from the immenfe differences which his relations towards us have from our relations to one another.

Wherefore in divers enquiries about Providence, to which our curiofity will ftretch itfelf, it is impoffible for us to be refolved, and launching into them we fhall foon get out of our depth, fo as to fwim in diffatisfaction, or to fink into diftruft: why God made the world at fuch an inftant, no fooner or later; why he made it thus, not exempt from all diforder; why he framed Man (the prince of vifible creatures) fo fallible and frail, fo prone to fin, fo liable to mifery; why so many things happen offenfive to him: why his gifts are diftributed with fuch inequality; fuch questions we are apt to propound and to debate; but the refolution of them our mind perhaps was not made to apprehend; however in this ftate we by no means can come at it: it at leaft being kept among thofe things, of which it is faid, fecret things belong unto the Lord our God, in diftinction from others, about which it is added, but thofe that are revealed belong unto us, and to our children for ever.

In fuch cafes the abfolute will, the fovereign authority, the pure liberality of God fupply the place of reasons fufficient, if not to fatisfy the minds of men fondly curious, yet to ftop the mouths of those, who are boldly peremptory; which are alledged, not with the intent to imply that God ever acteth unaccountably, or without highest reason; but that fometimes his methods of acting are not fit fubjects of our conception or difcuffion; for otherwise God appealeth, to the verdict of our reason, when the cafe is fuch, that we can apprehend it, and the apprehenfion of it may conduce to good purposes.

[To be concluded in our next.]

Of

ཡིན་པ་

Of LIBERTY or FREEDOM.

[Extracted from a late Author.]

REEDOM is not an arbitrary gift of God, as Bayle fays;

FRE

but a neceffary, infeparable adjunct of our intelligent, reafonable natures. Reafon is, comparing, examining, judging: now from this power flows the power of willing, chufing and preferring one object to another, which is freedom. We love good in general, or happiness, neceffarily; but all particular good, freely; because we may ftill think of another good far fuperior to any determinate one, and fo find a reason of preferring the greater to the leffer.

Hence freedom does not confist in a power to determine ourfelves without any reason at all. To chufe thus would be capricious fancy, and not a true perfection. We never a&t deliberately without fome motive or reafon; and this motive is always either real, or apparent good.

Hence freedom far lefs confifts in a power to prefer what appears the worst to what appears the beft: but in a power to fufpend our choice till we have examined if what appears the beft, be really fo or not. The view of the beft, or what appears to us fuch, always determines us neceffarily in the actual moment of choice: but antecedently to this moment, we have ftill a real, intrinfic, inherent, immediate, unchained power of examining whether what appears to us best be really fo or not, and of fufpending our choice till we have thus examined.

Hence freedom is a purely admiffive faculty, and no ways productive of the objects that act upon us. We are very often entirely paffive as to the impreffion of these objects; but always free to reflect upon and compare thofe impreffions. We are not always free to feel; but we are always free to confent to what we feel. We are not always free to reject wholly the involuntary

involuntary fenfations, ftrong imaginations, and violent impreffions objects excite in us; but we are always free to adhere to them, to correspond with them; and to difavow them, or to indulge them; to expose ourselves to their action; to live within the fphere of their activity; to fortify in ourselves the defire, union, and love of them; or to fhun the occafions that expofe us to their influences.

Hence though original fin has very much impaired our natural liberty; and though inveterate habits of corruption diminifh it more and more; yet it is not, and can never be totally deftroyed during this mortal life. Though of ourselves we cannot vanquish our paffions, refift violent temptations, do any fupernatural good, or practise any divine virtue; yet we have always present and at hand a fuperior, foreign, adventitious, fupernatural force, by which we can refift all the efforts of fenfe, paffion and felf-love; by degrees vanquish them, and become truly juft. If we are faithful to God's universal, preventing, purely gratuitous favours, which are refused to none, which is at firft difficult, will become lefs fo, then eafy; and in fine, natural to the new man that God creates in us, if we co-operate with his fanctifying operations.

SIR

Account of Sir PHILIP SIDNEY.

IR PHILIP SIDNEY was Governor of Flushing, and General of the Horfe under his uncle the Earl of Leicester His valour, which was efteemed his moft fhining quality, was not exceeded by any of the heroes of his age; but even this was equalled by his humanity. After he had received his death's wound at the battle of Zutphen, and was overcome with thirft from exceffive bleeding, he called for drink, which was prefently brought him. At the fame time a poor foldier was carried along defparately wounded, who fixed his eager eyes upon the bottle, juft as he was lifting it to his mouth;

upon

REEDOM is not an arbitrary gift of God, as Bay but a neceffary, infeparable adjunct of our intellig fonable natures. Reafon is, comparing, examining, ji now from this power flows the power of willing, chu, preferring one object to another, which is freedom. good in general, or happiness, neceffarily; but all good, freely; because we may fill think of another fuperior to any determinate one, and fo find a reaso: ferring the greater to the leffer.

Hence freedom does not confift in a power to deter felves without any reafon at all. To chufe thus wc pricious fancy, and not a true perfection. We nev liberately without fome motive or reason; and this always either real, or apparent good.

Hence freedom far lefs confifts in a power to [ appears the worft to what appears the beft: but in fufpend our choice till we have examined if what beft, be really fo or not. The view of the best, c pears to us fuch, always determines us neceffarily i moment of choice: but antecedently to this mome ftill a real, intrinfic, inherent, immediate, uncha of examining whether what appears to us beft be 1 not, and of fufpending our choice till we have thus

Hence freedom is a purely admiffive faculty, a: productive of the objects that act upon us. We are entirely paffive as to the impreffion of thefe objects; free to reflect upon and compare thofe impreffions. not always free to feel; but we are always free to what we feel. We are not always free to reject v

in