perhaps, alone excepted; and when these moral advantages concurred, his high rank and illustrious family ought to have been considered as circumstances to recommend him, giving him, as they would have done, additional claim to the respect of the army and people. With both he was exceedingly popular, especially among the La Manchans. Mr. Frere, who estimated the merits of the Duke as they deserved, was desirous that he should have the command in La Mancha, and suggested it to Cuesta. Unhappily Mr. Frere's advice was rejected, and this may be considered as a prime cause of the failure of the campaign. It had, at first, been doubted whether the French would make any thing more than a shew of resistance on this side of Madrid, and a plan was proposed for menacing their retreat, and the rear of the metropolis, by detaching a considerable Spanish corps through the Puerto de Arenas to Avila, Arevalo, and Segovia. Such a movement, it was thought, would compel the enemy either to retreat, or to detach a force of correspondent magnitude, and thus a material advantage would be afforded to the British army, which, when concentrated, amounted only to 20,000 men. Cuesta had about 38,000 men, well armed, but ill disciplined, and ill clothed, which in their state of discipline, was an evil of more consequence than may immediately be obvious. The intruder, with 9000 of his guards, and the greater part of the garrison of Madrid, had joined Sebastiani's army in La Mancha, · and attempted to bring Venegas to action; but finding this in vain, they left 200 men to defend Toledo against him, and prepared to bring their whole disposeable force, consisting of about 50,000, against the united Spanish and British armies. But the Spanish army was in such a state that little could be expected from its cooperation; a far smaller force would, under such circumstances, be of greater assistance, both as being more manageable, and more likely to follow the example and catch the spirit of their better disciplined allies. If, therefore, a large detachment of these troops, by moving towards Segovia, could draw off a body of the French to watch them, they would render infinitely more service by such a diversion than could be expected from them in the field. For this reason such a movement was advised both by Sir Arthur and Mr. Frere. There was another reason which made the Junta wish to see Cuesta's army diminished, and which is characteristic of that imbecile body. A suspicion had for some time prevailed that Cuesta had not forgiven his arrest, and that same temper which led him to those violent measures which had provoked that act of vigour, would tempt him to take some serious vengeance whenever

Victor had taken There Sir Arthur

it was in his power. This, it was thought, was more to be apprehended now than at any former time, because the army which his rival, Blake, commanded, had just at this time been shamefully dispersed, and thus the great obstacle to such a project was removed. The Junta were afraid to supersede Cuesta, even if they knew whom to appoint in his place, and they were afraid even to propose this measure of detaching a part of his army, under a commander of sufficient popularity to oppose his designs; but it was not doubted that if such a measure was proposed by the British General, as a military plan, they would joyfully accede to it. Cuesta was wronged by these suspicions: he was obstinate, untractable, and unfit for command; but a right honest man, and one who, from a sense of duty, as well as from his natural courage, would at any time have laid down his life for the service of Spain. Sir Arthur, whose head-quarters were at Placentia, went on the 10th of July to confer with the Spanish General at Almarez: 14,000 of the Spaniards were at this time stationed at the Puento del Arzobispo; the remainder were about two miles from the bridge of Almarez, encamped under the pass of Miravete. up a position upon the Alberche, near Talavera. stated his opinion, they ought to be attacked by the united force of the Allies; but that it would be desirable to detach a corps of 10,000 towards Avila, to turn their right. Cuesta approved of the proposal, but desired that they might be British troops. To this Sir Arthur replied, that the British army, to act with advantage, must act in a body; and the Spaniards could better spare such a detachment, being indeed more numerous than was either necessary for the operations on the Alberche, or convenient, considering their state of discipline. These representations were lost upon Cuesta, who probably estimated his own importance by the number of men under his command; he refused to make any large detachment, but offered to send two battalions of infantry, and a few cavalry to join Sir Robert Wilson's Portuguese brigade, and march upon Arenas, and thence to Escalona, in communication with the left of the British army. Had Sir Arthur's advice been followed, it was his intention to have recommended the Duke of Albuquerque to the command; but it was the fate of Spain to be almost always deprived of the services of this brave and able General by the jealousy of meaner minds *.

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In pursuance of the arrangement concerted at this interview, the British army broke up from Placentia on the 17th and 18th of July, and formed a junction with Cuesta on the 20th, at Oropesa. Sir Robert Wilson marched from his position on the Tietar on the 15th, and reached Escalona on the 23d, threatening Madrid on that side, from which he was a few leagues distant. Venegas had been directed to break up from Madrilejos at the same time as the British army, march by Tembleque and Ocana, cross the Tagus by the ford at Fuente Duenas, and advance to Arganda, so to threaten Madrid, which would then be within a few hours march. Had this plan been followed, either a considerable body of French must have been detached against Venegas, or he would have entered the capital without resistance. Sir Arthur was destined throughout the campaign to have his well-formed plans continually frustrated by the grossest misconduct on the part of those from whom he looked for the most cordial co-operation. On the 22d the combined armies moved from Oropesa, and the advanced-guard attacked Victor's rear-guard, which was drawn up in order of battle, upon a plain about a league from Talavera. Their right wing was turned by Brigadier-General Anson, and the Duke of Albuquerque attacked them in front, and drove them back; they retreated to a position upon the Alberche, a league beyond the town, and the combined armies advanced, and encamped that night in the vineyards and olive-grounds between the town and the French. Sir Arthur had a narrow escape this day; while he was reconnoitring, a three-pound shot was fired at him, with so good an aim, that it cut a bough from a tree close to his head. He determined to attack the enemy the following morning, and bring Victor to action before he was joined by Sebastiani and the intruder. The columns were formed for this purpose at an early hour, and at five in the morning they received orders to march; but these orders were countermanded, not more to the surprise and disappointment of the army than to the vexation of the General. Cuesta insisted upon delaying the attack till the following day. So unaccountable was this conduct, that one of the reasons which have been assigned for it was, that he scrupled at fighting upon a Sunday. Whatever his reasons were, they have never been explained, and probably were not more valid than this would have been: but thus the opportunity was let pass; for when, on the morning of the 24th, he was ready to give battle, it appeared that Victor, profiting by the precious time which had been given him, had decamped during the night,

and retired to St. Ollala, and from thence towards Torrejos, to effect that meditated junction which Sir Arthur's measures would have frustrated. The retreat of the enemy surprised Cuesta as much as if his own procrastination had not deprived Spain of the victory, which measures more prompt would have secured. The British General expected that this would be the consequence of so ill-timed a delay; and the disappointment was the more grievous to him because he could not pursue the French. From the hour in which he entered Spain he had never been able to procure any means of transport; for the baggage of individuals he required none, only for provisions, ammunition, money, and military stores, things indispensible for an army. These were not to be obtained. The country was in a state of total disorganization, and what was more extraordinary, the government seemed to be totally ignorant of this, and to suppose that nothing more was required of it than to issue edicts, which would be carried into effect as if things were in their ordinary course. This inconvenience was so severely felt, that Sir Arthur, before he left Placentia, informed Cuesta it would be impossible for him to undertake any farther operations after their arrangements against Victor should have been carried into effect, unless the necessary means of transport were supplied.

This declaration had been made as early as the 16th: a week had now clapsed, the evil continued the same, nor had there been the slightest effort to remedy it; and the evil was not alone, for from the same causes the troops were now in actual want of provisions. The Spanish Commissariat was in the most deplorable state, and that of the British army, which was yet far from being in a good one, could effect nothing in a country where they exerted no authority themselves, and the government would exert none for them. The evil was aggravated by the junction of two such large armies, in a country which had scarcely ever been without troops, to exhaust it during the preceding twelvemonths. When the people of the two combined armies became, as it were, competitors for food, the inhabitants naturally preferred their own countrymen: it was afterwards discovered also, that with a stupid selfishness, which admits neither of justification or excuse, they concealed the greater part of their stores from both. Thus painfully circumstanced, Sir Arthur could not proceed. He conceived also that the engagement which he had formed with Cuesta was completely fulfilled by the removal of Victor from the Alberche; for if advantages were duly taken of that movement, it gave the Spanish General possession of VOL. II. Ss

the course of the Tagus, and opened the communication with La Mancha and Venegas. He halted from absolute necessity, and be determined even to return to Portugal, if he were not properly supplied. Cuesta appeared fully sensible of the propriety of this determination, and trusting that good fortune would put him in possession of Madrid, which now seemed just within his reach, and thus put an end to the difficulties which embarrassed him, he having means of transport in abundance, advanced four leagues in pursuit of Victor, to the village of Bravo; Sir Arthur, meantime, moving two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, under General Sherbrooke, across the Alberche to Casalegas, to keep up the communication with Cuesta and with Sir Robert Wilson. Joseph Buonaparte left Madrid on the 23d, and halted that night at Navalcarnero, designing to form a junction with Victor at Casalegas, and to order Sebastiani there as soon as that General, in pursuance of his instructions, should have returned from Consuegra and Madrilejos, where he was watching Venegas, to Toledo. Another object which he had in view was to check Sir Robert Wilson, whose force he supposed to be considerably greater than it was, and of whose enterprising spirit the French stood in great fear. But Victor, who was well informed of the plans of his enemies, and had retreated in time to avoid an action in which he must have been defeated, perceived, that if he fell back upon Naval Carnero, to join the intruder, it would be easy to interpose between them and Sebastiani, in which case the junction of their whole force in this quarter would be rendered exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Apprizing Joseph, therefore, of his movements, he retreated to the left bank of the Guadarama, at its confluence with the Tagus near Toledo. Sebastiani reached that city the same day, and the intruder, marching to the same point, fixed his head-quarters at Vargas, two leagues distant, so that the whole force which he could bring against the Allies was now united. It consisted of 45,000 men, after 3000 were left to defend Toledo. They resolved immediately, now that this grand object was effected, to act upon the offensive, and on the next day they began their march to Torrijos. Cuesta had by this time advanced to St. Olalla. He there learnt that Victor had turned off towards Toledo, and so far was he from divining the obvious intent of such a movement, that he supposed the French were in full retreat, and that he had nothing to do but to pursue them. From some strange misconception too, he supposed the English were about to follow him; they were very short of provisions and