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Pillau, were to be delivered up to the commanding Russian General. An Imperial Russian Officer was to accompany the column to its place of destination, their baggage not to be subjected to any search, the French General, Castella, having declared upon his word of honor that there was nothing amongst it belonging to the Russians.

The garrison, which marched out, consisted of about 1,200 men, and the number of their sick left behind amounted to about 400.

On the 9th the Imperial Russian troops returned to the army, and only the Royal Prussian troops that were in the town and citadel remained behind to garrison them.

The Imperial Russian Colonel, Baron Von de Pablen, was appointed governor of the town.

On the 6th of February, the Emperor Alexander, with 28,000 men arrived at Polotzk; he was received with unanimous acclamations of joy. Indeed the mild and sagacious policy of the Russians in entering the provinces of the north as friends and deliverers, and restoring the national functionaries, gave great assistance to their exertions. Their advance into Europe was accompanied with every circumstance calculated to endear their cause to the nations around them. They resorted to the press, as the most formidable auxiliary which they could use for the overthrow of the oppressors of Europe. They disseminated proclamations and other publications over the Continent, and their conciliatory offers were hailed with eagerness at Warsaw, Berlin, Hamburg, and Dresden. The press, which has been so long fettered by the French-worse than fettered, compelled to disseminate falsehood throughout Europe, since the successes of the Russians, began again to exercise its legitimate functions.Wherever the allies carried their arms, the press was occupied in exposing the malignant and deceitful policy which has been so invariably pursued by the revolutionary tyrants.

Lord Cathcart, who had now concluded a treaty with the Danish minister at St. Petersburgh, the basis of which friendly arrangement were a free trade to Norway, the recal of the Danish letters of marque, the exclusion of all French privateers from Danish ports, and the mutual release of prisoners, quitted that capital on the 31st of January, where he had continued ever since the departure of the emperor, for the head-quarters of Alexander; and on the 6th of March, was with him at Kalitsch, a place about 150 miles from Dresden and 50 from Breslaw, in Silesia.

(To be continuedad

A Military View of the United States, AND THEIR VULNERABLE POINTS EXPOSED BY A REFERENCE TO THE

CONDUCT AND OPINIONS OF GENERAL WASHINGTON.

orama.

To the Editor of the Military Panorama. Sir, THE peculiar situation of affairs between this country and the United States, and the possibility that a common respect for our national honour, and ordinary regard for the peace and safety of our colonies, may compel us (for I trust that nothing but compulsion will induce a British minister to enter into the conflict) to a more active prosecution of warfare—these circumstances combined, have induced me to call your attention, and that of your military readers, to the attempt I propose to make of a display of some of the means of annoyance in our power, and, if we should be forced to it in selfdefence, of re-conquest.

When the subject first occurred to me, I thought that the most useful way to bring it before you would be to put it into the shape of a commentary on the transactions of the war of the Revolution. Before I perused the documents necessary to refresh my memory on the subject, I naturally thought that the errors of the past, properly exbibited, would be the best way to prevent them for the future; and, that an examination of the detail of the American War, would have proved the best source of information : but, on a reference to it, I found the blunders so gross, the negligence so glaring, the incredulity so great, and that contempt of an enemy which will always insure defeat, so predominating a motive in the minds of our officers, both civil and military, that I determined to cast the books aside, and consider the subject altogether as a new one. Hence, with the map in my hand, I began to search for the present position of each party, and to endeavour to shew to which party the su. periority now belongs.

Should any of your readers disagree with me on this subject, I should think an attentive re-perusal of any History of the American War would produce in their minds a conviction similar to that in mine.

A mere reference to the mad attempt of the three attacks made at Bunker's Hill on an hidden enemy, where our gallant soldiers marched up to certain destruction to the inconsiderate conduct of General Gage in detaching troops to Concord, whence arose the affair of Lexington-to the supine conduct of General Howe in suffering himself to be shut up with 8,000 well-disciplined troops in Boston by an unorganized body of men, irregularly armed, with a scanty portion of powder, with little artillery, without that enthusiastic ardour with which their previous successes at Lexington and Bunker's Hill inspired them ; greatly discontented, impatient to return home, disobedient to their officers; and, in short, as General Washington observed, dangerous only to themselves, and, he might have added, to General Howe-to the subsequent affairs of White Plains, Trenton, Princeton, &c. &c.--to the mad attempt to occupy Philadelphia-to the wretched system of detaching the troops into the Southern Departments, in order to be destroyed by fever, and make permanent enemies of those whose hostility would have proved but temporary, instead of directing the efforts of the army against the sources of rebellion-to the infatuated system to which every officer seemed blindly attached, of rejecting the advice and opinion of every one capable of giving them with correctness, judgment, and patriotism--to the blind contempt of the character of Washington, whose every step from his taking the command at Boston, ought to have proved to them the little chance he saw of success—to the stupidity which prevented their beholding in his acts the most serious apprehensions of defeat, if the British army were not drawn in the first instance from Boston, and, in the second, from the strong positions in the Highlands to the falling into the snare, laid by this Rebel Chief, which'led to the catastrophe at York Town:—to all these circumstances I would appeal, as well as those intemperate acts of some of our civil governors, one of whom dared, in a slave country, to arm the slave against his master, and thus to risk an indiscriminate massacre of friend and foe: but there is not now a boy of fourteen, who has been at a regimental drill, or seen a regiment change its front, who would be guilty of such errors. Hence I do not think them worth an allusion. The art of war, thank God! is changed. We are now aware that cavalry is as necessary to an army as infantry*.

• As proofs of the justice of these charges, I make the following extracts from Marsball's Life of Washington :

« The utmost address was used to conceal from the enemy the alarming deficiency which bas been siated; but when it is recollected in bow many various directions, and to what various authorities application for assistaoce was unavoidably made, it will appear scarcely possible that these efforts at secrecy could bare been completely successfial. N is more probable that the communication which must have been

Therefore, let us return to the more interesting part of our subject.

Speaking of the peace of 1763, Chief Justice Marshall says, “ by

made to the British General were not credited*; and that he could not persuade himself to believe, that a body of troops, circumstanced as was the American army in other respects, would be hardy enough to maintain the position they occupied, if destitute of ammunition. He knew well that the want of powder must be rendered still more fatal to them by other wants which could not be relieved. That of bayonets was peculiarly distressing. Their deficiency in this article was very considerable, and was of public notoriety.

“The people of New England were incomparably better armed than those of any other part of the Continent; but even among them this important weapon was very far from being common, and the government had not yet even attempted to lay up magazines of arms to be delivered to their soldiers. The army was also in such need of tents, as to be unavoidably lodged in barracks, instead of encamping in the open field, a circumstance extremely unfavourable to any sudden collection of its force, and not less unfavourable to health and discipline.

“ As the troops had been raised, not by Congress, but by the Colonial Governments, each of which had a different establishment, no uniformity existed among the regiments. In Massachussets the men bad choser their officers, and felt no inferiority to them. Animated with the spirit of liberty, and collected for its defence, they were not immediately sensible of the importance of discipline, nor could they, in an instant, be subjected to its rules. The army was consequently found in a state of almost entire disorganization; and the difficulty of establishing the necessary principles of order and subordination, always considerable among raw troops, was greatly increased by the short terms for which enlistments had been made. The time of service of many was to expire in November, and none were engaged to continue longer than the last of December. The early orders issued by the General, evidence a loose and unmilitary state of things, even surpassing what might reasonably be inferred from the circumstances under which the war was commenced.” -Marshall's Washington, vol. ii. p. 308.

It is not,' said General Washington, in a letter to Congress, ' in the pages of history to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musket-shot of the enemy for six months together without ammunition, and at the same time to disband one army, and recruit another, within that distance, of twenty odd British regiments, is more than, probably, ever was attempted. But if we succeed as well in the latter as we have hitherto done in the former, I shall think it the most fortunate event of my whole life.'

“The want of ammunition was not the only alarming difficulty to be encountered, The condition of the troops in respect to arms, was almost equally critical. The soldiers composing the first army, had, generally, brought with them into the field their own fire-arms. Indifferent as these were, it was necessary to retain, at least, as many of them as were in any degree fit for use. To effect this, inspectors were appointed to examine them, and fix their value, and notice was given that two

# “ For a confirmation of this circumstance the reader is referred to some anecdotes of the Revolutionary Leaders, in a work entitled “ Democracy Unveiled.” It is there asserted that even Putnam offered his services to General Howe, and extensive information, if his rank as Colonel was secured to him : General Howe Reither took any notice of the messenger, nor paid any attention to the message,

establishing these great natural boundaries to the British empire in North America, every cause for future contest respecting that

months pay should be stopped from every soldier who should leave the camp without this previous examination of his arms, and without giving up such as should be deemed fit for use. The arms were either so generally useless, or, notwithstanding these precautions, were so generally carried off, that only sixteen hundred and twenty muskets were retained; and thus, this source of supply, bad as it was, did not fulfil the hopes which had been formed of it. “The recruiting officers were directed to enlist only those who had arms; but they reported, that they must depart from those instructions, or recruit no soldiers. The neighbouring governments, as well as that of Massachussetts, were applied to without success; and persons sent with money to make purchases in the country, were not more fortunate. In the beginning of February, General Washington informed Congress, that there were then in his army near two thousand men without fire-arms of any sort; and, at that time, his whole effective rank and file, independent of militia, amounted only to eight thousand eight hundred and fifty-three. His incessant representations and complaints on this all-interesting point, were unable to procure, for a considerable time, any supply.” Idem, vol. ii. p. 340.

“The situation of the army, on Long Island, had now become extremely critical. In front was a victorious enemy, from whom much was to be apprehended, in case of assault, but whose numbers, and formidable train of artillery, rendered the destruction of their works, by regular approaches, inevitable. The movements of the fleet too, indicated an intention to make some attempt on New York, and, so soon as the wind should be favourable, to force a passage into the East River: should they succeed in this attempt, and attack him by water, while the army might assault him by land, they would render his retreat extremely difficult, if not absolutely impracticable. The troops, too, being obliged to lie in the lines, without shelter from the heavy rains which fell, were excessively fatigued and dispirited. Under these circumstances, it was determined to withdraw from Long Island; and this difficult movement was effected, on the night of the 28th, with such silence and dispatch, that all the troops and military stores, with the greater part of the provisions, and all the artillery, except such heavy pieces as, in the deep roads made by the excessive heavy rains which had fallen, could not possibly be drawn, were carried over in safety. Early the next morning, the enemy perceived the rear-guard crossing the East River, out of reach of their fire.” Idem, vol. ii. p. 518.

“General Washington continued in his lines, expecting an attack; to prepare for which, his sick and baggage were removed into his rear : but as a considerable part of the day had been exhausted in gaining the hill which had been occupied by M“Dougal, all attempts on his intrenchments were postponed until the next morning, and the whole British army lay on their arms the following night, in order of battle, and on the ground they had taken during the day.

“The night was employed by General Washington in strengthening his works, removing his sick and baggage, and preparing, by changing the arrangement of his troops, for the expected attack. His left maintained its position, but his right was drawn back to stronger ground. Perceiving this, and being unwilling to leave any thing to hazard, Howe resolved to postpone further offensive operations till Lord Percy should arrive with four battalions from New York, and two from the post at Mamara Neck. This reinforcement was received on the evening of the thirtieth, and preparations were then made for the attack next morning. In

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