ment before us is intended to shorten the method of calculation delivered in that Treatife, and accordingly confifts of tables computed for that purpofe; by which the labour attending thefe operations is greatly lef ferred, and the artift is in much less danger of committing errors in performing his calculations.

Art. 33. Cantabrigia Depicta: A concife and accurate Defcription of the University and Town of Cambridge, and its Environs. A particular Hiftory of the feveral Colleges and public Buildings, their Founders and Benefactors; with an Account of the confider able Improvements which have been lately made throughout the Uni verfity: Many correct Lifts of the University Officers, &c. An invariable Rule for the Beginnings and Endings of the Cambridge Terms; and other useful Notes relative to the Univerfity. To which is added, an exact Account of the feveral Pofts, Coaches, Flys, Stage-Waggons, and other Carriers. Illuftrated with feve ral neat Views of public Buildings, and a very accurate Plan of the University and Town. 12mo. 2s. Dod, &c.

The title gives a fufficient account of this article.

Art. 34. Propofitiones Geometrica, more veterum demonftratæ, ad geometriam antiquam illuftrandam et promovendam idonea. Autore MATTHEO STEWART, S. T. D. in academiæ EDINENSI Mathefeos Profeffore. 8vo. 5 s. boards. Millar.

This work is divided into two books: the first contains fixty propofitions, and the fecond fifty-two; all elegantly demonftrated, and that ftrictly in the manner of the ancients. The Author fupposes that the reader, before he attempts to perufe this performance, is acquainted with the first fix books of Euclid; and we will venture to add, that a student thus qualified, will not regret the time and attention he may employ upon this treatife.

LAW.

Art. 35. The Statutes at Large. Vol. V. By Owen Ruffhead, Efq; 4to. 12 s. 6 d. in sheets, to Subscribers. To nonfubfcribers, 15 s. Bafket, Woodfall, and Strahan, Lawprinters to his Majefty.

Of the First Volume of this valuable edition, we gave an account, in the Review for January 1763, p. 61, &c. We have only now to add, that, in the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th volumes, the accurate and judicious Editor fully answers the expectations we had formed, from the fpecimen given in the first volume, of his abilities for this great undertaking; and that the work is, in the prefent volume, continued from the hift year of Geo. I. to the third of Geo. II. to which is prefixed, as in each publication, a Table of the Titles of all the public and private Statutes, during that time.

The Sermons in our next.

ages. But unhappily for mankind, the arts, not of peace, but of war; not of populating, but of depopulating and destroying, were held in the highest efteem, and engroffed too much public attention and applaufe. This was, and always will be, the effect of ignorance, ferocity, and barbarity: as hath been verified, not only in the times of ancient Heroifin, but of (what was much alike) modern Chivalry. An ignorant people are most apt to wonder, and a favage people to admire, nothing fo much as exploits of military fury, ftrength, and intrepidity. Hence ancient and modern Romances (and fome writings called Hiftories deferve no better name) were calculated to work upon this paffion. Homer's Iliad was moft excellently adapted to fill the minds of his countrymen with wonder and amazement, at the fuperior ftrength, fiercenefs, and valour of their ancestors. But whatever reputation fuch works may have obtained in the world, or how entertaining foever they may naturally be to the human imagination; yet if the value is to be computed by truth and utility, and not by fiction and ornament, we cannot but think this work of Mr. Anderfon's, entitled to an equal, if not a fuperior place in the esteem of mankind.

It must give pain to every person who has a juft fenfe of humanity, when he confiders how much the operations of war have engaged the public attention, and employed the pens of the greatest Geniufes in all ages, while the arts of peace have fcarcely been thought to deferve mentioning, either in poetry or hif tory. But we may fafely aver, that the latter alone have contributed to the cultivation of human life, and the real benefit of mankind: that ali military exploits, how famous foever, are deftructive of the fpecies, and the more advantageous they are to one country, the more ruinous to another. We fhall here affert, (as it may ferve to fhew the importance of the arts of peace, and confequently of our Author's work) what may be thought by fome Readers a paradox, viz. That it is very poffible, and has often been experienced, that one nation may gain greater advantages over another by a treaty of commerce, than by a series of victories. To make this evident, let us fuppofe, that by one or more victories Great Britain destroys 200,000 Frenchmen, with the lofs of 100,000 of its own fubjects (which is a more fuccefsful war than even our late one) the power of France compared to that of Great Britain would be diminished in the proportion of 2 to 1. But if the 200,000 Frenchmen were tranfplanted into England, and fettled there, the power of Britain would be increafed in the fame proportion as that of France would be diminished, i. e. 4 to 1. Or if by any other means the number and industry of people be diminished in the latter, and increased in the former, the advantage is greater and

more

more permanent than that of a victory; unless that fingle victory produces (as is feldom the cafe between great Powers) an advantageous treaty. And we will venture to affert also, that France has contributed more to her own declenfion, by expell ing her induftrious proteftant fubjects, than by all the defeats fhe fuftained from the victorious Duke of Marlborough.

The rife and profperity of the republics of Pifa, Genoa, and Venice, and, in later times, of the Dutch republic, who all attained to their grandeur and profperity, not by extent of territory, but by Commerce alone, has, in a great measure, opened the eyes of almost all the Courts in Europe, and convinced them, that the largest extent of fertile territory, the wifeft counfels, and the best military difcipline, may not produce fo much national strength as may be produced by manufactures and commerce within the compass of a very small or barren territory. The Greeks in ancient times arose to their power and profperity, and gained the admiration of all other nations, by their activity and induftry in the arts of peace, as well as thofe of war and had the councils and military difcipline of Sparta been added to the commercial ftrength of Athens, i. e. if the power and policy of these two States had been united, Greece (efpecially if Greece had been an ifland like Great Britain) would have become invincible-the Macedonian empire could never have arifen, and the Romans would have been effectually stopped in the progress of their arms.

The commercial intereft and military power of a nation are not only compatible, but may, and will, be united by every wife State, in proportion to the means it poffeffes, and will be made fubfervient to each other. The one is acquiring ftrength, the other is exerting it. Strength is useless, be it ever fo great, in case of war, without skill to exert it; nay, improperly exerted may destroy itself. On the other hand, military skill is ufelefs, or foon spent, without national refources in wealth and number of people. A very large territory will maintain but a fmall number of people without the arts of agriculture and ma nufacture. But with thofe arts, especially when carried to perfection, a vast number of people may fubfift upon a small territory. Confequently it is induftry that makes a country populous, and fupplies the Government both with men and money. But, as a fmall State may poffibly overcome a great one, by mere dint of fuperior policy, military skill and difcipline, courage and expedition; therefore it is neceffary for a Government that has even the greatest resources in wealth and number of people, to be always in fuch a pofture as to be able to call forth and employ its ftrength, in the most expeditious and effectual manner against an enemy.

G 2

Now

Now, as Great Britain has the inestimable advantage of being an island, united within itself; as it can be invaded only by fea, and as its naval ftrength is its grand fecurity; fo the increase of its commerce conduces directly, not only to the increase and wealth of its people, but to the augmentation of its naval strength, and even to the more expeditious and effectual exertion of that ftrength. For Mariners are trained up and qualified by navigation for defence of the kingdom at fea, and acquire fuch fkill, courage, and activity, that they may be transformed in an inftant from commercial to military men. Hence it is, and ever muft be, the true policy of the British Government, to fupport and extend its commerce, in order to acquire fuperior ftrength in making war; and to make war, in order to protect and still farther extend its commerce.

But in order to fupport an extenfive and advantageous navigation and commerce, it is neceffary that we have a large fuperfluity, either of the products of our foil or manufactures, to be exported, and which can find purchasers abroad, to be paid for either in coin, bullion, or other commodities, fuch as our own people can and will make ufe of. The planting of colonies therefore (which will always have a political dependence on, and commercial connection with, the inother country, fituated in fuch parts of the world as fhall enable them to produce the greatcft quantity of fuch commodities (efpecially the most valuable) as we want, or are willing to confume, and which we cannot produce at home, at leaft not fo cheap, or in fufficient plenty, by which commodities thefe colonies fhall be enabled to pay for the greatest quantities of British exports,) is the fureft foundation of a large and growing commerce. For every other commerce muft of neceffity be in fome measure dependent upon the power, policy, and difpofition of foreign States, who may refufe to enter into fuch treaties of commerce with us, as will be advantageous to Britain; or may break them as foon as concluded. Some fmall fhare of commerce may, indeed, be preferved by fmuggling our goods into thofe countries where they are moft ftrictly prohibited. But fuch an illicit commerce muit be confined and precarious; and other nations will have equal advantage in running their goods upon our coafts; cfpecially while fo many of our own people are fo able and willing to do it for them. It is farther neceflary to the wealth, and confequently the power, of Great Britain, that the value of our exports fhould exceed that of our imports, in order to draw bullion and fpecie from abroad, and to produce a greater plenty, and quicker circulation, of money at home: by which intereft of money is reduced (a thing of great importance to trade) and the Government is enabled to raife more money to answer the expences