only remedy for the ignorance of her generals and the unsteadiness of her troops, by incorporating them completely with our armies; when her councils shall be directed by talents adequate to the emergency and difficulty of the situation in which she is placed; and when, like Portugal, her inhabitants shall be unanimous, at least in not joining and assisting the French, then will her hopes of success be better founded, and the day of her triumph, tranquillity, and independence be not far distant.

There still remains another topic of reflection on this most fruitful and interesting subject, to which we must advert before we enter on the narrative of the campaign in the peninsula; it will not, how ever, detain us long.

After all that has been urged, and must be allowed, with respect to the difficult situation in which the French armies in Spain are placed, and the impossibility of augmenting those armies from the impoverished state of the country, still the whole conduct of the war in Spain must tend to lower our opinion of Bonaparte's talents, both as a statesman and as a military character. At the very outset of the Spanish revolution he was manifestly ignorant of the state of Spain: he was totally unapprehensive of any opposition or resistance in the least formidable from the Spanish nation. Afterwards, when they did rise up in arms against him, he did not act with his accustomed deci

sion, promptitude, and vigour : he left his work incomplete, to go to war with Austria; although it might have been imagined that the nature of Spanish resistance would have been sufficiently known to him who had seen and felt it, to have convinced him that it was of infinitely more importance to crush the Spaniards than to conquer Austria. It is also difficult to account for the circumstance that Bo naparte himself has not gone into Spain to head his armies, since the war there presented so many difficulties, and advanced so very slowly. It is not consistent with his character, or with his former conduct, to suppose that he is deterred by an apprehension of danger: that was more likely to incite than to deter him. Upon the whole, and in all its parts, his conduct during the Spanish war has been very unaccountable: it however tends very strongly to illustrate and prove a position to which we have already adverted, that his power in France is laid now on other foundations than mere military conquest and glory. Had it rested sclely or principally on these, from which unquestionably it took its rise, Bonaparte durst not have been absent from the scene of danger; nor would he have felt as tranquil and safe, as he appears to have done, amidst the disasters of his armies in the peninsula. Is there not also reason to apprehend, that not only in France, but also in most of the other countries on the continent which the French arms have over-run and conquered, the people are beginning to settle, as it were, and become habituated to the new order of things? Can we suppose, if there still existed among them the same spirit of independence and hostility towards France,

that

that it would not have manifested itself since the reverses of the French armies in the peninsula? After every check or defeat which they have sustained, we have been told to be on the watch, for that the throne of Bonaparte was shaken, if not in France, at least in the

conquered nations. But our victories in the peninsula, have passed over ineffectual in this respect: his armies are defeated and disgraced there, but France and the conquered countries are still tranquil, and obedient to his yoke.

Tsena from the fosition he occur

HE retreat of marshal Mas

pied near the British lines at Torres Vedras to Santarem, was noticed in our volume for the year 1810. When the intelligence of this retreat first reached England, the joy and congratulation were excessive: his immediate and further retreat was looked forward to with certainty. When, however, he seemed resolved to retain the new position he had taken up, those who had been most sanguine began to despond: they looked upon his retreat to Santarem as a mere feint; or, at least, as rendered expedient and necessary only by the devastation of the country he had so long occupied. Early in the year 1811, intelligence was received by lord Wellington that a very numerous corps, amounting, it was said, to nearly 15,000 men, were on their march

general Silveira in vain endeavoured

to join Massena. The Portuguese

to interrupt the march of this body of men, or to harass them during it. The Portuguese troops by themselves were not able to cope with the French, and Silveira was compelled to abandon his object, after having suffered severely for his rashness.

For some time after Massena was thus reinforced, desertions from his army were less common and numerous; and the accounts of deserters no longer presented that picture of famine and wretchedness which they had formerly given. Indeed from the statements of the French papers, from the reports of deserters, and from what lord Wellington learnt by other means, it was rendered certain, that a large supply of provisions had been brought to Mas

sena's

sena's army by the corps which had joined him.

It was at first imagined that, being now so strongly reinforced, he would make an attempt on lord Wellington at Cartaxo; especially as the position of the latter was not now nearly so formidable as it had been at Torres Vedras; but the French marshal manifested no such disposition or intention. On the other hand, lord Wellington found that the position occupied by the enemy at Santarem could not be attacked with any prospect of success; it had been chosen with great judgement and skill, and fortified with the utmost care and caution. Thus to all appearance the two armies were exactly in every cir cumstance, except mere locality, placed relatively to each other as they had been at the close of the year 1810. The French indeed had opened to themselves an entry into a more fertile district of Portugal; but no part of this kingdom, exhausted as it had been, could long support such a numerous army as Massena commanded. Besides, it must have become apparent to him, that even if it were possible for him to continue at Santarem during the whole of the approaching spring, still his stay there could be of no avail: each day rendered the subsistence of his army more difficult, and saw it decrease by sickness and desertion; while each day added to the strength of lord Wellington's lines, without exposing his army to the difficulties under which that of the French suffered.

Knowing these things, lord Wellington confidently and repeatedly predicted that the French must retreat: this prediction not having been verified so soon as was expect ed and hoped for, many accused lord Wellington of being a false

On

prophet: the day of the completion of his prophecy was at hand. the 5th of March, marshal Massena having arranged every thing for his retreat with the most consummate skill and foresight, and with the most profound secrecy, broke up from his position at Santarem. He in part succeeded in deceiving lord Wellington with respect to the line of his retreat, by indicating a disposition to occupy Thomar; but having by his manœuvre drawn off part of the British army, Massena continued his march towards the river Mondego, with one corps on the road of Espinhel, another on the road of Anciao, and the remainder of his army towards Pombai.

The pursuit of the British was immediate and rapid; the light division, the royal dragoons and the 1st hussars at the very begin, ning of the pursuit overtaking the rear of the French, and taking about 200 prisoners. Nothing very important occurred till the 9th of March, on which day the enemy collected three of their corps in front of Pombal, and awaited the British. On the 11th lord Wellington had brought forward a sufficient number to attack them; but the French stood only to receive the attack of our advanced troops, when they again retreated. On the 12th, the 6th and the 12th corps of the enemy took up a strong position at the end of a defile be tween Redinha and Pombal, having their right on the river Soare, and their left extended towards the high ground that hangs over the river of Redinha: their rear was protected by the town of this name. The same day lord Wellington having brought up part of his army attacked them in this position. Their right though protected by the wood was first earried:

by

by this successful manœuvre, the troops were drawn up in the plain beyond the defile with great accuracy and celerity. The heights above the river of Redinha were the next object of British valour: from these the enemy were immediately driven in the most gallant style: the enemy, thus forced from their strong positions, crossed the bridge over the river, and were closely pursued by the British. As soon as they reached the other side, the French again occupied the opposite heights, on which, in anticipation of the necessity of such a manœuvre, they had placed several pieces of cannon. Some time necessarily elapsed before a body of troops sufficiently numerous could cross the river to attack them on these fortified heights. As soon, however, as the 3d division of the British army had crossed, they manœuvred on the enemy's left flank, while the light infantry and cavalry, supported by the light di. vision, drove them upon their main body at Ceudeixa.

This place again afforded them an opportunity of rallying, which the necessity under which Massena was placed of resting and collecting his army obliged him frequent ly to repeat, and which his consum mate skill and experience enabled him to do with great effect. Lord Wellington however did not permit them long to remain at Ceudeixa: by sending the 3d division under general Picton through the mountains upon their left, he dislodged them, and they retreated about a league further

On the 14th of March the 6th and 8th corps of the French army formed in a very strong position near Cazac Nova: this position was naturally so strong, and occupied with so much skill, that no at

tack in front could dislodge them from it. Lord Wellington therefore ordered movements to be made on their flanks, which were completely successful, compelling the enemy to retire from all the posi tions they successively took up in the mountains. In consequence of these operations of the British, Coimbra and Upper Beira were saved from the ravages of the French, and a communication was opened with the northern provinces of Portugal: the enemy were also obliged to change the line of their retreat, and to proceed along the road by Ponte de Marcella, in which the militia under colonel Trant and colonel Wilson annoyed and harassed them excessively.

On the 18th and 19th of March they attempted to make a stand in the Sierra de Moita, but they were driven from that position with the loss of 600 prisoners. On the 21st they were at Galiga,, and the British head quarters were at Algazil on the 20th. The French continued to retreat, cccasionally occupying a strong position, which they were always compelled to abandon as soon as the British army attacked them. On the 28th of March they occupied in force a position on the Guarda, in such a manner and with such appearances of a determination to retain it if possible, that lord Wellingtor thought it proper to collect his army in the neighbourhood of Celerico for the purpose of attacking. He had however scarcely made the requisite arrangement and movements for this purpose, when the enemy left their position on the Guarda without firing a shot; and retired upon Sabugal on the Coa. They kept this river in their front, and presented themselves very strong both in numerical force and