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extent. The wages of labour can never rise very much above the common price in other commercial countries; and under such circumstances England would have nothing to fear from the fullest and most open competition."

Our author thinks (chap. ix. book iii.) that if we were to lower the price of labour by encouraging the import of foreign corn, we should probably aggravate our evils. The decline in our agriculture would be certain. The British grower could not, in his own markets, stand the competition of foreign growers, in average years. Arable lands of a moderate quality would hardly pay the expenses of cultivation. Rich soils alone would yield a rent. Round our towns the appearance would be the same as usual; but in the interior of the country much of the land would be neglected, and almost universally, where it was practicable, pasture would take the place of tillage. This state of things would continue till the equilibrium was restored, either by the fall of British rent and wages, or an advance in foreign corn, or, what is more probable, by the union of both causes. But a period would have elapsed of considerable relative encouragement to manufactures, and relative discouragement to agriculture. A certain portion of capital would be taken from the land, and when the equilibrium was at length restored, the nation would probably be found dependent upon foreign supplies for a great portion of its subsistence: and unless some particular cause were to occasion a foreign demand greater than the home demand, its independence, in this respect, would not be recovered. In the natural course of things, a country which depends for a considerable part of its supply of corn upon its poorer neighbours may expect to see this supply gradually diminish, as those countries increase in riches and population, and have less surplus produce to spare.

This last remark of Malthus has been verified of late years in Europe, for countries from which we used some few years back to receive a considerable amount of our supplies of meat and grain, have now become competitors with us for supplies of these articles from the United States and Australasia. And for other countries his further remark holds true, that the political relations of such a country may expose it, during a war, to have that part of its supply of provisions which it derives from foreign states suddenly stopped or greatly diminished; an event which could not take place without producing the most calamitous effects. "A nation," he continues, "in which agricultural wealth predominates, though it may

not produce at home such a surplus of luxuries and conveniences as the commercial nation, and may therefore be exposed possibly to some want of these commodities, has, on the other hand, a surplus of that article which is essential to the well-being of the whole state, and is therefore secure from want in what is of the greatest importance. And if we cannot be so sure of the supply of what we derive from others, as of what we produce at home, it seems to be an advantageous policy in a nation whose territory will allow of it, to secure a surplus of that commodity, a deficiency of which would strike most deeply at its happiness and prosperity."

Malthus held that there is no branch of trade more profitable to a country, even in a commercial point of view. than the sale of rude produce. And here he seems to have disagreed with Adam Smith's views. That illustrious writer on Wealth observes that a trading and manufacturing country exports what can subsist and accommodate but very few, and imports the subsistence and accommodation of a great number. The other exports the subsistence and accommodation of a great number, and imports that of a very few only. The inhabitants in the one must enjoy, said Adam Smith, a much greater quantity of subsistence than what their own land, in the actual state of cultivation, could afford. The inhabitants of the other must always enjoy a much smaller quantity.

Malthus demurs to much of this argument of Adam Smith. For, says he, "though the manufacturing nation may export a commodity which, in its actual shape, can only subsist and accommodate a very few, yet it must be recollected that in order to prepare this commodity for exportation, a considerable part of the revenue of the country has been employed in subsisting and accommodating a great number of workmen. And with regard to the subsistence and accommodation which the other nation exports, whether it be of a great or a small number, it is certainly no more than sufficient to replace the subsistence that has been consumed in the manufacturing nation, together with the profits of the master manufacturer and merchant, which probably, are not so great as the profits of the farmer and the merchant in the agricultural nation ; and, though it may be true that the inhabitants of the manufacturing nation enjoy a greater quantity of subsistence than what their own lands in the actual state of their cultivation could afford, yet an inference in favour of the manufacturing system by no means follows, because the adoption of the one or the other system will make the greatest difference in their

actual state of cultivation. If, during the course of a century, two landed nations were to pursue these two different systems, that is, if one of them were regularly to export manufacture and import subsistence, and the other to export subsistence and import manufacture, there would be no comparison at the end of the period between the state of cultivation in the two countries; and no doubt could rationally be entertained that the country which exported its raw produce would be able to subsist and accommodate a much larger population than the other.'

It is a matter, says our author, of very little comparative importance, whether we are fully supplied with broadcloth, linens, and muslins, or even with tea, sugar, and coffee, and no rational politician therefore would think of proposing a bounty on such commodities. "But it is certainly a matter of the very highest importance, whether we are fully supplied with food; and if a bounty would produce such a supply, the most liberal economist might be justified in proposing it, considering food as a commodity distinct from all others, and pre-eminently valuable."

CHAPTER XI.

IN

N Chapter X. Mr. Malthus treats of bounties on the expor tation of corn. He sets out by observing that according to the general principles of political economy, it cannot be doubted, that it is for the interest of the civilised world that each nation should purchase its commodities wherever they can be had the cheapest.

"During the seventeenth century, and indeed the whole period of our history previous to it, the prices of wheat were subject to great fluctuations, and the average price was very high. For fifty years before the year 1700, the average price of wheat per quarter was £3 Os. 11d., and before 1650 it was £6 88. 10d. From the time of the completion of the corn laws in 1700 and 1706, the prices became extraordinarily steady, and the average price for forty years previous to the year 1750, sunk as low as £1 16s. per quarter. This was the period of our greatest exportations. In 1757 the laws were suspended, and in 1773 they were totally altered. The exports of corn have since been regularly decreasing, and the imports increasing. The average price of wheat for the forty years ending in 1800, was £2 9s. 5d., and for the last five years of this period £3 68. 6d. During this last term the balance of the imports of all sorts of grain is estimated at 2,938,357."

Mr. Malthus observes that it is totally contrary to the habits and practice of farmers to save the superfluity of six or seven years. Great practical inconvenience generally attends the keeping of so large a reserved store. Difficulties often occur from a want of proper accommodation for it. It is at all times liable to damage from vermin and other causes. When very large it is apt to be viewed with a jealous and grudging eye by the common people. And in general, the farmer may either not be able to remain so long without the returns, or may not be willing to employ so considerable a capital in a way in which the returns must necessarily be distant and precarious.

Mr. Malthus was in favour of a bounty on the exportation of corn, because the effect of such a bounty was to repress slightly the inereuse of population in years of plenty, whilst it on

couraged it comparatively in years of scarcity. This effect, he maintained, was one of the greatest advantages which could possibly occur to a society, and contributed more to the happiness of the labouring poor than could easily be conceived by those who had not deeply considered the subject. "In the whole compass of human events," he says, "I doubt if there be a more fruitful source of misery, or one more invariably productive of disastrous consequences, than a sudden start of population from two or three years of plenty, which must necessarily be repressed on the first return of scarcity, or even of average crops." From 1637 to 1700, both inclusive, the average price of corn, according to Adam Smith, was £2 11s.; yet in 1681 the growing price was only £1 8s. This high average price, according to Malthus, would not proportionally encourage the cultivation of corn, Though the farmer might feel very sanguine during one or two years of high price, and project many improvements, yet the glut in the market which would follow, would depress him in the same degree, and destroy all his projects. Sometimes, indeed, a year of high prices really tends to impoverish the land, and prepare the way for future scarcity.

In a foot-note in page 264, Chapter X., Mr. Malthus makes the remark that, "On account of the tendency of population to increase in proportion to the means of subsistence, it had been supposed by some that there would always be a sufficient demand at home for any quantity of corn which could be grown. But this is an error. It is undoubtedly true that if the farmers could gradually increase their growth of corn to any extent, and could sell it sufficiently cheap, a population would arrive at home to demand the whole of it. But in this case, the great increase of demand arises solely from the cheapness, and must therefore be totally of a different nature from such a demand as, in the actual circumstances of this country, would encourage an increased supply. If the makers of superfine broadcloth would sell their commodity for a shilling a yard, instead of a guinea, it cannot be doubted that the demand would increase more than tenfold, but the certainty of such an increase of demand, in such a case, would have no tendency whatever, in the actual circumstances of any known country, to encourage the manufacture of broad cloths."

In page 267 Mr. Malthus adverts to what has recently been commented upon by a great French statistician, Mr. Maurice Block, viz. the danger of a country becoming too dependent on others for its supplies of food. “A rich and commercial

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