of Abatucci: both had the art of conciliating the love of their subordinates, at a period when anarchy and ambition particularized nobility as a title of perfidy and treason. Their virtues, their talents, and their glorious death, óbtained them the united suffrages of the Generals and the soldiery, who erected mausoleums to them to transmit to posterity the merit of those brave warriors.

They may be reproached with too much timidity in the council, and too much ardour in the field of battle. It has been reported to me that they behaved as simple grenadiers, when they ought to have acted with the caution characteristic of a good General. Very often they suffered themselves to be influenced by the clamorous demands of some revolutionary officers, and the consequence was they were beaten. At times their diffidence sealed their lips, when they ought to have insisted on the adoption of their plans, and the rejection both of those of the ignorant L'Echelle, author of Laval's defeat in the Vendee, where Beaupuy was wounded, and of the wild Ferino, which occasioned the drowning of a great number of brave men of Abatucci's column in crossing the Lech. Those who shall peruse with attention the biographical notes of these two Generals, will be readily convinced that they only wanted experience to take the successful command of the largest armies.

THE SERENITY OF A PRINCE DISCOMPOSED.

I WAS at Hesse Cassel in the summer of 1795, and through military curiosity, went to the Sunday-parade, where the Prince was to inspect and manœuvre his guards. I expected a treat, nor was I disappointed, and I may say, that I never saw a finer body of men; but when I observed His Most Serene Highness gallopping down the front of the parade, caning indiscriminately the noncommissioned officers and privates, and swearing most cavalierly at the officers, my admiration was soon converted into pity for the brave men, (the officers deserved all they got,) and into unequivocal contempt for the ruffian Landgrave, the worthy and accomplished representative of the kind of petty despots who then infested Germany.

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGNS.

(Continued from page 441.)

IT is here proper, however, to enter into a minute review of the actual state of Hamburgh at this period, and the opportunities which the Hamburghers and General Tettenborn had of defending the same. The Danes, who had entered upon the defence of Hamburgh after Lauriston had left it, were recalled, much against the wish of the troops themselves, on the 19th of May, and six gunboats, which till then had defended the passage of the Elbe against the French, were withdrawn to Altona. This occurrence gave great uneasiness to the Hamburghers, for they were fully aware that the force of the Russians, all consisting of cavalry †, amounting only to about 1500 men; and the other corps, forming under the names of the Hanseatic and Hanoverian Legions, were by no means sufficiently organized to make an efficient determined resistance against a regular enemy. Nor was the noble and patriotic spirit of the Hamburghers, who were armed, and formed into a separate corps of about 6000 men, adequate to an effectual defence of their town, unless a more regular military system had been adopted therein. The inhabitants were also fully aware that much more could have been done for the defence of the place, and which opinion every military man will coincide in, who has been an eye-witness of the little that was done to that effect; for what General would have allowed a place, like Wilhelmsburg, so immediately before him, to be left unoccupied and unfortified. If it had only been considered as an advanced post to the main defence of the town itself, thereby preventing the enemy at least from making his advances so rapidly towards a bombardment of the city, as in the present instance was accomplished by the French from Wilhelmsburg, and which, of course, could not have been the case if, during the six weeks and more that the Russians were masters of Hamburgh, General Tettenborn had considered upon its real defence, and

Since the publication of the preceding pages, it has been ascertained that the departure of the Danes did not actually take place till the evening of this day, instead of the 18th.

+ It should be enquired what General ever before had an idea of defending a town solely with cavalry?

↑ Masters of Hamburgh, they certainly must have considered themselves to be, for under what plea or pretence could otherwise, as an Ally, the General commanding have demanded and received the sum of 5000 Louis d'or for himself, and 500 for each of his Aides-de-Camp, when the immense expense of his table, where, daily, at least from thirty to forty officers of various descriptions dined, was defrayed by the inhabitants of Hamburgh?

directed his attention towards that point; for if Hamburgh was to be defended, it must be evident that nothing seriously was attempted to that effect; and if it was not to be defended, it ought never to have been taken possession of in the manner it was, but should have been left to the French, until the moment arrived when ample means for effectually keeping it should have been at hand.

The effect which the loss of that place has produced on the cooperation from Great-Britain to assist in the formation of Count Walmoden's corps is in that and every other military point of view incalculable, and the effect its fall produced on the commercial interests in this country and on the Continent, is best known to those who at the time were travelling in Germany, who experienced the most serious inconveniences in procuring cash for bills on England, even at the loss of from 30 to 40 per cent. Thus much as to the little or nothing that was done by the Russians for the effectual defence of Hamburgh.

The following is an Extract of a Letter from an Officer serving with the Allies at the period.

"As great a misfortune as could possibly have befallen Hamburgh, or in short any other town or village in Germany, was the quartering of Cossacks upon them; for the treatment the inhabitants receive from these ungovernable warriors is beyond description, whenever objections are made to their exorbitant demands for provisions and forage; and the waste they commit in the latter article surpasses every thing known in any army, for the Cossack is in the habit of taking as much corn as he can carry, when he can obtain it, which he throws before bis horse, whether he is to remain one hour or two days in the sanie place, and with hay, if it can be got, he proceeds in the same manner, so that it may readily be imagined what incalculable injury they are to the supplies of other regular corps which have the misfortune to be quartered near them: nor can a General possibly calculate what time his own troops can be provided with forage whilst he has such irregular neighbours."

"Notwithstanding the great dislike to each other, which exists between the Russians and the Cossacks, still something might and ought to have been done by the former, on entering Germany, to prevent, or at least guard as much as possible against the irregularities which are now daily committed by the Cossacks, who have no other idea but carrying on war in an enemy's country. If Russian Officers, acquainted with the language, had been attached as Commissaries to those bodies of Cossacks, who resemble a regiment, there is no doubt but they would have gradually become accustomed to something like regular issues of provisions and forage, and afterwards, such of the Don Cossacks as had imbibed a little order and regularity, might have been attached to the others, who live in a more scattered manner; for, from the Oder to the Elbe, in all directions, are scattered detachments of Cossacks, from tens to hundreds. These detachments remain in the towns and villages as long as they please, and as long as they find good living-having not the smallest consideration for what passes to their right or left, and being completely without any plans of co-operation with the main armies. How they ever will be collected again is morally impossible to say; and how Germany ever will get rid of them again is equally as uncertain."

We have never been able to ascertain the real cause why the Swedish force amounting nearly to 5000, who were near Hambugh at the time we are speaking of, and ready to replace what was lost by the defection of the Danes, were directed to fall back again, and the Colonel Commanding ordered to repair to Stralsund to be brought before a Military Court, for having engaged to assist in the defence of Hamburgh; nor has it been made public what was done to that officer, who, it cannot possibly be supposed, had marched from Stralsund to the Elbe, a distance of 135 English miles, without some orders and some object to execute. Nevertheless, so it was, the Swedes retired, notwithstanding the most pressing representations from Count Walmoden urging their remaining only for another forty-eight hours, but all to no purpose, the order from the Prince Royal of Sweden was too peremptory to admit of any deviation by the Officer Commanding. Here a question obtrudes itself, "whether the Crown Prince was ever cordial in the defence of Hamburgh; or whether he considered its loss of such importance as it has subsequently proved to be; or whether its fall did not materially contribute to hasten the realization of that prince's own wishes."

If the Prince Royal of Sweden had been determined upon the defence of Hamburgh, it does not admit of a doubt, that it never would have again fallen into the hands of the French, at least not in the manner which occurred; for if the twenty-eight gun boats, which were laying at Gottenburg at the time (the 19th of May) the Danes withdrew theirs from before Hamburgh-if these gun-boats had been in the Elbe, could the French have remained long quietly in possession of Wilhelmsburg after they had been allowed to possess themselves of it, or could they ever have ventured to attempt a crossing at any one point in the Elbe?Could a Swedish force of from 5 to 7000 not have moved in and near Hamburgh, occupying the right bank of the Elbe, whilst the rest of the Russians, with such of Count Walmoden's corps as were efficient for service, followed the movements of General Tschernicheff on the left bank of the river?-Would General Van Damme in such a case have ventured upon an attack on Hamburgh, or would he not have been most likely forced to abandon the ground he held between the Elbe and Weser, evacuating Cuxhaven, and in short to abandon the territories of Hanover and Brunswick, where the patriotic spirit of the inhabitants was anxiously awaiting the moment of deliverance from the yoke of French despotism?-Admitting fully that the Prince Royal of Sweden had the safety of his own troops

at heart, was it likely that, under the before-mentioned circumtances, any failure could be expected to result from such proceedings? Having said thus much as to what might have been done by Sweden towards the saving of Hamburgh, and preventing it again falling into the hands of the French, it is next necessary to attempt divining the Prince Royal's motives for not having done so; for that it would have been saved by him from all the misery which has since been heaped upon its unfortunate inhabitants by the enemy, and very important influence thereby lost in that quarter, his Royal Highness is fully aware of.

To engage Sweden to take an active part in the operations on the Continent, the Allies had agreed to grant her the following number of troops-Russia, 36,000; Prussia, 16,000.

The troops which were organizing in the North of Germany under the protection, and at the expence, of England, were, together with those from the former two powers, to be placed at the sole disposal of the Crown Prince, thereby giving him an army of at least 90,000 men, including 27,000 Swedes.

The Swedes had arrived at Stralsund long before the fall of Hamburgh; but the contingencies, promised by Russia and Prussia, had not made their appearance, and the troops forming on the Elbe, under Count Walmoden, were as yet too inconsiderable; under these circumstances the Prince Royal, perhaps, reasoned in the following manner.-Unless I receive the troops promised me by the Allies, I will not move a step from hence, (Stralsund,) whatever shall become of Hamburgh or even of all Germany; for if I do go myself and save Hamburgh, is such an act befitting the Prince Royal of Sweden, or such a command not more becoming a General Officer of brigade or division? And if I do send a small force to co-operate with the allies on the Elbe, and Hamburgh is thereby, together with the assistance of my gun-boats in the river, saved from again falling into the hands of the French, will the Allies not be, perhaps, still more dilatory in furnishing their promised quota for my army; therefore let Hamburgh fall, and I am sure to receive sooner the promised troops, thereby obtaining and connecting a force, which will enable me to take a more threatening position in the general operations with the Allies; and from it I shall have a more decided voice to give hereafter as to what shall be and what shall not be in Germany; and when the promised Russians and Prussians do join me, I shall make the several Commanders thereof take an oath of alliance to me, declaring before the whole army that they are to follow me in all my operations to the execution of my