awe the Members when they fhould come into the Houfe, and therefore that to bribe would be an unneceffary Expence; but had he lived a Year or two longer, 'tis probable he would have found to his Coft that a free Parliament and an arbitrary Adminiftration are two Things that cannot long fubfift together.

This will naturally lead us to conder what must be the Condition of Great Britain, if ever it should come to that Pafs, that her Parliaments fhould be entirely influenced and directed by any Minifter or Minifters.

Whether this Influence be brought about by Terror, or by corrupting the Members, it will be indifferent to the People, only that the latter will be moft likely to laft; for, if we look into Hiftory, we fhall find no Inftance that a People ever obtained their Liberty, who were kept in Chains by the Corruption of fome of their Chiefs, whereas there are many Examples of Nations throwing off Slavery, who were kept under by Terror and Force.

In England we are fafe as long as the Reprefentatives of the People remain untainted, but if ever they fhould traffick away their Votes for Titles, Bribes, Penfions, or Scraps of Ribbon, vilia Servitus Pretia, and the Minifter need only command them to do this, and it is done, we may pretend to defpife the French as much as we pleafe, but they will have Reason to pity us.

I confess that nothing can appear fo unnatural in a free Country, as to fee the fame Perfons Reprefentatives of the People and Servans of the Crown at the fame Time, nor can I see how a Man can be counted a free Agent, nor how he can act according to the Dictates of his Reafon and Confcience, if five or fix hundred Pounds a Year fhould lie at Stake at every Vote he gives.

I remember fome Time after the Revolution, when Taxes began to be raised, and of Conféquence, Employments to encreafe, it was much apprehended by feveral thinking Men, that, if thefe Employments fhould be diftributed among the Members of the Houfe of Commons, it might prove a Rock upon which the Liberty of the Subject might be in Danger of splitting, and many worthy Men both writ and fpoke against it.

I have a Speech fent me by a Correfpondent, which was fpoken in Parliament by Sir Charles Sedley, upon the Bill of Ways and Means, in which he delivers his Opinion upon this Subject, in the folTowing Words.

"I believe, Mr. Speaker, when we come to "confider of it, we fhall find, that it is convenient "not only to leffen the Officers of the Court and "State, in Point of Profit, but in Point of Number too. We have nine Commiffioners of Excife, "feven of the Admiralty, three of the Poft-Office, "fix of the Cuftoms; I know not why half " or even lefs may not do as well; but when I con"fider all these or moft of them are Members of "Parliament my Wonder is over, for, tho' it may "be a Difpute whether many Heads are better than " one, it is certainly true, that many Votes are "better than one.

"Many of thefe Gentlemen have two Offices, " befides their Seat in Parliament, which require "Attendance in feveral Places, and Abilities of "different Natures, but Members, tho' well prin❝cipled, have no Privilege to be fit for any thing, "without Practice, Study or Application.

"Sir, we are call'd together by the King, fent & up by the People, and ought to regard no Intereft but theirs, which as I told you before, are always the fame, let us therefore proceed accordingly.

"The

"The late Propofals of the Courtiers themselves to fave the King and the Nation Money was by "applying the Profits, Fees and Salaries of their "Places that exceed eight hundred Pounds per An<< num, to the War; thus will the publick "Charge lie eafier upon the People, and the pre"fent Reign be more and more endeared to them; <s what is neceffary, we fhall chearfully fup« ply, when we fee all Men fet their Shoulders "to the Burthen, and ftand upon an equal Footing "for our common Defence, and that what we give "is faithfully applied to thofe Ufes for which we "give it, and the Army is punctually paid.

This Offer, Sir, as I remember, began when ་ an Obfervation was made by you of the long "Accounts, and that a great Part of the Publick "Revenues remain in the Hands of the Receivers, "( to which a worthy Member anfwer'd, It cou'd

not be help'd by Reafon fome Receivers were "Members of Parliament, and ftood upon their "Privileges; to which another Member was pleas'd "to anfwer, That we cou'd not deprive Members "of Parliament of their Privileges, but that to re"medy the like for the future we were ready to pafs << a Vote, that no Member of Parliament fhou'd be a Receiver of the King's Revenue,

"This unexpected Propofal alarm'd the whole "Body of Men in Office, fo that fome of them "ftood up, and (to prevent the Houfe from harping

any longer upon that String) faid, they fo little "valued their own Profit, that they were willing "to refign all their Fees, Salaries, and Perquifites, "exceeding three hundred Pounds per Annum, to"wards the next Year's Charge.

"If this Thing was really intended, it was very generous, but if it was only a Compliment, a "Shift, or an Expedient, to amufe and avoid the prefent Vote we were upon, 7 hat no Member of Parli

ament

ament should be a Receiver of the King's Revenue "nothing was more difingenuous, nor cou'd a great

་

er Abuse be offer'd to this House, for we proceed"ed fo far as to vote the Speaker, Judges, and "fome others fhould not be comprehended.

"The People abroad, who receiv'd our Votes, "will think ftrangely of it, and of us, if, after all thefe Preparations, we do nothing in it, and "fuffer ourfelves to be thus gull'd but I "hope better of the worthy Gentlemen, and can66 not but think they were in Earneft with this "House upon fo folemn a Debate.

It is certain, that fince this Speech was spoke an Act pafs'd to exclude the Commiffioners of the Cuf toms and the Poft-Office from fetting in Parliament, but nevertheless the Number of Employments in General is greatly increas'd, and there are a far greater Number of thofe Gentlemen who have Seats in Parliament, than before.

They are computed by fome to amount at prefent to two Hundred, by others to two Hundred and ten, and did we not live in a Age when Virtue, and a Publick Spirit are become fo fashionable, when no Perfons are chofen into any Employment but fuch as are most confpicious for Virtue, Honour, Fortune, and the Love of their Country, we might have fome Reason to be afraid of fo formidable a Body, efpecially if Men fhou'd once come to think that it wou'd be a filly Thing to lofe a Thousand Pounds a Year, by pronouncing a wrong Monofyllable.

But tho we may be eafy at prefent as to these Fears, because we have a Minifter whofe clean Hands and uncorrupt Heart we were well acquainted with before he was advanced to his prefent Height of Power, yet how are we fure we fhall be always fo happy? May not fome Perfon hereafter get into the Direction of Affairs with dirty Hands and an ignorant Head, who may fink the Publick Money into VOL. II. D

his

his own Pocket and blunder the Nation into Broils and Difficulties, and what Remedy can a Nation have ifa Majority of their Representatives fhou'd be obedient to the Treafury? Cou'd we ever expect to fee a Minifter again impeach'd? Or might not the most hated and the moft unpopular Man living, when the Publick Cry fhou'd be loudeft against him, infolently and fneeringly ask the honest Patriot -Why don't you impeach me?

It is the Opinion of Machiavel, that an abfolute Government wou'd be the beft in the World, provided we cou'd always be fure of a Succeffion of wife and vertuous Princes; but as the vicious and the foolish muft have their Turns, he thinks, the People must be mad who wou'd put it into the Power of a good Prince to incroach upon them, only becaufe they hoped he wou'd not make Ufe of it; and fure we may fay the fame Thing in Refpect of Minifters.

If the Number of Men in Office fitting in Parliament may be dangerous at any Time, it is incumbent upon the Subject to look about them before they feel the bad Effects of it; and perhaps no Conjuncture wou'd be fo proper for that Purpose as the prefent, for it is highly probable, that under the prefent popular and wife Administration there is no Law which might make the Subject easy upon this Head but wou'd pafs,

It is certain, the nearer we bring our Conftitution to its original Inftitution, the more content, and the happier the People will be; and if Parliaments fhou'd come again to be Annual, as they were defign'd by our Ancestors, it wou'd put an End to Bribery in Elections more effectually than any Law that has or cou'd be framed for that Purpose.

When Elections fhou'd come fo quick about, the trading Member wou'd find that he cou'd not make the Intereft of his Money this Way; I fay, when