any possibility of salvation from the effect of their own rash, undigested measures. It is true, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; and elsewhere than in the republic of Rome, and of other times than the days of Catiline, it may be said, "Haud sane quisque virtute magnus est."

""Tis not in mortals to command success!

But do you more, Sempronius!--don't deserve it,
And take my word you won't have any less;

Be wary, watch the time, and always serve it:
Give gentle way when there's too great a press;
And for your conscience, only learn to nerve it,—
For, like a racer, or a boxer, training,

"Twill make, if proved, vast efforts without paining."

I had more to say, Mr. Speaker, could I have said it, on this subject. But I cannot sit down without asking those, who were once my brethren of the church, the elders of the young family of this good old republic of the thirteen states, if they can consent to rivet upon us this system, from which no benefit can possibly result to themselves. I put it to them as descendants of the renowned colony of Virginia; as children sprung from her loins; if for the sake of all the benefits, with which this bill is pretended to be freighted to them, granting such to be the fact for argument's sake, they could consent to do such an act of violence to the unanimous opinion, feelings, prejudices, if you will, of the whole Southern States, as to pass it? I go farther. I ask of them what is there in the condition of the nation, at this time, that calls for the immediate adoption of this measure? Are the Gauls at the gate of the capitol? If they are, the cacklings of the Capitoline geese will hardly save it. What is there to induce us to plunge into the vortex of those evils so severely felt in Europe from this very manufacturing and paper policy? For it is evident that, if we go into this system of policy, we must adopt the European institutions also. We have very good materials to work with; we have only to make our elective king president for life, in the first place, and then to make the succession hereditary in the family of the first that shall happen to have a promising son. For a king we can be at no loss--ex quovis ligno-any block will do for him. The senate may, perhaps, be transmuted into a house of peers, although we should meet with more difficulty than in the other case; for Bonaparte himself was not more hardly put to it, to recruit the ranks of his mushroom nobility, than we should be to furnish a house of peers. As for us, we are the faithful commons, ready made to hand; but with all our loyalty, I congratulate the house-I congratulate the nation-that, although this body is daily degraded by the sight of members of congress manufactured into placemen, we have not yet reached such a point of degradation as to suffer executive minions to be manufactured into members of

congress. We have shut that door; I wish we could shut the other also. I wish we could have a perpetual call of the house in this view, and suffer no one to get out from its closed doors. The time is peculiarly inauspicious for the change in our policy which is proposed by this bill. We are on the eve of an election that promises to be the most distracted that this nation has ever yet undergone. It may turn out to be a Polish election. At such a time, ought any measure to be brought forward which is supposed to be capable of being demonstrated to be extremely injurious to one great portion of this country, and beneficial in proportion to another? Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. There are firebrands enough in the land, without this apple of discord being cast into this assembly. Suppose this measure is not what it is represented to be; that the fears of the south are altogether illusory and visionary; that it will produce all the good predicted of it-an honorable gentleman from Kentucky said yesterday and I was sorry to hear it, for I have great respect for that gentleman, and for other gentlemen from that state-that the question was not whether a bare majority should pass the bill, but whether the majority or the minority should rule. The gentleman is wrong, and, if he will consider the matter rightly, he will see it. Is there no difference between the patient and the actor? We are passive: we do not call them to act or to suffer, but we call upon them not so to act as that we must necessarily suffer; and I venture to say, that in any government, properly constituted, this very consideration would operate conclusively, that if the burden is to be laid on 102, it ought not to be laid by 105. We are the eel that is being flayed, while the cook-maid pats us on the head, and cries, with the clown in King Lear, "Down, wantons, down." There is but one portion of the country which can profit by this bill, and from that portion of the country comes this bare majority in favor of it. I bless God that Massachusetts and old Virginia are once again rallying under the same banner, against oppressive and unconstitutional taxation; for, if all the blood be drawn from out the body, I care not whether it be by the British parliament or the American congress; by an emperor or a king abroad, or by a president at home.

Under these views, and with feelings of mortification and shame at the very weak opposition I have been able to make to this bill, I entreat gentlemen to consent that it may lie over, at least, until the next session of congress. We have other business to attend to, and our families and affairs need our attention at home; and indeed I, sir, would not give one farthing for any man who prefers being here to being at home; who is a good public man and a bad private one. With these views and feelings, I move you, sir, that the bill be indefinitely postponed.

376

SPEECH OF DANIEL WEBSTER

ON

THE PANAMA MISSION,

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED

STATES, APRIL 14, 1826.

The following resolution being under consideration, in committee of the whole house upon the state of the Union, viz.,

"Resolved, That, in the opinion of the house, it is expedient to appropriate the funds necessary to enable the president of the United States to send ministers to the congress of Panama;"

Mr. M'Lane, of Delaware, submitted the following amendment thereto : "It being understood as the opinion of this house, that, as it has always been the settled policy of this government, in extending our commercial relations with foreign nations, to have with them as little political connection as possible, to preserve peace, commerce, and friendship with all nations, and to form entangling alliances with none; the ministers who may be sent shall attend at the said congress in a diplomatic character merely, and ought not to be authorized to discuss, consider, or consult, upon any proposition of alliance, offensive or defensive, between this country and any of the Spanish American governments, or any stipulation, compact, or declaration, binding the United States in any way, or to any extent, to resist interference from abroad, with the domestic concerns of the aforesaid governments; or any measure which shall commit the present or future neutral rights or duties of these United States, either as may regard European nations, or between the several states of Mexico and South America; leaving the United States free to adopt, in any event which may happen, affecting the relations of the South American governments, with each other, or with foreign nations, such measures as the friendly disposition cherished by the American people towards the people of those states, and the honor and interest of this nation may require." To which Mr. Rives proposed to add, after the words, "aforesaid governments," in the 12th line, the following:

'Or any compact or engagement by which the United States shall be pledged to the Spanish American states, to maintain, by force, the principle that no part of the American continent is henceforward subject to colonization by any European power."

The preceding motions to amend being under consideration, Mr. Webster delivered the following speech:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I am not ambitious of amplifying this discussion. On the contrary, it is my anxious wish to confine the debate, so far as I partake in it, to the real and material questions before us.

Our judgment of things is liable, doubtless, to be affected by our opinions of men. It would be affectation in me, or in any one, to claim an exemption from this possibility of bias. I can say, however, that it has been my sincere purpose to consider and discuss the present subject, with the single view of finding out what duty it devolves upon me, as a member of the house of representatives. If any thing has diverted me from that sole aim, it has been against my intention.

I think, sir, that there are two questions, and two only for our decision. The first is, whether the house of representatives will assume the responsibility of withholding the ordinary appropriation for carrying into effect an executive measure, which the executive department has constitutionally instituted; the second, whether, if it will not withhold the appropriation, it will yet take the responsibility of interposing, with its own opinions, directions or instructions, as to the manner in which this particular executive measure shall be conducted.

I am, certainly, in the negative, on both these propositions. I am neither willing to refuse the appropriation, nor am I willing to limit or restrain the discretion of the executive, beforehand, as to the manner in which it shall perform its own appropriate constitutional duties. And, sir, those of us who hold these opinions have the advantage of being on the common highway of national politics. We propose nothing new; we suggest no change; we adhere to the uniform practice of the government, as I understood it, from its origin. It is for those, on the other hand, who are in favor of either, or both of the propositions, to show us the cogent reasons which recommend their adoption. The duty is on them, to satisfy the house and the country that there is something in the present occasion which calls for such an extraordinary and unprecedented interference.

The president and senate have instituted a public mission, for the purpose of treating with foreign states. The constitution gives to the president the power of appointing, with the consent of the senate, ambassadors, and other public ministers. Such appointment is, therefore, a clear and unquestionable exercise of executive power. It is, indeed, less connected with the appropriate duties of this house, than almost any other executive act; because the office of a public minister is not created by any statute or law of our own government. It exists under the law of nations, and is recognized as existing by our constitution. The acts of congress, indeed, limit the salaries of public ministers; but they do no more. Every thing else, in regard to the appointment of public ministers, their numbers, the time of their appointment, and the negotiations contemplated in such appointments, is matter for executive discretion. Every new appointment to supply vacancies in existing

missions, is under the same authority. There are, indeed, what we commonly term standing missions, so known in the practice of the government, but they are not made so by any law. All missions rest on the same ground. Now the question is, whether the president and senate, having created this mission, or, in other words, having appointed the ministers, in the exercise of their undoubted constitutional power, this house will take upon itself the responsibility of defeating its objects, and rendering this exercise of executive power void.

By voting the salaries, in the ordinary way, we assume, as it seems to me, no responsibility whatever. We merely empower another branch of the government to discharge its own appropriate duties, in that mode which seems to itself most conducive to the public interests. We are, by so voting, no more responsible for the manner in which the negotiation shall be conducted, than we are for the manner in which one of the heads of department may discharge the duties of his office.

On the other hand, if we withhold the ordinary means, we do incur a heavy responsibility. We interfere, as it seems to me, to prevent the action of the government, according to constitutional forms and provisions. It ought constantly to be remembered, that our whole power in the case is merely incidental. It is only because public ministers must have salaries, like other officers, and because no salaries can be paid, but by our vote, that the subject is referred to us at all. The constitution vests the power of appointment in the president and senate; the law gives to the president even the power of fixing the amount of salary, within certain limits; and the only question, here, is upon the appropriation. There is no doubt that we have the power, if we see fit to exercise it, to break up the mission, by withholding the salaries; we have power also to break up the court, by withholding the salaries of the judges, or to break up the office of president, by withholding the salary provided for it by law. All these things, it is true, we have the power to do, since we hold the keys of the treasury. But, then, can we rightfully exercise this power? The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), with whom I have great pleasure in concurring on this part of the case, while I regret that I differ with him on others, has placed this question in a point of view which cannot be improved. These officers do, indeed, already exist. They are public ministers. If they were to negotiate a treaty, and the senate should ratify it, it would become a law of the land, whether we voted their salaries or not. This shows that the constitution never contemplated that the house of representatives should act a part in originating negotiations, or concluding treaties.

I know, sir, it is a useless labor to discuss the kind of power