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One might as well contend that the Lord is a literal rock, because be
is said to be a rock, and say that the assertion that he is a rock is
sufficient to show this, notwithstanding the circumstances to the con-
trary; as to say in opposition to the circumstances of the case that
the mere assertion, that God put a lying spirit into Ahab's prophets,
proves
cs that he absolutely put it there. And I do “think it common for
intelligent men," who are not Hopkinsians, " to say, that Divine Pre-
vidence does what they suppose God merely suffers or permits; and it
is very easy to ascertain whether they do or not, by asking them.
assert that it is begging the question for me to say, that God may de-
termine or decree certain wicked things, and accomplish them, merely
by giving wicked men an opportunity to do them, is not making it ap-
pear as begging the question; and supposing it to be admitted, that God
night thus determine wicked actions, it would to me seem perfectly
proper to say, even in the case of the murder of Christ, that God's hand,
as well as his counsel, determined what should be done; for it must be evi-
dent, that hand, in this instance, cannot mean what Hopkinsians under-
stand it to mean, viz. the moving of the actor, inasmuch as that hand deter-
mined what should be done, long before those who did it were in exist-
ence. Nor is there any necessity for so understanding it. The tera
hand is not confined to this sense. Was not the hand of Joab with the
woman of Tekoah, in counselling her respecting the plan to get Absa-
lom recalled from banishment? That is, was not the mind of Joab en-
gaged, together with that of that woman, in that business?

The world had no agency in its coming into existence; it has none
in its continuing to exist. No act of its own is requisite to either.
The same may be remarked in relation to the existence of men. And
with regard to existence in general, even of God himself, it may be ob-
served, that no action is involved on the part of what exists. But not
so volition. Though the existence of God and man does not involve
action on their part, the existence of their wills does. They can exist
without the exercise of any faculty whatever; but their volition cannot
exist without their activity. The exercise of their powers of volition
is requisite to their volitions; but the exercise of no creative powers of
their own is requisite to their existence. The cases of the existence
of beings and of their volitions, or, in other words, of the world and
volitions, are not therefore parallel; and there would be just as much
propriety in putting any other act of beings on the same footing with
their existence, as there is in placing an act of volition there. What!
because a being does not create himself, cannot he therefore create any
thing else?
Cannot man, canot God, possessed of faculties to will,
cause volition in themselves, merely because non-entity, possessed of
no faculty, cannot bring itself into being? What reasoning is there
from the one case to the other? A being must will, or he will have
no volition; but he has existence, though he does not create. Nor is
saying "he must will, or he will have no will," the same as saying that
if he wills he wills, &c. any more than saying he must talk, or he will
have no words, is the same as saying if he talks he talks, &c. The
exercising of the tongue, the lips, &c. which is denominated talking, is
not the words uttered-is not the talk. No more is the exercising of
the powers of volition, which is denominated choosing, the volition, the
choice itself.
"But is to will, the same thing as to create a will?" It
is so, agreeably to the proper use of the word create. To create means
to bring into existence. I bring this communication into existence. I
create it.
When Government make a new office, they are said to cre-
ate it. To will, then, is to create a will, whether the one who wills is
caused to create it by something else, or not. But what are we to un-
derstand by the word create comprising the ideas of cause and effect?
"An agent producing, and something produced." Be it so: and is

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not man an agent? Is not his will an effect? And does not he exist and act previously to the existence of his volition? The question is not, who creates man? Who creates the world? But who creates * man's volition after he himself exists, and who would be the creator of the world's volition, supposing it were to have one?

I think it has been shewn, that it is allowable to say, that God hardens the heart, if he merely permits it to be hardened." But if God did actually harden Pharaoh's heart towards the children of Israel; if he moved David to number Israel, &c. it does not hence follow, that he' made them wicked for the purpose. Pharaoh's heart when softened, was rendered sa by selfishness. He consented to let the children of Israci go, merely to avoid Divine judgments. And how much better is such a soft heart, than a hard one? David was not always a man after God's own heart; and had not God moved him to number Israel, he might perhaps have moved himself to rifle another Uriah of his Bathsheba. And had not God turned the heart of the Egyptians to hate his people, they might have employed their hatred on some other im proper object.

The case of the one whom it is impossible to renew again unto repentance, is unlike that of those in a state of probation, and therefore there is no arguing from the one to the other. On Hopkinsian ground, it must be both naturally and morally impossible; otherwise, the particular application of the term impossible to his case, is inappropriate; for, Hopkinsians say, that it is morally impossible to induce any to repent who do not. They may therefore themselves tell how men under such circumstances can be blameable for continuing impenitent. But one thing is evident: that whoever sins away his day of probation, does it at his peril, and justly involves himself in all the conscquences which follow, be they what they may-whether to be placed under a necessity of continuing sinful, and of being punished therefor, or not. But their case has nothing to do with the subject under consideration we are treating of the probationary state-of the state of man before it is impossible to induce him to repent.

"Moral inability." What is this moral inability? Let us for once fully investigate it. Moral inability to perform physical acts, is a want of a will to perform such acts; and this destitution of will, this moral inabilty, produces a natural inability. Let those who deny this try it by experience; and if they can do a thing which they do not first have a mind or a will to do; if they succeed in moving a limb differently from their volition, I will yield this point. Moral inability does then amount to physical or natural inabilty; and if men have not of themselves the faculty of changing their evil wills, they are utterly unable to do right. But were we to admit moral inability, as Hopkinsians hold it, it is absurdity itself to apply it to the bringing of the will into existence. Men, say they, have the natural, but not the moral ability, to will differently from what they do. Moral ability is the will, say they. Thus do they virtually say, that men have not the will to will differently from what they do; and that, to be morally able thus to will, they must first have the will itself to will thus with! and yet do they talk of our absurdities, as if they themselves could not be absurd. Let them talk about moral inability to do any thing but to will, but not in that case, unless they would involve themselves in a labyrinth of absurdities.

"Natural ability." And what is this? What is the natural ability to will? Is it not all that any being ever uses, all that is to be used in willing? Certainly the will which is produced is no part of the ability in any sense by which it is produced or willed. If men therefore have the natural ability to will, they have all the ability that is ever used on their own part in willing. Now, if God takes the helm, and causes

that ability, those faculties, those powers of volition, to will evil; con men, in any sense, cause those same powers, at the same time, to will good? If they can, they are stronger than God, and can do that which Hopkinsians say, would be choosing to choose-choosing without a choice-choosing without moral ability to choose-choosing a choice, &c. While on the subject of natural ability, I would observe, that without the self-determining faculty of setting his other powers in motion, no being has even all the natural ability requisite to enable him of himself to will; for what are powers, unless you can move them? And here I will remark, that it requires the same powers in every respect to keep one engaged in willing, that it does to set him about it. Now, if it were admitted, that nothing could have caused the will of God, inasmuch as that it was eternal, still I ask, what causes it now to continue as it does? For this there must be a cause. And let that cause be what it may, or whether no cause can be assigned, I shall press this case as an offset to all objections against our self-determining system. As the nature of volition is in all beings the same, man can, without the interposition of another being, as well continue to will, as God can: and he can as well begin to will, as to continue to will after he has begun. And all the difficulties which are urged in his case, Hopkinsians may remove for us in the case of the continuation of the Divine will. Let them tell how God causes his will to continue as it does, and we will then tell them how men cause their wills to be as they are.

I have not yet been able to see the difference between God's being caused to choose, and determined to choose. Pray, Sir, define the difference. And here let me ask if choice is not an effect; and if an ef fect, whether the assertion, that God's choice is uncaused, does not make an effect without a cause. "God," it seems, "is determined by something within himself to will." Why then may not men be determined to will by something within themselves? God," it likewise seems, "is induced by motives to act as he does-to choose as he does." So then he is determined by something within himself, and induced by motives, to choose as he does; and yet, without being caused to choose by any thing at all, he nevertheless does choose! What is the difference between being determined to choose, and induced to choose? And if God can choose by being determined to choose by something within himself, and by being induced to choose by motives, without being caused to choose by any thing; why cannot man choose in the same way, especially as he has "the same power to will differently from what he does, that God has ?"

The impropriety of placing the existence and the acts of a being on the same ground, must, I think, be obvious to all that will attentively consider the subject. Now volition is a moral act or exercise. To say that an act of a being is self-existent or uncaused, is a contradictory absurdity. But it is saying this, to assert that God's will is uncaused. If, however, it is uncaused, and merely exists as he does himself, out of necessity; why not let it go at that, instead of attempting to assign other reasons? Why not say he is determined and induced to exist, as well as to will by something within himself, and in view of motives? Why all this pains to account for the existence of the will of God, if it is self-existent like himself? Like his attributes? The fact is, volition is a sui generis. It is not an attribute, like the understanding, &c. It is a moral exercise, for which, blame or praise is Not so with regard to existence, or any of the attributes with which a being is endued. Now, though God and all his attributes are self-existent, and though he created man with his; still neither blame nor praise nor self-agency is concerned in all this. With the I will it is otherwise; and it is contrary to the nature of the thing, and to its attendant circumstances, that it be placed on similar ground with

attached.

them. It is therefore a great oversight in those who are for disposing of these different cases by the wholesale. Nor is volition circumstanced like any other act. View it in any point of light, and something peculiar will be seen attaching itself to it. Such or such a one does thus and so, because he chooses so to do. He performs his physical and his mental acts because he chooses to perform them. But when it is asked, Why does he perform the act of choosing to do thus, we immediately find ourselves on unique ground. We cannot say as in the other cases, Because he chose to choose thus. Here then is that about an act of volition which is about nothing else; and it is therefore to be approached and treated with care and skill. And now, Why does a being, God or man, choose as he does? "Motives induce him thus to choose." Mark it when we may, we shall ever find, that "motives induce us to choose ;" we do choose, whenever we choose at all, by being caused to choose by motives. And to this proposition, mankind do universally assent in reality, whatever they may hold in theory. Ask any one why he chooses this way or that, and he will instantly mention a motive as the reason or cause. This is the ground or reason of God's choice. The Hopkinsian idea, that God causes men to choose, makes motives useless. If he causes them to choose to do a thing, and if, notwithstanding all the motives presented, they would not do it without such causation, what have motives to do in the case, and what the need of them? It will now be asked, why then do not motives operate alike on all, and why do they not always have a similar effect on the same individual? On God they do, and so would they on men, were men infinite and perfeet. But owing to numerous causes, motives affect men differently at different times. The drunkard who has contracted a habit of drinking, finds a stronger motive in the gratification of his depraved appetite to drink, blunted as are his moral feelings, than he finds in any thing else to refrain from drinking; nor will he ever reform till a superior motive induces or causes him so to do. Thus it seems that he himself even causes his motive which continues him a drunkard. But why did he cause his motive? Various reasons might have conspired to cause him to cause it-jovial company, the temperate use of ardent spirits, &c. But why do these induce him to become intemperate, when others escape? For the very reason, that men are free agents, and, not being obliged to act alike, act differently. Beings are so constituted as to choose; by which I mean to say more than that they are so constituted as to feel a willingness in relation to a particular thing. They are endued with the faculty to choose either of two things. This is shewn in the very circumstance, that two things are set before them for their selection. As well present but one thing on the other plan, towards which a willingness would be felt on presentation. But why do they choose the one they do, rather than the other? Because, they are at that time in a condition which renders that thing more desirable to them. But what brought them into that condition? It may be they brought themselves into it, as has been seen in the case of the drunkard. And why did he bring himself into it? Because, he was a free agent. Had he not been, he would not have done it. Had his choice been directed by another, perhaps it would have been directed differently; and it certainly would have been directed differently, had those who choose differently directed it. Having run the circle, let us now strike off. If God causes man to choose in a particular way, how can he choose differently? He has the natural ability to choose differently, say Hopkinsians. We say no; for this same natural ability is occupied at the very time in choosing as it does; and it is physically impossible to choose both ways at once-or to choose differently from what God causes it to choose. Besides, natural ability to choose is all the ability there is. No being has a choice to choose, even when he

chooses. He merely chooses, not chooses to choose. To talk of moral ability to choose; to say that a man can choose thus and so if he has a mind to; is an absurdity. It is saying that a man can choose in a certain way, if he, before choosing, have a choice to choose so. Natural ability to choose, is therefore all the ability to do it with; and if a man have this, (which I contend contains a self-determining power,) he can without qualification, choose-can choose, and does choose, without the interposition of another being, as well as God himself; and there is no greater difficulty in the case of man, than in that of Godno greater difficulty in solving the question, why does man choose as he does? than in telling why God chooses as he does; or than there would be in telling why God chooses to cause man to choose as he does. The case is not at all relieved by referring man's choice to God; but has added to it the additional burthen, of blaming men for choosing as God efficiently, and therefore "irresistibly," causes them to choose --a sentiment which, however confidently asserted, can never be made to appear-a sentiment at which common sense revolts, and which outrages that sense of justice which God has implanted in the breast of man as a directory for his actions. It is true that a person is blamed for having an evil will; but what is now an evil will would no longer be morally evil, nor would men blame one for having it, did God cause him to have it. When they blame an individual for what is called a murderous will, they do it with the understanding that he is its author, and not merely because he has it; and for the correctness of this statement, I appeal to the bosom of every man.

Hopkinsians say, that God is the efficient cause of human volition. Then, according to the last reply to me, he is the irresistible cause; for, says my opponent, "what can be more absurd, than to suppose that an effect may resist its efficient cause, or may act before it has existence ?" Besides, if" God "cause men to will as they do, how does the" Hopkinsian "system," any more than the self-determining one, "leave them the power of changing their will?" "While" God “is causing them to cause an evil will, how are they to obtain a motive to cause them to cause a good will." Thus, dear Sir, can the objections against the system of motives, be urged with equal force against that of Divine efficiency. And the system of motives has this radical advantage besides; that one motive can be overcome by another stronger one, and thus it is not irresistible. Even a fellow being can present one a motive which will break the force of another motive that is "inducing" an individual to do wrong. Reflection will bring such a motive into view. And thus a chance is left for a man's escape from evil. But is motive stronger than God? Who can present a motive sufficiently powerful to induce" that man to refrain from evil whom GOD is" causing" to "choose" evil? No reflection, no motive, no man, can counteract Divine efficiency. One motive can be overcome by another; but no motive can overcome God. Our scheme therefore is in perfect accordance with the presentation of motives; while the Hopkinsian scheme makes it all a farce. For can there be a greater farce, than to urge motives upon a person to choose in a certain way, when God is efficiently and irresistibly causing him to choose differently? Can there be greater insincerity, than for God to call on them to will differently from what he is irresistibly causing them to will?—and greater injustice, than to punish them for thus willing?

As to my "carricature" of Hopkinsianism, I am confident I have given none. If God does not cause his will, he is not its author, according to the proper meaning of the term author; and consequently is not the author of his own acts, inasmuch as volition is an act. To will is to act; so that will or volition is an act. And if motives do not cause him to cause that act, then that act is motiveless, according to