officers killed and wounded, we are constrained to do the same. One ship, the Warrior, escaped with entire impunity; and the Hero, Agamemnon, Repulse, Raisonable, Glory, and Dragon, lost between them but three men killed and 14 wounded; nor were the Dragon's four men wounded by the enemy's shot, but by an accidental explosion. No ship had a mast shot away but the Windsor-Castle and Agamemnon, nor a yard except the Ajax.* The loss on board the two prizes was stated to consist of about 600 in killed and wounded; but a careful comparison of the number of wounded and unwounded prisoners, with the number of men deposed to have been on board each ship at the commencement of the action, has reduced the number considerably. In this amended state, the gross loss sustained by the combined fleet amounts to 476 officers and men killed and wounded. With respect to damages, the French and Spanish ships did not exhibit many marks in their masts and rigging; but some of them, undoubtedly, were much hit in the hull. One ship, we believe the Atlas, had the head of her bowsprit shot away; another, her fore yard and fore topgallantmast; and a third, a topsailyard. Had a court-martial on the French, as was the case with the British, commander-in-chief, called for a specific statement of each ship's damage, every wounded topgallantmast and spritsail-yard, every cut rope and shot-graze, would have been formally set forth; and then, and then only, would a fair opportunity have been afforded, of comparing the relative damage on board the two fleets. It was extremely natural for the French writers to make the most of the minute statement of damages published along with the proceedings of the court-martial which sat upon Sir Robert Calder; but they evinced very little candour, when they confronted the whole loss on the British side with a part only of the loss on their side, and then drew from it the inference that their fleet had suffered the least in the action. To have acted impartially, they should have struck out of the British returns the two ships that had sustained the heaviest loss, as a set-off against the two prizes, whose united loss, although the French were unable to enumerate it, they knew amounted to much more than that of any other two, or any four ships in the combined fleet. This would have made the numbers stand thus: British loss in killed and wounded, except of Windsor-Castle and Malta, 108; Franco-Spanish loss in killed and wounded, except of San-Rafaël and Firme, 171. But, if we add the loss of the two omitted ships on each side, as given (with respect to the Spanish ships for the first time) in the preceding page, the relative quantum of loss will be more than two to one in favour of the British. Daybreak on the 23d found the two fleets about 17 miles * See Appendix, No. 1. + See Appendix, No. 2. apart, reckoning from their respective centres; but, owing to the hazy state of the morning, neither fleet had of the other more than a partial view. The ships of each were lying to, or making very little way, with the wind as on the preceding day, a moderate breeze from north-west by west. The British fleet had just come to the wind on the larboard tack, but the combined fleet still remained on the starboard. The British advanced squadron, consisting of the Barfleur, Hero, Triumph, and Agamemnon, lay about five miles to windward of the main body; and, at the distance of about six miles to windward of the former, lay M. Villeneuve's advanced squadron, consisting also of four sail of the line, besides a few frigates. To windward of these again, at the distance of other five or six miles, lay the body of the Franco-Spanish fleet. To leeward of the British main body, about five miles, lay the crippled WindsorCastle, with the Dragon approaching to take her in tow; and still further to leeward, at about an equal distance, lay the Malta, Thunderer, two frigates, and prizes, all of whom were out of sight of the admiral. At 6 h. 30 m. A. M. the Prince-of-Wales, and the ships with her, filled their main topsails; and at 8 A. M. the van-division, by signal, bore up to close the former, which had then wore, and, under their topsails were running to leeward, to join the prizes and the ships with them. At 9 A. M., having concentrated his fleet, the British admiral hauled up on the larboard tack, and steered about north-east; keeping between the FrancoSpanish fleet and his three disabled ships. Of these the Windsor-Castle was in tow by the Dragon, the Firme, by the Sirius, and the San-Rafaël, at present by the Egyptienne, who had recently taken charge of her from the Malta. No sooner had the weathermost British ship bore up to join the prizes, than, imagining that the former, although under topsails only, were flying in disorder, "fuyant en désordre," the French admiral went with his staff on board the Hortense frigate, and calling to him all the other frigates, except the Didon, which latter had been sent ahead to reconnoitre, ordered them to inform his captains, that he meant to bring on a decisive action, and that they were to lay their ships as close as possible alongside of the enemy.* While the five frigates were hailing the line-of-battle ships successively, to acquaint them," au portevoix," with their chief's intention, the Didon, confiding in her superior sailing, had approached very near to the British fleet; so near, that the Triumph, at 11 A. M., for the want of a frigate to perform the office, tacked and chased her away. Towards noon the wind veered more to the northward and got very light, and a heavy swell came on from the same quarter. At a few minutes past noon the combined fleet, formed in order of battle, bore up towards the British fleet, then about four * Victoires et Conquêtes, tome xvi., p. 142. leagues off in the east-south-east; but, owing to the distance, and to the extreme lightness of the breeze, it was not until 3 h. 10 m. P. M. that the advance of the French and Spaniards was noticed by the British. Immediately the ships of the latter hoisted their colours, and hauled closer to the wind, awaiting the expected attack. At 4 P. M., however, the ships of the combined fleet, with colours also hoisted, and then distant about three leagues from their opponents, hauled to the wind on the same tack as the British ships; thus evidently declining, for the present, a renewal of the engagement. For a fact so important, and so utterly at variance with the statement at first given out by the French, some authority may be requisite. "A midi, toute la flotte prit chasse sur l'ennemi, qu'on estimait à trois lieues et demie: le vent était faible. A quatre heures, on n'avait encore gagné qu'une lieue à l'escadre anglaise; il n'y avait par conséquent pas d'espoir de l'atteindre avant la nuit, mais on pouvait au moins l'approcher davantage; cependant Villeneuve fit signal à la flotte de serrer le vent, son intention étant de n'attaquer l'ennemi que le lendemain; ce signal étonna autant qu'il affligea les officiers et les marins; on prévit dès lors qu'on ne parviendrait plus à joindre l'ennemi.”* The British admiral resumed his course to the north-east, but was soon driven from it by a change of wind; which, commencing about midnight at north, became, by 8 A. M. on the 24th, north-north-east, and occasionally north-west, but it was very moderate, amounting almost to a calm. This brought the combined fleet nearly astern of the British fleet; which was now to windward, and might, in all probability, have renewed the action. No attempt of the kind was made. Sir Robert, for reasons that will appear presently, continued with his prizes, under easy sail, working towards a British port, steering about south-east by east. The combined fleet had steered the same course as the British fleet until 8 A. M.: the ships then edged away and steered south-east by south. At 4 P. M. one ship only of the Franco-Spanish fleet was in sight of the British fleet, and by 6 P. M. the two fleets had wholly disappeared from each other. In examining the merits of the affair between Sir Robert Calder and M. Villeneuve, we shall take each day's proceeding by itself. The battle was fought as has already been shown, between 14, or, gratuitously adding the Dragon (for she was not engaged till at the very close), 15 British, and 20 French and Spanish sail of the line. Cases have occurred, where the French have enumerated frigates as a part of the force opposed to them. Here, be it observed, there were seven on one side, and two only on the other: those seven frigates had also been ordered, as will hereafter be made manifest, to take a part in the action, and one * Victoires et Conquêtes, tome xvi., p. 143. frigate did, for a short time, with other ships, engage the Windsor-Castle. If, between the four 80-gun ships in the combined fleet, and the four 98-gun ships in the British, any allowance is expected for the nominal (for it is not real*) superiority of the latter, let four of the five surplusage frigates be added to the former; which will be leaving three opposed to the British two, because one of the latter, the Egyptienne, mounted 24-pounders on her main deck. When also it is considered, that, from the weight of metal, and number of men she carries, a French 74 is of greater force than a British 74, no objection. on the part of the French or Spaniards, can be urged against an estimate which, grounded on the numerical line-of-battle strength on each side, fixes the ratio of force in their favour as four is to three. With, then, the inferiority of one fourth in point of force, the British succeeded in capturing two ships out of the adverse line. If these were slow sailers and bad workers, how many slow sailers and bad workers did the British fleet contain? If the density of the fog obstructed the French and Spaniards in their manœuvres, what effect must it have had upon the British, to whom, in spite of all that had been urged to the contrary, so many signals were made and so few seen or understood; and who actually performed the evolution, which brought on the close action, without a signal at all? The tacking of the Hero, for instance. Certainly, too, the fog, combined with the smoke, incommoded the British, who were to leeward, more than the French and Spaniards, who were to windward. A victory, therefore, it was that Sir Robert Calder had gained, but not a "decisive," nor a "brilliant" victory. To have made the action decisive, one way or the other, was exclusively in the power of M. Villeneuve; but he kept his wind, and the firing ceased, owing principally, if not wholly, to his having hauled out of gunshot. It may throw some light upon the proceedings of M. Villeneuve, both in this action and generally since he last quitted Toulon, if we transcribe a portion of the instructions which, on the eve of his departure, he addressed to the captains of his fleet. "I do not," he says, "intend to go in search of the enemy: I would even avoid him in order to get to my destination; but, should we meet him, let there be no discreditable evolution: it would dishearten our men and ensure our defeat. If the enemy be to leeward of us, having the power to adopt what evolution we please, we will form our order of battle, and bear down upon him in line abreast; each ship to close with her natural opponent in the enemy's line, and to board him should a favourable opportunity present itself."-" Every captain, who is not closely engaged, is not in his station; and a signal to recal him to his duty will be a stain upon his character. The frigates *See vol. ii., p. 185. must equally take part in the action:* no signals to that effect will be necessary; they must proceed to the point where their co-operation may be most advantageous, whether to hasten the surrender of an enemy's ship, or to cover a French ship too closely pressed, and to take her in tow or otherwise assist her."+ No shyness betrays itself here; an additional proof that, in his apparent disinclination to close with an inferior force, Viceadmiral Villeneuve was acting a compulsory part. On the 23d of July the parties, in point of relative force, stood nearly the same. The combined fleet had been reduced from 20 to 18 ships, and the British from 15 to 14. But the one had its seven frigates ready to act upon any service; while the other had its two frigates employed in towing the prizes of the preceding day; and which prizes, in the attention they otherwise claimed, impeded the British fleet in its progress, and prevented it from attempting any manoeuvre whereby an advantage might be gained. Considering the little value of the vessels, the SanRafaël, a ship of 34, and the Firme, a ship of 51 years old, and both battered to pieces, their destruction would have been not only a justifiable measure, but, under circumstances, the most eligible that could have been devised. With respect to the power of commencing the action, a continuance of the same wind kept it where it had been on the day previous; yet, with the exception of an hour's demonstration, or show-off, as it may be termed, the party possessing that power declined to use it. On the 24th a change of wind, to nearly an opposite point of the compass, produced a corresponding change in the position of the two fleets; but still they did not approach nearer each other. The truth is, that since the close of the first day's proceedings, Sir Robert Calder, unless some unlooked-for advantage should offer itself, did not intend to be a second time the assailant: he would neither attack nor retreat; nor would he deviate one point from the course necessary to convoy his crippled ship and his two worthless prizes beyond the reach of danger. Each fleet, therefore on the afternoon of the 24th, pursued its route, as if the other were not present, or that no hostility existed between them. "Notre intention est que vous fassiez votre jonction en évitant le combat," says Napoléon, in his instructions to M. Villeneuve ; and, in another place, "Si vous prenez le parti de faire votre réunion avec l'escadre de Brest, vous devez tenter de le faire sans combat." Buonaparte, also, when writing to M. Decrès, asks, "A quoi aboutissait une bataille?" and immediately answers the questions himself,-"A rien." If one admiral, * See p. 10. For the original of this curious production, see Appendix, No. 3. |