Mr. LANSING failed to see why all commercial ships of other countries passing through the Kiel Canal should be given special privileges. The same privileges might be asked in the case of the Cape Cod Canal, in the United States of America. He could see little justice in allowing the proposed clause to remain, in view of the fact that the German fleet was to be reduced to very small figures, combined with the destruction of the fortifications in the Kiel Canal.1 On April 16 there was a grand general meeting of the Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways and the naval experts of the powers. Here Admiral Benson, the American naval expert, stated flatly that the whole proposal of the French for the control of the canal "was a very dangerous international precedent, to which he most definitely objected." He said he was against "any measure which dictated to Germany what she was to do with regard to the canal." There followed a long and complicated discussion, the French arguing for close control by an international commission and the British favouring control by the League of Nations. Hudson, for America, worked here with the British. The Council, despite Admiral Benson's continued opposition, finally adopted the clauses which became with some changes Articles 380-386 of the Treaty. These do just what Benson objected to: dictate to Germany what she shall do with regard to a canal wholly within her own territory. It is opened to all nations, both for war and commercial vessels, on terms of entire equality, and though directly controlled by a German commission, in the event of severe controversy the League of Nations is to decide. This, of course, sets a most interesting precedent which may in future affect the control of many other canals. 1Secret Minutes, Council of Ten, March 6. 2See Minutes, April 18, p. 307. While rivers and canals are still very important means of inland transit in Europe, railways have also taken a place as carriers of international traffic which calls for the development of a broad policy concerning them. The difficulties are here exceptionally great. Such matters as standardization of gauge and of brake systems seem simple enough subjects for international agreement, yet the latter has not yet been satisfactorily adjusted. But the equalization of rates and service, in such a manner as to prevent unfair discrimination against foreign commerce, is a matter of appalling complexity. We have found such problems tough enough in our own country. In Europe they are tougher, for the states are more completely sovereign and jealousies among them fiercer; while no railway administration crosses national frontiers, except in some cases of the creation of new frontiers in Central Europe. Only an International Commerce Commission with very broad powers can really assure fair treatment for all under such conditions; but whence is it to derive an authority equal to our Interstate Commerce Commission? The League of Nations will have to develop far beyond the status laid down for it at Paris before it can lend any such sanction to its organs as that which is afforded by our Federal Government. Nevertheless, much can be accomplished by international agreement; and some steps had been taken along this road, especially since 1890, by a series of conventions signed at Berne.1 No serious attempt was made at Paris to arrive at a general convention on railways, but on March 9, the French, as usual, laid before the Commission a draft of clauses to be imposed on the enemy by the Treaty of Peace. These required the treatment of allied traffic 1By Article 366 of the Treaty the Powers renewed all but one of these invaluable Berne conventions. over the railways of enemy countries on equal terms with their own as regards rates and service-all of which is far less simple than it sounds. All this, of course, was without reciprocity on the part of the Allies. Most of the other delegations devoted themselves to proposing highly ingenious additional clauses further restraining or constraining the enemy to the advantage of their own countries. Thus Rumania wished to impose on the enemy countries the same obligations in her favour that they had imposed on her in the Treaty of Bucharest. One proposal, pressed by Czechoslovakia and Belgium, illustrates the complexity of the whole problem. This was that the enemy countries be prohibited from establishing cut rates over their lines between points served by shorter lines passing through allied territory-as between Silesia and Austria, Holland and the Rhineland or France. Miller asked: "If Germany was able to transport over long distances at lower rates than the other powers could she be prohibited from doing so?" But there is more to the problem of rate wars than that, as we have learned to our sorrow. The attempt to frame a general clause preventing rate cutting on competing lines was at last given up as too complicated. For the rest, a number of special articles were included in the treaties of peace governing such matters as the conditions attached to transfer of railway lines in ceded territories and the operation of sections of line lying within one country but forming parts of the railway system of another. But the conviction that national railway systems must fall into completely separate compartments was too ingrained to permit more than a few transitory provisions of this character. The international railway problems of Europe thus remain the farthest from settlement of any connected with the great business of international traffic-of such vital importance to civilization. A problem closely connected with that of the use of means of international communication is that of the use of ports. These are essential links in the system of transport, the points of transition from one form of carriage to another-transition between sea-borne and inland, between water-borne and overland traffic. They are as much parts of the general system as the locks in a canal or the switching yards of a railway. One of the great questions now before the world is that of "free ports." This was one of the sharpest points of controversy regarding Fiume; it entered into the discussion of the disposal of Shantung; it was, in large degree, the problem of Danzig. "Free access to the sea" was one of Wilson's principles and lies indeed at the foundation of the welfare of all peoples. The recognition of the need of new conventions to deal with this highly important problem was common to all the nations. Both British and French had drafts of proposals to present, and each made efforts to standardize and broaden the application of the principle; but the difficulties were so various and vast, and the jealous fears of each nation that its sovereignty would somehow be endangered were so acute, that little could be done. A few regulations were indeed imposed upon GermanyCzechoslovakia, for example, is to have the free use of certain zones in the German ports of Stettin and Hamburg-but beyond this little could be done. However, there is a chance that the League of Nations, if its members attack the problem with good-will, can really do something. A start was made by the Barcelona Conference of 1921, which drew up a series of recommendations that may open the way to further progress. CHAPTER XLVI AERIAL NAVIGATION AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE-AIR ERIAL navigation furnishes to-day the newest, most A national coöperation. A new instrumentality has appeared that obliterates former geographical obstacles, renders ancient boundaries insecure, breaks up the isolation, and threatens the safety of all nations; whole new ranges of problems are thus presented to the world. One real achievement the Paris Peace Conference has to its credit: it laid the foundations, by drawing up the first international agreements for dealing with this complex of new problems, and it performed this difficult task in a spirit of generous coöperation which made its record at Paris unique. And, curiously enough, it was a work performed not by civilians but by military and naval officers. One would have thought that the very novelty of the problem would have made it difficult to deal with, but the want of settled practices which introduced insuperable difficulties in other problems of international transit, such as railway traffic, here proved helpful in bringing about international coöperation. No established abuses, no jealous traditional interests, stood in the way of a frank recognition of new general principles. Moreover, it was pretty generally understood among the Allies at the start, not only that the enemy states would not |