instrument, there is no intent to defraud any particular person. Indeed, it is now clearly settled that, where a conspiracy is to defraud indefinite individuals, it is unnecessary to name any individuals.-R. vs. Peck. 9 A. & E. 686; Reg. vs. King, 7. Q. B. 782. This may be taken to be a general rule of Criminal pleading, and it has long been applied to forgery. In 1771, in R. vs. Birch, 1 Leach 79, the prisoners were convicted of forging a will, and one count alleged the intent to be "to defraud the person or persons who would by law be entitled to the messuages" whereof the testator died seized.-Chitty, Cr. L. 1066. And it has been the regular course in in dictments for forging wills, at least ever since that case, to insert counts with intent to defraud the heir-at-law and the next of kin, generally.-Jerv. Archb. 8th Edit. 370; 3 Chitty Cr. L. 1069. It is true that in general there have also been counts specifying the heir-at-law or the next of kin by name. But in Reg. vs. Tylney, there was no such count. No objection seems ever to have been taken to any such general count. So, also, in any forgery with intent to defraud the inhabitants of a county, hundred or parish, the inhabitants may be generally described. These instances clearly show that it is not necessary in forgery any more than in other cases, to name individuals where there is either great inconvenience or impractibility in doing so. A conviction for conspiracy to negotiate a bill of exchange, the drawers of which were a fictitious firm, and thereby fraudulently to obtain goods from the King's subjects, although it did not appear that any particular person to be defrauded was contemplated at the time of the conspiracy, has been held good, R. vs. Hevey, 2 East, P. C. 858, note a, and this case bears considerably on the present question. If

a person forged a bill of exchange with intent to defraud any one whom he might afterwards induce to cash it, and he uttered it to A. B., it cannot be doubted that he would be guilty of uttering with intent to defraud A. B., and it would indeed be strange to hold that he was guilty of uttering, but not of forging, the bill. No doubt, the offence of forgery consists in the intent to deceive or defraud; but a general intent to defraud is just as criminal as to defraud any particular individual. In each case, there is a wrongful act done with a criminal intent, which, according to R. vs. Higgins, 2 East R. 5, is sufficient to constitute an indictable offence. In the course of the argument, Erle, J., said: "Would it not have been enough to allege an intent to deceive divers persons to the jurors unknown, to wit, all the patients of his late master?" This approaches very nearly to the correct view, viz. that it would have been enough before the 14 & 15 Vict., ch. 100, s. S, to have alleged and proved an intent to deceive any persons who should afterwards become his patients. Wightman, J., during the argument said, "The question is, whom did he intend to deceive when the forgery was committed?" And Jervis, C. J., said: "The intent must not be a roving intent, but a specific intent." Now, if these remarks are confined to a count for forging, they are correct; though, in Bolland's case, 1 Leach, 83, the prisoner was executed for forging an indorsement in the name of a non-existing person, with intent to defraud a person whom he does not even seem to have known when he forged the indorsement.

But it cannot be doubted that a man may be guilty of intending to defraud divers persons at different times by the same instrument, as where he tries to utter a

forged note to several persons one after another, in which case he may be convicted of uttering with intent to defraud each of them. Thus much has been said, because it is very important that the law on the subjects discussed in this note should not be left in uncertainty, and it is much to be regretted that Reg. vs. Hodgson was ever decided as it was, as it may encourage ignorant pretenders to fabricate diplomas, and thereby not only to defraud the poor of their money, but to injure their health." Greaves, Consol. Acts, 303.

The case of Tatlock vs. Harris, hereinbefore cited by Greaves, is cited by almost all who have treated this question; 2 Russell, 774; 2 East., P. C., 854, &c. In Reg. vs. Nash, 2 Den. 493, Maule, J., said: "The Recorder seems to have thought, that, in order to prove an intent to defraud there should have been some person defrauded or who might possibly have been defrauded. But I do not think that at all necessary. A man may have an intent to defraud, and yet there may not be any person who could be defrauded by his act. Suppose a person with a good account at his bankers, and a friend, with his knowledge, forges his name to a cheque, either to try his credit, or to imitate his handwriting, there would be no intent to defraud, though there would be parties who might be defrauded. But where another person has no account at his bankers, but a man supposes that he has, and on that supposition forges his name, there would be an intent to defraud in that case, although no person could be defrauded."

And in R. vs. Mazagora, R. & R. 291, it has been holden that the jury ought to infer an intent to defraud the person who would have to pay the instrument if it were genuine, although from the manner of executing

the forgery, or from that person's ordinary caution, it would not be likely to impose upon him, and although the object was general to defraud whoever might take the instrument, and the intention of defrauding, in particular, the person who would have to pay the instrument, if genuine, did not enter into the prisoner's contemplation.-See R. vs. Crooke, 2 Str. 901; R. vs. Goate, 1 Ld. Raymond 737; R. vs. Holden, R. & R. 754. And even, if the party to whom the forged instrument is uttered believes that the defendant did not intend to defraud him, and swears it, this will not repel the presumption of an intention to defraud.-R. vs. Shephard, R. & R. 169. R. vs. Trenfield, 1 F. & F. 43, is wretchedly reported, and cannot be relied upon.-2 Russell, 790, note by Greaves. See also R. vs. Crowther, 5, C. & P. 316, and R. vs. James, 7 C. & P. 153, on the question of the necessary intent to defraud, in forgery; and Reg. vs. Boardman, 2 M. & Rob. 147; Reg. vs. Todd, 1 Cox 57. Though the present Statute, see post, sect. 51, has the words," where it shall be necessary to allege an intent to defraud " showing evidently that there are cases where such an averment is not necessary, it has been held, in a recent case, by Mr. Justice Quain, Reg. vs. Powner, 12 Cox 235, that, in all cases, an intent to defraud must be alleged. This doctrine seems to have been since repudiated by Martin, B., in Reg. vs. Asplin, 12 Cox 391; see post, under sect. 43.

It should be observed that the offence of forgery may be complete, though there be no publication or uttering of the forged instrument, for the very making with a fraudulent intention, and without lawful authority, of any instrument which, at common law or by Statute is the subject of forgery, is of itself a sufficient completion of

the offence before publication, and though, the publication of the instrument be the medium by which the intent is usually made manifest, yet it may be proved as plainly by other evidence. 2 East, P. C. 855. Thus in a case where the note, which the prisoner was charged with having forged was never published, but was found in his possession at the time he was apprehended, the prisoner was found guilty, and no one even thought of raising the objection that the note had never been published. Rex. vs. Elliot, 1 Leach, 175. At the present time, most of the Statutes which relate to forgery make the publication of the forged instrument, with knowledge of the fact, a substantive felony.-2 Russell,

709.

Not only the fabrication and false making of the whole of a written instrument, but a fraudulent insertion, alteration, or erasure, even of a letter, in any material part of a true instrument, and even if it be afterwards. executed by another person, he not knowing of the deceit, or the fraudulent application of a true signature to a false instrument, for which it was not intended or vice versa, are as much forgeries, as if the whole instrument had been fabricated. As by altering the date of a bill of exchange after acceptance, whereby the payment was accelerated.-2 East, P. C. 855; 2 Russell, 710; Crim. law Comm. reports, cited supra; R. vs. Post. R. & R. 101; Reg. vs. Hodgson, Dears. and B. 3.

In addition to Wilks's case, 2 East, 957, cited supra by Greaves, as to the principle that the making of any instrument which is the subject of forgery, in the name of a non-existing and fictitious person, is forgery, the following are given in Archbold, 562: R. vs. Lewis, Foster, 116; R. vs. Bolland, 2 East, P. C. 958; R.