privilege of counsel from so many members of theirs, so able, so intelligent of the grounds of things-[Sentence breaks down]—This is, I say, a very singular honor and favor to me; and I wish I may do, and I hope I shall do, what becomes an honest man in giving an answer to these things, according to such insight* either as I have, or as God shall give me, or as I may be helped into by reasoning with you. But indeed I did not in vain allege conscience in the first answer I gave you. [Well!] For I must say, I should be a person very unworthy of such favor if I should prevaricate in saying things did stick upon my conscience. Which I must still say they do! Only, I must also' say, I am in the best way I could be 'in' for information; and I shall gladly receive it.

Here have been divers things spoken by you to-day, with a great deal of judgment and ability and knowledge. I think the arguments and reasonings that have been used were upon these three heads:† First, Speaking to the thing simply, to the abstract notion of the Title, and to the positive reasons upon which it stands. Then 'secondly, Speaking' comparatively of it, and of the foundation of it: in order to show the goodness of it comparatively, 'in comparison with our present title and foundation.' It is alleged to be so much better than what we now have; and that it will do the work which this other fails in. And thirdly, Some things have been said by way of precaution; which are not arguments from the thing itself, but are considerations drawn from the temper of the English People, what will gratify them, and so on ;'-which is surely considerable. As also some things were said' by way of anticipation of me in my answer; speaking to some objections which others have made against this proposal. These are things, in themselves each of them considerable. [The "objections?" or the "Three heads” in general? Uncertain; nay it is perhaps uncertain to Oliver himself! He mainly means the objections, but the other also is hovering in his head, —as is sometimes the way with him.]

To answer objections, I know, is a very weighty business; and to make objections is very easy; and that will fall to my part. And I am sure I shall make them to men who know somewhat how to answer them,— 'to whom they are not strange,' having already in part been suggested to them by the Debates already had.

But upon the whole matter, I having as well as I could taken those things [Looking at his Notes] that have been spoken,-which truly are to be acknowledged as very learnedly spoken,-I hope you will give me a

*Desire' in orig.: but there is no sense in that. accounts' in orig

ittle time to consider of them. As to when it may be the best time for me to return hither and meet you again, I shall leave that to your consideration.

LORD WHITLOCKE. "Your Highness will be pleased to ap point your own time.' .

THE LORD PROTECTOR. On Monday at nine of the clock I will be ready to wait upon you.*

And so, with many bows, exeunt.—Thus they, doing their epic feat, not in the hexameter measure, on that old Saturday fore noon, 11 April, 1657; old London, old England, sounding manifoldly round them;-the Fifth-Monarchy just locked in the Tower.

Our learned friend Bulstrode says: The Protector often advised about this' of the Kingship and other great businesses with the Lord Broghil, Pierrepoint' (Earl of Kingston's Brother, an old Long-Parliament man), with Whitlocke, Sir Charles Wolseley, and Thurloe; and would be shut up three or four hours together in private discourse, and none were admitted to come in to him. He would sometimes be very cheerful with them; and laying aside his greatness, he would be exceeding familiar; and by way of diversion would make verses,' play at crambo, with them, and every one must try his fancy. He commonly called for tobacco, pipes and a candle, and would now and then take tobacco himself;' which was a very high attempt. Then he would fall again to his serious and great business' of the Kingship; and advise with them in those affairs. And this he did often with them; and their counsel was accepted and' in part followed by him in most of the greatest affairs, as it deserved to be.t

SPEECH X.

On Monday, April 13th, at Whitehall, at nine in the morning, according to agreement on Saturday last, the Committee of

Ninety-nine attend his Highness, and his Highness there speaks; -addressing Whitlocke as reporter of the said Committee:

MY LORD,

I think I have a very hard task on my hand. Thouga it be but to give an account of myself, yet I see I am beset on all hands here. I say but to give an account of "myself:" yet that is a business very comprehensive of others :-'comprehending' us all in some sense, and, as the Parliament have been pleased to shape it, comprehending all the interests of these Three Nations!

I confess I have two things in view. The first is, To return some answer to what was so well and ably said the other day on behalf of the Parliament's putting that Title in the Instrument of Settlement. [This is the First thing; what the Second is, does not yet for a long while appear.] I hope it will not be expected I should answer everything that was then said: because I suppose the main things that were spoken were arguments from ancient Constitutions and Settlements by the Laws; in which I am sure I could never be well skilled,--and therefore must the more ask pardon for what I have already transgressed 'in speaking of such matters,' or shall now transgress, through my ignorance of them, in my 'present' answer to you.

Your arguments, which I say were chiefly upon the Law, seem to carry with them a great deal of necessary conclusiveness, to inforce that one thing of Kingship. And if your arguments come upon me to inforce upon me the ground of Necessity,-why, then, I have no room to answer: for what must be must be! And therefore I did reckon it much of my business to consider whether there were such a necessity, or would arise such a necessity, from those arguments.-It was said: "Kingship is not a Title, but an Office, so interwoven with the fundamental Laws of this Nation, that they cannot, or cannot well be executed and exercised without it,'-partly, if I may say so, upon a supposed ignorance which the Law hath of any other Title. It knows no other neither doth any know another. And, by reciprocation,this said Title, or Name, or Office, you were farther pleased to say, is understood; in the dimensions of it, in the power and prerogatives of it: which are by the Law made certain; and the Law can tell when it [Kingship] keeps within compass, and when it exceeds its limits. And the Law knowing this, the People can know it also. And the People do love what they know. And it will neither be pro salute populi, nor for our safety, to obtrude upon the People what they do not nor cannot understand."

It was said also, "That the People have always, by their representatives in Parliament, been unwilling to vary Names,-seeing they love settlement and known names, as was said before." And there were two good instances given of that: the one, in King James's time, about his desire to alter somewhat of the Title: and the other in the Long Par.iament, where they being otherwise rationally moved to adopt the word "Representative" instead of "Parliament," refused it for the same reason. [Lenthall tries to blush.]—It was said also, “That the holding to this word doth strengthen the 'new' Settlement; for hereby there is not anything de novo done, but merely things are revolved in their old current." It was said, "That it is the security of the Chief Magistrate, and that it secures all who act under him."-Truly these are the principal of those grounds that were offered the other day, so far as I do recollect.

I cannot take upon me to refel those grounds; they are so strong and rational. But if I am to be able to make any answer to them, I must not grant that they are necessarily conclusive; I must take them only as arguments which perhaps have in them much conveniency, much probability towards conclusiveness. For if a remedy or expedient may be found, they are not of necessity, they are not inevitable grounds: and if not necessary or concluding grounds, why then they will hang upon the reason of expediency or conveniency. And if so, I shall have a little liberty to speak;' otherwise I am concluded before I speak.-Therefore it will behove me to say what I can, Why these are not necessary reasons; why they are not-why it is not (I should say) so interwoven in the Laws but that the Laws may still be executed as justly, and as much to the satisfaction of the people, and answering all objections equally well, without such a Title as with it. And then, when I have done that, I shall only take the liberty to say a word or two for my own grounds. And when I have said what I can say as to that latter point,'—I hope you will think a great deal more than I say. [Not convenient to SPEAK everything in so ticklish a predicament; with Deputa tions of a Hundred Officers, and so many "scrupulous fellows," considerable in their own conceit," glaring into the business, with eyes much sharper than they are deep!

66

Truly though Kingship be not a 'mere' Title, but the Name of an

* The Kingship: his Highness finds that the grammar will require to be Attended to.

Grounds' originating with myself independently of yours. Is this the "second" thing, which his Highness had in view, but did not specify after the "first," when he started? The issue proves it to be so.

Office which runs through the whole of the' Law; yet is it not so ratione nominis, by reason of the name, but by reason of what the name signifies. It is a Name of Office plainly implying a Supreme Authority: is it more; or can it be stre.ched to more? I say, it is a Name of Office plainly implying the Supreme Authority: and if so, why then I should suppose,—I am not peremptory in anything that is matter of deduction or inference of my own, but I should suppose that whatsoever name hath been or shall be the Name under which the Supreme Authority acts-[Sentence abruptly stops; the conclusion being visible without speech?] Why, I say, if it had been those Four or Five Letters, or whatever else it had been-! That signification goes to the thing, certainly it does; and not to the name. [Certainly!] Why, then, there can no more be said but this: As such a Title hath been fixed, so it may be unfixed. And certainly in the right of the Authority, I mean the Legislative Power,-in the right of the Legislative Power, I think the Authority that could christen it with such a name could have called it by another name. Therefore the name is only derived from that ‘Authority.' And certainly they, the primary Legislative Authority,' had the disposal of it, and might have detracted from it,' changed 'it :'— and I hope it will be no offence to say to you, as the case now stands, "So may you." And if it be so that you may, why then I say, there is nothing of necessity in your argument; and all turns on consideration of the expedience of it. [Is the Kingship expedient?]

Truly I had rather, if I were to choose, if it were the original question, which I hope is altogether out of the question [His Highness means afar off, in a polite manner, "You don't pretend that I still need to be made Protector by you or by any creature !"],—I had rather have any Name from this Parliament than any other Name without it: so much do I value the authority of the Parliament. And I believe all men are of my mind in that; I believe the Nation is very much of my mind,---though it be an uncertain way of arguing, what mind they are of.* I think we may say it without offence; for I would give none! [No offence to you, Honorable Gentlemen, who are here by function, to interpret and signify the Mind of the Nation. It is very difficult to do!]-Though the Parliament be the truest way to know what the mind of the Nation is, yet if the Parliament will be pleased to give me a liberty to reason for myself; and if that be one of your arguments-[" That :" what, your Highness? That the mind of the Nation, well interpreted by this Parliament, is really for a King? That our Laws cannot go on without a King ?—His Highness means the former mainly, but means the latter too; means several things together, as

* Naturally a delicate subject: some assert the Nation has never recognized his Highness, his Highness being of a very different opinion indeed!