subject of Arabic as blended with Persian), the student who desires a very critical knowlege of grammatical niceties, may consult the heavy quartos to which I have above alluded, with considerable advantage; and they will be found most especially useful to those resident in our Indian settlements. But among

my literary acquaintances I could enumerate three at least, who, without the assistance of any living master, or of any grammar besides Sir Wm. Jones's, have acquired such a knowlege of the Persian language, that they are enabled, with the help of Richardson's or Meninski's Dictionaries, to read, understand, and highly enjoy, some of the most difficult works, not only printed, but manuscript, as I have witnessed in hearing them translate various passages from the Shahnameh of Firdausi, the Divan of Saadi and of Hafiz, the Tarikh or chronicle of Tabari, and other rare compositions.

P. V. ›

RHODIAN INSCRIPTION.

IN continentibus urbis Rhodi jacuit diu, proxime monasterium Franciscanorum, lapis inversus, hanc habens inscriptionem :

ΞΗΝΩΝΝΑΟΥΜΟΥ

ΑΡΑΔΙΟΣ ΠΡΟΞΕΝΟΣ
ΔΙ ΣΩΤΗΡΙ

285.

quæ edita est tam a Britanno CLARKIO (Travels, tom. iii.p. 8vo. ed. 4.) quan a Germano Jos. VON HAMMER; (Topogr. Ansichten der Levante, p. 163. n. 14. cf. Tab. quarta et p. 79. in nota) et ab hoc quidem emendatè, ab illo ita ut primo versu pro MOY legeretur NOY.

Levicula tota res est: sed quandoquidem et leviora interdum utilia esse possunt iis qui in aliqua antiquitatis parte singulatim operam ponunt, et contra etiam leviores errores gravioribus interdum viam muniunt; haud exspectandum censui, donec Musei Lugduno Batavi inscriptiones edi possint, ut bauc illustrarem. Atque adeo spero sic ab utriusque itinerarii lectoribus aliquam initum iri gratiam.

CLARKIUS primum versum de pluribus hominibus, qui dedicaverint, accipit; sed difficultatem interpretandi sentiens, sicco pede transit HAMMERUS in tres voces Envæv vao pop dividens, vertit quasi Evwy scriptum sit, uasi genitivus pendeat a posvos,

et 'Agádios sit nomen proprium. Quæ difficilis constructio Latine sic quodammodo foret:

Hospitum templi mei

Aradius patronus (sive proxenus)
Jovi Servatori.

Lapis ipse nuperrime a ROTTIERSIO, viro strenuo, huc advectus cum aliis multis monumentis, Regis nostri jussu in Museum Lugduno Batavum illatus est, ita ut per otium multaque luce inspici potuerit, quod sine dubio viris illis celebribus, propter situm inversum, minus expeditum fuit. Sic ergo verior interpretatio haud difficulter se obtulit:

Xenon Naumi F

ab Arado, patronus (sc. proxenus)
Jovi Servatori.

Adparet neutrum editorem de Phoeniciis nominibus propriis cogitasse: Nomina dico, quippe neque Evwv, magis quam Naoupos, Græcæ est consuetudinis, nisi fortasse quadratarius perperam sic incidit pro Zývav. Naumi nomen e veteri Testamento notius

est.

Qui Proxeni fuerint, hujus loci non est, ut multis inquiramus. Consulibus mercatoriis hodiernis fere similes, auctoritate publica constitutos, intelligit REISKIUS in Indice Græcitatis Demosthenea.

Ab Arado, urbe Phoenicia, multi commercii, advenas Rhodi habitasse res ipsa facit ut credamus. Est et exemplum Architecti ab Arado CALLIE, qui Rhodiis, in obsidione DEMETRII POLIORCETE, helepolim hostium se intra muros translaturum promisit, nec effecit, memoratum a VITRUVIO (X. 22.).

C. J. C. Reuvens. Scrib. Lugd. Bat. Kal. Febr. c1ɔɔcccxxvii.

REMARKS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

1. THIS work exhibits the meridian light of human reason unaided by revelation.

2. It teaches us the difference between right but unassisted reason seeking light, with simplicity and diligence, in the dark ness of nature; and spurious reason seeking darkness, in order to shun and evade the sun-shine of revelation.

3. It prepares us for understanding more perfectly the New

Testament in respect to its language, reasoning, analogies, and wisdom; on which heads I beg leave to make a few observations.

First, in respect to its language. The New Testament seldom defines the meaning of the terms which it uses in common with Aristotle, signifying the virtues and the vices. Aristotle's Ethics supply the deficiency; and much light would be thrown on these terms in the New Testament by recurring to his definitions and distinctions; for it was not the proper object of revelation to make known what might be learned without revelation.

Secondly, in respect to its reasoning, there is much reasoning in the New Testament which is hardly apprehended by a person utterly ignorant of the system of logic instituted by Aristotle.

The person who has not learned to select and define terms, and to adhere to them, because no two terms are synonymous; to distinguish the different senses in which terms are used, absolutely and relatively, in precise and popular, and technical uses, is as little competent to understand St. Paul, as he is to comprehend Aristotle's Ethics. The logic of them both is one and the same, founded on the immoveable and eternal principles of truth. For instance, it is mistaken reasoning to deny the existence of plurality in unity, and of unity in plurality, either in the divine or human nature; to deny equality and unity of substance on account of inequality of person; and to make no distinction between sacraments as nominally and really defined, and as absolutely and relatively considered; as also not to dis tinguish between popular or rhetorical language, which calls the sign by the name of the thing signified, and that precise mode of speech which denies that the sign is really the thing signified. The predicaments of Aristotle have been despised in the present age, because they have been thought not to appertain to logic. I shall not dispute about terms; but what I here mean by logic is the art of reasoning; and in the art of reasoning I particularly intend as most important, definition, predicament, and method, because most commonly violated. It is to ignorance of these, as either taught or practically exhibited in the Ethics of Aristotle, that we may trace the perpetual misapprehension of the reasonings of our Lord and of his Apostles, so well understood by the reformers, who had not yet learned to despise rules for the improvement and direction of the understanding. The science of logic is to reasoning, what that of arithmetic is to numbering. Arithmetic, by its rules, does not merely render computation certain and expeditious; but by its authority it determines a question on numeration without appeal. Logic

might and ought to do the same in its province. The Ethics of Aristotle are perhaps the finest exemplification in existence of the application and use of definition, distinction, and method. They are in reality, what many fancy mathematics to be, logic exemplified in practice. Euclid can never teach us to apply the categories, which are the most important part of reasoning. Neither should it be passed over, that the style of the Ethics is precisely that which is most adapted to the demonstration of moral truth. In the didactic style, the sentences should be short, and their connexion marked by repetition of terms, as in the Gospel of St. John.

This is a style, which those who have not principally in eye the demonstration of truth, either despise or shun. The aim at elegance and variation of expression tend much to obscure every work of science. To evince the vast importance of logic, nothing would be so useful as to publish its rules, with examples of deviation from them taken from modern illogical and sophistical authors and talkers; and vice versa, to confirm its rules from Scripture and logical writers.

This is a wide field, and should comprehend a statement of the different modes by which a sophist attempts to perplex truth.

Modern self-called philosophers propose questions sometimes so framed, that they cannot be answered by a simple Yes or No. Such questions come from the father of lies. If either the Yes or the No be not given without qualification, they boast that they have silenced their opponent. Be it known, then, that the proper answer to a question is a question; to an assertion, an assertion; and to an argument, an argument.

There is another prevailing fallacy in the reasoning of most men at the present day. They feel certain difficulties respecting a doctrine, and therefore they will not assent to it. They do not, after the example of judges on the bench, collect and sum up the pros and cons, and survey the object in the aggregate, and assent or dissent according to the preponderance of arguments on the contrary, they take a partial view of a case; but a partial view is not a fair view; a fair view, is a comprehension and estimate of all the phenomena which we can discover. To this illogical method of attending to difficulties, rather than to estimating entire subjects, modern infidelity is so far owing, that were the logic of the persons described rectified, it were impossible for them to maintain infidelity by argument. lufidelity could not be supported by a method and process of reasoning similar to that used in the Ethics of Aristotle; and

therefore it is of the greatest importance to acquire a practical knowlege of Aristotle's method, that we may not ourselves be deceived or deceive others by irrational acts and arts of judgment. If we would reason well, our words must be selected, defined, and cemented, as stones for building; our propositions must rest as firmly and closely on one another as the stones in a well-built wall; our conclusions must be raised on their premises as firmly as the tiers of stone are placed on each other in the building. This is logical method, very inconvenient to the sophist either to employ or to assail. But if reason be the distinguishing faculty of man, the instruction of the reason is the distinguishing part of the education of man according to wisdom, human and divine.

1

The third head is the analogy of visible and invisible things which Aristotle mentions. Δει γαρ ύπερ των αφανών τους φανεροις μαρτυρίοις χρησθαι : and so says St. Paul, Τα γαρ αορατά αυτού τοις ποιήμασι νοουμενα καθοραται : compare John ii. 19. and 1 Cor. i. 22. and ii. 7. where is intended that the science which the Gentiles would have without analogy, is revealed only by analogy; for no sense of man has perceived the objects of revelation; and 1 Cor. xiii. 10-12. where it is shown, that our present knowlege will be done away with, because it is analogical, not real. A mystery is a type (Suicerus), and all that is known by a type is, as it were, known not in itself, but in its picture, or image; but when the reality shall have been seen, the picture will be useless. Such are the outward and spiritual signs of an inward and spiritual grace, so often confounded with the things signified. And whence arises this confusion of mind, but from inattention to the meaning of terms; as for instance, to the meaning of the terms, sign, mystery, sacrament? A sign surely cannot be the thing of which it is a sign; a means cannot be an end; a pledge cannot be the thing pledged. Mys tery and sacrament are the same in meaning. Mystery is the Bible word, which the Latin church renders by sacrament. The Greek church used the Bible word, and it is adopted in the Greek version of the English Liturgy.

The mistakes that are commonly made respecting the meaning of the church catechism, would afford ample illustration of the sad consequences of inattention to the analogy of things visible and invisible. This analogy was familiar to our reformers, and to the nation at large.

The fourth head is wisdom. "As knowlege," saith Bishop Wilkins, "doth respect things absolutely, so wisdom doth consider the relations of things one to another, under the notion of