When thou art prefent they will speak fweetly, and will admire thy Words, but at the laft they will writh their Mouths, or alter their Speech, and flander thy Sayings. I have bated many Things, but nothing like them, for the Lord will hate them.

A

SATURDAY, March 13, 1731.

Certain political Writer, who underftood our Conftitution perfectly well, fpeaking of Parliaments, fays,

that, "whenever the executive Part "of the Government does not act

"for the publick Good, not only "the Legiflature, but every particular and private "Member of the Commonwealth thinks it lawful "for him to intermeddle; for Man, having ori"ginally fubjected himself to Government for Eafe, "Plenty, and Protection, if he finds he is neither "happy nor fafe, and that this is occafion'd by the "male Administration of those that rule, he will "begin to think, that the Contract which he en"ter'd into for the Benefit of Society is broken "on their Side, and that they, who, by their "Conduct, have proved neither wifer nor ftronger "than himself, have no Right to command him; "that he is return'd into the full Liberty his

Progenitors enjoy'd in the free State of Nature; "that he may act for himself, and take all poffi"ble Ways of confulting and compaffing his own "Safety.

"From hence, without doubt, it proceeds, (fays my Author)" that, under loofe, weak,

" and

and corrupt Adminiftrations, all Degrees of Men, "from the higheft to the loweft, will be Statef "men, and that the People in general will grow "inquifitive, uneafy, cenforious, and difaffected; " and, in this Condition, they will come both to "hate and defpife that Miniftry, of whofe Corruptions and Incapacity for publick Affairs, they "have had woful Experience, and caft their Eyes upon other Men, who, perhaps have never appear'd upon the Scene of Bufinefs, from whom "they will be apt to expect better Things.

--

This Doctrine will never be relifh'd under bad Administrations; the base Inftruments of Power ill executed will tell you, that private Men have no Right to examine into the Conduct of thofe above them; that it is no Bufinefs of theirs whether the-Veffel of the Commonwealth be fteer'd with Skill or run against Rocks and Quickfands; their Duty is only to fubmit ; they are to behave like the Fellow, who, lying in his Cabin, was told, that the Ship had ftruck against a Sand, and that they were all going to perifh; to which he anfwer'd coolly, that's no Bufinefs of mine; I am but a Paffenger. Truth will be call'd Sedition, and Examples will be brought, to fhew, that Men have been put to Death for telling difagreeable Truths;- this will be the common Cant of Knaves and Sycophants, of Fellows that will be hir'd for afferting the moft grofs Abfurdities;but, let them fay what they will, and let Men be kept never fo much under the Awe of Punishment, thofe that have Senfe will think as this Author writes, and will act conformable to it, whenever they have Spirit enough to do so.

Q3

*

It

* A London Journal, publish'd a little before this Difcourfe, advanced this Doctrine.

It is our peculiar Happiness, that Things can never come to this Extremity, unless the Reprefentatives of the People fhould be debauch'd into Submiffions or Measures inconfiftent with Liberty; then arbitrary Government will indeed be establish'd by Law; for Machiavel has well obferv'd, that, in thofe Commonwealths, where nothing but the Appearance of Freedom is preferv'd, there the feverest Servitude is always intended.

It has often been faid in the best of Times, that, if England bould ever be ruin'd, it would be by her Parliaments; nor was this faid to give us a Diftruft of Parliaments, but on the contrary, to fignify unto us, that there lay our great Security, and that, as long as we continu'd uncorrupt in that Place, nothing could hurt us; and indeed, if ever Parliaments fhould be tempted to make any dangerous Conceffions to the Executive Part of the Government, if ever they fhould give them an Impunity in doing ill, or behave in any wife fo as to put the People out of Humour with Parliaments, it would be a very helpless Situation; I fay, it would be very hard to find out a Remedy for fuch a Distemper.

I know that it is with much Confidence afferted, that nothing can go amifs, as long as a good Underftanding continues betwixt the Legiflative and Executive Parts of the Conftitution; (but to make Ufe of a common Expreffion) these are People that fpeak without Book.

It must be granted, that, to impede or clog the Measures of wife and able Men, working for the publick Advantage, would be a mischievous Prejudice, but fuch a Prejudice, as fcarce has ever happened. Men who have conducted Things wifely, never meet with this Treatment from National ATfemblies. The true Reprefentatives of a People love themselves too well to quarrel with those,

from

ges.

from whofe Abilities their Country, and (in fome Degree) every Individual, is reaping daily AdvantaBut fure there must be great Danger in a thorough Agreement, when Affairs happen to be in bad Hands s; there is nothing more certain than that this Nation has often been faved (by the Oppofition made to Men in Power) from many Dangers and Difficulties, into which their ill Conduct wou'd have run her. The Representatives of the People have fometimes, by keeping the publick Money in the People's Pockets, tied up the Hands of the Minifters from buying dishonourable Alliances, making unnatural Treaties, and running into extravagant and wild Projects, and laid them under fuch Confinements and Disabilities in their Courfe of Adminiftration, that Foreign Nations could gain no Advantages of us by their Want of Capacity.

I could give many Inftances where a Jealoufy and Mifunderstanding betwixt the Legislative and Executive Parts of the Conftitution has been attended with no bad Confequences to the Commonwealth; nay, on the contrary, all good Laws in Defence of the Liberties of the Subject, have been pafs'd at fuch a Crifis, I fay, at fuch Times as the Minifters have been upon no good Terms with the Reprefentatives of the People; witnefs the Habeas Corpus Act, and the Bill for making Parliaments triennialNay, fome Authors tell us, that a wife Diftruft of the Defigns of Men in Power is the People's best Security.

It was this Jealoufy and Diftruft of Men in Power that fo long preferv'd the Liberties of the Roman People, and, when Means were found to remove that Diftruft, and to influence their Senates, thofe Liberties were loft; the fame People, among whom we find the moft glorious Examples of Vertue and publick Spirit, in one Age, are ftigmatiz'd

in

in another, for innumerable Inftances of the moft. abandon'd Prostitution to Power.

We are too little interested in what pass'd in those Days, and in thofe Countries, to be fway'd by Partiality or Prejudice, in our Opinions of their Actions, and it will be no unjuft Observation, to take Notice, that, as long as the Senates and Tribunes of Rome continu'd to punish the leaft Crime againft the People, while Men who had ferv'd the Commonwealth at one Time, loft their Lives for plotting against its Liberties at another, all Things went well, and this Commonwealth rais'd itself to a Pitch of Power and Glory beyond all that ever subfifted before, or have rifen fince it.

It has been obferv'd by fome, that the Roman People were addicted to Tumults and Mutinies; this indeed is true, and so they are, and will be in all free and popular Governments; in arbitrary Governments, perhaps, it will not be thought fafe to fuffer the People to affemble in great Numbers; their Governors, confcious of what they deferve from them, dare not truft them together; but in free Governments it is otherwife, and Machiavel tells us, thefe very Mutinies were falutary to the Commonwealth; they were like Storms, which make a Buftle for a little while, but clear the Air, and prevent a future Infection; for the People were never mutinous, but when fome Incroachments were attempting by ambitious Men, nor did they ever proceed in any Tumult to overturn the Laws or the Conftitution.

But when all Vertue and publick Spirit was departed from the Senate, when they were funk into the moft abominable Corruptions, there were no Accufations or Punishments of publick Robbers, every thing was fafe except Vertue and Honour, and to oppofe and cenfure Corruption was a Crime against the State, and punish'd accordingly,