cause for dissatisfaction and distrust. The men themselves were ready to fly at the sight of the French, because they suspected their leaders; yet they accused their leaders of treachery for not always turning and making head against the enemy, not reflecting that they, in like manner, though from a different motive, could place no confidence in their men. Many dropped on the way, overmarched, or foundered for want of shoes; others turned aside because they considered the army as entirely broken up, not from any failure of patriotism, or from courage; they were ready to die for their country, but it was folly, they thought, to squander their lives, and, under the present circumstance, their duty was to pre serve themselves, and recover strength for future service. The loss at Buvierca too had been considerable. Before they reached Siguenza the four divisions had thus been wasted down to 8,000 men: it was on the evening of the last day of November that they reached this point; here message after message arrived, requiring them to hasten with all possible speed to Somosierra.

They set forward again the following day, the infantry by Atienza and Jadraque, the horse and artillery by Guadalaxara, in order to avoid the bad roads, leaving the river Henares on their right. This plan was soon changed: advices reached them in the middle of the night at Jadraque, that the pass of Somosierra had been lost. It was now determined that the whole army should march for Guadalaxara, for the defence of Madrid; information of this movement was dispatched to the Marquis of Castelar, in that city, and persons were sent, some to ascertain the position of the enemy, others to learn where Sanjuan had retreated with the remains of his corps after his defeat, in order that some operations might be concerted with him. The next day when the foremost troops entered Guadalaxara, they found some detached parties of the enemy in the town, whom they drove out: the first and fourth divisions, the horse and the artillery, arrived there that night; here the news was that Madrid was attacked, and the continual firing which was heard confirmed it. Poor as the numbers were which they could carry to the capital, they were eager to be there; and had Madrid been protected as it would have been, had Sir John Moore been more enterprising, or defended as the inhabitants would have defended it, had it not been for Morla's treachery, eight thousand men, who stood by their colours under so many hopeless circumstances, would have brought an important succour. The inhabitants relied with great confidence upon this reinforcement;

and take

they expected hourly that these brave men would appear post beside them at their gates and in their streets; and one of the most successful artifices by which the traitors, who made the capitulation, depressed their zeal, was by reporting that a second battle had been fought, in which the army of the centre had been entirely defeated by Marshal Ney, so that no possible succour was to be expected from them. At the very time when this falsehood was reported a part of this brave army was only nine leagues from Madrid, impatient to proceed to its assistance. They were, however, compelled to remain inactive the whole of the next day, waiting for the second and third divisions and the van, which did not come up till the day following. The distant firing had now ceased, and the event which this cessation announced was confirmed by authentic intelligence of the capitulation.

Meantime the French were collecting in their neighbourhood: they occupied Alcalade, Henares, and the adjoining villages, and in Meco some skirmishes took place with them. It was now necessary to think of preserving the army, weak as it was, for other services. The first measure was to disencumber themselves of their disproportionate artillery; for they had brought with them no less than sixty pieces of cannon, which it was of much importance to preserve from falling into the hands of the enemy. Forty of their guns were sent across the Tagus at Sacedon, and such measures taken for conveying them forward, that they arrived safely at Carthagena; the other twenty they kept with them. The Duke del Infantado joined them at Guadalaxara: Buonaparte affirmed in his bulletin, that this distinguished grandee had fled from Madrid with the English minister, Mr. Frere; the fact was, that Mr. Frere followed the Supreme Junta, while the duke departed for the purpose of joining this army, and concerting measures for assisting in the defence of the capital. The Spaniards had no time to lose in securing themselves. On the 2d of December, Lubienski had informed Buonaparte of their approach; and as soon as Madrid had been betrayed, Bessieres was dispatched to Guadalaxara with a considerable force of horse, and Victor followed with the infantry. The van under Venegas, which had saved the army at Buvierca, by so bravely defending the pass, entered that city on the night of the 4th. Its losses had been replaced by draughts from the other divisions; the post of honor and of danger had been assigned it during the whole of this retreat, and it continued to cover the movements of the other divisions. Two of them were leaving VOL. II.

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Guadalaxara at the same time when it arrived, the second and third followed the next noon in two columns, proceeding by two roads to Santorcaz; this division began to follow them, but before it was out of one gate, the advanced-guard of the enemy entered at another. Venegas immediately perceived the importance of a strong position to the south of the city, lying directly between the two roads to Santorcaz, and he occupied it with the utmost celerity. The battalions (tercios) of Ledesma and Salamanca, which formed the rear of the third division, perceived his intention, and turned back and joined him; their Commanding Officers, D. Luis de Lacy and D. Alexandre de Hore, being ambitious of bearing part in the action which they expected.

The French were in great force opposite, on the right bank of the Henares; some of their detachments forded both on the right and left of the patriots' position; but light troops had been stationed on both the flanks, who skirmished with them, and repelled them till night. The position was judged too formidable in front to be attacked, and the main body of the French halted during the whole evening, not chusing to cross the river. Having thus obtained time for the army to perform its march, which was all he hoped or wanted, Venegas broke up three hours after the darkness had closed, and continued his retreat in good order without the loss of a single man. The Commander now took up a position at Santorcaz, a little village about two leagues east of Alcala, betwen the rivers Henares and Tajuna. The French upon this evacuated Alcala, and extended themselves along the heights at the back of Meco, and along the banks of the Jarama, pushing their advanced parties to Arganda, Morata, and other places in that neighbourhood. The plan of Lapena and his officers under these circumstances was, to cross the Tagus at Aranjuez, and take shelter, if necessary, among the mountains of Toledo; with this intent they marched to Villarejo de Salvanes. A few poor soldiers, who dropt behind at Nuevo-Bastan, were sabred by the French according to that cruelty which, since they have been under the tyranny of the Corsican, has characterised and disgraced their armies. On the 6th of December, when they were about to proceed to Aranjuez, tidings came that the French were in possession of that place; and this was confirmed by an express from General Llamas, who had vainly attempted to resist the enemy with a few armed peasantry and a few soldiers, who had escaped from Madrid.

New difficulties and new dangers now presented themselves to

the remnant of this harassed army. To look towards Toledo was become hopeless; it was equally hopeless to make for Andalusia, for the French General Ruffin, as soon as he had obtained possession of Aranjuez, crossed the Tagus, and pushing on as far as Ocana, cut off their retreat in that direction. Nothing remained but to cross the Tagus by boats at Villamanrique, Fuenteduenas, Estramera, and other places where there were ferries, and to make for the Sierras of Cuenca. There it was hoped they might be able to rest, rally the stragglers, and again unite in numbers sufficient to take vengeance for all their sufferings. Hazardous as it was to cross the river in this manner, with an enemy so near at hand, it was effected with rare good fortune; the French had not foreseen the attempt, and not a man nor a gun were lost. Having gained the left bank of the river they hastened on their retreat, and head-quar、 ters were established on the 7th at Velinchon. The second division under General Grimanest, which crossed at Villamanrique, was the only one which was endangered: this having effected the passage took up a position at Santa Cruz, between Aranjuez and Uclas, where it was attacked on the night of the 8th by a corps of Bessieres' division, under General Montbrun. Finding themselves unable to maintain the position against a force which was superior to their own, they abandoned it before they sustained any loss. At Velinchon, Lapena had the sorrow to learn, that the first and fourth divisions, who were quartered two leagues in advance at Tarancon, were in a state of such disorder and mutinous enmity, that it was apprehended some corps would attack each other. This was suspected to have been produced partly by the intrigues of some agents of the Intruder; partly by the mischievous ambition of a few officers, desirous, in these times of difficulty and insubordination, to raise themselves by flattering the soldiers and infusing suspicions of the Commanders, instead of making way to command by patient services and the active discharge of their duty. In consequence of this circumstance, of the difficulty which daily encreased of subsisting the troops, of their encreasing wants, and of the rapid desertions which were naturally occasioned by their privations, their want of hope, and the total relaxation of discipline, Lapena assembled all his General Officers at Alcazar de Huete.

The Duke del Infantado and Llamas, who had joined them at Villarejo, were present at this council; and it was determined, on Lapena's proposal, that the duke should take the command. reason for appointing him was, that he was president of the couneil of Castile, and in that character had a legal power to require

provisions and all things necessary from the people; such being the respect paid to the old authorities and established forms, even in times like these, when necessity might have superseded all laws as paramount to all. This nomination was announced to the army in a short proclamation; the Central Junta ratified it afterwards, approving the resignation of Lapena, and dispensing with an informality which the difficult and dangerous state of things rendered prudent. One good consequence resulting from this measure was, that whatever suspicions, seditious or treacherous agitators had raised against their leaders, were at once rendered harmless; for the Duke del Infantado was a man in whose patriotism the whole nation had the most entire confidence. The van was now stationed in Javaga and the neighbouring towns; the rest of the army, proceeding by Carrascosa and Horcajada, entered Cuenca on the 11th.

Here they concluded a retreat of nearly 450 miles, in which, amid the accumulating disasters of their country, the Spaniards sig. nally displayed that patience under all privations, and that resolute and enduring courage which formerly rendered them the best soldiers in Europe; here they rested, protected by the strength of the country; here they were clothed; and while the new Commander provided for their wants, he took measures for the restoration of discipline. One officer, who had been at the head of the mutiny, was brought to trial, condemned and executed. The bulletins asserted, that the remains of this army, finding their retreat into Andalusia cut off, had been obliged to disperse among the mountains of Cuenca. The truth was, that at Cuenca the army began to be reorganized: the stragglers and fugitives having recovered their strength, for want of which they had fallen behind or fled, rejoined their corps; new levies were raised; and it was manifest that, notwithstanding all their disasters, notwithstanding the mighty power of the enemy, the treachery of those leaders in whom they had confided most, and the misconduct of others, which was hardly less injurious to the common cause, the spirit of patriotism was still unimpaired, and the people, by whom alone a country is to be saved, had not abated one jot of heart or hope. Five days after their arrival, they were joined by a corps, which it was supposed had been cut off among the mountains of Rioja. The history of its escape is equally honorable to the men and to the Count de Alache D. Miguel Lili, who conducted them. They formed, originally, a part of the army of Old Castile, which had been broken up after the position of Logrono was lost. The Count de Cartaojal