with what is suitable for the attainment of heavenly beatitude" (1. i., c. 15). And elsewhere even more expressly he speaks of "divine worship, towards which kings and princes should aim with their whole endeavour and anxiety, as towards their due end." (l. ii., c. 16. See the original quoted in note to p. 78). Nay, as if to show still more clearly that he is not speaking of any power delegated by the Church, he extends his remarks to every monarchy [which has existed] from the beginning of the world." * From this, one conclusion at all events follows. Even though it had been true that Suarez and other theologians teach differently, we should have had to choose between their authority on one side and S. Thomas's on the other.

Suarez's teaching, however, does not, in fact, at all diverge from S. Thomas's. He frequently says, indeed (we fully admit it), that the civil power does not regard spiritual good here, nor eternal felicity hereafter, as its proper end, whether proximate or ultimate;† but only the temporal good of the community. Nor can we at all wonder that such a mode of speech should be regarded by our opponents as decisive in their sense. Their obvious argument may be this: If the end of civil government be exclusively temporal good, the ruler (unless he receive some delegated power from the Church) transgresses his prescribed province, and in fact violates a strict obligation, if in his political measures he directly pursues a spiritual and supernatural end. We are quite confident, however, that Suarez's doctrine is totally different from this. And we will give our opponents their greatest possible advantage by confining our argument to that very chapter in which Suarez states, more emphatically than anywhere else, the proposition on which they rely. We refer to the eleventh chapter of his third book, "De Legibus." We will first show that it cannot possibly bear the sense which they affix to it; and, secondly, we will explain what we believe him to have really meant. They, on their side, will of course concede to us the indubitable fact, that throughout this chapter he is speaking of functions intrinsically appertaining to the civil governor, and that he is not supposing any delegation from the Church. First, then, if we will but believe Suarez's express words in this very chapter, it is absolutely certain that he raises no objection (but very much the contrary) against the civil governor

* In quâlibet monarchiâ ab initio sæculi tria se invicem per ordinem comitata sunt: divinus cultus, sapientia scholastica, et secularis potentia.

For instance: "Potestas civilis et jus civile per se non respiciunt æternam felicitatem supernaturalem vitæ future tanquam finem proprium vel proximum vel ultimum."-De Legibus, 1. iii., c. 11, n. 4.

pursuing a supernatural end in his policy and legislation. He says expressly that "Catholic legislators, in enacting their laws, may, and in part ought, to regard the supernatural end.”* He further lays it down, that a Catholic prince is actually under the obligation "of commanding nothing through this [civil] power which is contrary to the supernatural end, or may impede its attainment." + But if this be so, a Catholic prince, as prince, is bound to consider his people's supernatural good with no small degree of " circumspection" and attention. Suarez, however, goes further than this. He quotes, with complete approbation, S. Augustine's words concerning Catholic emperors: "We account them happy if they make their power a servant to His Majesty, for the purpose of spreading as widely as possible the worship of God." He cites, with no less approval, S. Leo's praise of Theodosius, because the latter "showed not only a royal but also a sacerdotal mind; and because he laboured to avert heresies and schisms." He merely adds the caution, that this positive promotion of supernatural interests by the civil government is ordinarily a matter, not of precept, but of counsel. Nothing can bring into stronger light the contrast between Suarez's doctrine and that of our opponents. Let us suppose the case of a Catholic prince who adopts some political measure, avowedly and exclusively, for the sake of a supernatural end; who devotes public money, e.g., to the support of certain priests, simply for the sake of the good thence accruing to souls. And let us further suppose that there is no question at all of any delegation of authority from the Church. What shall we say of his act? "He is

* Licèt ipsi legislatores fideles in suis legibus ferendis, intueri possint, et ex parte debeant, supernaturalem finem.-De Legibus, 1. iii., c. 11, n. 9.

66

Per circumspectionem nihil statuendi per hanc potestatem, quod sit contrarium fini supernaturali vel ejus consecutionem impedire possit. Quæ observantia est non tantùm in consilio sed etiam in præcepto maxime proprio Christiani ac Catholici principis. -n. 11. "Hanc finem [temporalem] semper intendit ipsa [civilis] potestas quatenus talis est; licèt utens illâ possit perfectius operari. Et hoc modo Leo papa laudat Theodosium, quod non solùm regium animum sed etiam sacerdotalem ostenderet, et quod curam haberet avertendi hæreses et schismata" (n. 10). Legislatio civilis . . actio honesta est. . ergo est de se apta referri ad finem supernaturalem. Ergo princeps Christianus facile potest in eam finem illam dirigere, et optimè faciet illam referendo, juxta illud Augustini, ubi de regibus Christianis sit: 'Felices eos dicimus, si suam potestatem ad Dei cultum maxime dilatandum majestati Ejus famulam faciunt'. . . . Est autem observandum, hanc relationem posse dupliciter fieri; primò per positivam ordinationem; et sic regulariter erit in consilio, nisi ubi speciale præceptum, vel necessitas ad illam obligaverit. . . . Secundò intelligi potest per negationem tantùm, seu per circumspectionem nihil statuendi," etc., as just now quoted.-n. 11.

violating an obligation," say our opponents; "he is fulfilling a counsel," says Suarez.

What then is Suarez's meaning, here and in other places, when he insists so much on the end of civil government as being merely temporal good? We reply, he is speaking throughout of the class of acts which the civil ruler has authority to command, and the class of offences which he has authority to punish.* The analysis of his argument is this: "The end for which God instituted civil government is temporal good; the ruler therefore has been entrusted with no other kind of authority except such as is requisite for that end. He may command his subjects to pay taxes, or to serve in the army; he may not command them (on his own authority) to frequent the sacraments and be regular at mass. He may punish them for robbery or murder; he may not punish them (unless the Church delegates to him spiritual jurisdiction) for eating meat on abstinence days, or for heresy. Such, then, and such only, is the authority with which God has entrusted him: it is temporal, and not spiritual. Nevertheless, he is under the obligation of not so exercising this temporal authority as to impede his people in attaining their supernatural end. Still further, he acts more perfectly and more according to counsel, in proportion as he more defers to the maxims of S. Augustine and S. Leo; in proportion as he more closely imitates the great Theodosius; in proportion (that is) as he more energetically devotes his temporal authority to the advancement of spirituals." This is a most definite and intelligible theory; and if we accept it as the clue to Suarez's meaning, we shall find that the whole chapter hangs together most naturally and consistently. For ourselves, we are not prepared to maintain that his reasoning is throughout satisfactory; but the conclusions at which he arrives, the whole doctrine which he lays down on the relation of civil government to spiritual good, is, in all essential particulars, identical with that advocated in the preceding pages.

And whenever scholastic theologians dwell on the proposition

"Dico, potestatem hanc civilem non extendi in materiâ vel actibus suis ad finem supernaturalem," are his words.

There are two points on which we have ventured to differ from Suarez here. Firstly, we consider that the immediate end for which civil government was instituted, is not temporal good in general, but one particular part of it-viz., the protection of person and property. Secondly, we consider that the ultimate end contemplated by God in the primary institution, is not temporal good only, but, much more, moral and spiritual-viz., all the moral and spiritual good which flows from security of person and property.

that civil government was instituted for a temporal end, they do so invariably (as we confidently maintain) in reference to the class of acts which the prince has authority to command and to punish. Nothing can be more alien from their whole structure of thought, from their express assertions and their undeviating implications, than the notion that a Catholic prince transgresses his intrinsic province by directing temporal authority to spiritual good.

It so happens that a recent publication furnishes us with an excellent indication of the Church's mind on this whole matter. An excellent French priest, M. Godard, put out a little volume two years ago on the Principles of '89. It was promptly placed on the Index, and as promptly revoked by the author. He at once proceeded to Rome, and put himself into communication with the most accredited theologians; and the result has been a second edition of his work, guaranteed by them as in no respect open to theological censure. We may be pretty sure, then, that if there be any important statement contained in the first edition, but omitted and contradicted in the second, such statement was accounted censurable by the Roman authorities. Now, in the condemned edition, M. Godard referred to the opinion, as tolerated among Catholics, that the sovereign's authority should not be directed to a spiritual end, but exclusively to a temporal one. In the approved edition, however, he speaks most differently, and implies that those who hold such an opinion are censurable. For himself he adds these remarkable words: "Although spiritual good in this life and eternal felicity in the next are not the immediate end of civil society, yet it ought to be organized and directed as far as possible in such a manner as to guide the individual towards his true end, to which all the rest should be subordinated. . . . The individual claims at the hands of society aid and protection to arrive at the absolute good, the supreme end of his existence."*

Here then for the present we close our argument, having completed indeed our abstract theoretical statement. In an early number (though not in the very next) we hope to

* Quoique le bien spirituel ici bas et la félicité de l'autre vie ne soient pas le but immédiat de la société civile, elle doit être néanmoins organisée et dirigée autant que possible de manière à conduire l'individu vers la fin dernière, à laquelle il faut subordonner tout le reste. . . . L'individu . réclame de la société aide et protection, pour arriver au bien absolu, but suprème de son existence.-Principes de '89, p. 152.

The excellent author of this work died, very soon after its appearance, at an early age, and to the deep regret of all who knew him.

resume the subject; for we have yet to treat the practical application of our theory. We have still to consider what relations, in fact, would exist between the ecclesiastical and civil governments, whenever both should duly perform their proper functions. We have further to meet the obvious objection that our theory would go far to justify Protestant governments in adopting a policy of injustice and persecution towards the Catholic Church. Lastly, we must apply our general theory to the special circumstances of the present time, and in particular to the case of a Catholic having part in the Legislature of these islands. We heartily regret that we have no room here to enter on these momentous discussions for we are well aware that there is at last no method of testing theoretical truth which is so good and satisfactory as that of considering in detail its practical application.

A few further remarks on the subject treated in this article, will be found in the first of our "Notices of Books."

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ART. IV.-ROSA FERRUCCI.

Rosa Ferrucci: ses Lettres et sa Mort.
Douniol, 1858.

Par l'Abbé Henri Perreyve. Paris:

IT

T has been matter of surprise to us that so remarkable a work as the "Life and Letters of Rosa Ferrucci," although published both in Italian* and French, has remained so little known amongst us. In these days, when men are anxious both to range great Italian names on the side of rebellion and schism, and to prove that the Italy of the past was unable to foster education and genius, it is well to draw attention to a collection of writings which so abundantly refutes the assertion.

Rosa Ferrucci was a very gifted being; she possessed natural talents of the highest order, and she had also the advantage of wise parents, who knew how to direct and cultivate the remarkable powers of her mind. Her father was a professor in the University of Pisa, and her mother an authoress of some celebrity. Rosa was taught well and learnt well. At six years old she could read Italian, French, and German.

*Rosa Ferrucci, e alcuni suoi Scritti, publicati per cura di sua madre. Florence: 1857. A second edition, which appeared in 1858, has been enriched with additional matter at the express desire of Mgr. Charvaz, Archbishop of Genoa.