Lake had no alternative but to attack at once, in spite of the enemy's superiority of numbers, and of the obstacles of ground, or to retire; and he knew that, by retreating, he would expose the flank of the Duke of York's corps, and, moreover, would have presented the enemy a favorable opportunity of entirely defeating the detachment under his command.

Major-General Lake therefore determined on an immediate attack: the enemy occupied a redoubt of uncommon size and strength upon a rising ground across the high road in front of Lincelles; the road itself was defended by other works strongly palisaded; woods and ditches covered their flanks. The battalions were instantly formed, and advanced under a very heavy fire with an order and intrepidity for which no praise can be too high: after firing three or four rounds they rushed on with their bayonets, stormed the redoubt, and drove the enemy through the village; the latter rallied under the protection of other troops, and for some time kept up a severe fire, but they were again defeated, and entirely put to the rout.

It must be very evident that, in the above affair, the conduct of the British General was more conspicuous for gallantry than prudence: he certainly should have ascertained whether the Dutch retained possession of the post of Lincelles previous to his columns reaching the entrenchments. However, the promptness with which he took his resolution for an attack, and the vigour with which he formed it, deserved and obtained the greatest praise from his Royal Highness the Duke of York.

In May 1795, Major-General, then Captain Dilkes, returned to England with the last body of the troops which had been employed in the campaigns in Flanders. In February 1797, he was promoted to a company in his regiment, with the rank of LieutenantColonel, and in the following year, he embarked with the Guards for Ireland, during the rebellion, and remained in that country till June 1799. In the month of August of the latter year, Lieutenant-Colonel Dilkes embarked again with the expedition to the Helder, and was present in the different actions that took place in that short, disastrous, yet honorable, campaign to British courage, discipline, and perseverance under the greatest hardships.

The public in general are apt to draw conclusions, when judging, of events, not always in consonance with the causes by which they are produced, but from their successful or unfortunate issues. The fallacy of such conclusions can not be more fully demonstrated

than in the expedition to the Helder.-The principal objects of the expedition were to effect the re-establishment of the former legal constitution of Holland, and to restore the Stadtholderate to the House of Hanover. A plan of co-operation was concerted between Great-Britain and Russia, in the confidence that numbers of the Dutch, opening their eyes to their real interests, would combine with those, whom they might justly consider as their deliverers, as soon as they saw they could, with safety, act according to their sentiments and wishes. These confident expectations were indulged by the speculative government of the time; and for the accomplishment thereof, the British troops embarked were in as irregular a condition as any that ever left the shores of Britain; the regiments that were ordered for service had their complements of men made up from skeleton regiments, which last were afterwards wholly recruited, many of them with additional battalions, by volunteers from the English militia in the dresses of their different regiments, &c. But supposing that the expedition had succeeded so far, as to obtain possession of the capital of Holland, and the Stadtholder once more reinstated in the government, was it possible for him to have been maintained in his authority, while the French republic existed? In addition to the facility with which French troops could be marched into Holland, the general coldness of the inhabitants towards the House of Orange, and the impossibility of keeping a sufficiently large British army in that country, all conspired to render a permanent re-establishment of the old government extremely difficult, if not impossible. The British troops, under their illustrious General, accomplished every thing that was practicable. In the field they displayed the utmost valor; and, notwithstanding the greater part had never before been employed on foreign service, they exercised the greatest moderation and humanity when victorious; and with cheerfulness and calm fortitude submitted to the greatest privations.

In 1800 Lieut.-Col. Dilkes returned to Ireland with the same brigade, from which he was removed in the August of that year, by being attached to the light infantry battalion, then supposed to be first destined for service. In 1804, he took the command of the 3d regiment of Guards; in the brevet of October, 1805, he was appointed Colonel, and in 1808 Colonel on the Staff to command the brigade of Guards in London.

In February 1810, the subject of this sketch received orders to serve in Portugal, with the rank of Brigadier-General, and to take

the command of the brigade of Guards serving there; but his destination was shortly after changed to the command of the brigade of Guards ordered to Cadiz, for which place Brigadier-General Dilkes embarked in the month of March. Early in the following year he again embarked with this brigade, in the expedition that sailed from Cadiz, under Lieutenant-General Graham; and considering his rank at that period, he may be regarded as particularly fortunate in being employed on so memorable an occasion, as next in command to that highly-distinguished officer.

The troops ordered for the service marched from Isla on the night of the 17th of February, and embarked the next morning at day-break in Cadiz Bay. In the evening of the 21st, the expedition sailed; it arrived off Tariffa on the following day; but as the weather proved unfavorable for a landing at that place, it proceeded to Algesiras, where the troops landed on the morning of the 23d. On the 24th they marched to Tarifa through a beautiful and romantic track of country, without any other road than merely a mule path, which was found scarcely practicable for the advance of the cavalry all the artillery, therefore, was sent onwards by water.

On the 27th, the Spanish troops, under General Lapena, arrived from Cadiz, and landed at Tarifa; they had been embarked in open vessels, even before the British, and were consequently much exposed to the inclemency of the weather during the whole period, and in very confined and crouded situations. However, they were in readiness to march on the next morning, thereby exemplifying that patience and submission under great hardships and privations, which constitute the best military feature of the Spanish character. During the halt of the British at Tarifa, measures were adopted to render the road towards Medina Sidonia practicable.

The allied army + marched on the 28th to Facinas, always en

This brigade consisted of six companies of the 1st Foot Guards, forming one battalion, under the late General, at that time Colonel Wheatley, and afterwards commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Sebright; two companies of the Coldstream regiment, and three companies of the 3d Foot Guards, forming another battalion, under the Honorable Lieutenant-Colonel Onslow of the latter regiment.

+ Statement of the forces under the command of General Lapena and LieutenantGeneral Graham.

bivouac; in the night between the 1st and 2d of March to the neighbourhood of Casa Vieja; a long fatiguing night march across a country much intersected with water-courses. On the morning of the 3d, a battalion of Walloon guards and the regiment of Cuidad Real, joined the reserve, (as the corps under LieutenantGeneral Graham's command was styled;) the former was incorporated with the brigade of Guards, the latter with Colonel Wheatley's brigade*: the army marched during the whole day, and halted in the vicinity of Vejar at night. In the evening of the 4th, the troops were again in motion, and continued to march until the morning of the 5th, when the van-guard proceeded to attack the enemy's position opposite the point of Santi Petri, and the reserve halted on the east side of the heights of Barrosa, (by some called Cerra del Puerco †.)

The attack of the van-guard on the enemy's lines succeeded in this operation; it was supported by half of the Prince of Anglona's division, the other half remaining on the heights already mentioned, and it should seem, that previous to the movement of the British to that point, which the Spanish Commander thought it necessary to strengthen, General Lapena offered Lieutenant-General Graham his option, whether the latter should move for that purpose with his corps, or continue posted on the heights; but the LieutenantGeneral declining to make an election, the former decided that the reserve should march, leaving two battalions to join the remainder of the Spanish forces, to preserve the position on the heights. In addition, however, to two battalions of Walloon and Cuidad Real Guards, Lieutenant-General Graham left Colonel Brown's battalion, composed of flank companies, which was posted at the Torre Barrosa. The Lieutenant-General, therefore, had every reason to suppose the General-in-Chief would remain on that position during he day.

Colonel Wheatley was appointed to the command of a brigade of the line in a few weeks, perhaps two months, after the arrival of the brigade of Guards at Cadiz, when the command of the 1st Guards devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Sebright, as alluded to in the first note. Colonel Wheatley's brigade, on the expedition, was composed of three battalions of the line.

+ This arose from a change of plans; the original intention was to have proceeded to Medina Sidonia, and from thence towards Puerto Real, thereby, if successful, cutting off the French forces in Chiclana.

This will be seen by the following extract of a letter from Lieutenant-General Graham to the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley, dated Isla de Leon, March 24, 1811. "When the British division began its march from the position of Barrosa to that of Bermeja, I left the General on the Barrosa height, nor did I know of his

Lieutenant-General Graham's division being halted on the Eastern slope of the Barrosa height for about two hours, was marched about twelve o'clock through a wood towards the Torre Bermeja, (cavalry patroles having previously been sent towards Chiclana without meeting with the enemy); on the march the Lieutenant-General received notice that the enemy had appeared in force on the plain, and was advancing towards the height of Barrosa.--- LieutenantGeneral Graham considering the position as the key to that of Santi Petri, he immediately countermarched, in order to support the troops left for its defence; and the alacrity with which this mancuvre was executed, served as a favorable omen. Before the British troos could get entirely disentangled from the wood, the Spanish troops on the Barrosa hill were seen retiring from it, while the enemy's left wing was rapidly ascending, at the same time his right wing stood on the plain at the edge of the wood, within cannon shot. A retreat in the face of such an enemy, already within reach of the easy communication by the sea bank, must have involved the whole of the allied army in all the danger of being attacked during the unavoidable confusion of the different corps arriving on the narrow edge of Bermeja, nearly at the same time.-The British General, therefore, determined on an immediate attack.

intention of quitting it, and when I ordered the division to countermarch in the wood, I did so, to support troops left for its defence, and believing the General to be there in person. In this belief I sent no report of the attack which was made so near to the spot where the General was supposed to be, and though confident in the bravery of the British troops, I was not less so in the support I should receive from the Spanish army.-The distance, however, to Bermeja is trifling, and no orders were given from head-quarters for the movement of any corps of the Spanish army to support the British division, to prevent its defeat in this unequal contest, or to profit of the success earned at so heavy an expense. The voluntary zeal of the two small battalions (Walloon Guards and Cuidad Real) which had been detached from my division, brought them alone back from the wood; but notwithstanding their utmost efforts, they could only come up at the close of the action,

"Had the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse artillery, been rapidly sent by the sea beach, to form in the plain, and to envelope the enemy's left; had the greatest part of the infantry been marched through the pine wood, in our rear, to turn his right, what success might not have been expected from such decisive movements? The enemy must either have retired instantly, and without occasioning any serious loss to the British division, or he would have exposed himself to absolute destruction, his cavalry greatly outnumbered, his artillery lost, his columns mixed and in confusion, a general dispersion would have been the inevitable consequence of a close pursuit. Our wearied men would have found spirits to go on, and would have trusted to finding refreshment at Chiclana. This moment was lost. Within a quarter of an hour's ride of the scene of action the General remained ignorant of what was passing, and nothing was done."