of a republican lady; she is a plant which can grow only on our own soil. She must be more comprehensive in her aims, than the fickle beings who dance in the court of St. James; she must know how to preside in her parlor, and regulate her kitchen; to unite the plain utilities of life, with all that is graceful and lovely; and to resemble the conserve-rose, which retains its best qualities, when its beauty is lost. As fortunes are uncertain in our country, she must be prepared for exertion, even should she become poor. She must be prepared to meet and adorn all stations in life, and thus become the noblest specimen of human nature.

1

(UNIVERSITY CALIFORNIA

THE PURITAN.

No. 39.

Hypocrisy, of course, delights in the most sublime speculations; for, never intending to go beyond speculation, it costs nothing to have it magnificent. Burke on French Revolution.

In my dear country and in this peculiar age, it is the fashion to get astride of some hobby, and spur him, until you have reached the utmost extremes of the lists, or he has tumbled down some precipice to rise no more. It is the age of total abstinence, and I expect soon we shall have a society formed for cutting off fingers, lest we should be tempted to steal. One of the extravagances of the day respects emulation in schools; and, as there is no great danger of being ridiculous without company, I also will show my opinion.

Whether emulation ought to be encouraged in schools, depends on the answer to the question, whether emulation is a good principle. What is

emulation? Our discourse must take its origin from a verbal discussion.

Mr. Locke, whose examination of principles showed him the necessity of nicely considering words, has told us, that language has a twofold usage; civil and philosophical; by the civil usage, he says, he means such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words, as may serve for upholding common conversation and commerce, about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of life; and by the philosophical use of words, he means such a use of them, as may serve to convey the precise notion of things, and to express in general propositions certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon and be satisfied with, in its search after true knowledge. These two uses, he says, are very distinct; and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one case than the other. Similar expressions we may find in almost all the metaphysical writers. They all sing a melancholy monody on the ambiguity of popular language; and plead the necessity of a new lexicon, compiled with far greater precision and suited to the purposes of metaphysicians alone.

I confess for one, that I doubt the correctness of these representations. I suspect and it is certainly lawful to propose a suspicion even against high authority—that language, after all, is a practical analysis of the powers of the mind, and the properties of things, made according to the wants and observations

of men; and that these broad views, formed in the exigencies of real life, are more permanent and more useful, and have more relative truth in them, than the fine spun distinctions devised in the closet of the philosopher; and never to be understood until our thoughts are wrought into an artificial state. Men in common life never give names but where they can see distinctions; and when the names of these distinctions are found in all languages, and have floated down through all ages; we know they are founded on the common observation of mankind, they have the suffrage of the whole world in their favor. Besides, we give names for speculative and for practical purposes; and speculative names are often lost as soon as the speculator moves out of his abstract circle. The a b c, the x y z, of the algebraist, are of no use but for algebraical calculations. But it is remarkable that the common use of language is always given for practical purposes. It is the sign and the representation of that outside view of things, which men in active life always take. Let me illustrate my meaning by an example. In popular language, and in the broad views of the human mind, which men in all the stages of society have entertained, they have held such a conception and wanted such a word as memory; it is, I suppose, translatable into all languages; and if uttered to the savage, would be immediately understood. A late metaphysical writer,*

* Dr. Brown.

however, thinks that, for the analysis he has in view, it would be better to sink the word in a more comprehensive but accurate term-suggestion. For what is memory, says he, but the suggestion of an event, with the consciousness of its being past? Well, no doubt to throw away memory and to take suggestion, simplified his system, and increased the beauty of his arrangement. But if you were to go into Boston market, and leave your memory behind you, and take nothing with you but suggestion, how long would you make yourself understood? The truth is, all arrangement of things, all classification, and of course all language, has a reference to the practical perceptions of men. These they have always followed, and hence I suspect that language, popular language, is a safe light to guide us in finding the extent of their conceptions, and the principles of their knowledge. The civil use of language is always substantial and permanent; the philosophical (in Locke's sense of that word) is often shadowy, and like other shadows, passes away.

In tracing the history of all metaphysical reasoning, it is curious to see how much of its acuteness and ingenuity consists in innovations on language, and departures from the common usages of mankind. We are told by one, that all virtue depends on expediency. But what is expediency? Surely not what that word expresses in the light conversation of common parlance; as well might the eagle attempt to