عاتی and such a state of the votes as seemed to justify the expectation, that the power and influence of Mr. Madison and his party were nearly at an end. It was supposed, too, that the disgraceful and disastrous issue of the campaign in Canada, which in some degree was imputable to the ignorance or negligence of the government, would shake the stability of the war party: this expectation, indeed, was very plausible; but, like all our other conjectures and expectations with regard to America, it was entertained with out adequate local knowledge, and without a clear and full insight into the character of the people of the The disasters in United States. Canada, instead of rendering the war more generally and decidedly unpopular, changed the dislike which had been entertained for it in the northern states into a determination to prosecute it with vigour: they conceived their honour interested in not giving it up in the moment of defeat; and those very men who condemned its commencement,-who passed resolutions foretelling the disasters it would occasion, now that those disasters, or others equally serious and disgraceful, had occurred, were eager for the prosecution of hostilities. From this wayward disposition on the part of some, from the triumph which America had obtained at sea, and from other causes not so easily ascertainable, Mr. Madison's interest was strengthened, and his re-election secured. The senate and the house of representatives met, on the 4th of November, when the president's message was laid before them; of which the following is a brief outline: It begins with congratulating the nation on being in good health; then adverts to the unfortunate ter mination of general Hull's expedi- From this speech, and in th present sate of the war betwee Great Britain and America, ther countries will speedily be reco is little reason to hope that the tw ciled a feeling of alienation, spicion, and animosity exists both, very much in the way of s cere and well meant overtures peace: and yet it would scarc be possible to name two natio the mutual interests of which wo be more effectually or extensiv secu secured by peace. America is a rising nation, with great superabundance of produce, the raising of which is so very beneficial, that it can never be equally advantageous for her to divert her labour from it to manufactures: Great Britain, on the other hand, from her superior capital and skill, and from the improvements she has made in ma chinery, can afford to sell manufactured articles of the best quality at the lowest price: but, from the great pressure of taxation, she is unable to raise corn at nearly so cheap a rate as most other countries: if Great Britain and America, therefore, were at peace, their mutual superfluities might be exchanged, and thus their mutual interests promoted. This, however, is a very inferior consideration: there are higher and more noble interests, which would be promoted by peace between the two countries; so that, though we can scarcely hope for such an event speedily, it ought to be the wish and prayer of every inhabitant of Britain and America, CHAPTER XI. War in the Peninsula-Valencia taken by Suchet-French repulsed at TariffaLord Wellington commences the Campaign very early-invests Ciudad Rodrigo -Particulars of the Siege-Marmont seems disposed to relieve the Place taken by Storm-Lord Wellington proceeds against Badajos-wonderful Rapidity of the Operations against that Place-taken by Storm-Soult advances in the Hope of relieving it-retreats again-pursued by Lord Wellingtonpartial Engagement and Defeat-Marmont threatens Ciudad Rodrigo-Lord Wellington marches to the North of Spain-Destruction of the Bridge of Almarez-Lord Wellington advances to Salamanca-Capture of the Forts there-Marmont retreats across the Douro-is reinforced, and threatens Lord Wellington's Communication with Ciudad Rodrigo-Lord Wellington retreats-Manœuvres of both Armies—Battle of Salamanca. HE campaign in the peninsula year. Lord Wellington formed a plan of operations of such a comprehensive nature, that, if his means and opportunities had been at all commensurate, the French must have been driven beyond the Pyrennees before the close of the year 1812. At first complete success seemed highly probable: Marmont had dispatched a considerable part of his force into the south of Spain to succour and support Suchet, who had begun his career as a general there with great eclat by the cap ture of Valencia. To counterba place, the French had suffered a severe and inglorious defeat in an attempt which they had made on Tariffa. The first enterprise of lord Wel lington was the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo: it was necessary to gain possession of this place and of Badajos before he could regularly commence the plan of operations which he bad laid down. About the same time that his lord hip invested Ciudad Rodrigo, he dispatched gene al Hill against general Dombrouski, who who was stationed at Merida: from the information which had been received, there was reason to hope that the enemy's troops would have been surprised in this place; but general Dombrouski, being advised by his advanced guard of the approach of the British, left Merida in the night-time. Disappointed in this attempt, general Hill next turned his attention and directed his march against general Drouet, who commanded the 5th corps at Almandraljo: the enemy, however, did not wait his approach, but retired upon Zafra, leaving behind them a considerable quantity of provisions and ammunition. The French general retreated upon Llerena; and general Hill, finding that it would be impossible to follow him with any prospect of success, returned to Merida. The investment of Ciudad Rodrigo was begun on the 8th of January. During the time that the French had possession of this place they had greatly strengthened it: on the hill of St. Francisco they had constructed a redoubt, and had fortified three convents in the sub. urbs, which were connected with this redoubt: lord Wellington therefore directed his attention and efforts, in the first place, to obtain possession of the work on the hill of St. Francisco, since, before this was reduced, no progress could be made in the attack on the town. As it was of the utmost consequence to impress on the minds of the besieged a high idea of British valour, and besides of equal moment that the siege should be pushed on with the greatest alacrity, both that time might be afforded for the completion of the plan of the campaign, and that Marmont might not be reinforced before the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, it was resolved 1812. to carry this outwork by storm: accordingly the 52d regiment was employed for this purpose, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Colbourne: the attack was made shortly after it was dark; and in a very short time the redoubt was in our possession. Two captains and 47 men were made prisoners; the remainder were put to the sword. The loss of the British was not, as might have been expected from the nature of the attack, severe; there being only 6 men killed, and 14 men and 3 officers wounded. consequence of the success of this enterprise, lord Wellington was enabled to break ground within 600 yards of the place. In The besieging army was employed between the 15th and the 19th in completing the second parallel as soon as this was done, the batteries opened on the place with such effect as to make practicable breaches in one of the walls : it was now determined to storm the place, notwithstanding the approaches had not been advanced so near as it was generally deemed requisite they should before such a mode of attack was resorted to. In order to conduct the attack with the best prospect of success, five different columns were employed. Notwithstanding breaches were made before the attempt to storm, there were yet such impediments and difficulties as required the full display and exercise of British valour to surmount and overcome: the approaches, as has been already noticed, had not been carried to the outward extremity of the glacis, and the counterscarp of the ditch was still entire; but in half an hour all obstacles were overcome. Lord Wellington had intended that the column under general Pack should make a false attack; but such were Ꮓ the the impetuosity and zeal of the troops employed on this service, and such the enterprise and skill of their leaders, that the intended false attack was converted into a real one; and the advanced guard, under the command of major Lynch, actually followed the French from the advanced works into the fausse braze, and took prisoners all who opposed them. The principal breach in the body of the place was stormed, in a most gallant and undaunted manner, by major Ridge, of the 2d battalion of the 5th regiment, in conjunction with the 94th regiment under the command of lieut.-col. Campbell: by this means they not only effectually covered the advance from the trenches of the brigade under major-general M'Kinnon, but actually changed the arrangement of the operation, and preceded them in the attack. The enemy resisted for a long time with great obstinacy and gal lantry; nor, indeed, did they submit till the British troops were in possession of, and actually drawn up on, the ramparts of the place. The loss on both sides was very great. Just as major-gen. M'Kinnon had led his troops up to the breach, he was unfortunately blown up by the accidental explosion of one of the enemy's magazines; and major-general Craufurd, as he was leading on his light division to the storm, received a severe wound, from the effects of which he was a long time in recovering. It was geherally supposed that the people of Castile were very lukewarm in the cause of their country; but from them lord Wellington, in his official dispatches, in which he gives an account of the cpature of Ciudad Rodrigo, says that he received cons derable assistance, and bears wit ness that they invariably showed their detestation of French tyranny, and their desire to contribute every means in their power to remove it. To the conduct of the German troops also, which have often been so unfairly represented in this country, he bears his willing and flattering testimony: the first line batta lion of the German legion carried the convent of Santa Cruz, and thus materially assisted the attack on Ciudad Rodrigo. As soon as Marmont understood that lord Wellington had regularly invested this place, he began to ga ther in the troops around him, and to make such preparations and movements as indicated a resolu tion to march to its relief: this circumstance was well known to lord Wellington, and induced him to storm it, rather than to carry it by a regular siege. Marmont, aware of the bravery and strength of the garrison, and of the numerous obstacles which the outworks, as well as the town itself, must present, does not seem to have entertained the slightest or most distant apprehension that it could be reduced in such a very short space of time, and in so summary a manner. Before, however, he had advanced sufficiently near to encourage the garrison, or draw off the attention and force of lord Wellington from his enterprise, Ciudad Rodrigo was in the possession of the English; and in the official account of its capture, which Marmont transmitted to France, he expressed such a degree and kind of surprise and astonishment at its speedy reduction, as rather complimented the skill and bravery of the British than censured the commander of the place. As soon as lord Wellington had taken care that the fortifications of Ciudad Rodrigo were put in a good state of repair, and had reason to believe that Marmont meant no se rious attack upon it, he ordered part of his army to proceed to Badajos, the siege of which he next resolved to undertake. Badajos had for some time been blockaded by general Hill with between 12,000 and 15,000 men: along with him was the Portuguese army under marshal Beresford; which, by the unremitting and judicious attentions of that officer, had been brought to a very creditable and useful degree of discipline and steadiness. As lord Wellington had reduced Ciudad Rodrigo in a much shorter space of time than the enemy apprehended, it was to be supposed that they would take early measures to prevent, if possible, Badajos from falling into our hands. But, in order to attempt this with any prospect of success, it was necessary for the French to concentrate their forces, as lord Wellington had under his command nearly 60,000 British troops, besides Spaniards and Portuguese. Lord Wellington, in planning and conducting this enterprise, was equally aware, as when he invested Ciudad Rodrigo, of the necessity and advantage of vigorous and decisive measures. He was sensible, if he carried Badajos by storm, his loss would be very considerable: but he would thus gain time; and the probability was, that his loss would in the end be greater if he prosecuted the siege in a regular manner, and during the prosecution of it was obliged to fight the enemy. About the middle of March, lord Wellington had regularly and completely invested Badajos; forming his first parallel within 200 yards of the outwork called La Picurina: his lordship conducted the opera tions of the siege in person, with the 3d, 4th, and light divisions on the left of the river: in the mean time sir Thomas Graham crossed the Guadiana with three divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, and marched on Santa Martha and Valverdi; while sir Rowland Hill, with two divisions and a brigade of cavalry, moved upon Merida. In consequence of these movements, general Drouet retired to Homaschos, in order to preserve his communication with the division of the French army which was stationed at Llerena. The attack on Badajos was carried on on the north-west side only; and every thing was done with the greatest rapidity, under the immediate superintendence and direction of lord Wellington. Nor were the enemy idle: Philippon, a general of distinguished reputation in the French service, especially as an engineer, commanded the place; and he left no means untried by which he could strengthen the fortifications, or impede the progress of the siege. On the 19th of March the garrison made a sortie with 2000 men: the right flank of the British works was their object in this sortie; but they were driven in with considerable loss by major-gen. Bowes. The centre of the besiegers being completed, the place was first fired into on the 25th of March, at the distance of about 200 yards; and on the night of that day the fort of Picurina was carried by storm: an instance of activity, promptitude and dispatch rarely equalled in the siege of any place. This fort was defended by 250 men, and attacked by about double that number: the greater part of the enemy were either killed or wounded: the loss of the British was proportionably great. In consequence of the capZ 2 tare |