that when the noble lord was calculating upon grounds very little better than loose conjecture, with a view to deprecate a system for which he offered no substitute whatever, he ought at least to have kept within the bounds of moderation. If the noble lord had made any proposition in lieu of that which he condemned, he would have been much more entitled to attention. But the noble lord offered nothing. Ordinary recruiting, the noble lord had, for years, repeatedly maintained, was inadequate to supply the wants of the army, and therefore he could not recommend it in the present instance; nor did he say that the ballot ought to be revived, or a requisition attempted, Even the addi, tional force act the noble lord would not enforce; for to enforce it would be to produce no men but money, as the noble lord knew. The question was, as to the choice be tween requisition and inducement. What would the noble lord desire? He would not surely support requisition-nor would he attempt to support unlimited bounties; yet if those bounties were not tolerated, recourse must be had to other inducements-Parliament must resort to the one or to the other-either to unlimited bounties, which operated as a premium for desertion, or limited service, which held out allurements to the recruit, by conferring a benefit upon the soldier. In one part of the noble lord's speech it was remarkable that he talked much of the length of a man's life, which, according to his estimate, generally reached to sixty years. Here, however, it was the noble lord's object to enlarge the amount of the expence to be incurred by the right honourable secretary's project. But yet when he came to that part where it was desirable to him to depreciate the ope ration of this project, the noble lord maintained, that seven years being equal to the general estimate of a man's life, the people would be as little influenced by the mention of that period as if it were proposed to them to enlist for life. Upon such an estimate of a man's life, and the observation deduced from it, it was unnecessary to argue. Common sense must suggest to any man a sufficient answer to it. He would appeal to the plainest understanding whether, if a tenant who held a lease for seven years, were to apply to his landlord to exchange it for a lease of his life, the landlord would listen to the proposition? or whether, if a tenant held a lease for life, he would accede to the proposal of his landlord to exchange it for one of seven years? To state such a case was enough to expose the futility of the remark alluded

to. But to return to the subject of limited service; the principle was not only sanctioned by the measures to which he had already referred, but particularly recognised by that provision which granted a bounty to such men as volunteered from the limited to unlimited service. There was, however, much more in the right honourable secretary's plan than mere limited service, to procure soldiesr, and to please the public. But the noble lord's objection seemed principally to apply to limited service. The noble lord himself, however, bore testimony to the effects which must arise from 'such a measure, when he stated that its adoption would tend to nothing less than to create a mutiny among the veterans in the army, and also to excite discontents in the navy. And why? truly because it proposed to confer what the noble lord considered an extraordinary benefit on the army. But, upon this point it was to be recollected, that although in the American war seventyeight thousand men were raised for limited service, and in the last French war, forty thousand, still no symptom of discontent appeared among the veterans or the navy. But the idea of such discontent existing was quite preposterous. To suppose that any discontent could arise in the navy in consequence of any military arrangement benefiting the soldiery, would be to indulge a supposition by no means honourable to, or consistent with the character of those who belong to our navy. As to the veterans, the noble lord's argument stood thus:-The army were satisfied without any addition to their pay or pensions, and yet when an addition was to be made to both, they were, the noble lord stated, to become extremely discontented. So much with regard to the noble lord's allusion to the discontents likely to arise from the plan and the new operation of the inducements which it held out. Now, as to the connection which the project under discussion had with the cause of liberty, the noble lord seemed to argue as if to give the soldier an interest in civil liberty, to furnish him with additional reasons for attachment to the constitution of his country, was to damp his zeal. What, that when the pay of a soldier was increased-when his period of service was limited-when he had the prospect of returning to the enjoyment of his country's rights, that he would be less eager in her cause! If that were really the case--that when all the motives were afforded which could serve to animate a soldier's mind, that an English soldier would be insensible,

that

that he would be damped, the thing was incredible; but if it were so, then England was to be defended by satellites, and not by soldiers, and the constitution was to rely for its security on an army insensible to its value, and unworthy of living under its auspices. If the English were really such a force, then the old excitement to patriotic valour, the pro aris et focis, had ceased to have weight. If such degeneracy had taken place, an army of Prussians or Mamelukes would answer as well for the defence of this country; for, according to this, our army was become mere machines, and ceased to be Englishmen; if such were the ease, how much had all the provisions failed which were taken to attach the military to the constitution of the country-in fact, to interfuse as much as was practicable the military with the civil character. With that view military officers were permitted to sit in Parliament notwithstanding their dependance on the crown. This permission was always allowed from the evident policy of cultivating an intercourse between the military and the constitution of the country. The officer from such an intercourse was, of course, more likely to excite in the minds of the soldiery, a just reverence for freedom, and when a soldier was furnished with a comfortable livelihood, that must naturally tend to enhance his estimate of himself and his country. Indeed none was ever to be found in the military character by whom liberty had been always so highly prized as by the old English soldier. One of the objects of the right honourable secretary's plan was to give the soldier a competent subsistence; and of this he particularly approved. Every sentiment of humanity, justice, and policy, called for the assignment of an adequate provision to the soldiery, after they had become unable to serve. This too holding out to them the prospect of having a permanent interest in the state, formed an additional stimulus to their zeal while in the service. To create this interest had always been the policy of wise states. The Romans would allow none into the army, but those who were possessed of property, because without it they did not suppose that men were likely to feel much interest in the state. In consequence of this, the population were divided into six classes, the lowest of whom, because destitute, were deemed unworthy to be trusted with arms. That wise people were therefore particular about the construction and character of their army, and so they continued until towards the period of their de

cline.

cline. They then changed their system. They entrusted their defence to the prætorian bands, and their liberty was soon the victim. Their bands became bad soldiers as well as bad subjects, and they soon waited on their emperor to request his order to assassinate the senate. This institution having extinguished the liberty of the Romans, that people, because they soon felt they had nothing to fight for, speedily lost their greatness, their independence, and character. The consequences the Romans experienced from committing their country to the protection of the satellites were two-fold-first, their constitution was lost; secondly, their army degenerated, and became terrible only to their friends, while they became insignificant in the estimation of their enemies. Another reason for keeping up and improving the character of our army, arose out of a consideration of our present circumstances with regard to France. The flower of the French, said the honourable gentleman, which is prepared to act against you, must not be opposed by the refuse of the English. I do not of course mean to call the generality of your army the refuse of your country; but certainly you may have a better sort, and unless you combat the flower of the enemy with the flower of your own. people, your case is perilous. But if you will bring forward the force, which it is in your power to collect, inspired with the disposition which Englishmen never fail to feel when contending for their country, fired with that spirit which is the natural result of their constitution, with the public mind, as it were, marching along with their lines, there can be no doubt as to the issue of the contest. What any army are competent to, the British people are competent to do, when properly marshalled, and the right honourable secretary's plan is calculated to produce that effect. The people are to be trained, and thus the casualties of the army in the event of invasion may be filled up. By similar means the Fabian general was enabled to maintain himself upon the Sabine hill, until he found it convenient to come down upon the enemy. If the Romans were not a military people, Fabius could not have so acted and saved Rome, and if you are placed on the same footing neither your independence nor your liberty are safe; you must indeed become either a military government, or a military people; you have such an armed regular army in the country at this moment, at least your liberties, notwithstanding your volunteers, almost at the mercy of the crown, if a

King

King chose to try the experiment. I know we have every security against any such attempt in the character of the present family upon the throne, but I wish to consider the King in the abstract, without considering who may be King at the time. I would exhort you to take every means of interweaving the interests of the army with your civil rights. Such conduct is necessary to maintain the character of your army, and the safety and the constitution of your country. As to your constitution indeed, if that were gone, your national safety could not long survive it, for the spirit which results from the one is that alone which can preserve the other. If your constitution were no more, the conflicts to be expected between the crown and the people would speedily bring you to fight the battles of France in England. Therefore the right honourable secretary has been wise in connecting the popular with the regular army, and so interesting the latter in popular rights as to guard against such dangers as I have alluded to. This brings me to consider the assertion, that the interference of the House is an encroachment on the royal prerogative. But the annual discussion of the mutiny bill is a sufficient answer to that assertion. The assertion I have alluded to, I maintain to be in the highest degree uncon-stitutional; and that the troops of the line are, strictly speaking, a parliamentary army. The mutiny bill, indeed, on the face of it, recognizes the right and authority to which I refer; and any king or minister who should advise a king to deal with that army in any manner inconsistent with the prescription of Parliament, would be guilty of a breach of the bill of rights. The honourable gentleman conjured gentlemen on all sides of the House to devote their minds to the great object to which the measure before the House alluded; observing that they should be more adverse to France than to one another, and that this was not a time to be occupied about little objects. You must, said the hon. gentleman, direct your minds to higher considerations than those discontents which may possibly arise among the navy or among veteran soldiers. Let your difficulties be measured by your danger, and those difficulties must be great hat should obstruct your progress. Look at the perilous grandeur of the power that assails you, and reflect upon the means necessary to maintain your own elevation. Do not suffer yourselves to be drawn aside from the proper provisions for your security by financial calculations. You VOL. III. i805-6.

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were