no difference between a Judge acting in Court, or Judicially out of it, but that he has not the fame plenitude of Power in the one cafe which he has in the other. But ftill he acts by virtue of the Patent conftituting him a Judge of this Court, and of the Power which the Law gives him in that Character and Capacity. When he iffues his Warrant as a Confervator of the Peace, the Court punishes the Officer, who difobeys it, by Attachment: Why?-Because it is the act of a Judge in his Judicial Capacity; indeed it is an Obstruction to Process in that particular Complaint. But fuppofe he was calumniated for iffuing fuch a Warrant, would not the Court grant an Attachment for it?

The Court of Chancery has always punished the abuse of their Mafters, or of Commiffioners of Bankrupt, whilft acting in the execution of their Offices, in this fummary manner, by Attachment; and I thould think a Libel upon them, or upon the Mafter of the Crown Office, or on the Civil fide, for acts done by them in their Official Capacities, would be within the reach and reason of this mode of Proceeding. It is the Business of the Court, transacted by their Officers; and though under the Controul of the Court, that only refpects the Effects of what they do, and not the Capacity in which they do it..

Perhaps it may be faid, though Attachments are granted for the abuse of Officers in the actual Service of Procefs, yet never for a Libel upon them for what they have done in that Capacity; and therefore no Argument can be drawn from the Practice of iffuing Attachments in favour of Bailiffs abufed in actual Service, any further than whilft a Judge is in the actual Execution of his Office: but the Principles upon which the Court proceeds, in granting Attach

ments

The King

against Almon.

The King against Almon.

ments for abufing Bailiffs in the execution of Procefs, and abufing Courts for their Judgments, must be attended to, in order to find out the difference between the Cafe of libelling a Bailiff, and libelling a Judge of the Court.

The Principle upon which Attachments are granted, in respect of Bailiffs, is to facilitate the Execution of the Law, by giving a fummary and immediate Redress and Protection to the Perfons who undertake it. The Law confiders it as a Contempt of the Authority of the Court, to abuse and vilify the Person who is acting under it.

But the Principle upon which Attachments iffue for Libels upon Courts, is of a more enlarged and important nature,—it is to keep a blaze of Glory around them, and to deter people from attempting to render them contemptible in the eyes of the Public.

Bailiffs are neither appointed by the King nor the Court; a Libel upon them terminates only in the Defamation of a private Individual: it is only telling the People, that a perfon employed to execute Process has abused his Authority. But a Libel upon a Court is a Reflection upon the King, and telling the People that the Administration of Justice is in weak or corrupt hands; that the Fountain of Justice itself is tainted, and, confequently, that Judgments, which ftream out of that Fountain, must be impure and contaminated.

The Authority of the Court is contemned by abusing a Bailiff in the actual Service of Process: but the Juftice of the Court is not ar raigned, nor is the Court rendered contemptible in the eyes of the People by imputing misbehaviour to him; and therefore an Attachment for a Libel upon a Judge for what he does at Chambers, does not proceed upon any Principle analogous to the Cafe of a Libel upon a Bailiff, but falls directly within the Principle of libelling the Court,

5

Court, which is imputing to the King a Breach of that Oath, which he takes at the Coronation, to "adminifter Justice to his people;" and a Judge, at his Chambers, is as much in the Administration of that Justice, as when he is in Court, though his Acts have not the fame efficacy as the Acts of the whole Court; and Orders for Amendments do in fome respects differ materially from Mandatory Orders, enjoining a third perfon to pay money or perform any particular act; for Obedience cannot be enforced to fuch Mandatory. Orders, till the Court has exprefsly recognized them; but Orders for Amendments require no Act of the Court to authenticate them.. When the Alteration is made in pursuance of such an Order, and there is no Application to discharge fuch an Order, but it is acquiefced in by all Parties, it becomes the Act of the whole Court; and the Part amended is as much a part of the Record of the Court as any other part of it; and when this Pamphlet was printed, the Record had been amended in pursuance of the Order made by the Chief Juftice; and therefore to every intent and purpose the Amendment had been adopted, recognized, and was become the Act of the Court, by the acquiefcence of the Parties, as emphatically and. effectually, as if it had been originally ordered by the Court.

(b) Vide note (a) p. 243. alfo the Cafe of Rex v. John Wilkes, Efquire, Hil. Term. 10 Geo. III. 4 Bur. p. 2527. where the fubject of Amendments, made out of Court, is fully difcuffed.

IN THE COMMON PLEAS.

ROE, on the Demife of GEORGE DODSON, Efq;

AGAINST

GREW and Others.-In Ejectment.

Hil. 7 Geo. III. 1767. 2 Wilson,

322.

Dodfon against Grew and Others.

THIS was a Cafe on an Ejectment for the Recovery of certain Lands in the County of Middlefex, which was tried before Lord CAMDEN at the Sittings after last Easter Term, whereby it appeared

That DANIEL DODSON was feifed in Fee of the Premifes in queftion, and devised them in thefe Words; viz.

“Item. I give, devise, and bequeath unto my Nephew, GEORGE "GREW, All that my Manfion-house or Dwelling, with the Outhouses, Stables, Buildings, Orchards, Gardens, and Lands there"to belonging, fituate and being at Waltham Crofs, in the faid "County of Hertford, now in my own Poffeffion, and used there"with: And also all thofe my Meadow lands in Fowley, in the "Parish of Chefhunt, in the said County of Hertford, alfo in my

own Poffeffion: And also all that my one close of Pafture land, in "Waltham Crofs aforefaid, now in the Poffeffion of William Hunt: "And also all those my three acres of common Field Land, lying and "being in Brickwall field, Swan field, and Whitehorse field, in "Waltham Cross aforefaid, now in the poffeffion of myfelf and the "faid William Hunt: And alfo all those my three acres of land, lying

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lying and being in Bellfinore Lane, in the Parish of Enfield, and County of Middlesex; and all other my lands, tenements, and "hereditaments in Enfield aforefaid: And alfo all thofe my Cham"bers in Lincoln's Inn, No. 5, now in my own Poffeffion, in the "faid County of Middlesex :-TO HOLD all and every the aforefaid Meffuage, Lands, Tenements, Hereditaments, Chambers, and "Premises, with their and every of their Appurtenances, unto him "the faid GEORGE GREW for and during the term of his natural "life; and from and after his decease, to the use of the iffue male of "his body lawfully to be begotten, and the heirs male of the body of fuch iffue male; and for want of fuch iffue male, then I give all "and every the aforefaid Premifes unto my nephew George Dodson, "his heirs and affigns for ever."

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THAT in the Devife to GEORGE GREW, the words " heirs male of "his body" were originally written, but that the word "heirs" was fcratched out, and the word " iffue" inferted in its ftead, in the fame hand with the body of the Will, but in different ink.

THAT GEORGE DODSON, the Devifee in remainder in the faid Will, was GEORGE DODSON, the Leffor of the Plaintiff.

THAT the Teftator devised other Eftates to the faid Leffor of the Plaintiff in fee.

THAT GEORGE GREW, and the Leffor of the Plaintiff, were the Teftator's Nephews; and that he devised the refidue of his Estates, both real and perfonal, equally between his faid two Nephews.

THAT GEORGE GREW had no child at the time of making the Will: that he entered on the Premifes, fuffered a Recovery thereof, and died without iffue male.

Dodfon

against Grew and Others.