order to facilitate the reader's further inquiries, I shall proceed to lay before him a brief discussion of these questions, which seem to be involved in the statutes I have referred to in this chapter. They are,

1. Whether indiscriminate relief be consistent with the virtue of charity.

2. Whether every human being, in need of support, can be found with sustenance.

3. Whether labour can be found for all who apply for it.

4. How far the virtue of charity, and the finding of work for all, are fit subjects of legislation.

CHAPTER III.

On the Principles of the Poor Laws.

SECTION I.

INDISCRIMINATE RELIEF NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY.

THE first position to be discussed is, whether

"indiscriminate relief be consistent with the virtue of charity?" And as some of the popular errors, which are entertained concerning this virtue, proceed from a want of understanding the precise use of the terms employed,—the most fruitful source of controversy, I shall first point out the various ways in which the word Charity is used. In its primary meaning it signifies love in general; but it is most commonly used in our language to express love to our species. In a more limited sense it is sometimes intended to imply giving of alms, and doing good to inferiors; sometimes to express a disposition to entertain favourable sentiments of others, until the strongest evidence produce a contrary conviction; and at other times it is opposed to a censorious and contracted mode of thinking in religious matters. Many persons are in the

habit of confounding the word in the two first senses; and when they speak of charity in a restricted sense, they mean the virtue in its largest and noblest extent, and the contrary. In order to avoid this misapprehension and loose application, I shall use the term Benevolence to express the principle of good-will towards our fellow-creatures, or charity, as expressive of love to our species: and though this includes not only the affection which is excited by the suffering, but also by the goodfortune of others; yet it is with the former of these branches that we have more immediately to do.

Benevolence, then, as it regards man, may be considered in two views. It may signify either the principle, or that intuitive or instinctive impulse which excites in us sympathy towards the distressed, and a desire to relieve and communicate happiness; or, it may signify the exercise of the principle in the actual communication of happiness. This, in order to distinguish it from the former, has been frequently called Beneficence.

The principle, or the disposition to communicate happiness, in a well regulated mind will be universal. It can hear of no distress, however distant, and however unconnected with self, but it must wish to relieve it. In some urgent cases, as where life is suddenly in danger, it rises into a passion which overcomes every selfish feeling in others,

it manifests itself in what we mean by mercy, pity, compassion, commiseration, &c.: but these words express only the different modifications of the affection, according to the nature and degree of the suffering which excites it-the character of the object, the permanency of his distress,—his reputation and situation in life,—and other exigences which more or less interest our feelings, and which have introduced a correspondent phraseology into our language.

There are various ways also in which this benign principle is exercised for the benefit of our fellowcreatures; though our language does not afford us many terms which express the different species of action, those implying the disposition being frequently used in their stead. Bounty is employed to signify the liberal communication of some substantial good; Condolence is the expression of our commiseration; and Almsgiving is the bestowment of pecuniary or sumptuary relief on the poor. The principle remains the same, but the actions flowing from it may be modified in various ways, suited to the particular case of the object. Mercy is displayed by forgiving offences and pardoning the guilty. Where a Sympathy is excited for the loss of friends, it manifests itself by our participating in their sorrow, and we apply the language of condolence. The poor and needy appeal to us, and

we give them alms. The vicious claim our regard in another way; and we aim at correcting their morals, eradicating bad principles and implanting good ones. It is evident, then, that for an action to be benevolent, it must be appropriate to the wants of the object. Who would attempt to mitigate the distress of a husband, just bereaved of a beloved wife, by any other beneficence than the tenderest expressions of sympathy? and would it not be altogether irrational to give pecuniary bounty to the criminal under the sentence of the law? or to the vicious man, who would certainly employ it in the repetition of his vices? Thus, though the disposition to benevolence forms a part of our nature, and is necessary to us, the exercise of it (that is, every action proceeding from this disposition) should be under the direction of our reason, and should tend to increase the happiness of its object. Upon the truth of this depends the negative or affirmative of the position stated at the commencement of this chapter.

Now, if almsgiving be an absolute duty without regard to character, then there is no need of the employment of the judgement or the exercise of reason; but the act must be performed as necessarily as the disposition is felt: and I cannot discover in this view, why we should not as well attempt the cure of all misery, moral and natural,