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them back to such a distance, that, at night, the Russian advanced guards were placed without the walls. The attack of the enemy was very impetuous; but they received their recompence in their loss, which was incredibly great; that of the Russians bore no proportion to it, although they had 4,000 killed or wounded. The intention of the Russians in defending Smolensko, was to arrest the enemy, and prevent their arrival at Jelna and Dorogubush, and thereby give PrinceBagrathion time to arrive, without opposition, at the latter place, the further defence of which could have been no longer useful; but only, on the contrary, have occasioned the loss of valiant soldiers; for which reason, after having successfully repulsed a severe attack, the Russians determined in the night between the 5th and 6th (17th and 18th,) to leave it: but still keeping possession of the suburbs, called St. Petersburgh, and, with the whole army, take possession of the heights opposite Smolensko, and to appear as if waiting the attack of the French. The enemy, after garrisoning the town, skirmished the whole day with the Yagers, who were posted in the suburbs, of which, during all the evening, they attempted to take possession, but were constantly driven back. Nevertheless, during the night they succeeded in throwing a bridge across above the suburbs, and repairing the old one therein.

At seven, P.M. when no further attack from the enemy was expected, a part of the army which formed the second column, and consisted of the 2d and 3d corps of cavalry, and 5th and 6th of infantry, and a part of Major-General Newerousky, under General Docytrow, put themselves in motion, and continued their march through Sakelena, Poesklaw, and at nine P.M. the first column, consisting of the 2d, 3d, and 4th divisions of infantry, and of the first four of reserve of cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant-Gen. Kutusow, marched by the way of Kraepatscheni, Godonow, &c. to the high road of Dorogubush; but the troops under the command of Major-Gen. Boroskoff, who garrisoned the Petersburgh suburbs, marched on the 7th, (19th,) two hours after midnight, and formed the rear-guard of the first column. General Platow detached part of his light troops, and formed a chain of detachments from Smolensko to Porelscheji, in such a manner that they could approach with both columns to the Dnieper, and that these detachments should approach each other and form a mass, which could be freely used on all sides. On the retreat of Major-General Korff, at three A.M. the enemy began to pursue, at the same time detached a great part of his troops on the high road to Moscow; and scarcely had the second corps passed the village of Gedensnowo, where the road di

vides, one of which leads to Moscow and the other to Briduhens, to which the first column marched, when the enemy drove back the rear-guard, which was on the high Moscow road; and whilst they were furiously advancing to take possession of those points, which the rear-gnard of Major-General Korff's division had to pass, (to prevent any danger to this General's detachment, which covered the retreat of the army on the main road, and was still at six wersts distance from the second corps,) General De Tolly ordered MajorGeneral Prince Wirtemburg to defend this post with some divisions of the fourth corps, and the necessary quantity of artillery, till Major-General Korf should arrive with his detachment. Notwithstanding the immense superiority of the enemy, the Prince of Wirtemburg kept possession of this post till Major-General Korf, with his detachment, joined him, and then protected the retreat.

The enemy, who did not succeed in this operation, now began to force Major-General Korf's corps, which was posted along the great road to Moscow, and to pass troops from the left to the right of the Dnieper, above his position, to become master of the points which lead to the great road, before the arrival of the second corps.

The 3d and 4th corps were already drawn up in order of battle at this place; but in order to detain the enemy, the advanced-guard under Major-General Tutschkow was sent against them. He was already four wersts from the high road, on which the second division of cavalry, and Maj.-Gen. Korf's regiment was obliged to pass. Not long after Major-General Tutschkow was much pressed by the enemy, and was supported by the 3d and 4th divisions of cavalry, in order to assist in repelling the furious attacks of the enemy.

At six P.M. the enemy attacked Major-General Tutschkow with their whole force, consisting of Davoust, Ney, a part of the Viceroy of Italy, and with the cavalry of the king of Naples corps, endeavouring by every possible exertion to drive him from his position.In the meantime Major-General Korfs detachment, and the 2d corps, arrived on the high road, from whence General de Tolly also sent a part of the troops to support Gen. Tutschkow. This action, which continued from 1 P. M. till ten at night, was hot and bloody. The loss of the Russians on this day was very considerable, but that of the enemy greatly exceeded it. The former had cavalry attached to their left flank, which, notwithstanding the superior numbers of the enemy's cavalry, repulsed several desperate charges: at one o'clock of the morning of the 8th (20) the army put itself in motion, taking the direction of Solowjewo.

[To be continued.]

MILITARY CORRESPONDENCE.

OBSERVATIONS

UPON THE Marquis of WELLINGTON'S CIRCULAR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 28, 1812.

To the Editor of the Military Panorama.

SIR, Frencyda, Feb. 3, 1813. I EXPERIENCED real concern in reading the above letter in the daily prints, with comments thereon, from the pens of the editors. As the most equitable and honorable conduct, on all occa sions, is to attend to the arguments which are to be advanced on both sides of the question, previous to forming an opinion or offering judgment, I shall endeavour to state to you the circumstances which occasioned the letter, as the matter is generally understood in this country.

It was a remark made by a French General,* (a gentleman whose character stands high in our army, as well as with the one wherein he has the honor to serve) that the British army was the best dis.. ciplined in Europe, but that we exacted more from the Subaltern Officers than his Emperor dared to attempt. A review of facts will prove, whether, in this instance, the above General has proved himself an intelligent observer.

The Marquis of Wellington, in the first place, very properly calls the attention of Commanding Officers "to the state of discipline of the troops," which his Lordship in his own justice admits must, in "every army, after a long and active campaign, become in some degree relaxed;" but his Lordship has further observed, that our army has relaxed "to a greater degree than any army with which he has ever served, or of which he has ever read." However far from palatable such an observation may be, I regret to observe, that it most certainly was the case: and I shall here beg to intrude on your notice a fact that is well known in this army. For some days, during the retreat, both officers and men carried on a most destructive warfare against droves of pigs, which the inhabitants had turned into the woods, to pick up the acorns; and such was the continual firing of musketry, on all sides, that the army were frequently in a state of apprehension that they was sur

* General Brennier. This officer was made prisoner by the Guerilla Chief Don Julian at Cuidad Rodrigo.

rounded by the enemy. However, from the continuance of this warfare, and the plentiful supply of pork, the apprehension wore off: and to this alone is to be attributed the loss of our second in command, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Paget. The firing became customary, particularly in front of the columns, and a body of cavalry having penetrated between the rear of one division and the head of another, contrived to carry off the General with little opposition; some firing took place with the enemy, but the generality of the army conceived that it was merely a continuation of pig-shooting. This unmilitary system was certainly not confined to the British army, the Spaniards and Pertuguese were active partakers therein : and this simple undeniable fact alone, justifies Lord Wellington in the above declaration, however painful we may all feel the disgrace. thereby publicly cast on the conduct of this army.

The next observation of the gallant Marquis is, "this army has suffered no privations which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever, in the nature of the service." This is another most admissible fact. There were divisions of the army which suffered no privations, no disasters; but there were other divisions which experienced the most distressing privations, the greatest disOur noble Chief is now fully aware from whence they arose, and is informed of the supineness, instability, and ignorance of the Generals commanding those divisions, and that they are the persons on whom the blame should fall; he is aware, that to their conduct the disasters of this army are to be attributed.

asters.

Lord Wellington's following observation is, that "the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made in which the troops made such short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts; and none in which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy." These facts are alike admis sible-yet it must be evident to our General, that a large army, particularly when confined to one particular route, is with difficulty put at once into motion; that repeated and long halts were made during the march from casual obstructions, narrow bridges, &c. &c. and most particularly when irregularity prevails with those officers whose principal duty it is, by a prompt and expeditious issue of orders, to set every engine at work on the moment pointed out. Lord Wellington could not know, at the time he wrote the letter in question, however correctly he is now informed on the subject, that a division was frequently kept standing on the ground,

and perhaps during a heavy rain, for two hours, waiting the order to move: that from the careless manner in which the admirably digested orders of his Lordship were distributed, divisions at some periods were moved too soon, but generally too late that the signal to fall in and be prepared for the march, preceded the receipt of the order: that the order which directed the baggage to be sent forward at three o'clock, was not received till six, when the brigades were moving off their ground: that when the meat was to be distributed, the camp kettles had been sent away, and perhaps the regiment also marching. It was from these inattentions, from these gross derelictions of duty, on the part of different Generals of Divisions, that some regiments of this army have so severely suffered -it was from them that the fatigue, sickness, and deaths have arisen.—I admit with my noble Commander that the marches were short; but surely it was disastrous for men to be kept standing hours in the rain and on wet ground, perishing with cold; afterwards to be bivouac'd on a swamp, when dry ground was contiguous; then to lay down wearied and pinched with hunger and thirst; and when, from the faculties of the men being completely exhausted through fatigue, they have dropped into a sound sleep, to be roused for the purpose of receiving their meat, &c. and no means of dressing it; the mules dead that carried their camp-kettles, or by an error some miles in the rear.

The Marquis of Wellington states in his letter that he has no hesitation in attributing the evils" to the habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army." The officers divided the misery of the retreat with their men, and it is well known, that many of them had scarcely a covering to their backs. His Lordship then pays a just tribute to the zeal and gallantry of his officers, and recommends, in appropriate language, a proper attention to their duty.-He remarks, "I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the officers of the army, and I am quite certain, that as their minds can be convinced of the necessity of much and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will, in future, give their attention to these points.-Unfortunately, the inexperience of the officers of the army has induced many to conceive, that the period

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