is needless to say that no such record of the English Constitution has ever appeared; and that the word, as applied to the English government, can denote no settled form of polity, but only that form to which it suits the speaker's interest to apply it. A political constitution, however, of some sort, being essential to the public welfare, the epithet constitutional has acquired in the abstract a eulogistic sense, and impresses the unreflecting with some notion of undefined excellence. How fatal this error may become, where what is constitutional depends on the authority of the speaker, it is not difficult to perceive. It is scarcely necessary to pursue the investigation farther."

Balance of Power, as between the three branches of the state, King, Lords, and Commons, is an expression absolutely devoid of meaning; the functions of government cannot be performed without action; but bodies in equipoise must, with reference to each other, be entirely at

rest.

18. Allegorical Idols.

This fallacy, which is only a modification of the preceding, consists in substituting for men's proper official denomination, some general term to which an idea of excellency is attached: as government, for the members of the governing body; the church, for churchmen; the law, for lawyers. The device is used with the view of securing to individuals, and to the bad parts of an institution, the respect attached to the institution at large, and by that means, of exempting them from the control of public opinion. Propose to examine the conduct of a minister,-point out an abuse from which he derives an advantage,— the answer is at hand; you are an enemy to the government.' So, in whatever manner the imperfections in the church establishment are brought to notice ;-the disproportion between pay and service, for instance, or the pernicious effects of tithes,-the cry of " enemy to the church," at once overwhelms the assailant.

19. Sweeping Classifications.

The fallacy of Sweeping Classifications ascribes to one individual the qualities possessed by another, merely because the two have been classed together under a common name. The fallacy is equally applicable to undeserved eulogy as to undeserved censure; when employed for the purpose of undeserved censure, it scarcely differs from that species of vituperative personality which has already been noticed as "Imputation founded on identity of denomination." The injustice with which the Catholics of the present day are charged with a disposition to renew the barbarities of their ancestors, was fully pointed out under that section, and one example more will now suffice. In the heat of the French revolution, when Louis was yet on his trial, among the means employed for bringing about the result that followed, was the publication of a pamphlet entitled "The crimes of Kings." The object of the writer was obviously to ensnare his readers into some such reasoning as the following: "Criminals ought to be punished: kings are criminals, and Louis is a king; therefore Louis ought to be punished." It is needless to expose so gross a fallacy. But it was with a view to the same kind of reasoning that during one of the debates on Catholic Emancipation, a book was put forth with the title of "Cruelties of the Catholics."

20. Reproach of Popular corruption.

This fallacy consists in imputing to the people such a degree of political depravity and corruption, as to render useless any changes in our system of representation. "Instead of reforming Parliament, reform yourselves;" "The corruption is in the people not in the government." Such is the tone usually assumed, and which, whether sincere or affected, is the result of a thick confusion of ideas. The charge is, that the governed will, like the governing, sacrifice when they can, to their private interest, their share in the general interest of the community; and instead of exercising in the choice of representatives a discretion beneficial to the public, will vote for the individual who has most ability to serve their private interests if they fa-' vour him, or to injure them if they vote against him.

That, in the present state of political knowledge, they will do this for the most part when they can, is pretty clear, from the predominating influence of that regard for self which has already been explained, as so necessary not only to our welfare, but to our very existence. Unchecked by laws and by appropriate political institutions, this feeling, so salutary in the main, will unquestionably in some directions be productive of pernicious effects, but this affords the stronger reason for framing and establishing those appropriate institutions, instead of ignorantly lamenting the existence of the feeling, or reproaching the people with a more than ordinary submission to its influence. If there be any means by which it can be rendered im-' possible for an elector to serve his private interest at the expence of the general interest of the community; if all motives to do this can be removed out of his way, and the only motives which shall be left to operate upon him, shall be those which will induce him to further to the best of his ability his share in the general interest of the community, it is unjust and absurd to reproach him with yielding to a temptation which it is the duty of the legislature to remove out of his

way.

That such means may easily be found, cannot be doubtful to those who have considered the mode of election procedure by ballot. When the candidate has no means of ascertaining with certainty which way the elector has given his vote, it is useless to threaten, foolish to promise, and almost lost labour even to canvass. When the elector is protected, if he chooses, by the secrecy of this mode of procedure, from being deprived of his farm or his customer, for giving a conscientious vote; when no man will offer him a bribe even though he be willing to receive it, because it can never be ascertained whether or not he has voted as the briber directs; no course remains but to. serve the general interest, by voting for an able and upright man.

21. Anti-rational fallacies.

When reason is adverse to a man's interests, he will naturally feel an antipathy to any exercise of the faculty, and so long as abuses exist in the administration of government, they who profit by them will endeavour to render the powers of reason, and even thought itself, an object of contempt. This is accomplished by speaking of every intel-lectual process in a tone of sarcasm and ridicule. If a plan does not suit the interests of an official person, who is unable to assign any'

valid objection against it, he saves himself the trouble of rational discussion, by pronouncing it speculative or theoretical; he will hold up the word theory, and even plan, project, system, as exciting ideas of distrust and apprehension. "Looking at the House of Commons,' says one of these orators, my object would be to find out its chief defects, and attempt the remedy of them one by one," (snail's-pace argument,) "To propose no system, no great project, nothing which pretended even to the name of a plan, but to introduce in a temperate and conciliatory manner, one or two separate bills."

Now a theory is formed out of general conclusions drawn from the collection and comparison of facts. Facts taken alone and by themselves are altogether useless; and the sum of every man's knowledge is in effect made up of the number and extent of his theories. Undoubtedly there are bad theories as well as good; but it would be as absurd to proscribe all theory, because some is bad, as to proscribe all reasoning, because some reasoning is a vehicle for fallacy. The honest course in such cases is, not to condemn a theory, plan, or system, merely because it is a theory, and bears the marks of rational contrivance, but to examine and point out in what respect, if any, it is likely to prove defective. If this were done, instead of the absurd expression which we often hear from the unreflecting, that a thing may be good in theory, but bad in practice, it would be found that whatever was bad in practice must be bad in theory also.

Thus, the scheme for lighting the streets with gas, held out to those who proposed to engage in it a larger profit than was warranted by the result; but upon examination of the scheme it was afterwards discovered that the projector had in his calculations inadvertently omitted the expence of iron pipes for conveying the gas. As to the expected profits, therefore, the project was bad in practice, because it was bad in theory. If indeed a theory is nothing more than from a general survey and comparison of the means in possession and the end in view, to adapt the one to the other for the purpose of practice, it is not easy to perceive how that which is bad in practice can be good in theory. According to this strange absurdity, the very goodness of a plan, has sometimes been urged as a ground for its rejection. "It is too good to be practical :” an objection which has been sufficiently answered by the foregoing exposition.

To the epithets speculative and theoretical, are often added in the same sense, or by way of aggravation and climax, those of visionary, chimerical, romantic, Utopian. If these words have any meaning-beyond that of the speaker's dislike to the measure against which he directs them, it is, that in his estimation the measure is impracticable. If this be so, it would be so easy to state why he entertains such an opinion; what he esteems to be difficulties in the way of carrying the measure into execution; what the causes of its probable failure; that when in lieu of this, he merely resorts to vituperative and contemptuous expressions, it may safely be inferred he has no such objections to urge.

Besides the set who find their account in every instrument of delusion which can mystify the intellects of mankind, the anti-rational fallacies are singularly acceptable to three extensive classes of.men.-To the idle and frivolous, who hate the trouble; to the ignorant, who have

not the means; and to the dull, who have not the power of thinking on intricate and extensive subjects. Their ease and their vanity conspire in inducing them to get rid of thought, and these fallacies are the most efficient instruments for the purpose: an expression of scorn levelled at the author of this trouble, is at once likely to operate as a suppression of the evil, and as a punishment, however inadequate, for the disturbance attempted to be given to honourable repose.

22. Paradoxical Assertion.

The object of the preceding fallacy, is, as we have seen, to bring into disesteem the faculty of reason itself. The fallacy of paradoxical assertion proposes to cast discredit on the only modes in which reason can be usefully employed. With this view the principle of utility, (or that which seeks to establish the greatest happiness of the greatest number, as the paramount object of morals and legislation,) has been denounced as a useless or even dangerous principle; classification, method, and simplification, as frivolous impediments to knowledge, and political disinterestedness, as a mark of the basest profiligacy .

The object of those who pronounce in the same breath, the extravagance, that things which are useful, are at the same time and on that very account, not useful, is the same as theirs who decry that quality of discourse which is known by the name of method or classification. By following a methodical rule the elements of good and bad are extracted from the details of every measure, and brought to view in the state best fitted for comparison. How far the opposite state of confusion and darkness, is better suited to the purposes of those who profit by a system in which the interests of the many are sacrificed to the interests of the few, is too obvious to require further elucidation. It is true, that in order to arrive at correct conclusions in the application of the principle of utility, a concurrence of intelligence, discernment, patience and integrity, is requisite; of each of them, no inconsiderable amount; while nothing more than a moderate share of ignorance, impudence, and improbity, is necessary to qualify a man for pronouncing decisions in the true ipse-dixit style; but whether it be safer to act on decisions so pronounced, than to search for correct deductions from the principle of utility,-whether the compass should be thrown overboard, because it occasionally varies,-whether the principle of utility should be stigmatised as dangerous, and abandoned, because men may occasionally err in the application of it,-is left to the ingenious reader to determine.

23. Cause and Obstacle confounded:

Non causa pro causâ; or Cum hoc, ergo propter hoc.

In every political system of long standing, which has not been pro. duced in prosecution of any comprehensive design, but piecemeal, at different and distant times, according to the predominance of conflicting interests, among the incidents which may compose the general result, some will be found to have operated as promotive causes, others as obstacles, and others, as uninfluencing circumstances. It is obvious, that if the system contain any good points, the beneficial effects • See Burke's pamphlet on his Official Economy Bill.

arising from them are not occasioned by the abuses or imperfections of the system, but that such abuses must have operated as obstacles. The fallacy in question consists in representing the obstacles, or at least the uninfluencing circumstances as the cause of the beneficial results; it is the converse of the preceding fallacy, which represented evil as occasioned by good; whereas this represents good as occasioned by evil.

It would be easy to shew, for instance, if this were the proper place, that if the English have been less ill-governed and more prosperous than other European nations, such comparative exemption from mis-government, and such prosperity, have been mainly occasioned by the greater degree of publicity which, through the press and other means, has always attended our legislative and judicial proceedings; this publicity having created a tribunal of public opinion, to which, in the long run, our rulers have been more or less obliged to submit. It would be equally easy to shew, that among the causes which have contributed to promote misgovernment, and impede us in the career of prosperity, the most active and prevailing has been the system of our parliamentary representation: a system, by which a few powerful families are, to a considerable extent, enabled to apply to their own purposes the immense sums of money annually collected from the people in the way of taxation.

The orator, however, who profits by this disposition of the public money, and has, therefore, some small interest in supporting this state of the representation, jumbles together publicity, representation, (virtual representation as he calls it,) hereditary monarchy, and an hereditary court of justice, in one lump, which he calls the system, or the constitution, and then expatiating on the general prosperity of the country, affirms, that the system "works well in practice;" by this he would have it inferred, and the illogical heads of his hearers intoxicated by his glowing descriptions, have accordingly inferred, that the prosperity so described, is entirely owing to that virtual representation, which, by the waste of the public resources, has mainly contributed to check its career. Much in the same way, the influence of the crown and the seats possessed by the bishops in the House of Lords, have been represented as being among the causes of good government; the system of education pursued at the universities, as the cause of national learning; the usury laws, as the cause of national wealth; and the opulence of the clergy as the cause of national virtue.

Luckily, it is easy to discomfit by the single monosyllable "How ?” the sophist who employs this fallacy; if these effects are produced by this cause, shew us how: we cannot admit it upon unsupported assertion

Real knowledge depends in a great degree on the being able to distinguish from each other, causes, obstacles, and uninfluencing circumstances, and if the querist is able to pursue this division, he will have little difficulty in exposing the ignorance or dishonesty of his opponent.

24. Fallacy of Partiality.

"From the abuse argue not against the use."

When abuses are too plain to be denied, the system may yet b de