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It is not intended by this statement to convey the idea, that the rise in the value of any particular tract of land, will be in the exact proportion here mentioned. In many important instances in America it has been greater, in others perhaps less.

But it is intended to shew that the increase in the value of American lands is, in its nature, like that of compound interest; and that assuming the very moderate ratio of three and a half per cent. for the increase of inhabitants, the general rise in the value of property resulting therefrom, is very far above the profit of capital in any of the ordinary ways of employing it. And it is to be remembered, that these statements being matters of arithmetical calculation, are not to be disproved, except by di proving some of the premises on which they are founded.

It ought also to be remarked, that the statement is burthened by the inclusion of all the lands in the United States, and of course, of many millions which are not now for sale, and will not begin to be settled for many years. It is, therefore, much too moderate, if

considered with respect to the lands now in market.

The lowest price at which Congress sell the lands, they offer for sale at two dollars per acre.

The astonishingly low prices of lands in America, have hitherto been occasioned by the want of capital to invest in them. Only a few European capitalists have lately understood the subject; and no body is ignorant of the immense advantages they have derived from it. The great increase of capital in America, together with the investments which Europeans are beginning to make in lands, will probably raise their value far above the rate at which it has increased at any former period.

Such a conclusion results, not unnaturally, from another consideration, which is this:-the price of any commodity whatever may be raised in two ways-either by diminishing the quantity for sale, or by increasing the demand.. But the extension of settlements, and the increase of wealth and population, operate at once, in both these ways, upon American lands: not only diminishing the quantity for sale, but increasing the means and eligibility of making further purchases and settlements.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR OFFICERS,

WHOSE DUTIES HAVE CALLED THEM TO EMPLOYMENT UPON OR NEAR THE SCENES OF ANTIENT RENOWN, &c. &c.

SIR,

IN my former letter I pointed out to your notice (with the hope of attracting the notice of others employed within the country) the seat of war, in the North Western quarter of Sicily, where, towards the close of the first shock of hostility between the rival republics of Carthage and Rome, a peace was achieved by the arms of the latter. Upon referring to my portfolio for the materials of a second address upon the subject, which I have already endeavoured to explain in my preceding one, I feel no difficulty in selecting for the scene of action, which 1 could wish to have described and illustrated, a portion of the Spanish territory. Five years of our lives have now passed away since there began in Spain the contest which no well ordered nature, I believe, has been able to survey, with the interest belonging to it, without shedding, on the one hand, the bitterest tears of sorrow, or glowing with the fiercest feelings of indignation, and on the other, without sympathising with the unconquerable spirit manifested, or joining in the high exultation of its successes. Language can but poorly do the office of telling the bursting sentiments of anger and abhorrence, which the atrocious aggression of France could not fail to excite. It has failed altogether, when called upon to describe the errors of unhappy Spain; full of errors has she been: for who, when he recollects their too powerful causes in the long history of Spanish evil treatment, would wish to declare or point out to notice the faults and failings of the generous nation, which has more than redeemed them all by her noble perseverance? Oh, what has not Spain-peaceable, retired, unoffending Spain, suffered through the cruel lapse of these tedious five years? She has seen her palaces usurped, her cities pillaged, her villages and her hamlets laid in ashes, her daughters insulted, and her sons only spared from unpitying and indiscriminate carnage in order to be swept away into the service of the accursed foe. She has seen all this; she has bled at every pore; she has been panged to the very soul. She was unprepared for any contest. Her strong places were already occupied; her founderies and arsenals were either dilapidated or seized; her military spirit was in decay; every de partment of her service was neglected or mismanaged; her offices of trust and power were exclusively held by a degenerate and dis

eased nobility. But the heart of Spain was yet alive, and yet beat with the vigorous pulsations of an immortal nature; while from the vocabulary of her stately and powerful language was expunged the term-submission.

We have seen the effects of this fine spirit, which, even while beaten to the ground by the violence of the storm, nourished the elastic principle that rose continually to the pressure. The principle has triumphed over the imposing array of a power apparently overwhelming yes, Sir, Spain; (and let us bear it in mind, even in this glorious hour, while glowing with the exultation excited by the triumphs of Vittoria) Spain it has been, whose loyalty and whose spirit, by throwing open to the genius and prowess of Lord Wellington her fields and her population, has given to herself and to Europe, hope, victory, and freedom.

Greatly indeed has that consummate Captain availed himself not only of the means thus put into his hands, but of every other, which his judgment had arranged or his genius created. For myself and some few (very few) of my friends, I can safely declare that from the hour Lord Wellington entered his lines before Lisbon I considered the question of his ultimate success as quite settled. From that corner of the Continent, as "a little cloud out of the sea, like a man's hand," his force has continued to swell till it has poured itself out over the Peninsula to the refreshment and safety of the nation. But delightful as is the theme of this great modern chieftain's name and character, I must quit it a while in order to recur to the consideration of an exploit performed in Spain, by the most prominent personage of antiquity.

When, (by the long suspended, but, at length, bloody retribution, due to the series of offences committed, Rome had turned against herself the sword, which she had so wickedly and remorselessly urged against the numerous and successive victims of her power and policy) Julius Cæsar exulting from his butcheries in Germany and Gaul, and fresh from his easy expulsion of Pompey out of Italy, had carried his arms into Spain, the first great blow, struck by him there, was against Petreius and Afranius, the lieutenants of his rival †, in the neighbourhood of Ilerda (Lerida).

Those two commanders, committing the provinces of ulterior Spain, and of Lusitania to the care of M. T. Varro, (who however

* 1 Kings, xviii. 44.

+49 years before the birth of our Saviour.

illustrious as a scholar, seems to have been but a very incapable General), had advanced to that town with a combined force of five legions, five thousand horse, and a crowd of Spanish auxiliaries, drawn chiefly from among the Celteberians.

On the other hand Fabius had been dispatched by Cæsar from Narbonne, first to seize the Pyrennees, and secondly, by advancing, to keep in check the forces of his opponents, until the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief. The first step of Fabius, we are told, upon arriving in the neighbourhood of Lerida, where the Pompeians were encamped, was to establish (1) TWO BRIDGES OVer the Sichoris (the Segre) about four miles* apart, for the purpose of sending his foragers over to the right bank of the river. The same was also done by Afranius from his camp, which was connected with Lerida by a bridge, so that skirmishes daily happened between the parties thus employed. These skirmishes appear to have grown in character and extent, as we find Fabius sending over no less than two legions for the protection of his foragers. The number of the troops, the weight of the cattle and horses, and the force of the stream, all combined to destroy, upon this occasion, the bridge; the frag. ments of which, borne down the river, speedily informed his enemy of the disaster. To attack the two legions (thus cut off by the destruction of, I presume, the lower bridge) Afranius and Petreius immediately passed from their camp through Lerida, four of their legions and all their cavalry. To sustain the efforts of this very superior force was the part of Plancus, under whom were the two Cæsarean legions, until Fabius, with much expedition, came up to their assistance with the remainder of his forces over the further and remaining bridge. The affair then terminated, and each party retired to its camp.

Two days after this Cæsar himself arrived with 900 horse: Immediately ordering the broken bridge to be restored, and leaving as a guard to it and to the camp six cohorts (a legion), he drew up his whole force in three lines, and advanced towards the enemy, in order to offer them battle, (æquo loco) in a place mutually favourable. Afranius also drew out his, and (in medio colle sub constitet) halted (2) ON THE MIDDLE OF THE HILL near his camp. At a distance of 600 paces (950 yards) from the BOTTOM OF THE HILL, Cæsar, seeing

* The Roman mile (it may here be observed, as precision in the distances will be very necessary) contained 1610 of our yards. At the period of the warfare described above, the Roman legion may be estimated at about (or rather less than)

5000 men.

the intention of Afranius not to go far from his camp, resolved to entrench himself. This he did under the cover of his two first lines, by the laborious exertion of the third, and by drawing a ditch of fifteen feet deep (3) ROUND THE SPOT selected for the purpose. On the third day after the cominencement of this daring measure, he completed his defences by the construction of a rampart, the materials of part of which were necessarily brought from some distance, and marched into it the legion which had been left for the protection of the former camp. We now reach some description (chapter 43) which seems to prove that the camp of the Pompeians did not absolutely touch or lean upon Lerida: for, "there was between that town and (4) THE HILL WHERE WAS PITCHED THE CAMP OF AFRANIUS AND PETREIUS, a plain or open space of about 300 paces (425 yards) in the middle of which arose a (5) SMALL ELEVATION OF GROUND." To seize and fortify this spot became a marked object with Cæsar, as he would thus cut off his enemies from the town, the bridge, and their magazines, which were collected in Lerida. The attempt was repulsed; the Cæsareans driven back TO THE NEXT HILL (in proximum collem). The Afranians, in their too eager pursuit, were, in their turn, compelled to take refuge under THE WALLS OF LERIDA. (17) HERE THE PLACE WAS ABRUPT AND STEEP ON EACH SIDE, but it afforded A WIDTH OF FACE upon which three cohorts (about 2,500 men) might be drawn up. From it the troops of Afranius were enabled to engage with advantage their adversaries. Opposite to this commanding spot, it should seem, (8) WAS A GENTLE ACCLIVITY OF ABOUT 400 PACES (600 yards) upon which the Cæsareans formed themselves. The battle was fed on both sides from the town and from Cæsar's camp respectively, until considerable forces were engaged in a very close and sharp action for five hours. By a desperate effort on the part both of his cavalry and his legionian troops, Cæsar was enabled to extricate his men, when he retired to his camp. The rising ground, the original object of attack, remained in the hands of the Afranians, and was fortified by them.

A new scene now opens; for Cæsar informing us (which he had not done before, and which indeed is not quite reconcileable with his story hitherto told) (9) that HIS CAMP WAS BETWEEN THE CINGA (the modern Cinca, which coming from more to the West unites with the Segre at Mequinenza, about twenty miles below Lerida) and the Sichoris; where by the rupture of his two bridges over the latter, he found himself confined to a space of about thirty miles.

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