up the idea, regained his grip on reality, and even opposed later manifestations in favour of it. The more reactionary elements in France, however, would not be so easily convinced. Foch, especially, the most hopeless victim of illusions once he looked beyond his technical field, believed in the vision and even proposed attempting to give it reality. This was in the days when the council was beginning to consider how Germany might be coerced into signing the peace if she balked. It was also during the time of inception of the Rhine republic plot. That plot was kept under cover; but on May 19 Foch reported an intrigue of a different sort to the council. This was the request of Dr. Heim of Bavaria who was at Wiesbaden with the Rhineland conspirators, to talk to some French representatives about a new separatist movement there. Although Foch reported the affair, he had already taken the responsibility of detailing General Desticker to hear and question the would-be revolutionists; and the conversation, held at Luxembourg on the same day as Foch's notice of it, was reported to the council on the 23rd. Heim talked confidently of the separation of all the other considerable German States from Prussia and the formation of a new confederation including German Austria, under a "protectorate, mainly economic, of the Entente. He argued that such a Catholic and conservative "bloc" would form a more effective barrier against Bolshevism than a Prussianized Germany could ever constitute. The Frenchman objected to the inclusion of Austria and was unable to get very satisfactory assurances concerning the payment of reparations. The unwillingness of France to renounce anything in this line was the main obstacle to any real encouragement of separatist movements. Secret Minutes, Council of Four. No action was taken upon this report by the Council; but when, on June 16, Foch was summoned by the Four to give final details of his plans for coercing Germany, he made the startling proposal of basing them on a separatist policy. He argued that his troops were insufficiently numerous to penetrate far into Germany without such means of securing the flanks and rear—a consideration he had not previously advanced. When asked if he meant to buy the consent of the separate States to separate treaties of peace by remissions of indemnity, he replied no. He could only define his idea of "special treatment" for them by remarking that "they would have a pistol at their throat at the beginning." No one undertook to quiz the Marshal as to what kind of security he would consider a peace so obtained; for everyone realized that he was not speaking from a military point of view at all. As Lloyd George put it: What he feared was that Marshal Foch was mixing up politics with strategy. He hoped that Marshal Foch would not mind his saying that he feared he was allowing his judgment on political matters to create doubts in his judgment on strategical matters.1 Even Clemenceau opposed the plan as foolish and dangerous to allied prestige. A variant of the project, based on the signing of separate armistices, was hardly more favourably received; but the Council decided to hold its final instructions in abeyance until definite word was received from the Germans as to whether or not they would sign. The decision of the Germans to sign the Treaty as it stood obviated the necessity of considering a new policy; and the delegates subscribed themselves as “acting in the name of the German Empire and of each and every Secret Minutes, Council of Four, June 16. component State." The idea of interference with German unity was thus finally abandoned. 4. DIPLOMATIC "JOKERS" We come finally to a number of seemingly trivial but really important efforts to evade or modify the agreements made by the Four with diplomatic "jokers" in the actual drafting of the Treaty. The French had special opportunities for making conversions more favourable than the actual agreements, in view of their control of the machinery of treaty making-chairmanship of committees, etc. In the hurry and bustle of the few days preceding the handing of the Treaty to the Germans several little "jokers" were passed over unnoticed only to be discovered later. One such-annulling any vote for Germany in the Saar district if the German Government failed to redeem the mines of gold-was pointed out by the Germans and rectified at once. (May 22.) The story of another of these, discovered by President Wilson, is most significant. The draft agreement of April 20, concerning the fifteen-year occupation of the Left Bank, had contained a vaguely qualifying clause permitting reoccupation at any time if the Reparation Commission "recognize that Germany refuse to execute the whole or part of the conditions agreed upon by her according to the present treaty." In his denunciation of the Rhine compromise in the Plenary Session of May 6, Foch made the astounding observation that the task of reporting all violations, justifying reoccupation-"even those which have no connection with indemnities"-fell to the Reparation Commission. Amid the general annoyance aroused by the Marshal's speech this remark passed without immediate effect; and the Treaty was delivered to the Germans as it stood. But when Wilson came later to examine the article (430) referred to by Foch he found that the language had been altered so as to authorize reoccupation "in case the Reparation Commission finds that Germany has failed to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the present treaty." On May 9, the President pointed out in the Council how far this wording diverged from the intent of the agreement; but he had to admit "that the original text was partly misleading." The misleading tendency had not only been retained but strengthened in the direction of giving the Reparation Commission power to pass on all violations of the Treaty, instead of being confined to its own chapter; whereas the intent had been to make this qualification of the withdrawal time apply only to financial obligations. Moreover, a real and material change had been made in substituting "failed to observe" for "refuse to execute." Correction of these slips was authorized without objection; but Clemenceau refused his assent to a revision of the original text requested by Wilson-a change from "will" to "may" in the reoccupation phrase. The new article 430, approved finally May 12, applies only to obligations "with regard to reparation." This correction restores the balance of the agreement from the slight further tilt it had taken toward the French side. But if the French, dissatisfied with the compromises, endeavoured to evade them, the British-and Americans! -were also dissatisfied and endeavoured to modify themas will be shown in the next chapter. CHAPTER XXX BRITISH AND AMERICAN REVOLT AGAINST THE TREATY- I F POWERFUL French groups were dissatisfied and disappointed with the compromises with which Clemenceau had emerged from the bitter struggles of the Dark Period-and made efforts, as shown in the last chapter, to evade or modify the terms, equally powerful British groups-and, in lesser degree, the Americans at Paris-were also dissatisfied and alarmed. The French felt that they had received too little; the British and Americans were sure that France had been given too much. Thus French opposition came chiefly from reactionary sources, while British and American opposition came chiefly from radical and liberal sources. The record of the revulsion of feeling in Great Britain is most remarkable. The Treaty was presented to the Germans on May 7, and the first comprehensive knowledge of its terms was conveyed to the world in the summary issued upon that day. The first reactions came, naturally enough, from the radical and labour press, which in England represented a labour group becoming rapidly powerful in politics-a group with which Lloyd George had always to count. "The Treaty is entirely in the spirit of the old régime,” said the Labour Herald. "The League of Nations is |