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construct the great work of the equilibrium of

Europe, and thereby to insure public tranquillity and individual happiness." (To be continued.)

ch this invitation is addressed.

to put an end to the calamities by which she is oppressed, to demonstrate

to her king the friendship which he preserves for him, and to restore to the
Monarchy of Frederick its eclât and its extent. He hopes that his Prussian
Majesty, animated by sentiments which this frank declaration ought to
produce, will, under such circumstances, take that part alone, which the
wishes of his people, and the interest of his States, demand. Under this
conviction, the Emperor, my master, has sent me the most positive orders
to avoid every thing that could betray a spirit of hostility between the two
powers, and to endeavour, within the Prussian provinces, to soften, as far as
a state of war will permit, the evils which for a short time must result from
their occupation."
(Signed)

The Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Armies,
PRINCE KUTUSOFF SMOLENSK.

PROCLAMATION.

"When the Emperor of all the Russias was compelled by a war of aggression, to take arms for the defence of his States, his Imperial Majesty, from the accuracy of his combinations, was enabled to form an estimate of the important results which that war might produce with respect to the independence of Europe. The most heroic constancy, the greatest sacrifices, have led to a series of triumphs; and when the Commander-in-Chief, Prince Kutusoff Smolensk, led his victorious troops beyond the Niemen, the same principles still continued to animate the Sovereign. At no period has Russia been accustomed to practise that art, (too much resorted to in modern wars,) of exaggerating, by false statements, the success of her arms. But with whatever modesty her details might now be penned, they would appear incredible. Ocular witnesses are necessary to prove the facts to France, to Germany, and to Italy, before the slow progress of truth will fill those countries with mourning and consternation. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive that in a campaign of only four months' duration, 130,000 prisoners should have been taken from the enemy, besides 900 pieces of cannon, 49 stand of colours, and all the waggon train and baggage of the army. A list of the names of all the Generals taken is hereunto annexed. It will be easy to form an estimate from that list of the number of superior and subaltern officers taken. It is sufficient to say, that out of 300,000 men, (exclusive of Austrians,) who penetrated into the heart of Russia, not 30,000 of them, even if they should be favoured by fortune, will ever revisit their country. The manner in which the Emperor Napoleon repassed the Russian frontiers can assuredly be no longer a secret to Europe. So much glory, and so many advantages, cannot, however, change the personal dispositions of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias. The grand principles of the independance of Europe have always formed the basis of his policy; for that policy is fixed in his heart. It is beneath his character to permit any endeavours to be made to induce the people to resist the oppression and to throw off the yoke which has weighed them down for twenty years. It is their government whose eyes ought to be opened by the actual situation of France. Ages may elapse before an opportunity equally favourable again presents itself; and it would be an abuse of the goodness of Providence not to take advantage of this crisis to reconstruct the great work of the equilibrium of 'Europe, and thereby to insure public tranquillity and individual happiness."

(To be continued.)

PLAN

FOR AFFORDING INCOMES TO GENERAL OFFICERS ADEQUATE TO THE SUPPORT OF THEIR RANK.

BY WILLIAM MORTON PITT, ESQ. M. P.

WHEN the number of General Officers bore a small proportion to the number of regiments, there were several officers of the rank of Colonel who had regiments. At present, there are not only many Major-Generals, but also some Lieutenant-Generals who remain without any other emolument than the bare half-pay of the rank they held when reduced. Some of these, having realized, either in the whole, or in part, the value of their commissions, and retained their rank, have certainly no pretensions to additional advantages; but those who have never recovered any part of the money expended in the purchase of their commissions, who have no prospects of obtaining regiments, or governments, and who, (after very long service) have no other provision than their half-pay as Captains, Majors, Lieutenant-Colonels, or Colonels, as the case may be, seem to have a fair claim on the bounty of their country, and to a provision in some measure proportional to the station they hold in society.

If the situation of an officer of high rank in the army is compared with that of the corresponding ranks in the navy, the difference is truly striking. In the navy the half-pay of Admirals, who rank as General Officers, increases on every promotion; but in the land service no officer receives a higher half-pay, than that of Colonel, equal only in rank to a Post-Captain of three years standing.-The naval officer also, is at no expense for the purchase of his commissions, and further, has prospects of prize-money, an advantage which but seldom, to any considerable extent, falls to the lot of the army.

Four thousandpounds laid out in the funds, or on a mortgage, would produce a larger annual interest in perpetuity than that which the same sum expended in the purchase of commissions in the army would amount to as an annuity, under the donomination of half-pay; and in the former case there would not only be a provision for a family, but the possessor would be master of his own time, and be at liberty to exercise a profession, or profitable employment.

It would not be necessary to grant any addition to Major-Generals; they might take their chance of being appointed to regiments,

or governments: but from their promotion to the rank of LieutenantGeneral, the situation of those who have no emolument but halfpay appears entitled to consideration, and to require additional

remuneration.

Those who have disposed of their commissions, retaining their rank, or who have any other emolument from the public, civil or military, could have no pretensions, and in the case of being Perplaced on the Staff, the allowance should be suspended. haps also, those, who, without serving, and by the mere operation of Brevets, have arrived at the 'rank, should not be included to the full extent. And as the object in view should be to improve the situation of such only, who have little or nothing but their half-pay for their support, men of fortune might also be excluded, by requiring from them all an oath, (somewhat similar to that which is taken annually by the widows of naval officers, for their pensions) that they do not enjoy any income, or private fortune, equal to the aggregate of their half-pay, and proposed allowance.

It would probably be found, that out of the whole list of General Officers, the number who would have claim to an allowance might not exceed ten; and estimating the highest proportion at five hundred per annum, with an inferior allowance to such as have been advanced only by Brevet rank, if such a difference should appear expedient, the expense to the country would hardly extend to five thousand per annum, whilst the distresses and disappointments of meritorious officers would be humanely considered, and essential good produced to the service.

CAMPAIGNS IN THE PENINSULA.
[Continued from page 153.]

THE situation to which this General, Don Manuel de Lapena, succeeded, was truly deplorable: the artillery had indeed been saved, and the pass of Buvierca most gallantly defended and maintained; nevertheless the army had suffered during its retreat from all the accumulated evils of disorder, insubordination, incapacity on the part of the officers, nakedness, and cold, and hunger, and fatigue. Sometimes when the rear-guard was on the point of taking food, the enemy had come in sight, and the ready meal had been abandoned to the pursuers; this, though it was the effect as much of the panic, which suspicion and insubordination produced in the soldier, as of any want of conduct in their Commanders, gave new

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