government; clearing the divine character from all impeachment, from the wrong elections of moral agents, and from the consequences which follow them. This is well done; and nothing, indeed, can be plainer, than, that the standard of moral rectitude must necessarily be immutable. Were any error, or moral evil, attachable to God, there could be neither móral government, nor divine rectitude, nor virtue, in the universe.

The single consideration of what is due to a creature, what is the operation of absolute justice towards it, must at once unveil its comparative imperfection; and, this justice, uninfluenced by sovereign interposition, will clearly shew, that indefectible stability in goodness is peculiar to the first cause; and, that evil, of whatever kind, is peculiar to a creature. As evil has no conceivable existence without a subject; so, where there was no antecedent standard of perfection, there could be no evil. That infinite perfection should be liable to evil of any kind, involves a contradiction: for it supposes, that, the only standard and measure by which evil is estimated is liable to become evil itself; while at the same time, without that standard, for any thing to become evil, would be absolutely impossible: thence, it irrefragably follows, that only a being derived, created, or dependent, a being comparatively imperfect and defective, as contrasted with one infinitely perfect, on whom it depends, can possibly be evil. Now, this is true, whether we consider it in reference to individuals, societies, or the world at large.

Section IV. of this chapter solves some difficulties with very considerable ease and ability. The contrasts exhibited in the two last paragraphs, between the misfortunes of the righteous, and the prosperity of the wicked, are well executed, and deserve particular notice. We think also that Section V. on the necessity of good and evil being blended ina probationary state, contains matter full of edification, and ought to be perused by every reader with reference to himself. The contents of the last section, assigning "reasons why all rewards and punishments are not instantaneous," are no less important and interesting. We shall conclude our review of it with the words of the last paragraph :

"In thus surveying the conduct of God towards his rational, though fallen creatures, we behold both his justice and his mercy; his justice in punishing the incorrigible, and his mercy in pardoning the penitent; and in both we behold his goodness. It therefore follows, that, although he has the command of all possible means, none, to which he can resort, can be unjust; because

he can adopt none that are contrary to his own perfections. And, consequently, all the dispensations of nature, of providence, and of grace, must perfectly coincide with his nature; although we have not powers sufficiently acute and comprehensive, to trace them on all occasions." [p. 256.]

The whole of the arguments advanced by the author in his view of Providence are of what he calls the mixed kind, by which we understand, partly taken from the light of nature, and partly from revelation; and they have this advantage, that they shew there is no discordance, or discrepancy between them; encourage the study of both; and lead the Christian to his God, both by creation, providence, and revelation.

In Part the Fourth we are presented with proofs of the being, perfections, and providence of God, from revelation. These are comprehended in Chapter XXV. The subject of this chapter consists of topics so general and universally admitted, among all denominations of Christians, that nothing is necessary to be said, but to recommend the perusal of it; and we do not hesitate to say, that no part of it will be called in question by any Christian reader; and venture to add, that many such readers will find their faith in God much comforted, strengthened, and confirmed, by the perusal.

Chapter XXVI. is intitled Propositions founded on the preceding chapters, and inferences drawn from them, which are most necessary for, and useful to, mankind." It forms a chain of forty-six propositions, so linked together that they run naturally into one another, and hang together so firmly, that to destroy one, would be to destroy all. These propositions may be called the aphorisms of the light of nature and revelation. They are comprehensive, clear, short, pertinent; and correspond in every respect to the intention of the author. We confess we have seldom, if ever, seen so much truth comprehended in so small a compass; and we are of opinion, that these propositions will be generally useful, whilst we hazard the hint, that if the reader would commit them to memory, he would not lose his labour; for upon every reflection, any one of them would afford him much pleasure and profit. Upon the whole, we confidently recommend these two volumes to the notice of the public, and congratulate society in general upon receiving such a boon. We hope the work will be admitted into the divinity halls of the United Kingdom, as a class-book for young divines; and confidently add, that the classes of moral

philosophy will find it to their advantage to bestow some time in perusing it. In the mean while, we conclude our review by saying, that if the readers find as much entertainment, and we hope we may add, edification, in the perusal of the work, as we have done, they will not fail to give it a second reading, which it at once deserves and requires.

Augustus; or the Ambitious Student. 8vo. Lond. 1820. Baldwin. pp. 356.

To trace the history and progress of the human mind has hitherto been the province of the philosopher and the metaphysician, who have defined, and subtilized, and refined upon the subject, until they have but too often involved themselves and their readers in a labyrinth of inextricable confusion. If it has been thus with the operations of the mind in general, still more unfortunate has been the developement, or attempted developement, of the effect of an ardent devotion to literary pursuits, upon the disposition, character, and feelings of the devotee. The biographers of men of genius have, in too many cases, had little or nothing of hopes or of fears, of joys or of sorrows, of pursuits or of disappointments, of tone, of character, or feeling, in common with the subjects of their memoirs. They have told us when and where they lived and died, and how they looked, and what they wrote. They have studiously raked together all the stories in circulation, of their eccentricities, their follies, and their vices; but seldom is it that they have attempted to trace these to their source, and still less frequently that the attempt has been crowned with success. We admit that genius is often eccentric; but it is not necessarily so, at least to any thing like the extent which the lives of its possessors have frequently displayed. In many instances, especially amongst the lower species of this elevated class,-borderers on mere common talent,-inhabitants, perhaps, of a land debatable, this eccentricity is generally affected; whilst in spirits of a higher mould it is as generally induced by circumstances often fortuitous, seldom essentially connected with the possession of exalted talents, or their devotion to literary pursuits. At the same time, however, we mean not to contend that there is not usually a something particular in the train of thinking, of feeling, and of acting, habitual to men of genius, which the world around may set down for eccentricities, when in fact

the deviation from that line of conduct which ought to be pursued by a rational being, is entirely on their own side. But to render this apparent, the principles on which men of superior minds are wont to act, the habits in which they are trained,-the feelings they most fondly cherish,-the vexations to which they are exposed,-the pleasures they enjoy, should be delineated by one who has either felt and acted as he describes, or at least been most intimately conversant with the scenes, the principles, and the feelings which mark the order of beings whose character he would pourtray. Such an one we hoped to find in the author of the work before us, and to a certain extent our hopes have not been disappointed. He is evidently a man of genius, though not of the highest order; yet are there in his composition many traces of the common features of the family, in some of whose difficulties and crosses, had he not told us himself, we should have suspected that he had participated, we hope but to triumph over them, and to participate in its pleasures, with as little of alloy as falls to the lot of humanity in this, perhaps, the most sensitive of its varieties.

There is in his very preface a strong indication of his thinking and acting for himself, in lieu of following in the beaten path of men of every-day acquirements,-a conciousness of his own strength, mingled with an anxiety for the estimation in which his first essay may be held; which we conceive to be some of the characteristics of genius.

"The diffidence of the author of the present work," he there tells us, "is great, from causes which are only fully known to himself. Thrown into the wide world while yet an infant, to struggle honourably through his difficulties, unprotected, cheerless, and alone, animated by a remembrance only of the past, to labour in the restoration of what misfortune had early deprived him, he appeared, considering the bent of his mind, to be naturally led to regard the public as his patron. He had been made to feel the severity of the world too deeply to await with confidence the approaches of patronage and friendship; and he felt therefore animated by those cheering words of Goldsmith, that the public will ever be found to be the best patron to the literary character. The good which the author has drawn from his studies, as it has been his only happiness, has naturally inspired him with a fervid zeal for knowledge; but whether his zeal for the good of others, which he presumes to be evinced in the present production, will be equally successful, can alone be determined by generous and impartial criticism. He can only aver, in extenuation of his literary faults, that, deeply impressed with the respect due to a British public, he has rigorously contracted his

work within the narrowest limits necessary for his literary plan; and, in the unassisted progress of his mind, has laboured to render his book as useful as possible, and, perhaps, with too little regard to the more agreeable modes of writing. The great purposes of his work, however, to afford encouragement to the youthful mind to pursue the most honourable career of ambition-to look generously and nobly upon the world-to render its studies and its sufferings instrumental to its happiness, he feels convinced, will ensure him the support of all who are engaged in the same philanthropic cause, and who can look with generosity upon the more immature offerings of an unsupported candidate." [preface, pp. iii-v.]

The

We have extracted this passage, because, to our apprehension, it is well calculated to bespeak the favour of the public on behalf of an author, who seems to be actuated by principles and by motives very different to those but too generally prevalent with the writers of this book-making generation. How he has executed his purpose, we will endeavour to inform our readers as briefly as we can. hero of the piece is the second of three sons of a German merchant, who had retired from business upon a competent fortune, the fruits of his own industry, with a very exalted opinion of those who had risen in life by their own merit and application, though his was merit and application of a peculiar sort, or rather directed into a peculiar channel. The lessons which his own experience and observation had taught him, of the incalculable advantages,to those who would get forward in the world, of perseverance, and a laudable ambition, not too lofty to spurn at any thing that could further their advancement, nor yet too low to be easily depressed by disappointment and temporary defeats, were sedulously inculcated on the minds of his children.

"And, although many wise individuals had undertaken to prove the dangers of ambition, and its total opposition to the ordinary character of happiness; yet he had never been able to comprehend any other felicity, than that which arises from the view of an increasing reputation. Of vigorous habits and an enterprising temper, he had always looked contemptuously upon indolent habits of life; and always considered him to be an unworthy citizen, who did not contribute to the prosperity of his country." [p. 3.]

As far as the latter sentiment is concerned, we cannot but approve the views and conduct of the old merchant : and as he had sufficient of this world's goods to leave to each of his sons a small independency, we quarrel not with