the paffage fhould be attempted at places at fome distance, both above. and below the town, where the refiftance would be confiderably weakened, if not rendered ineffective. Buonaparte, however, full of confidence in his foldiers, and feeling that delay was more injurious to his plan of operations than the lofs to be incurred by marching up to the batteries of the Auftrians, gave peremptory orders that the attack hould be made by the bridge. Accordingly, before day-break, the army prepared for the enterprife, and a column of carabineers, followed by the battalion of grenadiers, paffed half-way the bridge before they were perceived by the Auftrians. A general difcharge deftroyed about feven hundred; the advanced body of the column was ftruck with terror, and stopped fhort; but animated by the cries of "Vive la republique!" from the generals, who faw the danger, and who threw themfelves at their head, they ruflied forwards with impetuofity, feized the Auftrian artillery, broke through the lines, and throwing the whole into diforder, ended the conteft by difperfing the imperial troops. While one part of the republican forces purfued Beaulieu towards Mantua, the reft entered Milan on the 18th May, without further reftance; and the French armies gained poffeffion of the whole of Lombardy.

While France by the fuccefs of her arms was leffening the number of her enemies in Europe, the found her influence decreafing in the United States of America. Though little was to have been expected from national gratitude, it was fuppofed that national honour would have prevented the American go. vernment from feizing the opportunity when the French republic

was ftruggling for her political exiftence, to throw itfelf into the arms of her most potent enemy. It was therefore with equal furprise and indignation that the French government heard of the conclufion of the treaty which was formed by Mr. Jay, between that country and England, the tenor of which was fo evidently in oppofition to treaties already exifting between America and France, that it was concluded that an open breach between the two nations must have been the immediate confequence.

For fome time paft, the conduct of the American administration towards the republic had been distant and ceremonious; nor did the recall and difgrace of M. Genet, the French ambaffador, whose perfonal altercations with the president had led the French government to make this act of folemn reparation, effect any change in its favour. There is no doubt that the conduct of M. Genet was contrary to that fpirit of moderation which a perfon in his official station ought to have obferved; but the peculiar fituation of the French republic should have led the American government to make great allowances, especially when the fyftem of the propagande, which, it is faid, was attempted to be in troduced, by order of the committees of the revolutionary regime, into America, had been formally difclaimed by thofe who afterwards held the reins of power.

A momentary gleam of reconcili ation had been thrown across this fhade of discontent by the arrival of a new ambaffador, Mr. Monroe, from America; whofe political principles were known to be direct. ly oppofite to thofe of his predeceffor, Mr. Morris: and the language of American fraternity and congra tulation was once more heard at the

bar of the national convention. But the negotiation for a treaty of commerce with England foon taught the French what value they had to affix to these new profeffions of national amity, and what confidence was to be repofed in the benevolence of a government, the standard of whose attachment, it was faid, was to be known only by that of its avarice. The treaty itfelf was lefs heeded in France than the difpofitions which led to its formation. It was obferved, that certain articles in this treaty not only infringed on the treaty concluded between the United States and the French nation in 1778, but were direct violations of it. In that treaty, for inftance, the United States formally guaranteed to the French their colonies in the Weft Indies, in cafe of attack; in the prefent, even fupplies of provifions fent to thofe colonies are stated to be illegal com

merce.

It was expected that a treaty fo hoftile to the intereft of France, and fo contrary even to that fpirit of neutrality which it was the obvious intereft of the American government to obferve, would not have been fanctioned by the American legiflature. Notwithstanding the predominancy of Britif influence in the fenate, and the disfavour of the prefident towards French principles, were well understood to exift, yet it was fuppofed that the change which had taken place in the fituation of France and that of Europe fince the negotiation had been opened, would have led the American legiflature to refufe its ratification. But although it was evident from the decifion of the congrefs, what was the general fentiment in America refpecting this treaty, the French government heard with indignation 1796.

of this legalized preference fhewn to the Englith intereft.

An intercepted letter from the prefident of the United States, addreffed to Mr. Morris, who was lately the American ambasador in France, and who then officiated as fecret agent of the American g9vernment in London, had already difcovered to the directory the hoftile views of the government of the United States. This letter, dated from Philadelphia, the 22d December, 1795, was a detailed anfver to various letters of Mr. Morris re

fpecting the pending negotiation. The prefident complained highly of the haughty conduct of the Engli adminiftration, and of the arbitrary measures which they had purfued, and which they were continuing to purfue, with refpect to American navigation. He requested Mr. Morris to represent to the minifter not only the injuftice, but the impolicy of this conduct, particularly at a moment when it was fo much the intereft of England to conciliate the minds of the inhabitants of the United States to the acceptance of the treaty. He detailed the efforts he had made, and the difficulties ne had undergone, to overcome the wayward difpofition of his countrymen towards French politics, the abettors of which were the chief opponents of the treaty in queftion, which, however, he faid, had the approbation and fanction of the greater and more refpectable part of the community. His main object, he obferved, the only object which ought to be continually kept in view, was peace, which he was moft anxious to preserve and if America was happy enough to keep herfelf out of European quarrels, fhe might, from the increafe of her trade, from fecuring the monopoly N

of

of being the carrier of the world, vie, in twenty years, with the most formidable powers of Europe.

This letter, faved from the wreck of the Boston packet, which had foundered on the coaft of France, was confidered as decifive evidence of the difpofitions of the American government towards the rench republic; of the intrigues carried on with the English; and naturally awakened thofe feelings of refentment which arife from a fense of injury heightened by ingratitude; and excited alfo a defire of difplaying that refentment. Various were the representations made to the executive power of France to calm the indignation which thefe provocations had roufed. It was alleged on the one hand, that the attempts made by the late committees of government to revolutionize America, had not been forgotten; that the English party, taking advantage of the imprudence of the agents of the French republic, had acquired an undue preponderance in the counfels of the executive power of the United States; that this alienation was only temporary, arifing on the one hand from the dread of the English, on the other, from the powerlefs ftate of the French republic at that period; from whom they could, in cafe of need, hope for no affiftance; that it was very probable the ratification of the treaty would be refufed by the congrefs; and that the general diflike of the inhabitants of the United States to any ferious connection with the English government, was a decided fact, whatever might be the difpofition of the executive power; that a declaration of hoftilities against the United States would be detrimental to the caufe of the republic, by leffening the number of its friends; and that it was

probable the enfuing election for the prefidentfhip would produce fuch changes in American politics as might prove more beneficial to the interefts of France than the most brilliant and decided fuccefs of her arms.

Thefe and other representations counteracted the effects of the difcovery made by the prefident's letter. The directory determined on continuing the femblance of friendfhip with the United States, and contented itfelf with following the fame conduct with refpect to their veffels bound to England, as England had done, throughout the war, with respect to American veffels bound to France.

While fuch was the fituation of France with respect to one republic, her interefts with another appeared not lefs on the decline. The republican party in Holland had taken meafures to infure the fuccefs of the French arms in that country in the campaign of 1793, had not Dumouriez's precipitate retreat, and his fubfequent defection, not only crufhed their efforts, but endangered their lives. Early in the campaign of 1794, they informed the commiffioners from the convention, who attended the northern armies, of their fituation, and of the impoffibility of attempting to fhake off their yoke without fome effective foreign aid. The favourable anfwer given by the commiffioners, and the more certain promifes made by the committees of the French government, led them to affemble again on all fides in fecret committees, to organize a general plan of national infurrection. As the first object was to enlighten and inftruct the people (as they termed it) they establified fecret printing-offices, and adopted various other means to deceive the vigilance of the government.

9

Having

Having inftituted popular focieties throughout the country, the chiefs formed themselves into two central committees, of which one was appointed to correfpond with the French government and its agents, while the talk of the other was to watch the motions of the government at home, to counteract its operations, and contribute, as far as their influence extended, to prepare the mafs of the nation for a general reclamation of its rights.

The infurrection was to take place at Amsterdam: and although the fuccefs of the French arms in the Low Countries had filled Holland with the retreating armies of the ftadtholder, and of England, it was determined by the committees to take advantage of the favourable events which the brilliant fucceffes of the French at Fleurus, and on the Meufe, gave them, and declare themselves openly both in the capital and in the provinces. General Pichegru, who was made acquainted with this refolution, informed them by letter (on the 6th of September), that, according to the inftructions he had received from the committees of government, he should attack in a few days the armies that covered the frontiers, and fhould detach thirty thousand men who were on the Meufe, across the Waal, to prevent the march of the enemy to Amfterdam; to which place the French troops fhould repair on the news of the infurrection of the patriotic party, who were urged to make provifion at Utrecht for the speedy arrival of their auxiliaries. A variety of obstacles to the accomplishment of their purpofe, on the part of the French, once more fpread confternation and difmay among the Dutch patriots. The affurance of fuccefs in the promifes of immediate fupport on the

part of the French, had alfo thrown them off their guard; and their plan of infurrection, which had hitherto been kept fecret by a vast multitude, came to the knowledge of government.

The stadtholder, alarmed at the nature and extent of the confpiracy, was too weak to punish, or too timid to attempt it; and the only act of violence committed was the arrest of fix citizens, who, our readers will recoilect, in difobedience of a procla mation, prefented a petition against the refolution adopted by the government of inundating the country on the approach of the French armies. The forming of a revolutionary army on the eaftern frontiers, to be commanded by Dutch officers then in the French fervice, among other projects of infurrection, was propofed by the French commiffioners, and approved by the Dutch patriots, who, though the plan was difcult and dangerous, refolved to put . it into execution, and fent a deputation, to concert the means with the French generals. Thofe deputies on their arrival found the plan altogether abandoned, and the French commiffioners difpofed to receive then rather as vanquished enemies than as allies or brethren.

On the invasion of Holland, facilitated by the feverity of the feafon, which had frozen the rivers and the inundations, the Dutch, who had experienced how little confideration was to be expected from the agents of the French government, applied immediately to the government itself, and prefented a long chain of evidence to prove how neceffary their co-operation with the French arms had been for the fubverfion of the power of the ftadtholder, with whom they had confidered themselves, equally with France, as being at war, and had N 2

ufed