more inftances to thofe already cited, of the doubtfulness and obfcurity of hiftorical fame. There is fcarcely any controverfy that has been agitated within the last twenty years, which has been diftinguifhed by more fierceness of affertion, than that refpecting Mary Queen of Scots and the English Elizabeth. If I ask the two first inquifitive perfons I meet, what is become of this controverfy? they will each of them tell me, that the queftion is completely decided, but one will affirm that the iffue is in favour of Mary, and the other of Elizabeth. How fhall I determine between their oppofite affertions? A few incidental points have been cleared, but the main queftion is where it was. Was Mary acceffory to the murder of her hufband? After his death, is the to be regarded as a chafte and noble-minded woman in the hands of an audacious free-booter (Bothwel), or muft fhe be confidered as an abandoned flave to the groffeft paffions, and claffed with the Meffalinas and the Julias? Was Elizabeth incited to confent to her death, from low motives of rivalship and jealoufy, or because fhe conceived the public fafety would allow no longer delay? Was her reluctance to confent real, or only a well concerted fiction? Was the a party to the exe crable prefumption to foretel, that, unless the improvement of the human fpecies fhall prove rapid beyond all former example, the fame difpute about the character of Johnfon will remain a century hence, and the pofterity will be still unborn that are to pafs an unanimous verdict upon his merits. ESSAY ESSAY IX. OF DIFFERENCE IN OPINION. SECT. I. ONE of the best practical rules of morality that ever was delivered, is that of putting ourfelves in the place of another, before we act or decide any thing refpecting him. It is by this means only that we can form an adequate idea of his pleafures and pains. The nature of a being, the firft principle of whofe exiftence is fenfation, neceffarily obliges us to refer every thing to ourselves; and, but for the practice here recommended, we fhould be in danger of looking upon the concerns of others with inadvertence, confequently with indiffer ence. Nor is this voluntary tranfmigration lefs neceffary, to enable us to do juftice to other men's motives and opinions, than to their feelings. We obferve one mode of conduct to be that which, under certain given circumstances, as prefumption to foretel, that, unless the improvement of the human fpecies fhall prove rapid beyond all former example, the fame difpute about the character of Johnson will remain a century hence, and the pofterity will be still unborn that are to pass an unanimous verdict upon his merits. ESSAY ESSAY IX. OF DIFFERENCE IN OPINION. SECT. I. ONE of the best practical rules of morality that ever was delivered, is that of putting ourfelves in the place of another, before we act or decide any thing refpecting him. It is by this means only that we can form an adequate idea of his pleafures and pains. The nature of a being, the first principle of whofe exiftence is fenfation, neceffarily obliges us to refer every thing to ourfelves; and, but for the practice here recommended, we should be in danger of looking upon the concerns of others with inadvertence, confequently with indiffer ence. Nor is this voluntary tranfmigration lefs neceffary, to enable us to do juflice to other men's motives and opinions, than to their feelings. We obferve one mode of conduct to be that which, under certain given circumstances, as |