CHAPTER XXXVI

THE PROBLEM OF SHANTUNG

T

JAPANESE TACTICS AND

ULTIMATUM-WILSON AND THE JAPANESE

AND CHINESE

HE Japanese crisis was now at its bitterest. Hav

ing lost out in their first great contention at Paris-the recognition recognition of "racial equality" in the Covenant of the League-they came to their second, the territorial demands, with a kind of cold determination. They presented to the Conference what was practically an ultimatum.

The Japanese delegation [declared Viscount Chinda] were under an express order in the case that the question [of Shantung] was not settled they were not allowed to sign the treaty.'

They not only demanded a settlement exactly on the lines they had laid down, but they insisted upon immediate action.

President Wilson knew that the entire weight of the struggle, in this crisis, would rest upon him, that the influence of both Lloyd George and Clemenceau, who were indeed bound by the secret agreements of 1917, would be against him. He gave to no problem that arose at Paris more concentrated effort, for the very essence of his programme of the peace was bound up in it. Could he get a settlement on a basis of international coöperation? Or must he allow the settlement to slip back to the old basis of nationalistic competition and secret and limited

Secret Minutes, Council of Four, April 22.

alliances? He was profoundly convinced that no hope existed for future peace in the world, nor any justice to China, except through true international action.

In order to understand clearly the discussion of these complicated problems by the Four, consider first, briefly, the main factors in the situation.

For nearly a hundred years Western nations-especially Great Britain, France, and Russia-had been steadily encroaching upon China, seizing territory and exploiting the resources for their own benefit, at best bringing to China Western ideas and Western commerce, at worst debauching the Chinese with opium. Germany was the more rapacious for coming late into this great game of "grab" and, taking as an excuse the murder of two missionaries, seized the gateway which practically controlled the rich province of Shantung. The United States took no part in this game of “grab,” but stood upon the negative policy of the "open door"-that is, the right of all nations to trade on an equal basis in China. Japan, awakening late to the situation, was alarmed at these European aggressions in China-for she feared that they meant a diminishing opportunity for her own expanding ambitions. She considered that she had better warrant for claiming China as her natural sphere of influence than any Western nation. If America had a Monroe Doctrine to keep all other nations out of South America, why could not Japan assert a similar doctrine as to eastern Asia? She also began playing the game of grab in 1894 when she first entered Korea, which she finally swallowed whole in 1910. Her victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 enormously increased her own self-confidence and added to her prestige. In 1905 she succeeded to the Russian sphere of influence at Port Arthur and has steadily extended her power there.

When the World War broke out in 1914, with European energies fully occupied with their own difficult affairs, Japan realized her new opportunity. Within a few weeks after the Battle of the Marne, despite the efforts of Great Britain and the United States to dissuade her and keep the war out of China, she issued an ultimatum to Germany demanding the surrender of Kiauchau, but promising to return it to China, to whom, of course, it really belonged. When nothing happened Japan, assisted by Great Britain, captured the port. Instead of returning it to China, however she had made no promise as to time! she took over the Shantung railroad and enforced a control in the province more extensive and drastic than Germany had ever attempted. She also engaged in the familiar business of trafficking with corrupt Chinese officials. She permitted her traders to spread the demoralizing opium traffic. All this aroused the bitter suspicion and hatred of the Chinese people, who demanded that the Japanese withdraw, and later began to boycott everything Japanese.

In January, 1915, the Japanese, still eagerly improving the opportunities presented by the preoccupation of Europe, presented to China the famous or infamous "Twenty-one Demands," part of which were kept secret from the outside world. These demands, if accepted entire, would have made China practically a vassal of Japan. When China objected, Japan sent a forty-eighthour ultimatum (on May 7), and China was forced to submit to a large proportion of them. And one of them gave Japan a secure foothold in the vast rich provinces of Manchuria. Since then she has entered Siberia and still sits there.

As to Shantung, its disposal was provided for in two sets of agreements between Japan and China, one con

cluded on May 25, 1915, the other September 24 and 28, 1918.

Japan, in these agreements, provided that when, after the war, she was free to dispose of the territory she had taken from Germany she would restore it to China upon certain conditions, the principal ones being that Kiauchau should be a free port, that Japan should have a concession there, and that the important Shantung railroad should become a joint Chino-Japanese enterprise with a “police force" directed by the Japanese. In short, while the Japanese were agreeing to return Kiauchau to China they were actually demanding so the Chinese assert—more rights than the Germans ever had. The Chinese, with painful awareness of what Japan had already done in Korea, at Port Arthur, and in Manchuria, had no confidence whatever in Japanese policies and feared being left at the mercy of Japan.

Early in 1917 Japan took still another advantage of the war in Europe to assure herself of her new possessions and rights. Before she would grant her naval assistance against the ravages of the German and Austrian submarines in the Mediterranean she extorted the profoundly important secret agreements with Great Britain and France (February, 1917) under which these great nations agreed to support her claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and also agreeing that Japan was to have all the former German islands north of the equator, and Great Britain all of those south of the equator.1

Such was the situation, the almost impregnable diplomatic position of Japan, when the Peace Conference attacked the problem. Five definite proposals for meeting it soon emerged:

1. That of Japan, which was designed to carry forward 1See Chapter III on Secret Treaties for a more complete account.