I believe that if we can once get out of them into the calmer airs it would be easier to come to satisfactory solutions.

Clemenceau's view of the transactions of this period is presented in certain remarks addressed to the Belgians on April 29:

M. CLEMENCEAU said that

.. it was necessary to approach all these problems in a spirit of conciliation and not to insist too strictly on a full measure of concessions or to propose as an alternative a definite breach between those who were charged with arriving at a solution that would guide the tendencies of the future. He himself might often have broken off negotiations if he had insisted on what he conceived to be his rights. Everyone had had to give way on points which appeared to be vital, and everyone must be prepared to take painful decisions and to bear the bitter reproaches of his own supporters. Parliaments were all alike; each of them wanted everything for themselves. Newspapers clamoured for the impossible and the best thing was to pay no attention to them whatever.1

But it is the defect of compromises in vital matters such as these that they really satisfy no one. They were followed immediately by extraordinary attempts to evade or modify them.

'Secret Minutes, Council of Four.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE "RHINE REBELLION"-FRENCH EFFORTS TO EVADE THE SETTLEMENTS-DIPLOMATIC "JOKERS"

T

HE French crisis of the Peace Conference, so far

as the Four were concerned or better, the Three, for the Italians had had practically nothing to do with it was now past. By the end of April the official settlements having to do with the French claims were mostly completed.

But like all compromises on really vital issues, they were satisfactory to nobody. While the French felt that they had received too little, the British and Americans feared they had been given too much. There followed during those desperately crowded and feverish weeks attempts both to modify the terms by processes of further discussion, and to evade or circumvent them by an extraordinary series of intrigues. Some of these episodes have thus far been kept wholly from public knowledge. They furnish an illuminating commentary upon the extent of the wild and ungovernable forces of violence and chicanery released by the war and reveal the mountainous difficulties which the Americans had constantly to meet. They are the perfect expression of the methods of the old diplomacy; for even the attempts at orderly modification of the terms, for the most part, were not dictated by a desire for a juster peace, but either to serve the political necessities of the various leaders or out of fear lest the Germans refuse to sign.

In the case of the French efforts at evasion or modi

fication, which will be treated in this chapter, the obstinate consistency of the French, especially the extreme group, in adhering to the utmost limit of their claims, as first set forth, is remarkably exemplified. The French never stopped fighting—have not stopped yet!-for their full programme. These efforts at evasion show how bitterly they resented the concessions which Clemenceau had accepted, to which he had been driven by the pressure of events and by President Wilson's insistency. These efforts may be considered in four groups.

1. The military intrigue of the French to encourage a rebellion in the Rhine provinces, and thus secure by a coup d'état what they had not succeeded in getting at the Peace Conference.

2. Attempts outside of the Peace Conference to secure more sweeping economic control of the Left Bank and, incidentally, cripple Germany.

3. Further proposals to break up the German Empire into separate States.

4. Diplomatic "jokers"-efforts to juggle the words in certain parts of the Treaty, so as to change the real intent of the Four and make provisions more favourable to the French.

1. THE "RHINE REBELLION"

Consider first what has been called the "Rhine rebellion." In accepting the demilitarization and temporary occupation clauses of the compromise agreement as to the Rhine, Clemenceau had, of course, abandoned the early French demand for a special political status in the German territory west of the Rhine.

But no sooner was this settlement publicly known than there began to be strange reports of intrigues to break it down, both by politicians and military men. These be

came so serious that on April 29 Lloyd George called the attention of Wilson and Clemenceau to a speech of the Burgomaster of Cologne "intimating the possibility of the establishment of a separate republic for the Rhenish provinces and Westphalia."

This project (dropping Westphalia) continued to simmer along more or less publicly under the direction of Dr. Dörten and a band of conspirators at Wiesbaden. These were in constant touch with General Mangin, commanding the French Army of Occupation, who favoured their project. About the middle of May, when Foch was making a tour of inspection of the armies, he was informed of this situation and approved Mangin's course. The conspiracy rapidly matured to the point of execution. General Mangin personally gave advice to the plotters, disapproving a project of April 17 and accepting one of the 19th. A proclamation was drawn up announcing the separation of all German portions of the Left Bank and their constitution as an "autonomous Rhenish republic," under a provisional government and with a call for election of an Assembly. The capital was declared to be Coblenz, within the American zone of occupationthus disguising the French influence. May 24 was fixed as the day for issuing the manifesto.

Before a successful result of the coup could be assured, however, the approval of the other commanders along the Rhine-American, British, and Belgian-must be obtained, so that proceedings would not be interfered with Mangin, on the 22nd, sent staff officers to interview them all. President Wilson was startled on the same day by a telephone message from General Liggett, forwarded by Pershing, stating that one of Mangin's officers had asked what would be his attitude toward the establishment of Secret Minutes, Council of Four.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Paris, May 22, 1919.

I have just received a message from the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation to the following effeat:

"This morning, General Mangin, Commanding General of the French Army at Mayence, sent a Colonel of his Staff to General Liggett's headquarters at Coblentz to inquire what our attitude would be toward a political revolution on the west bank of the Rhine for the establishment of an Independent Rhineland Republic, free from Germany. He inquired what the American attitude would be toward such new Republic. The Staff Officer stated that they had fifty deputies ready to send into the American sector to assist in starting the revolution. The meaning of the word deputies in this connection is not clearly understood, but it was made clear that they were to be French."

General Liggett very properly declined to consider the proposition, and his action has been approved by me, I have given him instructions not to permit the entry of political agitators into our sector, no matter by whose order they might claim to be operating.

Faithfully yours,

John J. Pershing.

Letter of General Pershing to President Wilson informing him of the French proposal for a revolution in the Rhineland