Prooem.) The manual (Enchiridion) and commentaries of Arrian, together with the explanations of Simplicius to the former, and some later paraphrases, have been edited by Schweighauser, who has added the notes of Upton, his own, and those of some other commentators. (Epicteteae Philosophiae Monumenta, post J. Uptoni aliorumque curas, edidit et illustravit J. Schweighauser, Lipsiae, 1799, 1800, 6 vols. 8vo.)

We may apply to Epictetus himself what he says of his Stoic master, viz. that he spoke so impressively, and so plainly described the wickedness of the individual, that every one felt struck, as though he himself had been spoken to personally. (Dissert. iii. 23, 29, comp. c. 15, i. 9.) Being deeply impressed with his vocation as a teacher, he aimed in his discourses at nothing else but winning the minds of his hearers to that which was good, and no one was able to resist the impression which they produced. (Arrian, Ep. ad L. Gell. i. P. 4.)

Far from any contempt of knowledge, he knows how to value the theory of forming conclusions and the like. (Dissert. i. 7, 1, &c., comp. i. 8, 1, &c., i. 17, ii. 23, 25.) He only desired that logical exercises, the study of books and of eloquence, should not lead persons away from that of which they were merely the means, and that they should not minister to pride, haughtiness, and avarice. (i. 8. 6, &c., 29. 55, ii. 4. 11, 9. 17, 16. 34, 17. 34, 21. 20, iii. 2. 23, 17. 28, 24. 78.) He never devotes any time to disquisitions which do not, either directly or indirectly, contribute towards awakening, animating, and purifying man's moral conduct. (i. 17. 15, 29. 58, ii. 19. 10; comp. iv. 8. 24, 6. 24.)

The true Cynic-and he is the same as the Stoic, the philosopher,-is in the opinion of Epictetus a messenger of Zeus, sent to men to deliver them from their erroneous notions about good and evil, and about happiness and unhappiness (iii. 22. 23), and to lead them back into themselves. (ib. 39.) For this purpose he requires natural gracefulness and acuteness of intellect (ib. 90), for his words are to produce a lively impression.

The beginning of philosophy, according to him, is the perception of one's own weakness and of one's inability to do that which is needful. (ii. 11. 1; comp. iii. 23. 34, ii. 17. 1.) Along with this perception we become aware of the contest which is going on among men, and we grow anxious to ascertain the cause of it, and consequently to discover a standard by which we may give our decision (ii. 11. 13, &c.): to meditate upon this and to dwell upon it, is called philosophizing. (ib. 24; comp. iii. 10. 6.) The things which are to be measured are conceptions, which form the material; the work which is to be constructed out of them, is their just and natural application, and a control over them. (iii. 22. 20, 23. 42.) This just choice of conceptions and our consent to or decision in their favour (роаíρEσis, σvукатábeσis), constitute the nature of good. (ii. 1. 4, 19. 32.) Only that which is subject to our choice or decision is good or evil; all the rest is neither good nor evil; it concerns us not, it is beyond our reach (i. 13. 9, 25. 1, ii. 5. 4); it is something external, merely a subject for our choice (i. 29. 1, ii. 16. 1, 19. 32, iv. 10. 26): in itself it is indifferent, but its application is not indifferent (ii. 5. 1, 6. 1), and its application is either consistent with or contrary to nature. (ii. 5. 24.) The choice, and consequently

our opinion upon it, are in our power (i. 12. 37) in our choice we are free (i. 12. 9, 17. 28, 19. 9); nothing that is external of us, not even Zeus, can overcome our choice: it alone can control itself. (i. 29. 12, ii. 1. 22, iv. 1, ii. 2. 3, iii. 3. 10, i. I. 23, iv. 1. 69.) Our choice, however, is determined by our reason, which of all our faculties sees and tests itself and everything else. (i. 1. 4, i. 20. Reason is our guide (Tò nμovikóv), and capable of conquering all powers which are not subject to freedom (ii. 1. 39; comp. iii. 3); it is the governing power given to man (To Kupielov, i. 1.7, 17. 21); hence only that which is irrational cannot be endured by it. (i. 2.) It is by his reason alone that man is distinguished from the brute (ii. 9. 2, iii. 1. 25): he who renounces his reason and allows himself to be guided by external things, is like a man who has forgotten his own face (i. 2. 14); and he who desires or repudiates that which is beyond his power, is not free. (i. 4. 19.)

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That which is in accordance with reason coincides with that which is in accordance with nature and pleasing to God. (i. 12. 9, 26. 2, iii. 20. 13, ii. 10. 4, i. 12. 8.) Our resemblance to God (i 12. 27), or our relationship to the Deity (i. 9. 1, (i 11), and the coincidence of our own will with the will of God (ii. 17. 22, comp. 19. 26, iii. 24. 95, iv. 1, 89. 103, 4. 39), consist in our acting in accordance with reason and in freedom. Through reason our souls are as closely connected and mixed up with the Deity, as though they were parts of him (i. 14. 6, ii. 8. 11, 13, 17. 33); for mind, knowledge, and reason, constitute the essence of God, and are identical with the essence of good. (ii.8. 1, &c.) Let us therefore invoke God's assistance in our strife after the good (ii. 18. 29, comp. i. 6. 21), let us emulate him (ii. 14. 13), let us purify that which is our guide within us (iii. 22. 19), and let us be pure with the pure within us, and with the Deity! (ii. 18. 19.)

The prophet within us, who announces to us the nature of good and evil (ii. 7. 2), is the daemon, the divine part of every one, his never-resting and incorruptible guardian. (i. 14. 12.) He manifests himself in our opinions, which have something common with one another and are agreeing with one another (i. 22. 1); for they are the things which are self-evident, and which we feel obliged to carry into action, though we may combat them. (ii. 20. 1.) That which is good we must recognize as such a thing: wherever it appears, it draws us towards itself, and it is impossible to reject the conception of good. (iii. 3. 4, comp. i. 4. 1.) The opinions just described are the helps which nature has given to every one for discovering that which is true. (iv. 1. 51.) Wherever they are not recog nized, as is the case with the followers of the New Academy, our mind and modesty become petrified. (i. 5. 3.) To investigate this criticism of what is in accordance with nature, and to master it in its application to individual things, is the object of all our scientific endeavours (i. 11. 15), and ths mastery is obtained only by the cultiva tion of our mind and by education. (Taidela; i. 2. 6, 22. 9, ii. 17. 7.) The practice in theory is the easier part; the application in life is the more dif ficult one, and is the object of all theory. (i. 26. 3, 29. 35.) We find that as far as practical application is concerned, many men are Epicureans and effeminate Peripatetics, though they profess the doctrines of the Stoics and Cynics. (ii. 19. 20, 12

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disappeared, and philosophers endeavoured to establish an internal freedom based upon ethical principles, and to maintain it in spite of outward oppression, no less than to secure it against man's own passions and evil propensities. Perfect independence, self reliance, and contentment, therefore, were regarded as the highest good and as the qualities which alone could make men happy, and as human happiness was with Epicurus the ultimate end of all philosophy, it was necessary for him to make ethics the most essential part, and as it were the centre of his whole philosophy. He had little esteem for logic and dialectics, but as he could not altogether do without them, he prefixed to his ethics a canon, or an introduction to ascertain the criterium which was to guide him in his search after truth and in distinguishing good from evil. His criteria themselves were derived from sensuous perception combined with thought and reflection. We obtain our knowledge and form our conceptions of things, according to him, through eldwλa, i. e. images of things which are reflected from them, and pass through our senses into our minds. Such a theory is destructive of all absolute truth, and a mere momentary impression upon our senses or feelings is substituted for it. His ethical theory was based upon the dogma of the Cyrenaics, that pleasure constitutes the highest happiness, and must consequently be the end of all human exertions. Epicurus, however, developed and ennobled this theory in a manner which constitutes the peculiarity and real merit of his philosophy, and which gained for him so many friends and admirers both in antiquity and in modern times. Pleasure with him was not a mere momentary and transitory sensation, but he conceived it as something lasting and imperishable, consisting in pure and noble mental enjoyments, that is, in drapağía and drovía, or the freedom from pain and from all influences which disturb the peace of our mind, and thereby our happiness, which is the result of it. The summum bonum, according to him, consisted in this peace of mind; and the great problem of his ethics, therefore, was to shew how it was to be attained, and ethics was not only the principal branch of philosophy, but philosophy itself, and the value and importance of all other kinds of knowledge were estimated by the proportion in which they contributed towards that great object of human life, or in which they were connected with ethics. His peace of mind was based upon opóvnois, which he described as the beginning of everything good, as the origin of all virtues, and which he himself therefore occasionally treated as the highest good itself.

In the physical part of his philosophy, he followed the atomistic doctrines of Democritus and Diagoras. His views are well known from Lucretius's poem De Rerum Natura. It would, however, appear that sometimes he misunderstood the views of his predecessors, and distorted them by introducing things which were quite foreign to them; sometimes he appears even in contradiction with himself. The deficiencies are most striking in his views concerning the gods, which drew upon him the charge of atheism. His gods, like everything else, consisted of atoms, and our notions of them are based upon the etowλa which are reflected from them and pass into our minds. They were and always had been in the enjoyment of perfect happiness, which had not been disturbed by the

laborious business of creating the world; and as the government of the world would interfere with their happiness, he conceived the gods as exercising no influence whatever upon the world or man.

The number of pupils of Epicurus who propagated his doctrines, was extremely great; but his philosophy received no further development at their hands, except perhaps that in subsequent times his lofty notion of pleasure and happiness was reduced to that of material and sensual pleasure. His immediate disciples adopted and followed his doctrines with the most scrupulous conscientiousness they were attached and devoted to their master in a manner which has rarely been equalled either in ancient or modern times: their esteem, love, and veneration for him almost bordered upon worship; they are said to have committed his works to memory; they had his portrait engraved upon rings and drinking vessels, and celebrated his birthday every year. Athens honoured him with bronze statues. But notwithstanding the extraordinary devotion of his pupils and friends, whose number, says Diogenes, exceeded that of the population of whole towns, there is no philosopher in antiquity who has been so violently attacked, and whose ethical doctrines have been so much mistaken and misunderstood, as Epicurus. The cause of this singular phaenomenon was partly a superficial knowledge of his philosophy, of which Cicero, for example, is guilty to a very great extent, and partly also the conduct of men who called themselves Epicureans, and, taking advantage of the facility with which his ethical theory was made the handmaid of a sensual and debauched life, gave themselves up to the enjoyment of sensual pleasures. At Rome, and during the time of Roman ascendancy in the ancient world, the philosophy of Epicurus never took any firm root; and it is then and there that, owing to the paramount influence of the Stoic philosophy, we meet with the bitterest antagonists of Epicurus. The disputes for and against his philosophy, however, are not confined to antiquity; they were renewed at the time of the revival of letters, and are continued to the present day. The number of works that have been written upon Epicurus and his philosophy is prodigious (Fabric. Bibl. Graec. vol. iii. p. 584, &c.); we pass over the many histories of Greek philosophy, and mention only the most important works of which Epicurus is the special subject. Peter Gassendi, de Vita et Moribus Epicuri_commentarius libris octo constans, Lugdun. 1647, and Hag. Comit. 1656, 4to.; Gassendi, Syntagma Philosophiae Epicuri, Hag. Comit. 1659, 4to., London, 1668, 12mo., Amsterdam, 1684; J. Rondel, La Vie d'Epicure, Paris, 1679, 12mo., La Haye, 1686, 12mo.; a Latin translation of this work appeared at Amsterdam, 1693, 12mo., and an English one by Digby, London, 1712, 8vo.; Batteux, La Morale d'Epicure, Paris, 1758, 8vo.; Bremer, Versuch einer Apologie des Epicur, Berlin, 1776, 8vo.; Warnekros, Apologie und Leben Epicurs, Greifswald, 1795, 8vo.; and especially Steinhart in Ersch u. Gruber, Allgem. Encyclop. vol. xxxv. p. 459, &c.

Diogenes Laërtius (x. 26) mentions three other persons of the name of Epicurus, and Menage on that passage points out three more; but all of them are persons concerning whom nothing is known. [L. S.]

EPICY'DES ('Eπikúdns). 1. A Syracusan by D 2

origin, but born and educated at Carthage, and the son of a Carthaginian mother, his grandfather having been banished by Agathocles, and having settled at Carthage. (Polyb. vii. 2; Liv. xxiv. 6.) He served, together with his elder brother Hippocrates, with much distinction in the army of Hannibal, both in Spain and Italy; and when, after the battle of Cannae, Hieronymus of Syracuse sent to make overtures to Hannibal, that general selected the two brothers as his envoys to Syracuse. They soon gained over the wavering mind of the young king, and induced him to desert the Roman alliance. (Polyb. vii. 2-5; Liv. xxiv. 6—7.) But the murder of Hieronymus shortly after, and the revolution that ensued at Syracuse, for a time deranged their plans: they at first demanded merely a safe-conduct to return to Hannibal, but soon found that they could do more good by their intrigues at Syracuse, where they even succeeded in procuring their election as generals, in the place of Andranodorus and Themistus. But the Roman party again obtained the upper hand; and Hippocrates having been sent with a force to Leontini, Epicydes joined him there, and they set at defiance the Syracusan government. Leontini was, indeed, quickly reduced by Marcellus, but his cruelties there alienated the Syracusans, and still more the foreign mercenaries in their service; a disposition of which Hippocrates and Epicydes (who had made their escape to Erbessus) ably availed themselves, induced the troops sent against them to mutiny, and returned at their head to Syracuse, of which they made themselves masters with little difficulty, B. C. 214. (Liv. xxiv. 21—32.) Marcellus immediately proceeded to besiege Syracuse, the defence of which was conducted with ability and vigour by the two brothers, who had been again appointed generals. When the Roman commander found himself obliged to turn the siege into a blockade, Epicydes continued to hold the city itself, while Hippocrates conducted the operations in other parts of Sicily. The former was, however, unable to prevent the surprise of the Epipolae, which were betrayed into the hands of Marcellus; but he still exerted his utmost efforts against the Romans, and co-operated zealously with the army from without under Himilco and Hippocrates. After the defeat of the latter he went in person to meet Bomilcar, who was advancing with a Carthaginian fleet to the relief of the city, and hasten his arrival; but, after the retreat of Bomilcar, he seems to have regarded the fall of Syracuse as inevitable, and withdrew to Agrigentum. (Liv. xxiv. 33-39, xxv. 23-27.) Here he appears to have remained and co-operated with the Numidian Mutines, until the capture of Agrigentum (B. C. 210) obliged him to fly with Hanno to Carthage, after which his name is not again mentioned. (Liv. xxvi. 40.)

2. A Syracusan, surnamed Sindon, one of the lieutenants of the preceding, who were left by him in command of Syracuse when he retired to Agrigentum he was put to death by the Roman party, together with his colleagues. (Liv. xxv. 28.)

3. Of Olynthus, a general under Ophellas of Cyrene, who took Thimbron prisoner at Teuchira. (Arr. ap. Phot. p. 70, a.) [E. H. B.] EPIDAURUS ('Emídavpos), the mythical founder of Epidaurus, a son of Argos and Evadne, but according to Argive legends a son of Pelops, and

according to those of Elis a son of Apollo. (Apol lod. ii. 1. § 2; Paus. ii. 26. § 3.) [L. S.] EPI'DIUS, a Latin rhetorician who taught the art of oratory towards the close of the republic, numbering M. Antonius and Octavianus among his scholars. His skill, however, was not sufficient to save him from a conviction for malicious accusation (calumnia). We are told that he claimed descent from Epidius Nuncionus (the name is probably corrupt), a rural deity, who appears to have been worshipped upon the banks of the Sarnus. (Sueton. de Clar. Rhet. 4.) [W. R.]

C. EPI'DIUS MARULLUS. [MARULLUS.] EPIDO'TES ('Emidwτns), a divinity who was worshipped at Lacedaemon, and averted the anger of Zeus Hicesius for the crime committed by Pausanias. (Paus. iii. 17. 8.) Epidotes, which means the "liberal giver," occurs also as a surname of other divinities, such as Zeus at Mantineia and Sparta (Paus. viii. 9. § 1; Hesych. s. v.), of the god of sleep at Sicyon, who had a statue in the temple of Asclepius there, which represented him in the act of sending a lion to sleep (Paus. ii. 10. § 3), and lastly of the beneficent gods, to whom Antoninus built a sanctuary at Epidaurus. (Paus. ii. 27. § 7.) [L. S.]

EPI'GENES ('Emiyévns), son of Antiphon, of the demus of Cephisia, is mentioned by Plato among the disciples of Socrates who were with him in his last moments. Xenophon represents Socrates as remonstrating with him on his neglect of the bodily exercises requisite for health and strength. (Plat. Apol. p. 33, Phaed. p. 59; Xen. Mem. iii. 12.) [E. E.]

EPIGENES ('Eπiyévns). 1. An Athenian poet of the middle comedy. Pollux indeed (vii. 29) speaks of him as véwv TIS KWμιkŵv, but the terms "middle" and "new," as Clinton remarks (F. H. vol. ii. p. xlix.), are not always very carefully applied. (See Arist. Eth. Nic. iv. 8. § 6.) Epigene himself, in a fragment of his play called Mvnuáriov (ap. Ath. xi. p. 472, f.) speaks of Pixodarus, prince of Caria, as "the king's son"; and from this Meineke argues (Hist. Crit. Com. Graec. p. 354), that the comedy in question must have been written while Hecatomnus, the father of Pixodarus, was yet alive, and perhaps about B. C. 380. We find besides in Athenaeus (ix. p. 409, d.), that there was a doubt among the ancients whether the play called 'Apyvplov apavioμós should be assigned to Epigenes or Antiphanes. These poets therefore must have been contemporaries. [See vol. i. p. 204, b.] The fragments of the comedies of Epigenes have been collected by Meineke (vol. iii. p. 537 ; comp. Poll. vii. 29; Ath. iii. p. 75, c., ix. p. 384, a., xi. pp. 469, c., 474, a., 480, a., 486, c., 502, e.).

2. Of Sicyon, who has been confounded by some with his namesake the comic poet, is mentioned by Suidas (s. v. Θέσπις) as the most ancient writer of tragedy. By the word " tragedy" here we can understand only the old dithyrambic and satyrical paywola, into which it is possible that Epigenes may have been the first to introduce other subjects than the original one of the fortunes of Dionysus, if at least we may trust the account which we find in Apostolius, Photius, and Suidas, of the origin of the proverb oddèv πpòs tòv Ai6νυσον. This would clearly be one of the earliest steps in the gradual transformation of the old dithyrambic performance into the dramatic tragedy of later times, and may tend to justify the state