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into final shape by the economic section appointed early in December. It was provided that nations desiring financial credit should notify the commission what assets they possessed, that the commission should then estimate their value and authorize the governments in question to issue gold bonds. It was understood that the plan had received the approval of the leading European bankers. The text of the draft approved by the Council was in part as follows:

"The government of a country desiring to participate shall notify the commission what specific assets it proposes to assign as security for commercial credits to be granted by the nationals of exporting countries. The commission, after an examination of these assets, shall determine the gold value of the credit which it would approve against the security of these assets. The participating Government will then be authorized to issue bonds to a gold value fixed by the commission.

"The assigned assets are to be administered by the participating Government or by the commission as a majority of the League of Nations may determine on the proposal of the commission. Nevertheless, in cases where the administration of assigned assets is by the participating Government, the commission at any time may-and in case of default shall require the participating Government to transfer the administration of the assets to itself. The participating Governments have the right of appeal to the Council against this requirement, and the decision of the Council shall be binding.".

"The countries exposed by the weakness of their credit to onerous conditions and exacting demands will thus secure an impartial tribunal to protect them. They will find in it support when dealing with creditors and will be relieved of any fear of unfair political pressure, which would not, as in the case of debt councils," threaten to encroach on their sovereign rights. These sovereign rights would remain under the protection of the Council of the League. Being thus able without misgiving to offer to the lenders adequate guarantees, they should be in a position to borrow on more reasonable terms than would otherwise be the case."

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The Assembly closed its sessions on the evening of December 18. The last session was the occasion of some sharp discussion in respect to the powers of the Council. Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. Balfour, the English delegates took opposing ground as to the policy of the League in respect to mandates and as to the relation between the Council and the League. There was much criticism, especially on the part of the representatives of the smaller nations, of the wide powers assumed by the Council. It was the controlling authority in nearly every matter, except the admission of members and the appropriation of money. A resolution had been introduced declaring that the states holding mandates should not exploit the territories concerned or raise troops in them. Mr. Balfour contended that the Council retained the entire freedom of action in this respect. There was also much objection to the secrecy of its proceedings. Lord Cecil recommended that the great Powers should make their policy in respect to mandates known. He consistently demanded publicity. He persisted in this demand believing that the time of the old secret diplomacy had passed. Mr. Balfour declared that the Council was the responsible body under the Covenant and that its members could not admit any restriction on its freedom of action. This issue had divided the Assembly during its entire session. It was charged that the great Powers were simply carrying out selfish national policies in the manner of the old diplomacy. The refusal to publish their proceedings gave offence to a large number of members.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. In October the secretary of the League of Nations published the plan for the permanent International Court of Justice, as developed by the committee of

jurists in sessions held at The Hague, June 16July 24th. The chief interest of the plan was its manner of solving the problem which had caused the failure in 1907, namely, the question of the composition of the court. According to the plan the judges of the court were to be elected by the council and the Assembly of the League from a list of names designated by the national groups of the permanent court of arbitration instituted at The Hague by the conferences of 1899 and 1907. Its permanence was insured by the requirement that it should hold a session each year and, at the option of its president, might be convoked in extraordinary session when circumstances required. The powers of the court were indicated by the following provisions. In a difference arising between the states which cannot be resolved through diplomatic channels and which does not pertain to another jurisdiction, the complainant may submit it to the court of international justice. The court has jurisdiction over first, the interpretation of the Treaty; second, all questions of international legislation; third, any violation of international obligations; fourth, the nature and extent of the reparation for such violation; fifth, the interpretation of sentences pronounced by the court. It also would take cognizance of all differences of any kind that might be submitted to it as the result of a general agreement or a specific understanding between the parties concerned. If a contest arose between the parties in regard to the competence of the court in respect to a difference between them the court was to decide. It was also to give its advice in respect to any international question even if it did not have relation to a difference between the nations. The language of the court was to be French although another language might be authorized at the request of the parties in litigation. The committee of the League's plan was presented to the Assembly at Geneva, December 13, and unanimously adopted. It differed from the plan of Mr. Root and his associates in some important particulars. For example, the committee of the League in conformity with the decision of the Council at Brussels believed it impossible to secure the consent of the requisite number of League members to a plan which permitted an offended nation to cite another nation before the Court. This provision was replaced by one which gave the nations the right to consent or refuse obligatory arbitration.

SAAR BASIN. The commission of the Saar Basin was appointed by the Council of the League February 13, and assumed its duties February 26. Its president was M. Rault of France, other members were two representatives of Belgium, one of Denmark, and one of Canada. The Saar Basin, it will be remembered, comprises the mining region which for fifteen years under the terms of the Treaty was to be exploited in the interest of France for the payment of the damage done to her industrial regions. The function of the governing commission was to make sure that the new arrangement caused no unnecessary friction with the natives. It announced that officials would thenceforth be chosen, so far as possible, from among the population and no longer be appointed by the Prussian, Bavarian, or German governments, and that above all, the administration of justice was to be in the hands of the natives. Religious freedom was assured and provisions for the material welfare of the inhabitants promised. Subsequent conferences

were held with representatives of the natives with a view to a policy suited to their interests and wishes, and a programme was finally laid down embodying among other points the immediate end of military rule, the prompt insuring of food supplies, the freeing of travel from incumbrances, the removal of the censorship on letters, and the granting of freedom of the press and of assembly and association as soon as possible.

GERMAN WAR CRIMINALS. On February 7, the Supreme Council demanded of the German government the extradition of 890 German subjects accused of crime in connection with the war. The main part of this list was made up of names presented by France and Belgium. Great Britain listed ninety-seven; Poland, fiftyone; Rumania, forty-one; Italy, twenty-nine; and Jugo-Slavia, four; while all the rest were almost evenly divided between France and Belgium. Neither Japan, nor the United States asked for any extraditions. Here, as in the case of the German ex-emperor, the Allies completely backed down and after some hesitation accepted the German government's proposal of January 5, that a German federal court should try the accused at Leipsic. In March, forty-six names were presented by the Allied justice committee, being selected from those against whom the evidence seemed the strongest. The Allies were to have the right to order a re-trial or to re-try the cases themselves if they disagreed with the verdict. The subject was debated in the German parliament and in the course of the discussion it was made known that the government had prepared a list of war criminals among the Allies, but had decided not to publish the names.

THE EXTRADITION OF THE EX-KAISER. On January 15, the Supreme Council demanded of the Netherlands that the former Kaiser should be surrendered for trial in accordance with the Treaty. The Dutch government refused on the principle of the national law of asylum for political fugitives. The Council again applied to the Dutch government, February 14, giving it to be understood, however, that the Allies would not insist upon the actual surrender of the ex-emperor, provided that the Dutch government would intern him and be responsible for his acts. The Dutch government replied March 5, that it would take the necessary means of preventing the ex-emperor from endangering the peace of the world. This proposal was accepted by the Powers on March 31.

SAN REMO CONFERENCE. Several important meetings of the Supreme Council took place during the year. The first of these was the conference at San Reno, April 18. Here the main feature was the manifest division in the policy of the Allies. The deviation between French and British aims was now evident. French troops had occupied German towns to the east of Maience in order to insure the withdrawal of German troops from the Ruhr district. There was a general feeling in France among political leaders that London did not mean to enforce the Treaty and there had been many notes interchanged between the two governments before the conference met. The French insisted upon strict enforcement of the Treaty; the Italians favored revision; and the British pursued a policy of adaptation to the changing needs. It was decided as noted above that

French troops should be withdrawn from the Ruhr Valley as soon as the German forces there had been reduced to the required limit. After a warm discussion the conference agreed upon a note to Germany insisting upon disarmament and the execution of the Treaty, but it denied any intention to annex German territory and invited Germany to meet the delegates of the Allies at the conference which was to be held at Spa. Other questions before the conference were those of the Turkish settlement and the Russian and Adriatic problems. In regard to the Turkish settlement, the conference agreed upon the principles which were embodied in the treaty with Turkey described in another paragraph. It agreed also that Great Britain should be the mandatary power for Mesopotamia and Palestine and France for Syria, and it offered the Armenian mandate to the United States, after the League of Nations had declared that it would be unable to accept it. It promised the Zionists that civil rule should replace the military administration in Palestine. In regard to the Russian question, it instructed the executive of the Supreme Economic Council to enter into negotiations with the Soviet delegate M. Krassin in respect to commercial relations. It decided that the Adriatic question should be left to the two nations concerned in the dispute.

So far as the area of her acquisitions was concerned, Great Britain was far in the lead of all the others, having added a new empire to her possessions, while France and Italy were confined to the coast. The British control extended over western Asia including all the country between Cairo and Calcutta and between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, not to mention the fact that she was in possession of Constantinople. This was undoubtedly the greatest change in favor of one Power in that part of the world since it was overrun by the Ottoman Turks when they built up their empire. The point is important in view of the Anglophobia manifest in France, in certain quarters in the United States, and throughout many countries, and the common assertion that Great Britain had gained the lion's share in the spoils of the war. Other territories whose status had to be determined were Armenia and Anatolia. While the Armenians were scattered over the vast region extending from the Black Sea to the Mediterrenean and from Sivas in Anatolia to Kars in what had been Russian land till the revolution, they constituted only a minority in the greater part of this region; and it did not seem practical to try and secure Armenian supremacy over any such enormous region.

The decision to invite the Germans to meet the Allied representatives at Spa caused much discussion. It was argued that peace could not be restored until Germany as well as Russia was brought into the concert of nations again. It was agreed at San Remo that the Treaty should be enforced but that this should be done in a spirit of fairness and for the purpose of restoration. It was important that Germany should know how much she was to pay and this was important also for France and Belgium. But there was not a strong enough government in Germany to carry out a plan for the payment of the reparations. Throughout the country there was a defiant or evasive spirit and a tendency to terrify the Allies by threats of Bolshevism or to soften them by appeals to sympathy. Little

was heard in 1920 of demands that Germany should confess her guilt, surrender her war criminals, or make a definite renunciation of her old policies-that is to say these matters were not discussed among practical public men though they figured conspicuously enough in the writings of journalists and literary men. The conference of Spa was looked forward to as a step toward reconciliation and reconstruction.

HYTHE CONFERENCES. The second conference of the prime ministers was held at Hythe, England, May 15. Its object was to draw up a plan for a conference that should be held at Spa, Belgium, to which the German Chancellor would be invited. Its general conclusions were: That the Treaty should be enforced in all respects, especially its disarmament provisions; that a lump sum should be fixed for the German reparation by experts who would also determine the method of payment; that the payment of Allied debts to Great Britain should be dependent on the payment by Germany of her indemnity. This agreement in respect to fixing definitely the amount to be paid by Germany was reached only after a long contest in which the French prime minister, M. Millerand had stood out against it.

Another conference was held in Hythe June 20 attended by the French, British and Greek prime ministers, for the discussion of the Turkish question, and decided to give Greece a free hand in dealing with the Turkish Nationalists. It was merely preliminary, however, to the Boulogne meeting on the following day.

BOULOGNE CONFERENCE. A conference was held June 21 at Boulogne attended by France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan and Belgium. Its main result was an agreement to approve the war against the Turkish Nationalists. The question of the German indemnity gave rise to a long discussion, but without definite result except that it was decided to turn the matter over for settlement to a financial conference to meet at Brussels, July 2.

SPA CONFERENCE. It was agreed at the conference of Spa between the Allied and German representatives that the monthly delivery required from the Germans should be reduced from 3,500,000 to 2,000,000 tons. On the one hand advances were to be made to Germany in proportion to her deliveries in order that she might feed her miners; on the other hand the Ruhr district and other coal basins were to be occupied for three months if the promised coal were not received.

GERMAN DISARMAMENT. As noted in the preceding YEAR BOOK there were repeated charges that Germany was failing to execute the terms of the Treaty in respect to disarmament and was under various pretexts maintaining a large military force. At the beginning of 1920 the statements were repeated and became more precise. According to one report circulated in the leading French and British journals, the total German armed forces were 1,062,000, divided into five branches and this was were said to be a conservative estimate. Of these, 400,000 were attributed to the Reichswehr which was formed out of voluntary units during the Spartacide revolution in the opening months of 1919 and another 400,000 was attributed to the Civic Guards or Einwohnerwehr. These

or

similar assertions were repeated at short intervals down to the last day of the year. The French complained that distant nations like England and the United

States unlike France not being in immediate danger, Germany was taking advantage of laxity in enforcing the terms of the Treaty to place herself on a strong military footing. At the meetings of the Supreme Council at Boulogne and Spa, Germany was ordered to abolish her enforced military service and to reduce the army to 150,000 men by October 1, 1920 and to 100,000 men by January 1, 1921; to dissolve the socalled Sicherheitspolizei, a sort of military police created by the Berlin government against the Bolshevists both in and outside Germany and numbering about 300,000; and to disarm the civil population including so-called popular guards or Einwohnerwehr comprising about 300,000 men. The first two of these measures were promptly carried out. On July 1, the suppres sion of compulsory military service was voted and volunteer recruiting was prescribed for the next ten years. But the measures adopted for the organization, according to the French critics, provided ingeniously for an increase of the numbers by a clandestine method admitting of great elasticity, and described in detail in the French press: A report was made by Marshal Foch December 31, toward the end of the failure of Germany to carry out the obligations in the matter of disarmament, and the French government addressed a note to Berlin dealing in detail with Germany's failure to observe the requirements of the Spa protocol of July 9 in respect to disarming the police and delivering surplus war material and guns. The French note asserted that German laws were inconsistent with the military clauses of the Treaty, that the commission of control had not been able to verify the German contention that the army had been reduced to 100,000, and that the commission had encountered resistance to its orders for the destruction of air-craft material. The German government in reply attempted to disprove these statements except in regard to certain points where exact conformity to the terms imposed had been impossible. It declared that Germany did not refuse to disarm the home guards of East Prussia and Bavaria, but that conditions there did not permit so prompt an execution of the terms as in other parts of the country. It asserted that the security police existed no longer; that the German government had obeyed substantially the demands of the control commission; that it had no intention of evading the obligation it had undertaken at Spa; that the existence of self-defense organizations was not inconsistent with Article 177 of the Treaty, etc.

REPARATIONS. The quarrel over the amount of reparations, the fixing of that amount in advance, and the question whether Germany was seeking to evade or unable to meet her obligation continued without interruption throughout the year. After the Boulogne conference the provided for payments of 3,000,000,000 gold most definite plan before the public was one that marks annually for the first five years, payment of 6,000,000,000 annually the next five years, and payments of 7,000,000,000 annually the next thirty-two years, a total of 269,000,000,000 marks in forty-two years, it being calculated that at 8 per cent interest, with 1 per cent amortizement, this would be equivalent to 85,000,000,000 marks gold, value. France, receiving 55 per cent of the indemnity, would thus get about 47,000,000,000 marks gold, about 60,000,000,000 gold francs at present value, or 148,000,000,000 gold marks, if she waited

current

dis

forty-two years to get it all. It was the plan
at that time that France could borrow in Eng-
land and America on her share by means of
Reparation Commission bonds guaranteed by Ger-
many, England, France and Belgium, bearing 8
or 9 per cent interest, and that thus she would
be in a position to meet her current reconstruc-
tion expenditures. Much bitterness was
played by French writers against British laxity
in the matter of the reparations. The opposing
points of view are presented in the paragraphs
on Anglo-French Friction below. Early in No-
vember it was learned that an arrangement had
at length been reached between the French and
British governments in respect to procedure in
the matter of reparations. In France this was
regarded as a diplomatic victory. It was in fact
a compromise whereby the French government
agreed to meet the representatives of the other
Allies and also the representatives of Germany
and to consider the question of fixing definitely
the amount of the indemnity. The British de-
manded that German experts should be admitted
to the discussion. The terms of the accord were
published on November 12 as follows: (1) The
meeting at Brussels of technical experts of the
allies along with technical experts of Germany.
(2) A conference of Allied Ministers at Geneva
after the plebiscite of Upper Silesia not later
than the middle of February, 1921 to discuss in
its entirety the question of reparations; Germans
to participate in an advisory capacity. (3) The
Reparations Committee to proceed then to the
fixing of the total amount in the matter of pay-
ment of the indemnity from Germany and to
make a report to the Powers in regard to Ger-
many's ability to pay. (4) The Supreme Coun-
cil to meet and fix penalties in case of non-
execution.

RUSSIA AND THE OTHER POWERS. The policy known as that of the "sanitary cordon" employed against Russia in 1919, was definitely abandoned at the close of the year, and its complete failure was implied in the decision announced, January 16, by the Supreme Council, that the Russian blockade would be raised. The Council announced at this time also, that trade relations would be established, but denied that it intended to recognize the Soviet government. The Russian question came up at the conference of San Remo but without any definite result. The Italian prime minister, Nitti, urged that trade should be resumed but while this was favored in general terms, each nation was left to its own discretion in the matter and it met with little approval on the part of the French, who declined to admit the Bolshevists' contention that the debt of the former Russian government should be excluded from the present government's obligations, which meant a repudiation of some 26,000,000,000 francs due to France. At Copenhagen an agreement was signed with certain international commercial groups looking to a prompt resumption of trade (April 23). In this matter the Russian representative, Krassin, was active. His subsequent efforts to re-open trade with Sweden failed as did also the efforts of the Moscow government to arouse American interest in the matter. Meanwhile British, German, French, and Italian prisoners continued to be sent back to their respective countries. The Japanese signed a protocol April 29, with the Russian officials in Siberia, but still continued in control of Vladivostok and the military group

in Siberia was accused of arbitrary acts by the
members of the inter-Allied railway commission.
France continued consistently anti-Bolshevist.
On August 11 France recognized the government
of General Wrangel as the government de facto
of Russia. The comment of French government
organs emphasized the importance of this new
government; and said that General Wrangel had
taken measures to prove that he had been freely
accepted by the populace, that he was governing
well and defending their liberties. He further,
according to French opinion was the represen-
tative of popular rule whereas the Soviet gov-
erment was, as it declared itself, simply a dicta-
torship. France was ready to recognize any
government in Russia, no matter what its form
on condition that it was really representative of
the nation, and not of a mere faction. In addi-
tion to these, reasons for recognizing Wrangel,
another one of great force in France was his
recognition of the obligations of the government
to pay off the debts incurred under the old
régime, including the large debt to France. This
attitude brought France in opposition to the
policy of th British government. Many of the
British papers declared that the French recog-
nition of Wrangel was entirely opposed to British
ideas and was a menace to the relations of
France and Great Britain. Italy and Great
Britain inclined to a policy of moderation and
the resumption of trade. For an account of the
Krassin mission and the negotiations on this
subject see GREAT BRITAIN. On November 19
it was learned that the British government in-
tended to carry out the arrangement resulting
from these negotiations (June 30 to October 6).
The resumption of trade according to the British
demands was to rest upon the mutual cessation
of hostilities. The conditions included the fol-
lowing points: The Soviet government was to
refrain from hostile actions and propaganda di-
rected against British institutions, and from
military action or propaganda to encourage the
peoples of Asia in opposition to British interests;
immediate release of British prisoners in Rus-
sia; and recognition by the Soviet government of
the principle of liability to pay compensation to
private citizens who had supplied goods or ser-
vices to Russia. There was opposition in a
portion of the press to the principles of this
agreement, especially to a clause which proposed
that the British government should not place any
or commodities
embargo on gold securities
shipped from Russia in payment of imports.
The long correspondence on the subject was made
public at this time.

RUSSO-ESTHONIAN TREATY. The first treaty which the Russian Soviet government made with the new Baltic states was that signed at Dorpat February 2 with Esthonia after negotiations lasting about a month. The principal points in it were, after declaring that the war should cease from the date at which the treaty became effective: The determination of the frontier by a line defined in detail, a joint commission being appointed for the delimitation; provision for a neutral military zone January 1, 1921; obligation on the part of both signers to prohibit the maintenance of any hostile armies or their passage through the territory or the transportation of munitions from enemies; renunciation by both of all claims for military expenditures or war losses; an agreement to an exchange of prisoners.

Pres

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POLAND. For an account of Poland's repulse of the Soviet armies and the subsequent Treaty, see POLAND, History. The main question before the American people in 1920 in respect to Poland was whether or not her recent policy had been imperialistic. An enormous body of writing centered about this subject and it was difficult to arrive at any impartial conclusion. ident Wilson, when he vetoed the proposed peace by resolution on May 26, criticised the arrangement therein proposed because among other reasons, it had nothing to say about the reestablishment of an independent Polish state. The championship of Poland had been one of the principles in his proclamation as a basis for ending the war long before the celebrated fourteen points were in evidence. As to American interest, it was argued that the success failure of Poland was of the utmost importance to the United States for the most important financial interests were involved in it. After the war all of Poland's frontiers were in the hands of the enemy. The government of M. Paderewski and Gen. Pilsudski, criticised though it had been for its imperialistic tendencies, had to contend with these dangers. It succeeded in coming to terms with the Lithuanians and putting an end to the German danger; in turning the Ukranians from enemies into friends; and in agreeing to a friendly settlement of the difficulties with the Czechs. As a consequence there remained only the Bolshevist front which had to be defended. In midsummer the military situation of Poland according to the United States government was not dangerous. The city of Kiev was still held firmly by the Ukraians and Poles, and Minsk and Vilna were still in Polish hands. According to reports of June 1, after heavy fighting, the Reds had been defeated by the Poles near Borisov with a loss of many prisoners and the line of the Beresina river had been re-taken. In the north, on the other hand, the Reds had driven back the Polish lines to some extent and a drive against Vilna was threatened. It was reported at that time that Poland with her ally, the Ukraine, was secure in the possession of about three-fourths of her ancient kingdom and that about half the territory was outside the provisional eastern boundary fixed for Poland by the Supreme Council at the Peace Conference.

This last point is of great importance in the whole discussion of the subject because it was the ground on which the critics of Poland charged that she was pursuing a policy of imperialism, and called the Polish operations in this region a war of conquest. It was repeatedly urged throughout the year that with the Polish forces several hundred miles beyond the line fixed by the Treaty it was absurd to speak of Poland as fighting a war of self-defense. These charges were as frequently denied or dismissed. The justification for Poland's seizing so much territory in White Russia was presented by her partisans as follows: In November 1918, when Poland regained her freedom, the Bolsheviki were nearly at the gates of Warsaw. When the Peace Treaty was signed in June 1919, the Bolsheviki had been driven several hundred kilometers to the east. In December, 1919, Poland's eastern boundary was fixed provisionally. Meanwhile the Poles had continued to drive back the Bolsheviki and were holding a strategic line just to the east of Minsk or 250 kilometers

east of the new boundary. This region was still well within the ancient boundaries of the kingdom of Poland. The Poles had accomplished this by themselves and in spite of the withdrawal of America and England from northern Russia. When the Allies through the Supreme Council invited them to fall back they naturally objected on the ground that this request was unaccompanied by any provision for preventing the enemy from following them up. Thus the Poles were technically in the position of invaders, but as a matter of fact, they had delivered this region from the Bolsheviki; they were feeding and protecting the inhabitants; and they were trying to restore the country to a productive state. Furthermore, according to their point of view, they had not conquered the inhabitants, for these inhabitants were their former subjects. Nor did they claim this territory, either as a result of their occupation or because of racial affinity. They merely claimed the right of selfdetermination for the inhabitants. General Pilsudski and the Diet had disavowed any intent to annex forcibly this region. It was further argued that the fixing of the provisonal eastern line practically left the nation free to push as much further east as it was able. When Poland signed the Treaty, it left her eastern boundary to be determined later by the Allied and associate Powers. The Polish demands in midsummer were as follows: the retirement of the Reds beyond her 1772 boundaries, that is to say, the boundaries that existed before Poland's first partition. The Peace Treaty and the later proclamation concerning the boundary left Poland with an area little more than one-third of the ancient kingdom. that is to say, of Poland as it existed before 1772, and it excluded some 8,000,000 Poles from Poland. The Poles were dissatisfied with this arrangement. They held that besides excluding these 8,000,000 Poles, the provisional boundary was a line unsuited by nature to military defense. In short, they held that they had been left in a bad position with only vague hopes of the support of the League of Nations. They thereupon determined by their own efforts to check the Red advance and to strengthen Poland in every way. They had united with Latvia against the German Baltic troops in the operations around Riga and they had joined the Polish and Lettish frontiers against the Bolsheviki. Those who sympathized with Poland's course throughout all this believed that all criticism of it was due to such influences as German propaganda, Soviet propaganda, the interest of Great Britain in resuming trade with the Soviet government, and in general, ignorance of the true facts, and acceptance of reports colored by the self-interest of those who circulated them. They argued that the Germans naturally were alarmed by Polish success against Russia because they looked to Russia for their own salvation. They regarded the provisional eastern boundary of Poland as a rampart for the protection of the Bolshevists and they expected to penetrate and exploit Russia by means of it. Berlin press agencies were flooding central Europe with publications attacking Poland and predicting Polish disaster.

It will be recalled that under the treaty a corridor was cut through German land from Poland to the port of Danzig, which port was made a free city, contrary to the desire of the Poles, who wished to control it themselves. The

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