commanded, with the Duke de Albuquerque under him. At the end of October Castanos stationed them along the skirts of the Sierra de Cameros, extending from in front of Logrono to Lodoso; the last division of this corps, which formed the left flank of the army, was posted at Nalda, under Lili.-During the first three weeks of November this division sustained repeated and almost daily attacks, varying its position as circumstances required, to Bigueras, Lumbreras, Nalda, and Alvelda; and having, like Blake's army, to endure the severest privations, from scarcity of food; nevertheless it carried off' fourteen pieces of artillery, which Castanos had considered it impossible to save, from Nalda to Ausejo and Calahorra, in the sight of the French, and by roads which had been thought impracticable. On the night of the 21st Lili received intelligence that a considerable force of the enemy had moved from Logrono towards Ausejo; the next day he learnt that the Spaniards, who were stationed there and at Tudelilla, had fallen back upon their right, and that 5,000 French infantry and 1,000 horse, had moved from Najara, giving out that they were going for Calahorra. thus in imminent danger of being cut off and surrounded. Immediately he left the banks of the Iregua, and fell back to Venta de Codes, four leagues in the rear of Nalder, where, in the course of the night, a messenger from Cartaojal reached him, with instructions, written at Tudelilla on the 21st, saying, that the French were in great force at Ausejo, and that Castanos ordered him to retreat by the Sierra to Agreda, whither Cartaojal himself was going with all his troops to oppose the French on the side of Almazar. For Agreda therefore, Lili began his march at day-break.—By two in the afternoon he had reached Villa del Rio, five leagues from the place which he had left, eight from that to which he was bound; but here he met intelligence of fresh disasters and new dangers. He was Agreda, it was said, had already been abandoned by the Spaniards, 1200 French cavalry, with a small body of foot, were on their way to that town from Soria, which had opened its gates to the enemy; other columns from Soria and from Almazan were to follow in the same direction. Fugitives now arrived every hour from the villages between this place and Soria, with tidings that the enemy were sacking one place or approaching another; all their parties tending to the one point of Agreda. Lili perceived that if Cartaojal had not already retired from that town, he inevitably must, when forces so very superior were advancing against him, and that for himself, if he continued his march, it would be to run into the midst of his enemies; he did not hesitate, therefore, to disobey orders which would have involved him in certain destruction; and, acting upon his own judgment, he marched the next morning in a contrary direction, to Lumbreras, and the day afterwards to Montenegro, thinking that a more defensible point; and for the sake of receiving certain intelligence from the side of Agreda. The report that that town had been evacuated on the 23d was premature; and Lili received a letter from Cartaojal, written from thence on the 24th, and regretting that he had fallen back to Lumbreras upon erroneous information: to have joined him at Agreda, he said, was the proper movement, and almost the only means of safety, but it was no time to consider what might have been done, and, as things were, he must now follow his own discretion, with that zeal which it was not doubted he possessed. Whatever regret Lili might have felt at receiving this reproof, was effectually counteracted by the report of the messenger who brought it, for at the very moment when Cartaojal dispatched him, news arvived that the enemy were beginning to attack the town. In fact, he was compelled speedily to abandon it, and marching by way of Borja to Calatayud, joined the wreck of the army of the centre, and accompanied them in that retreat, which has already been related. Hopeless as Lili's situation now was, he had yet to receive intelligence of events which rendered it more utterly desperate. On the 27th he learned at Salos de los Infantes, from some stragglers who had escaped from the action at Burgos, that that capital was now in the hands of the French. His spies brought him information, that the intruder was with a great force at Aranda; that the enemy occupied all the bridges and fords of the Duero; and that Somosierra was threatened by him: finally, to crown the distressing news of the day, a full and authentic account reached him of the battle of Tudela. On every side he was surrounded; to move in any direction seemed equally perilous, and he was utterly ignorant what course had been taken by the relics of the army which he wished to join. In these difficulties his first measure was to march to Canales, four leagues from Salas, where, in the very centre of the mountains, he might hope to remain concealed from the enemy, or to resist them to the best advantage if he were discovered and attacked. There, amid those difficult and inclement heights, from whence the Arlanza flows towards Lerma; the Duero towards the plains of Castille; the Tiron, the Najerilla, and the Iregua towards Rioja; he remained from the 29th of November to the 4th of the following month, six days. During this time he obtained sufficient intelligence of the movements of the French to direct his own, and then proceeded towards New Castille, in search of Castano's broken army. On the 5th he reached Quintanar de la Sierra; on the 6th San Leonardo. His men travelled the whole of the following day and night, and crossed the Duero at Berlanja. On the 9th they entered Atienza; and here the information which they found served only to occasion new perplexity, for here Lili learned that the central army had passed through, and been pursued by the French; that they had afterwards abandoned Guadalaxara and the heights of Santorcaz, where they had subsequently taken up a position: of their further movements nothing was known. Lili, however, considering all circumstances, was convinced that they must have retreated upon Cuenca; and upon that conviction, he directed his march towards the same point. On the 11th, at day-break, he crossed the great road from Zaragoza to Madrid, at an opportune and happy hour, passing between the last division of the French and their rear-guard, then on their way from Calatayud; and on the day that the Duke del Infantado reached Cuenca, he arrived at Villar de Domingo Garcia, from whence, on the 16th, he passed to the head-quarters of the Commander. During this whole retreat, which was over a track nearly four hundred miles, through the most difficult and untravelled ways, this corps had constantly been surrounded by the enemy, who were seldom more than ten or twelve miles distant from them. Food they had none, but what they could procure upon the way; most of the men were barefooted, many of them nearly naked, but their spirits never failed. While this army was to be reformed and re-equipped among the mountains of Cuenca, the whole of those extensive plains, which form the centre or table-land of Spain, lay at the mercy of the invaders. On the 11th of December Victor had his detachments in Aranjuez and in Ocana; on the 19th he occupied Toledo. The surrender of this ancient and famous city, after its professions of determined patriotism, was one of those circumstances which concurred to confirm Sir John Moore in the unjust and self paralyzing prejudices which he had formed against the Spanish people. Yet if the Toledans did not signalize themselves by heroic sacrifices, like the Zaragozans, and the people of Gerona, and of Ciudad Rodrigo, it is to be imputed to the government rather than to them; there was no want of a right spirit, nor had they been deficient in any exertion for the common cause. In the spring of the preceding year, when, by the weakness of the old government, and his own unparalleled treachery, Buonaparte was marching his armies through the country, and on the point, as it appeared to common observers, of obtaining military possession of it, Dupont and Wedel entered that city with their divisions, and raised a most oppressive contribution upon the inhabitants. But no sooner had they proceeded on their way to Andalusia, than a junta was immediately formed, consisting of the most respectable citizens: they could not raise forces themselves, being surrounded by the enemy, and having no military means; but they ordered as many of the districts in that kingdom as could exert themselves, to act under the instructions of the Junta of Badajos: they contributed large sums of money; and they refused obedience to four successive orders which enjoined them to proclaim the intruder, though it was announced that, if they continued in their disobedience, 5,000 French would come, and perform the ceremony sword in hand. The evacuation of Madrid relieved them from this danger; and when the victorious army of Castanos was on its way to the capital, Toledo supported 10,000 men of that army for three weeks, made a donation of three hundred thousand reales to them on their departure, equipped many of their officers, and clothed a great proportion of the men. This was not all in two months it raised and equipped two regiments of infantry, and a corps of 700 horse, for which funds were raised by a subscription: all persons of all ranks, from the arch-bishop to the poorest peasant, contributing liberally and joyfully, according to their means. The university also raised a corps of students; and after the siege of Zaragoza, the pectoral of the arch-bishop, which was valued at a hundred and fifty thousand reales, was converted into money to relieve the inhabitants of that heroic city. After the defeat of the Estremadura army at Burgos, the Toledans applied to government for arms to defend their walls. This was the mode of warfare to which the Junta, if they had rightly understood the nature of their own strength, should have resorted, instead of opposing the French with armies newly levied, undisciplined, ill-equipped, and worse provided; and this system of defence was advised by Mr. Frere. But this essential precaution had been neglected by the government; and when the Toledans applied for artillery and ainmunition, disaster followed so close upon disaster, that there was no leisure for attending to their request, urgent and important as it was. What then could be done? To stand a siege without artillery was exposing themselves to useless destruction. They sent off all their moveable property to Seville; twelve thousand swords also were dispatched to the same place from that fabric, which for so many centuries has been famous, and which probably owes its original celebrity to workmen from Damascus. The Junta, all the legitimate authorities, and all the most distinguished inhabitants, left the city; neither the threats nor the promises of the intruder, could induce them to return: they retired to the free part of the Peninsula, submitting to poverty with that dignified composure, which resulted from the consciousness that they had discharged their duty. This was the fate of the parents, while their sons in the corps of the students fought and bled for the independence of Spain. It is plain, therefore, that though the gates of Toledo were opened to the enemy, that same spirit still existed within its walls, which, during the war of the commons of Castille, rendered it the last hold of liberty. From Toledo, from Aranjuez, and from Ocana, parties of French cavalry overrun the open and defenceless plains of Lower la Mancha, foraging and plundering the towns and villages with impunity, as far as Manzanares. The La Manchans, relying, like the government, too confidently upon the resistance which regular armies, and the modes of regular warfare could oppose to such a military power as that of France, had made no preparations for defending themselves: some places were deserted by the inhabitants; all left open to the enemy, who scoured the country at their pleasure. The little townlet of Villacannas afforded, however, a single and honourable exception: a party of sixty horse entered it on the night of the 20th of December, being a detachment from a much larger force which had quartered itself in Tembleque. The people, though they had taken no previous measures for defence, caught up such arms as they could find, and drove the invaders out: they began immediately to dig trenches and throw up barricadoes; the adjoining peasantry came to their assistance; a few persons of high quality played the coward and fled; but, with these few exceptions, the utmost zeal and alacrity were displayed by all ranks, and ready obedience was paid to some old soldiers, who took upon themselves the command. During five successive days the French renewed their attack, and were constantly repulsed; their plundering parties had no artillery with them, and the means of defence, therefore, as long as the Spaniards took care not to expose themselves to a charge of horse in the open country, were equal to those of attack. Weary at length of these repeated failures, and |