an

ernment is opposed to the cancellation of the debts and it does not consider the question of debts and that of reparations as allied; the European nations ought to come to understanding in order to place their houses in order, and the urgent European interest at this time is the balancing of their the budgets and reduction of armaments. In certain quarters this was taken as а reply to the Clemenceau visit. There was, however, no evidence of this and the programme by no means conformed to the desires of M. Clemenceau or the parties in France that he represented. In fact, on the assumption that these principles represented the possible programme of the United States there was a formidable body of criticism aroused in the French press. Many of the leading journals attacked it as if it were conceived in the interest of Germany alone. That was the criticism of the Paris Temps. Other papers declared that the first duty of the United States should be to cancel the sums that it claimed of the Allies if it wished to save Europe from financial chaos. It was argued in certain quarters that this programme was aimed simply at preventing France from occupying the Ruhr. Other representatives of the prevailing opinion in France declared that the conditions stipulated by America were exactly the contrary of those required to prevent Germany from avoiding the reparations. It was said that the Americans might render a great service if they permitted France to seize the German capital which existed in the United States in order to pay for the reparations during a period of two years, thus avoiding the necessity for a moratorium. Such was the first response to these suggestions in the United States, but the above criticisms came only from quarters that were particularly subservient to the recent government policies. Ever since the War it had been the practice of the French writers of all classes, including the most distinguished, to attribute every move or statement that they did not approve to German propaganda or to the influence of Berlin. Accordingly the first remark of many writers on hearing of the American programme, which was apparently put out for the purpose of sounding public opinion, was to the effect that it had been inspired from Berlin, and there were not lacking those who came forward with evidence to that effect. The attitude of the American press toward the question was uncertain, owing to the variety of the comment. There appeared to be no general demand for cancellation, nor any general tendency to regard the questions of reparations and cancellation necessarily bound together. There was little appreciation in this country of the state of opinion in France. The natural reply of France to the overtures above indicated would be either to demand a favorable settlement of the question of the debt of France to the United States, if not a complete cancellation, or to affirm anew that the United States and Great Britain not having guaranteed France any support in case of an attack France would assure herself of protection by the means that seemed to her best. But in the United States on this whole question of a resort by France to military sanctions in case of continued German refusal to pay, and continued indifference on the part

as

of the Allies to the German default, the attitude of France was interpreted in many quarters as mere bluffing; that is to say, it was not believed that in France itself there was strong support of the policies of German occupation repeatedly urged by spokesmen of French opinion after 1920 and manifestly approaching the point of fulfillment at the close of 1922. believed that the frequent reference of French public men to the need of forcible measures such as the occupation of the Ruhr was merely for the purpose of intimidating Europe, because on many occasions those threats had been made and had not yet been executed.

It was

In Octo

LONDON CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER. ber and November a conference to be held at Brussels on reparations and inter-Allied debts was the subject of much anticipatory comment. M. Poincaré pronounced it the last chance for the solutions of the reparations problem without recourse to direct action. By the end of November, however, the French programme had definitely assumed the necessity of direct action unless the demands of France were met. The plan for the conference at Brussels to discuss further means of compromise was abandoned and a conference was appointed to meet at London to consider the French proposals which involved forcible seizure of German territory. Among the French it was hoped that M. Poincaré's programme would be accepted. This involved the concession of a moratorium to Germany on certain specific conditions. One of the main features of the programme was a military guarantee in the shape of joint occupation of the Ruhr valley. The conference of the four premiers met in London, December 8. The German financial expert, Karl Bergman, brought the proposal from the German Chancellor that the moratorium granted conditionally on the recent payment of treasury notes to Belgium should be extended beyond the date fixed for the Brussels financial conference. The German Chancellor presented a picture of the wretched economic conditions of Germany but declared the government's intention to meet its obligations as completely as possible. The details of the general proposal were not made public at the time but at the meeting of December 10 it was given out that the Allies were unanimously opposed to the plan. The French conditions for the acceptance of a two-year moratorium for Germany included measures for the economic control of the Rhineland industries and partial occupation of the Ruhr district by a military force which would collect the customs on the coal output. According to the French view this was not a military action against Germany. At the meeting of December 9 Mr. Bonar Law was prepared to reconsider the question of cancellation if a settlement satisfactory to the British could be arranged. He suggested as the feature of such a settlement: A moratorium sufficient for the financial reestablishment of Germany; no military action of any character by the French; and a reduction of the indemnity to between 30 and 40 billion gold marks. Each of the other Allies made proposals for settlement. Finally the French plan brought out a division among the premiers who could not agree to the occupation of the Ruhr as a productive guarantee. The British premier declared that if France occupied

the Ruhr she would have to do so alone and the Italian premier agreed generally in this attitude though professing sympathy with France. The division being irremediable the conference adjourned to meet again in Paris, January 2. During the adjournment of the conference the question of the French resort to seizure of German property was actively debated. The policy was of course condemned in all Liberal quarters and generally opposed in the countries of the Allies. In France, however, there was strong support for it. On December 28 it was announced that the French government had completed its preparations for the seizure of certain German state forests. The Reparations Commission had declared a few days before that Germany had willfully defaulted because she had not delivered this year the required amount of building material. Some of the forests were situated in Bavaria. It was given out that the prime minister would insist that this plan be brought up at the meeting of the conference and that he would demand the approval of France's Allies for it. The government took its stand on the clauses of the treaty as interpreted by the Reparations Commission, while the British government considered this interpretation doubtful. It was believed that the British prime minister would oppose any discussion of seizures or economic guarantees until all other means of settlement had been examined. The paragraphs of the Treaty on which the French contention rested were 17 and 18 of Annex II. The members of the Reparations Commission, according to reports, expressed the opinion that only some unexpected events such as the interven

tion of the United States at the last moment could prevent France from seizing certain economic guarantees. And it was supposed that these guarantees would consist of a 10 per cent tax on the exports of coal from the Ruhr valley and the rigorous collection of a 25 per cent tax on the value of all exports from the Rhineland. There was some discussion as to whether or not armed forces would be necessary for the execution of these measures.

CLEMENCEAU'S VISIT. Georges Clemenceau, the great war premier of France, regarded by many as the greatest French statesman of war time, visited the United States and began a series of addresses in November. His coming was variously interpreted. According to some it related to internal political conditions in France, where it was said Clemenceau hoped to bring back a prestige from his American journey that would strengthen the element that he represented and perhaps bring him again into power. On the other hand M. Clemenceau himself disclaimed any such political purpose declaring that the sole object was to bring the United States into smypathy with France and make the American people understand the French position and the French frame of mind. His addresses were delivered to large and sympathetic audiences and aroused the greatest interest everywhere. In the press of all shades there were expressions of sympathy with M. Clemenceau but on the whole there was little disposition to accept the policy that he proposed which was based rather on the situation as it seemed to him at the time of the Peace Conference than on the present condition of affairs. He pleaded for a degree of union between the

United States and France that would draw the former further into European politics and involve it in an international partisanship that was against the instincts of the people and the policies of their leaders. He hoped to stabilize the results of the victory whereas in the United States there was a widespread and growing he lief that the Treaty was about the worst imaginable instrument for the peace of the future. In general the objection to M. Clemenceau's addresses was that they did not take sufficient account of the present and the future and indicated no advance beyond the point at which M. Clemenceau had stood in 1918. On the other hand their vigor, patriotism, and frankness appealed strongly to the public. While, therefore, his visit did tend to promote sympathy with the French people on account of his prestige and his appealing personality, it probably left the practical issues of American international policy precisely where they were before. From liberal, progressive, and radical quarters in the United States there arose much criticism of Clemenceau's position. His views were atWashington and tacked by the group of progressive Senators at in the progressive press. They furnished the occasion for renewing the charges of militarism and imperialism against France.

war was

THE DARDANELLES CRISIS: SITUATION IN THE SPRING. The most acute problem in European international polities of the year was that of the Far East, and as indicated in following paragraphs, it developed into a crisis in September which threatened the peace of Europe. Responsibility for the Turco-Greek variously interpreted during the year, in accordance with French or English sympathies. In the United States there was a disposition in many quarters to blame both Powers for their selfish ambitions. On the whole, among the Liberal writers in the United States there was a tendency to support England rather than France. According to the view of the French and their sympathizers, the British government was responsible for the Near Eastern difficulty. At the end of the War Great Britain had conceived a vast plan of Oriental domination. Her forces extended in a net-work from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and from the deserts of Arabia to the summit of the Caucasus, with the Euphrates, the Black Sea, Bagdad. Transcaspia and Transcaucasia within its limits. She was master of Persia, protector of the Arabs and Greeks, and the conqueror of Turkey. To the British expansion all this naturally opened the way to a consolidation of the British Empire from the Indies to Egypt. The important rôle played by the Greeks in this scheme, according to the French, lay in the fact that the further Greek expansion advanced, the more completely would the new Greece become a satellite of Great Britain. Venizelos and his supporters were loyal to Great Britain and the latter had no doubt of this loyalty and made the Greek her soldier in the East against the Turk. This policy involved two conditions: (1) The possibility of England's holding in the East considerable military forces; (2) The superiority of Greek power to Turkish. British public opinion, however, and the difficulties arising in Egypt, India and Ireland, obliged the British government to abandon its military advance in the East. On the other hand, the advantage of

Greece, which was considerable at the beginning of the contest with Turkey, rapidly diminished until the balance was reversed. As things turned against this Eastern policy of the British government, it gradually changed its attitude. In the first place, in the autumn of 1921 it admitted the necessity of restoring Turkish sovereignty in Asia Minor. It had made no such admission till then. In the second place, it admitted the impossibility of limiting the hinterland of Constantinople to the Tchataldja frontier. It also abandoned the plan imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres for the financial and administrative control of Turkey. This change of policy had been caused by the revelation of Greek weakness, the fear that the French agreement with the Turkish government might be the point of departure for a new Turco-French understanding and policy, and, finally, the realization that throughout the whole Mussulman world sympathies were turning toward France and against England on account of the latter's policy. The last-named consideration was doubtless the most important.

This in brief was the situation as interpreted especially by the French when a conference of the three ministers met in Paris in March. The aims of the conference were: (1) To develop a plan whereby Turkey might regain her national existence, and (2) to develop a system for controlling the Turk at points where Europe was directly interested in the Dardanelles. Under the first head, there were various proposals for setting up the Turkish authority unimpaired in Asia Minor. According to the published report of the meeting the decision on this point was that the Ottoman sovereignty should be restored from the Caucasus to the Mediterranean, and this restoration should be integral. Such reserves as were made in respect to Smyrna and Armenia were merely franchises protecting the liberties of the inhabitants. It would have been fatal to Turkish solidarity to take away Smyrna, which was the necessary outlet to Anatolia on the Mediterranean. There was every sign that if such an attempt were made, the Moslem world would never acquiesce in it. As to Armenia, her fate had been at stake from the first. Everywhere in a minority, except perhaps in a small portion of the former Russian possessions, it was everywhere exposed to the hatred of the Turkish Nationalists. The Armenians were not even able to exist without foreign financial and military support. Since neither Great Britain nor the United States, the traditional protectors of Armenia, had been willing to undertake this charge, and since France, already burdened with the Syrian mandate, could not assume this additional duty, there was nothing left but to leave Armenia to the Turks, entrusting her at the same time to the moral protection of the League of Nations.

The Turks claimed the 1914 frontiers, i.e. the line of Maritza-Adrianople, thus assuring themselves of a sufficient space in the neighborhood of their capital and of the full control of the Straits. This demand seemed excessive to the statesmen of the Entente, and they were not ready to go so far in admitting Turkish independence. They insisted on a stage of supervision and they first concerned themselves with Constantinople. The new Turkish frontier, which to the north boarded Bulgaria, descended

next nearly parallel to the Black Sea, leaving Kirk-Kelissé near Grecian Thrace, and reaching Rodosto on the Sea of Marmora. To complete the protection of the Turkish capital the Powers provided for a demilitarization of all Thrace, both Greek and Turkish. There was to be a zone of perpetual peace around Constantinople. The revision of the frontiers was completed by a recasting of the administrative arrangements of the Treaty of Sèvres. The result in this field corresponded to that in respect to territory. The stipulations of Sèvres involved a rigid system for the protection of minorities involving penalties. The régime imposed upon the Turks in this respect went far beyond that which had been imposed upon the other victims of the war, namely, the Bulgarians and the Hungarians; and as to financial control, it was pushed so far that it struck at the vitals of Turkish sovereignty. These clauses were moderated. The League of Nations, to which Turkey was entitled to admission, was to charge itself with the protection of minorities and the financial control under its new form tended to approach such traditional institutions as the organization of the Ottoman debt. All this showed a great advance in the direction of concessions to the Turks, and a Turkey based on this plan was not so very different from the Turkey of 1914. On

Now comes the question of the Straits. that subject the three ministers proposed a series of measures assuring an effective control and supervision. The experience of 1914 had left painful memories. It seemed that, without the intervention of Turkey in the contest, or with Turkey on the side of the Allies, the War might have been cut down to half its duration. More than any other nation Great Britain had insisted on European control of the Straits. In addition to the motives of her Allies, Great Britain had the particular motive resting on her imperial interests. It was a traditional policy of the British Foreign Office to control the lines of communication between different parts of the Empire, and this concern had never been more lively than in the period following the War. It showed itself in the obstinacy that the British had displayed in the Tangier question and in its attitude toward the Egyptian government in respect to the British garrisons along the Suez Canal. England in the circumstances could not wash her hands of the Straits which were the gateway to Russia, the Caucasus and Asia in general. On the French side the Straits were regarded differently. A portion of French public opinion favored the restoration of the Straits to the Turks, subject only to their permanent neutralization by the demilitarization of the coasts and the denial to Turkey of the right to maintain a navy. Others believed that such guarantees were insufficient, and in spite of their Turkish sympathies they did not think important safeguards should be abandoned. To many French observers the Turkey of to-day seemed altogether different from the Turkey of tradition, especially that of the nineteenth century where a spirit of wide tolerance and concession to the wishes of the European Powers had prevailed. Turkey had learned the present doctrine of nationalism in the school of Germany. Although Enver Pasha and his friends had disappeared from the scene, their spirit survived in Turkish policy. The new Turkey was not likely to show any of the in

difference of the former Turkey to European encroachments, and, on the contrary, was likely to be extremely nationalist and even full of hatred for foreigners.

Moreover, the solidarity of the Moslem governments had now become a practical policy for the Turks. As their religious fervor diminished their political ambitions developed. They realized that the solicitude of France for them arose from French anxiety not to offend the colonial dominions of France in Africa. They attributed to the pressure brought to bear by the Moslems of India the change of front that had just been revealed by the British government. There was a danger present in the minds of the statesmen of the Powers, that the combined influence of Turkish nationalism and the rôle of Turkey as a leader of the Moslem world might lead to dangers in the future. Therefore, on the part of important elements both in France and England there was a disposition to unite with Great Britain in a complete control over the Straits. The reason why demilitarization of the shores of the Bosporus was insufficient was, according to the experts, due to the fact that any Power that controlled the banks could block the passage of every ship in the Dardanelles or the Bosporus and that mines and air ships would supply the country in control of the banks with irresistible power. Hitherto vessels of deep sea draft could menace with impunity Constantinople. Henceforth without support from the coast itself the best squadrons, no matter how strongly armed, were powerless. Either control by the European governments would require a military establishment on the banks or this control would be ineffective. Marshal Foch and other experts had brought this aspect of the subject to attention. It was on account of this consideration that the Allies when they stopped the Turkish frontier at the city of Rodosto left the Dardanelles under Greek administration and provided for a European garrison at Gallipoli, the forces there to have an inter-Allied character and the command to be exercised in turn by a representative of each of the great Powers.

Such was the newly revised arrangement for the Turks after their long resistance against the original Treaty of Sèvres. It was now a question whether they would accept it.

THE BURNING OF SMYRNA. For an account of the Greek defeat in Asia Minor, see GREECE, History. The Turks were completely victorious and in September the Greek army was fleeing in disorder toward the coast. Smyrna fell into the hands of the victors, September 11, and three days after the Turkish triumphal entry a fire which started in the Greek and Rumanian quarter swept over the entire western part of the town and practically destroyed the whole section facing the water fronts. Reports indicated that 100,000 people had been left homeless and that the loss in property amounted to $200,000,000. According to the accounts in the press the soldiers got beyond the control of the Turkish officers and maddened by the devastation worked by the Greeks in their retreat and by a supposed bomb outrage after the Turkish entry, they began looting and killing. Great numbers of refugees made for the foreign ships at the docks and begged to be taken off on them. The American cruisers anchored there rescued many. There were a few American relief officers in the city

who struggled to aid the fugitives but little could be accomplished on account of their great numbers. As to responsibility for the fire it was charged that the Turks had deliberately started it but this the Turks denied and the French High Commissioner at Constantinople after investigation declared that he could find no evidence fixing responsibility on the Turks. R.-A. Mark L. Bristol in command of American naval forces in Turkey succeeded in obtaining from Kemal Pasha permission for the removal of the refugees on Greek and Allied ships. Greek ships now began to carry the refugees in great numbers to the island of Mitylene, haste being necessary as Kemal fixed September 30 as the end of the period for evacuation. In the last two days of September 74,000 were reported to have been removed. Meanwhile the great congestion of refugees on the islands of Mytilene and Chios who were placed at the number of 400,000, led to the risk of starvation. In spite of the limits fixed by the Turks the evacuation continued after October 1 and the period was extended by the Turks to October 8. When the limit had been passed the Turks still permitted the women and old men to depart but seized males between 15 and 50 and sent them to the hills of the interior.

After the capture of Smyrna the Turks moved toward the Straits and it was feared that they would pursue the Greeks into Thrace. The French opposed the use of armed forces of the Allies to prevent the Turks from crossing into Europe. In Greece there was a great alarm lest the Turks should occupy Thrace. The Greek forces in Thrace were reorganized and former Prime Minister Venizelos then exiled in Switzerland, was asked to plead the case of Greece with the Allies. Greek volunteers poured into Thrace and the Greek commander of the forces there declared they would defend the country regardless of the decision of the Allies at the approaching armistice conference. Meanwhile Venizelos was trying to make the Allies check the advance of the Turks and refused to give Thrace to Turkey but the demand for Thrace was one of the chief points in the Turkish conditions for an armistice. Kemal Pasha insisted that the Greeks should be made to evacuate the province at once, that is to say, all of Eastern Thrace. They were willing to leave the fate of Western Thrace to a plebiscite.

THE ARMISTICE OF MUDANIA. The chief in

ternational point at issue was the final disposition of the Straits. When the Turks advanced to the shore of the Dardanelles they found their way blocked by the British contingent at Chanak on the Egean Coast. They thereupon upbraided the British for their interference and declared that neutralization in the British sense meant simply the holding of the Straits by Great Britain. On the other hand the British government insisted that the Straits should not be crossed and that the Turks should not invade this neutral zone which lay beyond a line drawn on the Chanak side along the Straits and the Bosporus and included a band of territory on the Thracian side. The British government sent a note with French approval to Mustapha Kemal, September 15, warning him against violation of the neutral zone, but Kemal refused to recognize the zone as neutral unless he received a pledge that