connected route from north to south at the commencement of the revolution; and that a very imperfect one. The existence and principle of our union point out the necessity of a very different policy.

The advantages which would be derived from such improvements are incalculable. The facility which would thereby be afforded to the transportation of the whole of the rich productions of our country to market, would alone more than amply compensate for all the labor and expense attending them. Great, however, as is that advantage, it is one only of many, and by no means the most important. Every power of the general government and of the state governments, connected with the strength and resources of the country, would be made more efficient for the purposes intended by them. In war, they would facilitate the transportation of men, ordnance, and provisions, and munitions of war, of every kind, to every part of our extensive coast and interior, on which an attack might be made or threatened. Those who have any knowledge of the occurrences of the late war, must know the good effect which would result in the event of another war, from the command of an interior navigation alone, along the coast, for all the purposes of war, as well as of commerce, between the different parts of our Union. The impediments to all military operations, which proceeded from the want of such a navigation, and the reliance which was placed, notwithstanding those impediments, on such a commerce, can not be forgotten. In every other line their good effect would be most sensibly felt. Intelligence by means of the postoffice department would be more easily, extensively, and rapidly diffused. Parts the most remote from each other would be brought more closely together. Distant lands would be made more valuable, and the industry of our fellow-citizens, on every portion of our soil, be better rewarded.

It is natural in so great a variety of climate, that there should be a corresponding difference in the produce of the soil; that one part should raise what the other might want. It is equally natural that the pursuits of industry should vary in like manner; that labor should be cheaper, and manufactures succeed better, in one part than in another. That where the climate was most severe and the soil less productive, navigation, the fisheries, and commerce, should be most relied on. Hence, the motive for an exchange for mutual accommodation, and active intercourse, between them. Each part would thus find for the surplus of its labor, in whatever article it consisted, an extensive market at home, which would be the most profitable because free from duty.

There is another view in which these improvements are still of more vital importance. The effect which they would have on the bond of anion itself, affords an inducement for them, more powerful than any which have been urged, or than all of them united. The only danger to which our system is exposed arises from its expansion over a vast territory. Our Union is not held together by standing armies, or by any ties, other than the positive interests and powerful attractions of its parts toward each other. Ambitious men may hereafter grow up among us, who may promise to themselves advancement from a change, and by practising upon the sectional interests, feelings, and prejudices, endeavor, under various pretexts, to promote it. The history of the world is replete with examples of this kind; of military commanders and demagogues becoming usurpers and tyrants, and of their fellow-citizens becoming their instruments and slaves. I have little fear of this danger, knowing well how strong the bond which holds us together is, and who the people are, who

are thus held together; but still it is proper to look at, and to provide against it, and it is not within the compass of human wisdom to make a more effectual provision, than would be made by the proposed improvements. With their aid, and the intercourse which would grow out of them, the parts would soon become so compacted and bound together that nothing could break it.

The expansion of our Union over a vast territory can not operate unfavorably to the states individually. On the contrary, it is believed that the greater the expansion, within practicable limits, and it is not easy to say what are not so, the greater the advantage which the states individually will derive from it. With governments separate, vigorous, and efficient for all local purposes, their distance from each other can have no injurious effect upon their respective interests. It has already been shown, that, in some important circumstances, especially with the aid of these improvements, they must derive great advantage from that cause alone, that is, from their distance from each other. In every other way, the expansion of our system must operate favorably for every state, in proportion as it operates favorably for the Union. It is in that sense only that it can become a question with the states, or rather with the people who compose them. As states, they can be affected by it only by their relation to each other through the general government, and by its effect on the operations of that government. Manifest it is, that to any extent to which the general government can sustain and execute its functions with complete effect, will the states, that is, the people who compose them, be benefited. It is only when the expansion shall be carried beyond the faculties of the general government, so as to enfeeble its operations, to the injury of the whole, that any of the parts can be injured. The tendency, in that stage, will be to dismemberment, and not to consolidation. This danger should, therefore, be looked at with profound attention, as one of a very serious character. I will remark here, that, as the operations of the national government are of a general nature, the states having complete power for internal and local purposes, the expansion may be carried to very great extent, and with perfect safety. It must be obvious to all, that the further the expansion is carried, provided it be not beyond the just limit, the greater will be the freedom of action to both governments, and the more perfect their security; and in all other respects, the better the effect will be to the whole American people. Extent of territory, whether it be great or small, gives to a nation many of its characteristics. It marks the extent of its resources, of its population, of its physical force. It marks, in short, the difference between a great and a small power.

To what extent it may be proper to expand our system of government, is a question which does not press for a decision, at this time. At the end of the revolutionary war, in 1783, we had, as we contended and believed, a right to the free navigation of the Mississippi, but it was not until after the expiration of twelve years, in 1795, that that right was acknowledged and enjoyed. Further difficulties occurred, in the bustling of a contentious world, when, at the expiration of eight years more, the United States, sustaining the strength and energy of their character, acquired the province of Louisiana, with the free navigation of the river, from its source to the ocean, and a liberal boundary on the western side. To this, Florida has since been added, so that we now possess all the territory in which the original states had any interest, or in which the existing states can be said, either in a national or local point of view, to be in

any way interested. A range of states, on the western side of the Mississippi, which already is provided for, puts us essentially at ease. Whether it will be wise to go further, will turn on other considerations than those which have dictated the course heretofore pursued. At whatever point we may stop, whether it be at a single range of states beyond the Mississippi, or by taking a greater scope, the advantage of such improvements is deemed of the highest importance. It is so, on the present scale. The further we go, the greater will be the necessity for them.

It can not be doubted, that improvements for great national purposes would be better made by the national government, than by the governments of the several states. Our experience, prior to the adoption of the constitution, demonstrated, that, in the exercise by the individual states of most of the powers granted to the United States, a contracted rivalry of interests, and misapplied jealousy of each other, had an important influence on all their measures, to the great injury of the whole. This was particularly exemplified by the regulations which they severally made, of their commerce with foreign nations, and with each other. It was this utter incapacity in the state governments, proceeding from these and other causes, to act as a nation, and to perform all the duties which the nation owed to itself, under any system which left the general government dependent on the states, which produced the transfer of these powers to the United States, by the establishment of the present constitution.—The reasoning which was applicable to the grant of any of the powers now vested in Congress, is likewise so, at least to a certain extent, to that in question. It is natural that the states, individually, in making improvements, should look to their particular and local interests. The members composing their respective legislatures represent the people of each state, only, and might not feel themselves at liberty to look to objects, in these respects, beyond that limit. If the resources of the Union were to be brought into operation under the direction of the state assemblies, or in concert with them, it may be apprehended that every measure would become the object of negotiation, of bargain and barter, much to the disadvantage of the system, as well as discredit to both governments. But Congress would look to the whole, and make improvements to promote the welfare of the whole. It is the peculiar felicity of the proposed amendment, that while it will enable the United States to accomplish every national object, the improvements made with that view will eminently promote the welfare of the individual states, who may also add such others as their own particular interests may require.

The situation of the Cumberland road requires the particular and early attention of Congress. Being formed over very lofty mountains, and in many instances over deep and wide streams, across which valuable bridges have been erected, which are sustained by stone walls, as are many other parts of the road, all these works are subject to decay, have decayed, and will decay rapidly, unless timely and effectual measures are adopted to prevent it.

The declivities from the mountains, and all the heights, must suffer from the frequent and heavy falls of water, and its descent to the valleys, as also from the deep congelations during our severe winters. Other injuries have also been experienced on this road, such as the displacing the capping of the walls, and other works, committed by worthless people, either from a desire to render the road impassable, or to have the transportation in another direction, or from a spirit of wantonness to create employ

ment for idlers. These considerations show, that an active and strict police ought to be established over the whole road, with power to make repairs when necessary; to establish turnpikes and tolls, as the means of raising money to make them; and to prosecute and punish those who commit waste and other injuries.

Should the United States be willing to abandon this road to the states through which it passes, would they take charge of it, each of that portion within its limits, and keep it in repair? It is not to be presumed that they would, since the advantages attending it are exclusively national, by connecting, as it does, the Atlantic with the western states, and in a line with the seat of the national government. The most expensive parts of this road lie within Pennyslvania and Virginia, very near the confines of each state, and in a route not essentially connected with the commerce of either.

If it is thought proper to vest this power in the United States, the only mode in which it can be done, is, by an amendment of the constitution. The states, individually, can not transfer the power to the United States, nor can the United States receive it. The constitution forms an equal and the sole relation between the general government and the several states; and it recognises no change in it, which shall not, in like manner apply to all. If it is once admitted, that the general government may form compacts with individual states, not common to the others, and which the others might even disapprove, into what pernicious consequences might it not lead? Such compacts are utterly repugnant to the principles of the constitution, and of the most dangerous tendency. The states, through which this road passes, have given their sanction only to the route, and to the acquisition of the soil by the United States-a right very different from that of jurisdiction, which can not be granted without an amendment to the constitution, and which need not be granted for the purposes of this system, except in the limited manner heretofore stated. On full consideration, therefore, of the whole subject, I am of opinion that such an amendment ought to be recommended to the several states for their adoption.

I have now essentially executed that part of the task, which I imposed on myself, of examining the right of Congress to adopt and execute a system of internal improvement, and I presume have shown that it does not exist. It is, I think, equally manifest, that such a power vested in Congress, and wisely executed, would have the happiest effect, on all the great interests of our Union. It is, however, my opinion that the power should be confined to great national works only, since, if it were unlimited, it would be liable to abuse, and might be productive of evil. For all minor improvements, the resources of the states individually, would be fully adequate, and by the states such improvements might be made with greater advantage than by the Union; as they would understand better such as their more immediate and local interests required.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

JANUARY 5, 1825.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:As the term of my service in this high trust will expire at the end of the present session of Congress, I think it proper to invite your attention to an object very interesting to me, and which, in the movement of our government, is deemed, on principle, equally interesting to the public. I have been long in the service of my country, and in its difficult conjunctures, as well abroad as at home, in the course of which I have had a control over public moneys to a vast amount. If, in the course of my service, it shall appear, on the most severe scrutiny, which I invite, that the public have sustained any loss by any act of mine, or of others, for which I ought to be held responsible, I am willing to bear it. If, on the other hand, it shall appear, on a view of the law, and of precedents in other cases, that justice has been withheld from me, in any instance, as I have believed it to be in many, and greatly to my injury, it is submitted whether it ought not to be rendered. It is my wish that all matters of account and claims between my country and myself be settled, with that strict regard to justice which is observed in settlements between individuals in private life. It would be gratifying to me, and it appears to be just, that the subject should be now examined, in both respects, with a view to a decision hereafter. No bill would, it is presumed, be presented for my signature, which would operate either for or against me, and I would certainly sanction none in my favor. While here, I can furnish testimony, applicable to any case, in both views, which a full investigation may require, and the committee to whom the subject may be referred, by reporting facts now, with a view to a decision after my retirement, will allow time for further information, and due consideration of all matters relating thereto. Settlements with a person in this trust, which could not be made with the accounting officers of government, should always be made by Congress, and before the public. The cause of the delay in presenting these claims will be explained to the committee to whom the subject may be referred. It will, I presume, be made apparent that it was inevitable; that, from the peculiar circumstances attending each case, Congress alone could decide on it; and that, from considerations of deliicacy, it would have been highly improper for me to have sought it from Congress at an earlier period than that which is now proposed-the expiration of my term in this high trust.

Other considerations appear to me to operate with great force in favor of the measure which I now propose. A citizen who has long served his country in its highest trusts, has a right, if he has served with fidelity, to enjoy undisturbed tranquillity and peace in his retirement. This he can not expect to do, unless his conduct, in all pecuniary concerns, shall be placed, by severe scrutiny, on a basis not to be shaken. This, therefore, forms a strong motive with me for the inquiry which I now invite. The public may also derive considerable advantage from the precedent, in the future movement of the government. It being known that such scrutiny was made in my case, it may form a new, strong barrier against the abuse of the public confidence in future.