pointment of the President and senate, but not binding on the House, and therefore not complete, must become complete and binding, from the moment when it receives the sanction of the House. If not, it never can be complete and binding; must always remain an inchoate thing, which would be a most manifest absurdity.

If, therefore, the sanction of the House can legalize and complete that office of foreign minister, which originates in the appointment of the President, this sanction has already been given, and these offices of minister plenipotentiary to Lisbon and Berlin, which it is the object of this amendment to destroy, have already been legalized and completed by the assent of this House. They are consequently, at this time, according to the principles of gentlemen themselves, completely legal offices; as much so as those of President, chief justice, or secretary of state; and these gentlemen, in attempting to destroy them, by withholding an appropriation, are guilty of as direct and as great an infraction of the law and the constitution, as if they were to attempt to drive the President of the United States from his office, by refusing the annual appropriation for payment of his salary. An office must either be legal or not legal. If legal, it is equally binding, in whatever mode it became so, whether by the law of nations, an act of Congress, or the appointment of the President and senate, sanctioned by this House; and there exists the same obligation on the House to provide an adequate salary, in one case as in the other.

Will gentlemen ask when these offices of minister plenipotentiary to Lisbon and Berlin, received the sanction of this House? Lest they should have forgotten, I will tell them. The first received it in May, 1796, and the second from this present Congress, in June, 1797. It will appear by a reference to the files of the House, that on the 28th of May, 1796, the President of the United States sent a message to the House,

informing it that he had appointed ministers plenipotentiary to Madrid and Lisbon, instead of ministers resident; and that this augmentation of the grade would require an additional appropriation. In consequence of this message, a bill was passed on the fifth of June following, by which the necessary appropriation was made. Thus the office of minister plenipotentiary to Lisbon received the express sanction of this House.

Surely we cannot have forgotten what passed in this House last June, during the first session of this Congress. We were informed by the estimates from the department of state, that thirteen thousand, five hundred dollars would be wanted, for the salary and outfit of a minister plenipotentiary to Berlin. A bill was brought in, containing this appropriation. The appropriation was opposed; but after full discussion it was carried by a great majority, and the bill passed. Thus the of fice of minister plenipotentiary to Berlin received the express sanction of this present House of Representatives.

If these offices, therefore, were inchoate before, according to the doctrine of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, they became complete, on his own principles, as soon as these appropriations were consented to by this House; for he has told us over and over that an inchoate treaty becomes complete, as soon as this House gives its assent by an act of appropriation; and, by the whole tenor and the very terms of his argument, he places an inchoate treaty and an inchoate office on the same footing. Consequently, he is now bound to appropriate for this office, as much as he admits himself to be bound to appropriate any sums which may still be wanted, for carrying into effect a treaty once sanctioned by this House. And yet that gentleman, and those who agree with him on the present occasion, are content, for the sake of effecting their favorite object, the establishment of a control over executive appointments, to act in direct opposition

to their own principles, in manifest inconsistency with those very doctrines, for which on former occasions they have so strenuously contended! The truth is, that they shape their doctrines to the purposes of the moment, and abandon them without difficulty, when those purposes require it. When they had resolved to defeat the British treaty in this House, they introduced the doctrine of inchoate. They alleged that the House was under no obligation to carry a treaty into effect, because it was only an inchoate act, till sanctioned by this House; but they admitted, in the most explicit manner, and made it a part of their doctrine of inchoate, that when this House had given its sanction, the treaty became complete and obligatory. Now that their object is to turn certain ministers plenipotentiary out of office, and to establish a precedent of the control of this House over the executive, in the exercise of its constitutional functions, they discard their favorite doctrine of inchoate, which is no longer adequate to the purpose. They go further, and contend that the House, by its power over appropriations, has a right to control all the acts, to stop all the movements of the other departments: that it may withhold appropriations, in all cases, according to its own good pleasure or caprice, which the gentlemen dignify with the name of discretion. There cannot be a doubt that the doctrine now contended for, would enable this House to drive the secretaries, the judges, and even the President from office, by withholding the appropriation for their salaries, if ever they should become personally obnoxious to a majority of this House. The step from the present doctrines to that point would be far shorter, than from inchoate to the present doctrines: and the right of encroachment being once established, there will be nothing to set bounds to it, but the good pleasure of the House. I have heard it avowed, Mr. Chairman, that the affairs of this country can never prosper, until all the present heads of departments shall be driven from office; and I have no doubt that the means of

effecting that purpose, so desirable to these gentlemen, are intended to be furnished by this amendment. Should it prevail, it will establish a precedent, that may easily be extended to that or any other object; and have we reason to believe, from what we now see and have witnessed on former occasions, that the extension will not be attempted?

Let not gentlemen, therefore, Mr. Chairman, accuse us of too much jealousy, when we zealously oppose these attempts, and charge them with supporting principles which lead to the utter overthrow of the constitution. I view their principles in that light; and in this view I am fully confirmed by the most mature reflection, not only on the consequences of those principles, but on the manner in which they have been introduced and supported here.

But, say gentlemen, what interest can we have to subvert the constitution? Why should we harbor designs of overthrowing the government, and introducing anarchy and confusion? Have we not as much at stake, as much to lose, as you? Have we not equally concurred in the establishment of this government? And what inducement can we have to wish for its destruction?

Since gentlemen, Mr. Chairman, make this appeal to their motives, I must be permitted to offer a few observations on that subject, before I dilate, as it is my intention to do, on the object and tendency of their political system.

As to motives, Mr. Chairman, I have no difficulty in declaring, that I believe the far greater part of these gentlemen to be actuated by the purest motives. I do not say all, because I am not bound to answer for the motives of all. There are some among them, of whose motives I know nothing; but far the greater part of those who support the system, of which this amendment is a leading member, are actuated, in my opinion, by motives as pure, I will not say as my own, because perhaps those gentlemen may deny me the merit of

pure motives, but as those of the best and purest men in this country and if I could find security against the consequences of men's actions, in the uprightness of their intentions, I never should apprehend harm from these gentlemen. But, Mr. Chairman, does history, experience, or common sense inform us, that such security can be found? Do we not confine lunatics, and keep knives and razors out of the hands of children? Why? Not because we are afraid of their intentions, but of their actions: because we are justly apprehensive of their doing mischief, without intending it.

Does not history teach us that there is nothing more common, than for men to do mischief when they mean to do good? Did the La Fayettes, the Rochesancalds, the Liancours, the Lameths, and the Clermonts of France, when they first taught the doctrines of insurrection, and stirred up the mob to resist the government, intend to pull down ruin on their country, their families and themselves? Did they intend to procure their own death or banishment, and the confiscation of their estates; to send to the guillotine hundreds of thousands of the best of citizens, including their own families and friends; to drench the whole country in blood, and transfer the most absolute power into the hands of the vilest of mankind? Certainly they had no such intentions; and yet we find that these consequences did result from their measures. France and the world have groaned and are groaning under these consequences; nor are they less real or less deplorable, because their authors intended to do good and not mischief. Fanatics never, or very rarely indeed, intend to do mischief; and yet all experience proves, that no description of men are half so mischievous. They rush blindly on, without reflection or hesitation, and aim directly at the accomplishment of their designs, without being delayed or turned aside by any considerations of the result.

With these awful examples before us, shall we trust fanatic men with power, by reason of their upright