two brigs had sailed out, the wind shifted to the west-southwest, and blew with extreme violence, raising such a sea, that most of the prizes broke their tow-ropes, and drifting far to leeward, were in part only again secured. The Franco-Spanish squadron making its appearance about noon, the most efficient of the British line-of-battle ships cast off the hulls of which they had with so much difficulty recovered possession, and by 3 P.M. were formed in line, to the number of 10 sail, between the greater part of those prizes and the ships of M. Cosmao. The odds were far too great for the French commodore, even had the wind been in his favour, to venture within gun-shot; but his frigates soon effected the principal object for which he had sailed out: they recaptured the Santa-Ana and Neptuno, and carried both safe into port. The recapture of the two Spanish prizes was not, however, without its alloy. On the 24th the fine French 80-gun ship Indomptable was wrecked off the town of Rota, situated on the north-west point of the bay of Cadiz. Unfortunately the Indomptable had on board, in addition to her own, the survivors of the Bucentaure's crew, amounting to nearly 500 men; making in all, 1100 or 1200 souls, of whom not more than 100 are represented to have been saved. The San-Francisco-de-Asis parted her cables, and went on shore in Cadiz bay, near Fort Santa-Catalina: her crew, except a small portion, were saved. The Rayo, three-decker, another of M. Cosmao's squadron, not being able to enter Cadiz bay, anchored off San-Lucar, a town at the mouth of the river Guadalquivir, a few leagues to the north-west of Rota. There the Rayo soon rolled away her masts, which had been previously wounded by shot.

Observing that some of the leewardmost of the prizes were running for, and had already approached very near to, the Spanish coast, the Leviathan obtained leave of the commanderin-chief to endeavour to bring them to anchor. On the 24th, at daylight, when standing after the Monarca, the Leviathan discovered the Rayo, with Spanish colours flying, still at an anchor off the shoals of San-Lucar. At this time the 74-gun ship Donegal, Captain Pulteney Malcolm, from Gibraltar, was stretching in from the southward, on the larboard tack, with a moderate breeze from north-west by north, and steering direct for the Spanish three-decker. At about 10 A. M., just as the Monarca had got within little more than a mile of the Rayo, who was at about an equal distance from the Donegal and Leviathan, the latter fired a shot wide of the Monarca, in order to oblige her to drop anchor. The shot falling about midway between the Monarca and the Rayo, the latter, conceiving probably that it was intended for her, hauled down her colours, and was taken possession of by the Donegal; who presently anchored alongside and took out the prisoners. Meanwhile the Leviathan kept standing on towards the Monarca, and, on boarding her, found See p. 26.

that she was in a sinking state. Captain Bayntun, as quickly as possible, removed all the Englishmen, and nearly the whole of the Spaniards. It was well the Leviathan did so, for, in the gale of the ensuing night, the Monarca parted her cable and went on shore. A similar fate, a day or two afterwards, attended the Rayo; and, of the 107 officers and men put on board by the Donegal, 25 were drowned: the remainder were made prisoners by the Spaniards.

The supposition that the Franco-Spanish squadron, which had sailed out of Cadiz on the 22d, consisted of 10, instead of five sail of the line, was doubtless the reason that as many as 10 sail of British line-of-battle ships had been ordered to cut adrift their prizes, and form in order of battle. This untoward circumstance, and the continuance of bad weather, determined Vice-admiral Collingwood to destroy all the leewardmost of the captured ships. Accordingly the Santisima-Trinidad was cleared, scuttled, and sunk by the Neptune and Prince; but, in spite of every pains to remove the wounded by lowering them down in cots from the stern and quarter-gallery windows, 28 of them perished in the ship. The south-west gale increasing to a most violent degree, it took several days to collect and anchor the remaining hulls preparatory to their destruction. Notwithstanding every exertion was used on the part of the Defiance, the Aigle drifted into Cadiz bay on the night of the 25th, and was stranded on the bar off Port Santa-Maria.

The few remaining prizes were at length anchored between Cadiz and about six leagues to the westward of San-Lucar; and on the 28th the body of the British fleet lay also at anchor to the north-west of Lucar, the Royal-Sovereign without any masts except jury main and mizen ones, and the Mars with main and mizen masts only, each ship having lost her foremast in the last. severe gale. Between the 28th and 30th the Intrépide was burnt by the Britannia, and the San-Augustin by the Leviathan and Orion; and the Argonauta was scuttled and sunk by the Ajax. Another of the hulls, the Berwick, after having anchored in apparent safety, was wrecked off San-Lucar, entirely owing to the frenzied behaviour of a portion of the prisoners who cut the cables. The Donegal, being at anchor near, cut her cables, and, standing towards the drifting ship, sent her boats to save the people on board. This noble proceeding of Captain Malcolm was only partially successful, when the Berwick struck upon the shoals; and in her perished about 200 persons.

As a practical proof of the benefit that might have been derived to the fleet and prizes by attending to Lord Nelson's dying injunctions, the Defence, accompanied by her prize, the San-Ildefonso, anchored on the evening of the action, and weathered the gale in safety. The example of these ships was followed by two other of the prizes, the Swiftsure and Bahama; and, with the assistance rendered by the Donegal and Phoebe, these also were saved. The fourth and only remaining prize,

*

the San-Juan-Nepomuceno, being less disabled, had not been: in such imminent danger, and was already safe in the offing.

On the 30th, in the afternoon, Vice-admiral Collingwood was joined by Rear-admiral Louis, with the 80-gun ship Canopus, Captain Francis William Austin, 98-gun ship Queen, Captain Francis Pender, and 74-gun ships Spencer, Captain the Honourable Robert Stopford, and Tigre, Captain Benjamin Hallowell; which squadron, as already stated, had been detached to Gibraltar for water, and to escort a convoy up the Mediterranean.* While reconnoitring Cadiz, just before the squadron joined, the Queen had a slight brush with the batteries and with the Argonaute, who, with only her foremast standing, lay at anchor at the entrance of the bay. On the 31st, in the morning, Viceadmiral Collingwood shifted his flag from the Euryalus to the Queen.

To sum up the result of the battle of Trafalgar, the French, out of 18 sail of the line, preserved only nine, and the Spaniards, out of 15 sail of the line, lost all except six. Of the 19 French and Spanish ships, including the Rayo, which the British captured, one, the Achille, was accidentally burnt, and 14 were recaptured, wrecked, foundered, or destroyed; leaving but four ships, one French and three Spanish 74s, as trophies in the hands of the conquerors. The following recapitulatory table may here be usefully introduced:

In reviewing the merits of the battle of Trafalgar, we shall take the number of ships in each line, 27 and 33, as a fair criterion of the relative force of the two fleets. It is singular that the aggregate of the rated number of guns on each side, 2148 and 2626, affords about the same result, a full sixth part in favour of the French and Spaniards. The real number of guns on each side would very slightly reduce the disparity. A few examples will establish this. The Victory and Téméraire mounted, the one two, the other four, guns only more than the numbers of their respective classes, or 102 guns each. Those of the Victory consisted, in equal divisions upon her first, second, and third decks, of 90 long 32, 24, and 12 pounders, and of 10 long 12-pounders and two 68-pounder carronades on her quarterdeck and forecastle. The guns upon the three principal decks of the Téméraire were 86 long 32 and 18-pounders (30 of the latter on the third or upper deck), and those upon the quarterdeck and forecastle were four long 18pounders and twelve 32-pounder carronades. These two ships, therefore, although of different rates (first and second), mounted the same number of guns; and the 98 was actually 50lbs heavier in her broadside than the 100.

As the Victory and Téméraire were the two ships of the British fleet whose rated and real number of guns approximated the nearest, so were the Tonnant and Belleisle, the latter in particular, the two in which there was in that respect the greatest difference. The Tonnant, for instance, whose rate was 80, mounted 90 guns; and the same number were mounted by the Belleisle, although she was only a 74. The latter was even the heavier ship in broadside force, the age and weakness of the former having required the substitution of 18 for 24 pounders on the main deck; while the Belleisle was enabled to carry on her main deck a whole tier of the larger of those calibers. No other 74-gun ship, however, in the British fleet, to our knowledge, mounted more than 82 guns; and that number would of course include six light poop-carronades.

With respect to the gun force of the ships in the FrancoSpanish fleet, our previous statements upon the subject have left little to add. The force, in long guns, of the Santisima-Trinidad, and of a Spanish first-rate of the class of the Santa-Ana and Principe-de-Asturias, has already appeared; and so has the force of a Spanish 80 and 74 gun ship of the old or small construction.* For an 80 of a more recent build and equipment, the San-Rafael, taken by Sir Robert Calder, may be referred to; and, for a 74, the San-Ildefonso, captured on the present occasion. The guns of the latter consisted of 58 long 24-pounders on the first and second decks, four long 8s and 10 iron 36pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and forecastle, and six iron 24-pounder carronades on the poop; total 78. The pre* See vol. ii., p. 66. + See p. 14.

sence of these carronades renders it probable, that most if not all of the other Spanish ships in the fleet carried a proportion of them, thereby adding four at least to their rated number of guns,

The force of that fine and powerful ship of war, a French 80, has already appeared in the statement of the guns found on board the Franklin.* It is doubtful, however, if either of the French 80s in the combined fleet carried any brass long guns: if not, their guns, instead of being 92, would be 86, as formerly mentioned to be the establishment of the class, and as subsequently ascertained to have been the armament of the Formidable, one of the ships in this fleet. All the French 74s captured out of this fleet were found to mount, upon their first and second decks, the 58 guns already so frequently specified, except the Berwick and Swiftsure, which, having been English ships, carried 28 instead of 30 guns on the second deck. Upon the quarterdeck many of the ships appear to have mounted, by filling the cabin ports, 20 instead of 16 long eights: thus making their total force, including four, and in some instances six, brass carronades on the poop, 82, and in the latter case 84 guns. These were exclusive of brass cohorns in the tops, the fire from which, at close quarters, had in this very engagement proved extremely destructive. Most of the captured French ships were also found to have on board one field-piece (in some instances two), with carriage and apparatus complete.

No deduction need be made for inexperience in the FrancoSpanish crews; for the whole of the 18 French, and nine out of the 15 Spanish, ships had been some time at sea, and 13 of the former had, as recently as the 22d of the preceding July, gained over the British, what the French considered, a victory. The British and the Franco-Spanish fleets, therefore, which met and fought off Cape Trafalgar on the 21st of October, 1805, with the exception of a difference in force of say a sixth in favour of the latter, were fairly opposed.

The French and Spaniards, in general, fought bravely: some individual ships, indeed, of both nations behaved most heroically. Those who, writing when Spain was at peace and France still at war with England, declared, that "the Spaniards, throughout the battle, showed a more uniform firmness and spirit than the French," did but prove how completely their judgment was held in thraldom by their politics. Thinking to compliment Spain at the expense of France, the same writers wished their readers to infer, that there was a want of unanimity between the ships of the two nations. That a native of France or of Spain, as some excuse for his country's share of the defeat, should have

* See vol. ii., p. 185. + See vol. i., p. 54. Clarke and M‘Arthur, vol. ii., p. 455. Mr. Southey indulges in the same strain.