iv

XLVII. Republicanism-Favorable to Love and Domestic Enjoyment-The Art of Courting,

XLIX. An Oration for the Fourth of July-The Popular Style

LVI. The Golden Image,

LVII. The Ship with too Much Sail and too Little Ballast,

LVIII. Morbid Poetry-Home-sickness,

LIX. Character of American Periodical Writers-Franklin

Dickinson-Fiske-Dennie-Sampson, and others,

LX. A Farewell to the Reader,

UNIVERSITY

CALIFORNIA

THE PURITAN.

No. 31.

-Find out moon-shine; find out moon-shine.

Midsummer Night's Dream.

I HAVE illustrated the vagueness of general terms, (out of which general principles must be formed,) in instances brought from material objects; because such exemplifications are most clear and convincing. But the remark is stronger when applied to intellectuals. Of these, the most specific parts are more dark than of tangible substances; and of course general terms must increase the obscurity. Indeed," says one of the greatest metaphysicians of our own country, "there is a vast indistinctness, and unfixedness in most, or at least very many of the terms used to express things pertaining to moral and spiritual matters. Whence arise innumerable mistakes, strong prejudices, inextricable confusion, and endless controversy!"

Now in forming general terms in politics or morals, the authors of them must have two objects in viewtheir inclusiveness, and their clearness. If a general term be very wide, it of course must be very inclusive; it must embrace all the cases, which the speaker wishes to cover; and the wider the general resemblances, the less the approximation to perspicuity in particular cases. I speak of a fish, for example; and I wish to include in that term, all the living creatures which inhabit the waters. But it may mean a large fish or a small one, a whale or a minnow, a shell fish or a fish with a skin, a halibut or an eel. Now it has been unfortunate, especially in immaterial things, that writers have been more intent on the inclusiveness of their general terms, than on their clearness. The question has not been so much, how much information will the term convey, as whether it covers the whole ground; and hence the accuracy of the philosopher has only been the darkness of the man. The fact is, that these two things hold an inverse ratio to each other. This is the misfortune of all generic philosophy. It only turns to us the darkest side of things. As you make a term inclusive, you must of course make it obscure. As a sun placed in a remote quarter of the heavens, becomes to a spectator on this earth, a twinkling star, shedding a feeble light, and only useful as a guide-mark to a wanderer on the wilderness or ocean, so a truth pushed to its highest generality, becomes less clear, even should its true

ness not be lost. Or, it is like a candle in a room, which reflects much light when its rays are confined and returned by the walls; but remove the walls, and its straggling lustre, in the wide expanse of darkness around it, is in danger of being lost.

Suppose I

It is evident

Let us illustrate this by an example. am asking what is the nature of virtue. here that I wish to find some term, which will cover all the cases in which virtue can be found. If I leave out one instance, or class of instances, my definition is not complete. I fix my mind on this fact, and proceed with this fear before my eyes. In other words, it is obvious that I am attending to the inclusiveness of my definition. As if I were drawing out a piece of wax, to see how far its tenacity could be carried; it is certain I should not care how fine the thread was, provided it did not absolutely break. But I may stretch my wax so that the thread may become almost invisible; and I may make my definition so inclusive as to make its clearness almost lost. In either case, I may gain my object on one side. I may show how ductile the wax is, and how inclusive my terms are; but then, I lose on the other side, and the collective advantages, required in this world of experience and practice, are perhaps comparatively unseen. The definition of virtue, I affirm to be benevolence. This is a very general word, coming from the Latin bene and volo-to wish well; to have a good will to any person or object. In this definition, I am anxious to

include all the cases of virtue which can occur in imagination or practice. But any word placed in that position insensibly gets an enlarged character. It borrows its chief force from its place; it receives as much light from the thing it seems to illuminate, as it can possibly communicate to it. Two general principles, laid beside each other, are like two parallel lines; you may dispute endlessly, which is the primitive standard of comparison. The one has as much right to that term as the other.

If instead of saying that the foundation of all virtue is benevolence, I should say that it was chamasish—a word borrowed from the language of Nootka Sound— the hearer would immediately wish to know what this word means. I could only answer him by saying it means the soul and essence of all virtue; and this definition would be much more clear than benevolence; for the word chamasish has none of those more specific expressions which always cleave to a term, when we lift it up from common use, to generic regions; and cleave to it in spite of our definitions. But such a word shows at once, that our definition is reciprocal; and of course, lets in very little light on the region of truth.

There are two reasons, which make the terms of the widest generality proportionally obscure; and the maxims we form by them. In the first place, it is hard to know whether they are true; and secondly, supposing their truth, it is harder to make the specific