complained that she did not allow herself, without argument, to be dragged along behind his chariot. France has let down," said Sir George Younger, and the whole Coalition pretended to be outraged by the separate policy of France. It seems to have occurred to none of them that France has little reason to trust the speeches of Mr Lloyd George. After all, she has not yet let tradition go, and still believes that wisdom and courtesy are part of a diplomatist's equipment.

And there was no reason for all the excursions and alarms by which Mr Lloyd George hoped to dazzle the voters. The freedom of the Straits, whatever that might mean, was not jeopardised. As Mr Arnold Toynbee has pointed out, our Prime Minister declared that the Turkish National Pact "substantially demands that they (the Turks) should have the power to close the Straits.' The Turkish National Pact does nothing of the sort. It states, what is reasonable, that the security of Constantinople must be protected from every danger, and that, "provided this principle is assured, whatever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and all other Governments concerned regarding the opening of the Bosphorus to the commerce and traffic of the world is valid." And there was less excuse for Mr Lloyd George's street corner diplomacy, because Fethi Bey, a member of the Angora Govern

ment, came to London in the beginning of August with the hope of putting before the British Government a serious proposal, accepted and approved by his colleagues. So little was Mr Lloyd George interested in the matter that he did not receive Fethi Bey, nor did the Foreign Secretary. Indeed, nothing was said officially of Fethi Bey's visit, except that presently Mr Lloyd George issued a document to the London Press explaining that "Fethi Bey was not in London on any business connected with the Near Eastern settlement, and that he had been received at the Foreign Office only in an informal way and as a matter of courtesy by junior officials." If Fethi Bey were not here on business connected with the Near East, we should like to know why he took so long a journey. And was it his fault that he was deemed unworthy of being received by any others than junior officials, and that even this paltry honour was conferred in a formal way and as a matter of courtesy "?

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Thus the stage was set for great events, and one of our heaven-sent governors had the happy thought of despatching ecstatic telegrams to our dominions oversea. This manœuvre had been highly successful at the moment of the Irish surrender. Why should not the Government make profit for itself out of the conspicuous loyalty and high spirit of the dominions? A wickeder step was never taken by an

enfeebled minister. If Mr Lloyd George or Mr Churchill, or whoever was the hero to whom this happy thought came, had wished to lose the support of our kinsfolk, this was the way to do it. Yet a memory of the magnificent response made by the dominions in the Great War might have persuaded the Government to a more decent reticence. To demand aid, so to say, at the sword's point, in a quarrel which was unnecessary and unexplained, is the sure way to lose the regard and support of our gallant friends and cousins. Thus are the methods of the amateur carried to the pitch of ridicule, and we should have marvelled at the telegram even if it had been sent by a rowdy schoolboy.

Mr Lloyd George, then, until the sudden and helpful resuscitation of Lord Curzon, who instantly restored to us the ancient methods of diplomacy, took nobody into his confidence except the Labour Party. He refused to summon the Houses of Parliament; he abstained from consulting his Cabinet. He had no hesitation, in listening to the impassioned eloquence of Mr Thomas, and confided to that demagogue and his friends the inmost secrets of his solitary heart. The secrets afforded them little encouragement. The wonder is not what the secrets were, but that they should have been betrayed at all. Mr Lloyd George's colleagues are never tired of telling us that Labour, which they themselves most

VOL. CCXII.-NO. MCCLXXXV.

wantonly enfranchised, is not fit to rule. Perhaps it is not. But if it be not fit to rule, why is it a fit repository of official secrets? Why should it be Mr Lloyd George's first endeavour always to placate this party of incompetents? The motive, no doubt, is fear. And it is obvious that the privileges which Mr Lloyd George freely confers upon Labour would be sternly withheld from any other party in the State foolish enough to demand them. On all accounts, then, we trust that this is the last that we shall ever hear of the happygo-lucky autocratic diplomacy of the amateur. The distinction between the old and the new method has been clearly put by Mr Aubrey Herbert, whose wise intervention has done much to restore sanity to our policy. "The objects of the old diplomacy," says he in The Times,' were to obtain peace. Knowledge and good manners were an essential part in the training of the diplomatist knowledge make the best of the bargain, manners to avoid friction. The diplomatist was the go-between of the high contending parties. If his knowledge failed or his temper gave way, the harm was not irreparable, for the last word had not been said. Mr Lloyd George has found it more amusing to do his own negotiating. To this work he has unfortunately brought, with regard to the East, prejudices and not knowledge, and if report speaks true, courtesy is not the strongest part of his 20

to

autocratic equipment." The distinction could not be more plainly made, and the crisis in the Near East will not have been wholly in vain if it warns Great Britain of the danger which it incurs daily by giving its support to Mr Lloyd George.

The Prime Minister has failed to manage a spectacular curtain, and every hour brings closer the end of the play. A General Election cannot long be deferred, and the politicians who cling obstinately to office, and believe that nothing is of the smallest importance except their own return to power, are sorely distracted. Even the optimists among them are at last discovering that the word Coalition has no charm in the public ear. All over the country the members of the Coalition, Liberals and Conservatives alike, are tacking on to themselves the label of "independents." In vain they deceive They are but obeying the behests of the leader into whose pocket they put their consciences four years ago, and hoping that something will turn up to save them. They say, and no doubt believe, that after the General Election a Coalition will still be necessary, and then that those who for a few weeks have boasted of their "independence" will rally round the old flag. In other words, Mr Lloyd George, as they say in the city, will join the board after allotment, and the same weary game of scandal and surrender will continue for another five years. It is not a pleasant prospect for the rest of us, and happily it is a pros

us.

pect which we do not think will ever become a reality.

lips.

Whatever the future holds, it is certain that the present has filled our Ministers with panic fear. They are ready, each one of them, with their apologias. Mr Austen Chamberlain came into the field first, and delivered such an oration as can neither deceive nor persuade anybody. At the very moment of declaring his loyalty to Mr Lloyd George, he pretends to regard himself as the leader of the "Unionist " Party. Had he been blessed with a sense of humour, he would never again permit the word Unionist to pass his What does he think of his "Unionism" when he casts his eye towards Ireland, and sees what havoc his treachery to the party, of which he called himself the leader, has wrought in that distressed country? It was his duty to preserve by all means in his power the Union which existed, and which clearly must exist again, between Great Britain and Ireland. And so easily did he sacrifice his duty that he took Michael Collins by the hand. He did more than this: he attempted to involve his father in his own sudden change of view. From that moment Mr Chamberlain disqualified himself for the position to which he clings. It is in no spirit of party that we hope and pray for the end of the Coalition. We have no interest in labels. We desire nothing more than to see the affairs of the Empire honestly and wisely managed. If we had to make a choice

between Mr Lloyd George and Mr Chamberlain, we should, we think, prefer Mr Lloyd George. We know perfectly well what Mr Lloyd George will do. When he took the murderers by the hand, whom he had promised to take by the throat, he acted after his kind. He had given no pledge to Unionism, and if he had, we could have fairly estimated the worth of that pledge. Mr Chamberlain existed for and by Unionism. He had been sent to Parliament by those who professed the doctrine, and he was bound in honour to support his friends. He chose to support the enemies of his friends, and we should have thought better of him if, in the act of renewing his promise of loyalty to Mr Lloyd George, he had tendered his resignation to to the the Unionist Party.

The arguments which he used to justify his policy are one and all worthless. He tells us that Mr Lloyd George has scrupulously observed the agreement which he made with Mr Chamberlain's predecessor. "He has strengthened the Unionist element in the Cabinet." Has he? How does it profit the country if Mr Lloyd George crams more Unionists" into his Cabinet, when these Unionists," as soon as they enter it, are ready to join the murderous Sinn Feiners in their policy of assassination and disruption? We have got to the point when names and titles do not matter. We know well enough what heavy blows Mr Chamberlain and Lord

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Birkenhead have struck at the security of the Empire, and we might respect them just a little if they had the courage to call themselves Sinn Feiners, and to acknowledge their natural love of surrender and rebellion.

And again says Mr Chamberlain : "In all the difficulties we have faced, in all the dangers we have encountered and overcome, never once has any question of principle separated Mr Lloyd George and his Liberal friends from my Unionist colleagues and myself." How should it? When neither side knew any principle of any kind, how could Mr Chamberlain be separated by principle from Mr Lloyd George? Opportunity has been the god of their undivided worship, and no sooner did they both embrace the doctrine of Sinn Fein than separation by principle became impossible for them. Henceforth they were not only friends but accomplices, and it is hardly worth mentioning that they are still as thick as thieves. But even if Mr Chamberlain had not gone over to the other side at the very crisis of the battle, he would not be fit to be a leader. He is no leader who, professing to know the end and purpose of the campaign, does his best to ensure its failure. "These are days," says Mr Chamberlain, "when it is our duty to seek to rally the constitutional and conservative elements of the country, to whatever class they belong." That is true enough, but Mr Chamberlain has put it out of his power to rally