sailing. He might possibly be told, that our merchantmen were advised to avoid the Cape; that the importance of that settlement was not so great as was represented; and that our ships might touch at the Brazils. The settlement which the French had acquired in the Brazils would, in that case, give additional importance to France. The Cape and Cochin were insisted on by lord Malmesbury, at Lisle, as points from which we would not accede; and these were now given up, from that want of vigour, spirit, and prudence which mark our negotiations. An attempt had been made to represent the Levant trade as unimportant to this country. But our manufacturers, he conceived, would tell a far different tale. Was it true that Malta was unimportant; - that fortress which had sustained a blockade of nearly two years? It could not be seriously contended. To rescue Malta and Egypt from France is deemed an object of primary importance; but when it is considered expedient to give them up, their importance suddenly vanishes, and they become trivial and insignificant. No part of the treaty of peace, nor any thing connected with it, excited so much astonishment in his mind, as our treatment of the house of Orange, except the defence of that treatment. Britain was formerly bound by a solemn treaty with that house. He understood some private arrangement was making, between France and Prussia, relative to that subject. But the prince of Orange was not to be thrown as an outcast on the world, by those for whom he had sacrificed his ail. Where would have been the diculty in introducing an article in the preliminary treaty, similar to one which was prepared at the negotiation at Lisle, which stipulated for the restoration of the whole property of the house of Orange, or the full value of it in money? There could be no objection to this; but we wanted the spirit, the vigour, or courage to support an ally, who had been so unfortunate as to be an enemy to France! Though he did not think the peace of 1753 was either glorious or honourable; yet he would recommend it to the gentlemen to read the preliminaries to that treaty, and compare them with the present. Let the cessions made then be compared with the cessions made now; and, though he thought the former a bad peace, which presented nothing but defeat and humiliation, yet would the latter be found infinitely worse in itself, and unfortunately more dangerous in its consequences. The present peace was not honourable, in respect of out allies; nor was it necessary to be made. Mr. Addington had indignantly disclaimed the plea of necessity. Although a difference of opinion existed as to the terms of the peace, no ore would contend that we were reduced to the necessity of making a peace, dishonourable to our allies or unsafe to ourselves. He contrasted the terms of the peace of Utrecht, and of the peace of 1763, with those of the present peace; showed the vast increase of power which France had acquired now, and the consequent increase of danger to ourselves. The noble lord had contended, that our danger did not accrue from the existence of republican principles in France, but from the extent of her power; that, in this respect, things had changed. Admitting Admitting such to be the case, could any man view the present power of France, and consequently our present danger, without shuddering? In the event of a war, notwithstanding our stipulations, all the ports and fortresses in the Mediterranean would be seized by France, and shut against us. She will monopolize its commerce in time of peace, its power in time of war. Acting upon such a principle of negotiation, or rather of sacrifice, and let the definitive treaty be completed, and he would desire to know whether it would not place as in a state of war with France in twelve months? Could peace be good if its duration were so short? It would reduce us to the necessity of dismantling our navy, and disbanding our army and our volunteers; it had deprived us of all the military points and stations; and, notwithstanding all our exertions of economy, what would be our state, if France, in the course of twelve -months, should take us unprepared, and direct her whole power against us? He called upon the house seriously to reflect on our situation; and to ask themselves what state we should be placed in if France should so declare war against us? Did they not believe that such a war must shake our country to the very center? Feeling, as he did, that the peace was neither honourable to our allies, nor safe to ourselves, he should give his decided .negative to the motion. Lord Castlereagh supported the pence, and thought it bid as fair to he lasting as any which had ever preceded it. This peace, at least, would try France, and he thought it but fair to give her a trial. He relied much on the great change which had taken place in the public mind, both in Ireland and in France. Lord Temple highly disapproved of the concessions which ministers had made, as dangerous to the safety, and degrading to the honour of England. He had seen with regret, that a party of degenerated Englishmen were to be found, mean enough to draw the coach of gen. Lauriston through the streets of London, with cries of " Long live Bonaparté." This was an afflicting prospect, and augured no good to the country: but this was in some degree encouraged by the conduct of ministers; for he understood that general Lauriston was accompanied from France by a person who had been twice sent out of the country under the alien act; that on his arrival the proper officer recognizing him, refused him permission to land, till general Lauriston declared that in that case he would return with the preliminaries; and this man he understood was in the coach with general Lauriston when he was drawn in triumph through the streets of London, and that ministers had not the spirit to take notice of the circumstance. If that was a true statement of the fact, it was rather an unhappy omen of what this country had to expect from a connexion with France, under its present ministers. He opposed ministers from no factious motive, but because he sincerely thought them unworthy of the confidence of the public. He was aware that his objections would not be supported by those who were in the constant habit of opposing the conduct of administration, but he did not wish for the support of any man who could declare his pleasure at the peace," because it was glorious to the the enemy." Such a sentiment he thought by no means becoming a patriot or an Englishman, and any peace founded on it must be hollow and suspicious. peremptory in our demands. He Mr. Pitt said, that he had upon this occasion the misfortune to differ from some of those with whom he had been long united in the ties of private friendship and political opinion. He should begin by observing, that whatever variety of sentiments once existed, as to what governments we ought to treat with, whatever objects it might have once been thought most advisable to pursue in the course of the war, for some time past all have agreed that the question of peace and war was now a mere question of terms. After the continental alliance had been dissolved, nothing remained for us but to procure just and honourable conditions of peace for our selves and the few allies which had not deserted us. When it became merely a question of terms, he was Imuch more anxious as to the tone and character of the peace, than about any particular object which should come into dispute. Although he conceived it the duty of every minister to obtain the best possible terms for the state to which he be-longed, yet as long as the peace was honourable, he should prefer accepting terms, even short of what he thought the country entitled to, to risking the result of the negotiation by too obstinate an adherence to any particular point: although certainly every thing had not been obtained by the preliminaries, yet it did hot appear to him that the difference between those terms and what the country had a right to, was to be compared with the evils which might have resulted from being too globe, globe, as giving to our Indian empire a security which it had not enjoyed from its first establishment. As to the arrangement proposed by lord Malmesbury about Cochin, he did not feel himself at liberty to state how far lord Malmesbury had been permitted by his instructions to recede from the projet presented at Lisle but it was evident that Cochin was not now of the importance it possessed while Tippoo Saib was master of the surrounding districts. It was like Berwick-uponTweed, which, while the Scotch were a separate people, was of great importance as a fortified frontier town; but after the whole island was happily united, what was the political importance of Berwickupon-Tweed? While Tippoo existed, the supplies he might have received from the port of Cochin, in the hands of France, was a most important consideration, but at present, even Negapatam was of more consequence than Cochin. Mr. Pitt also expatiated at great length on the importance of Trinidad; he said, that with the terms of peace, as they regard ourselves, he was completely satisfied. They were also satisfactory with respect to our allies for the Porte we had done every thing we were bound to do, and a great deal more. The recognition of the republic of the Seven Islands was of the utmost importance, as the very existence of the Turkish empire was in danger, if they should be left in the hands of France. For Naples we had done every thing which could have been done, even if the treaty had still existed with that power. As to Sardinia, it was evident, that unless we had the power to dissolve the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics, and undo all 3 that the war in Italy had done, we never could restore the king of Sardinia to his former situation. With respect to Portugal, we had not only exhibited the most punctilious good faith, but the most dignified liberality. France would have insisted on far more considerable cessions, had it not been for our interposition. As to our guaranty of the constitution of Holland in 1787, could it be forgotten what exertions we had made to support it? As to a mere pecuniary indemnity to the stadtholder, which was all that was asked at Lisle, it was an object of too trifling importance to endanger the success of a negotiation about. Many gentlemen seemed to think, that we had ceded possessions which were important to our security; he, on the contrary, thought that what we had ceded was not unimportant to our commerce or finance, but had nothing to do with our security: the retaining them would not have maintained the integrity of Portugal, Naples, or Sardinia, nor would have deprived the French of any of that immense line of coast which causes our dismay. A little more commerce, a little more finance, after a continuation of the war for some years longer, would be a bad bargain: unless it was possible to raise up a new confederacy more unanimous and better cemented than the former ones, war might not only be an idle waste of treasure, but might leave the relative situation of the country worse than it is at present. France had not insisted on the uti possidetis with the nations she conquered on the continent, much less had we a right to insist upon that basis with her. It would be strange indeed if we should expect that the gigantic power. power of an enemy should be a ground for obtaining better terms than could reasonably be asked if he was feeble. It would be strange language indeed for a negotiator to say to France, You are so formidable, and so exceedingly alarm us, that you must give us a share of your possessions to make us equal. A wish of this sort might be expressed, but it could not reasonably be expected that it would be gratified. As to the present government of France and the first consul, he should abstain from any disrespectful or irritating language, as every mark of outward respect was due to every government with which we were at peace. His opinion of the past however remained unaltered. This country was at first called upon to resist an attack against all existing governments; its object was security. He must confess that his majesty's ministers then thought that the dissolution of the revolutionary government was the best means of obtaining this security, but he never reckoned it a sine qua non he then thought the restoration of monarchy would be a happy thing for France and for Europe: he thought so still, and he should confess that, to his dying day, he should regret the disappointment of his hopes. He should have been happy to have put together the fragments of that venerable edifice which had been so cruelly scattered; but when that object became unattainable, he must take that which was within his reach. They had survived the ravages of jacobinism; they had, at least, lived long enough to see it lose much of its virulence, and stripped of those delusive colours which once gave it its powers of deVOL. XLIV. struction. At other times we might have thought of driving France within her ancient limits, and even strengthening the barriers of her neighbours: but now that every hope of success in such a plan is vanished, it becomes right to consider the actual situation of the two countries. To remain obstinate after circumstances had changed would be the most fatal of errors. He coincided with what had fallen from his noble friend (lord Hawkesbury), that when we speak of the aggrandisements of France, we should also take into the account her losses, both in population, capital, and industry; we must take also into the account the acquisitions of other powers. The growth of this country too had been immense, and by the advantages we had gained by the union with Ireland, by our naval and military reputation, by the consolidation of our Indian empire, and the increase of our commerce, we might well hope, that if the country was true to itself, that it would enjoy a long train of prosperity and happiness. He concluded by giving his sincere assent to the motion. Mr. Fox said, that since he had been member of that house, he never gave his assent with greater satisfaction to any measure, than he now did to the preliminaries of peace. He considered that this peace must be allowed to be honourable by those who supported it, or else it could not meet their appro bation, of be considered safe. With nations, as well as individuals, honour is the most essential means of safety. Without honour a nation can neither expect to meet respect at home, nor confidence abroad, which are absolutely necessary to the true greatness of a nation. Na D tional |