Government, and the wealth employed to obtain political influence, have increased very greatly within the last fifty years; and consists almost entirely in the assertion, that this increase, great as it undoubtedly is, yet has not taken place, in the same period, in the wealth, weight, and influence of the people; so that, in point of fact, the power of the Crown and Borough proprietors, although absolutely greater, is proportionally less than it was at the commencement of the present reign; and ought to be augmented, rather than diminished, if our object be to preserve the ancient balance of the constitution! We must do Mr. Windham the justice to say, that he does not make much use of this argument; but it forms the grand reserve of Mr. Rose's battle; and, we think, is more frequently and triumphantly brought forward than any other, by those who now affect to justify abuses by argumentation. -a feeling of political right, and of individual interest, among so great a number of persons, as will make it not only discreditable, but unsafe, to invade their liberties, or trespass upon their rights. It is never to be forgotten, that the great and ultimate barrier against oppres-kept pace with the general increase which has sion, and arbitrary power, must always be raised on public opinion-and on opinion, so valued and so asserted, as to point resolutely to resistance, if it be permanently insulted, or openly set at defiance. In order to have this public opinion, however, either sufficiently strong, or sufficiently enlightened, to afford such a security, it is quite necessary that a very large body of the people be taught to set a value upon the rights which it is qualified to protect, that their reason, their moral principles, their pride, and habitual feelings, should all be engaged on the side of their political independence, that their attention should be frequently directed to their rights and their duties, as citizens of a free state,and their eyes, ears, hearts, and affections familiarized with the spectacles, and themes, and occasions, that remind them of those rights and duties. In a commercial country like England, the pursuit of wealth, or of personal comfort, is apt to engross the whole care of the body of the people; and, if property be tolerably secured by law, and a vigilant police repress actual outrage and disorder, they are likely enough to fall into a general forgetfulness of their political rights; and even to regard as burdensome those political functions, without the due exercise of which the whole frame of our liberties would soon dissolve, and fall to pieces. It is of infinite and incalculable importance, therefore, to spread, as widely as possible, among the people, the feelings and the love of their political blessings-to exercise them unceasingly in the evolutions of a free constitution-and to train them to those sentiments of pride, and jealousy, and self-esteem, which arise naturally from their experience of their own value and importance in the great order of society, and upon which alone the fabric of a free government can ever be safely erected. The first answer we make to it, consists in denying the fact upon which it proceeds; at least in the sense in which it must be asserted, in order to afford any shadow of colour to the conclusion. There is, undoubtedly, far more wealth in the country than there was fifty years ago; but there is not more independence. │There are not more men whose incomes exceed what they conceive to be their necessary expenditure;-not nearly so many who consider themselves as nearly rich enough, and who would therefore look on themselves as without apology for doing any thing against their duty or their opinions, for the sake of profit to themselves: on the contrary, it is notorious, and not to be disputed, that our luxury, and habits of expense, have increased considerably faster than the riches by which they should be supported-that men, in general, have now far less to spare than they had when their incomes were smaller-and that if our condition may, in one sense, be said to be a condition of opulence, it is, still more indisputably, a condition of needy opulence. It is perfectly plain, however, that it is not the absolute amount of wealth existing in a nation, that can ever contribute to render it politically We indicate all these things very briefly; independent of patronage, or intractable to the both because we cannot now afford room for persuasive voice of a munificent and discerna more full exposition of them, and because it ing ruler, but the general state of content and is not our intention to exhaust this great sub- satisfaction which results from its wealth being ject on the present occasion, but rather to proportioned to its occasions of expense. It place before our readers a few of the leading neither is, accordingly, nor ever was, among principles upon which we shall think it our the poor, but among the expensive and exduty to expatiate at other opportunities. We travagant, that corruption looks for her surest cannot, however, bring even these preliminary and most profitable game; nor can her influand miscellaneous observations to a close, ence ever be anywhere so great, as in a counwithout taking some notice of a topic which try where almost all those to whom she can seems, at present, peculiarly in favour with think it important to address herself, are the reasoning enemies of reform; and to which straitened for money, and eager for preferment we cannot reply, without developing, in a-dissatisfied with their condition as to fortune more striking manner than we have yet done, the nature of our apprehensions from the influence of the Crown, and the holders of large properties, and of our expectations of good from the increased spirit and intelligence of the people. The argument to which we allude, proceeds upon the concession, that the patronage of and, whatever may be the amount of their possessions, practically needy, and impatient of their embarrassments. This is the case with the greater part even of those who actually possess the riches for which this country is so distinguished. But the effect of their prosperity has been, to draw a far greater proportion of the people within the sphere of selfish ambition-to diffuse those habits of expense which give corruption her chief hold and purchase, among multitudes who are spectators only of the splendour in which they cannot participate, and are infected with the cravings and aspirations of the objects of their envy, even before they come to be placed in their circumstances. Such needy adventurers are constantly generated by the rapid progress of wealth and 'luxury; and are sure to seek and court that corruption which is obliged to seek and court, though with too great a probability of success, those whose condition they miscalculate, and labour to attain. Such a state of things, therefore, is far more favourable to the exercise of the corrupt influence of government and wealthy ambition, than a state of greater poverty and moderation; and the same limited means of seduction will go infinitely farther among a people in the one situation than in the other. The same temptations that were repelled by the simple poverty of Fabricius, would, in all probability, have bought half the golden sa traps of the Persian monarch, or swayed the counsels of wealthy and venal Rome, in the splendid days of Catiline and Cæsar. This, therefore, is our first answer; and it is so complete, we think, as not to require any other for the mere purpose of confutation. But the argument is founded upon so strange and so dangerous a misapprehension of the true state of the case, that we think it our duty to unfold the whole fallacy upon which it proceeds; and to show what very opposite consequences are really to be drawn from the circumstances that have been so imperfectly conceived, or so perversely viewed, by those who contend for increasing the patronage of the Government as a balance to the increasing consequence of the People. There is a foundation, in fact, for some part of this proposition; but a foundation that has been strangely misunderstood by those who have sought to build upon it so revolting a conclusion. The people has increased in consequence, in power, and in political importance. Over all Europe, we verily believe, that they are everywhere growing too strong for their governments; and that, if these governments are to be preserved, some measures must be taken to accommodate them to this great change in the condition and interior structure of society. But this increase of consequence is not owing to their having grown richer; and still less is it to be provided against, by increasing the means of corruption in the hands of their rulers. This requires, and really deserves, a little more explanation. All political societies may be considered as divided into three great classes or orders. In the first place, the governors, or those who are employed, or hope to be employed by the governors, and who therefore either have, or expect to have, profit or advantage of some sort from the government, or from subordinate patrons. In the second place, those who are in opposition to the government, who feel the burdens and restraints which it imposes, are jealous of the honours and emoluments it enjoys or distributes, and grudge the expense and submission which it requires, under an apprehension, that the good it accomplishes is not worth so great a sacrifice. And, thirdly and finally, those who may be counted for nothing in all political arrangements-who are ignorant, indifferent, and quiescent-who submit to all things without grumbling or satisfaction-and are contented to consider all existing institutions as a part of the order of nature to which it is their duty to accommodate themselves. In rude and early ages, this last division includes by far the greater part of the people: but, as society advances, and intellect begins to develope itself, a greater and a greater proportion is withdrawn from it, and joined to the two other divisions. These drafts, however, are not made indiscriminately, or in equal numbers, to the two remaining orders; but tend to throw a preponderating weight, either into the scale of the government, or into that of its opponents, according to the character of that government, and the nature of the circumstances by which they have been roused from their neutrality. The dif fusion of knowledge, the improvements of education, and the gradual descent and expansion of those maxims of individual or political wisdom that are successively established by reflection and experience, necessarily raise up more and more of the mass of the population from that state of brutish acquiescence and incurious ignorance in which they originally slumbered. They begin to feel their relation to the government under which they live; and, guided by those feelings, and the analogies of their private interests and affections, they begin to form or to borrow, Opinions upon the merit or demerit of the institutions and administration, to the effects of which they are subjected; and to conceive Sentiments either hostile or friendly to such institutions and administration. If the government be mild and equitable-if its undertakings are prosperous, its impositions easy, and its patronage just and impartial-the greater part of those who are thus successively awakened into a state of political capacity will be enrolled among its supporters; and strengthen it against the factious, ambitious, and disappointed persons, who alone will be found in opposition to it. But if, on the other hand, this disclosure of intellectual and political sensibility occur at a period when the government is capricious or oppressive-when its plans are disastrousits exactions burdensome-its tone repulsive -and its distribution of favours most corrupt and unjust;-it will infallibly happen, that the greater part of those who are thus called into political existence, will take part against it, and be disposed to exert themselves for its correction, or utter subversion. The last supposition, we think, is that which has been realised in the history of Europe for the last thirty years: and when we say that the people has almost every where grown too strong for their rulers, we mean only to say, that, in that period, there has been a prodi- not have suggested itself, even to the persons gious development in the understanding and by whom it has been so triumphantly recomintelligence of the great mass of the popula- mended, unless it had been palliated by some tion; and that this makes them much less colour of plausibility: And their error (which willing than formerly to submit to the folly really does not seem very unnatural for men and corruption of most of their ancient gov- of their description) seems to have consisted ernments. The old instinctive feelings of merely in supposing that all those who were loyalty and implicit obedience, have pretty discontented in the country, were disappointed generally given way to shrewd calculations candidates for place and profit; and that the as to their own interests, their own powers, whole clamour which had been raised against and the rights which arise out of these powers. the misgovernment of the modern world, origiThey see now, pretty quickly, both the weak-nated in a violent desire to participate in the nesses and the vices of their rulers; and, emoluments of that misgovernment. Upon having learned to refer their own sufferings this supposition, it must no doubt be admitted or privations, with considerable sagacity, to that their remedy was most judiciously detheir blunders and injustice, they begin tacitly vised. All the discontent was among those to inquire, what right they have to a sove- who wished to be bribed-all the clamour reignty, of which they make so bad a use- among those who were impatient for preferand how they could protect themselves, if all ment. Increase the patronage of the Crown who hate and despise them were to unite to therefore-make more sinecures, more jobs, take it from them. Sentiments of this sort, more nominal and real posts of emolument we are well assured, have been prevalent and honour, and you will allay the disconover all the enlightened parts of Europe for tent, and still the clamour, which are now the last thirty years, and are every day gain- frighting our isle from her propriety!" ing strength and popularity. Kings and nobles, This, to be sure, is very plausible and ingeand ministers and agents of government, are nious-as well as highly creditable to the no longer looked upon with veneration and honour of the nation, and the moral experience awe, but rather with a mixture of contempt of its contrivers. But the fact, unfortunately, and jealousy. Their errors and vices are is not as it is here assumed. There are two canvassed, among all ranks of persons, with sets of persons to be managed and appeased! extreme freedom and severity.The corrup- and the misfortune is, that what might gratify tions by which they seek to fortify them- the one would only exasperate the discontents selves, are regarded with indignation and of the other. The one wants unmerited honvindictive abhorrence; and the excuses with ours, and unearned emoluments-a further which they palliate them, with disgust and de-abuse of patronage—a more shameful misaprision. Their deceptions are almost universally seen through; and their incapacity detected and despised, by an unprecedented portion of of the whole population which they govern. plication of the means of the nation. The other wants a correction of abuses-an abridgment of patronage-a diminution of the public burdens a more just distribution of its trusts, It is in this sense, as we conceive it, that dignities, and rewards. This last party is still, the people throughout civilised Europe have we are happy to think, by far the strongest, grown too strong for their rulers; and that and the most formidable: For it is daily resome alteration in the balance or administra- cruited out of the mass of the population, over tion of their governments, has become neces- which reason is daily extending her dominion; sary for their preservation. They have become and depends, for its ultimate success, upon too strong, not in wealth-but in intellect, nothing less than the irresistible progress of activity, and available numbers; and the tran- intelligence of a true and enlightened sense quillity of their governments has been endan- of interest-and a feeling of inherent right, gered, not from their want of pecuniary in-united to undoubted power. It is difficult, fluence, but from their want of moral respectability and intellectual vigour. -a then, to doubt of its ultimate triumph; and it must appear to be infinitely foolish to think Such is the true state of the evil; and the of opposing its progress, by measures which cure, according to the English opponents of are so obviously calculated to add to its reform, is to increase the patronage of the strength. By increasing the patronage or inCrown! The remote and original cause of fluence of the Crown, a few more venal the danger, is the improved intelligence and spirits may be attracted, by the precarious tie more perfect intercourse of the people,- of a dishonest interest, to withstand all atcause which it is not lawful to wish removed, tempts at reform, and to clamour in behalf and which, at any rate, the proposed remedy of all existing practices and institutions. But, has no tendency to remove. The immediate for every worthless auxiliary that is thus reand proximate cause, is the abuse of patron-cruited for the defence of established abuses, age and the corruptions practised by the gov- is it not evident that there will be a thousand ernment and their wealthy supporters:-and new enemies called forth, by the additional the cure that is seriously recommended, is to increase that corruption!-to add to the weight of the burdens under which the people is sinking, and to multiply the examples of partiality, profusion, and profligacy, by which they are revolted! An absurdity so extravagant, however, could abuse exemplified in the new patronage that is created, and the new scene of corruption that is exhibited, in exchanging this patronage for this dishonourable support?-For a nation to endeavour to strengthen itself against the attempts of reformers by a deliberate augmentation of its corruptions, is not more poli tic, than for a spendthrift to think of relieving himself of his debts, by borrowing at usurious interest to pay what is demanded, and thus increasing the burden which he affects to be throwing off. The only formidable discontent, in short, that now subsists in the country, is that of those who are reasonably discontented; and the only part of the people whose growing strength really looks menacingly on the government, is that which has been alienated by what it believes to be its corruptions, and enabled, by its own improving intelligence, to unmask its deceptions, and to discover the secret of its selfishness and incapacity. The great object of its jealousy, is the enormous influence of the Crown, and the monstrous abuses of patronage to which that influence gives occasion. It is, therefore, of all infatuations, the wildest and most desperate, to hold out that the progress of this discontent makes it proper to give the Crown more influence, and that it can only be effectually conciliated, by putting more patronage in the way of abuse! and venal, while there is still spirit and virtue enough left, when the measure of provocation is full, to inflict a signal and sanguinary vengeance, and utterly to overthrow the fabric which has been defiled by this traffic of iniquity. And there may be great spirit, and strength, and capacity of heroic resentment in a nation, which will yet allow its institutions to be, for a long time, perverted, its legislature to be polluted, and the baser part of its population to be corrupted, before it be roused to that desperate effort, in which its peace and happiness are sure to suffer along with the guilt which brings down the thunder. In such an age of the world as the present, however, it may be looked upon as absolutely certain, that if the guilt be persisted in, the vengeance will follow; and that all reasonable discontent will accumulate and gain strength, as reason and experience advance; till, at the last, it works its own reparation, and sweeps the of fence from the earth, with the force and the fury of a whirlwind. In such a view of the moral destiny of na In stating the evils and dangers of corruptions, there is something elevating as well as tion and profligacy in a government, we must always keep it in view, that such a system can never be universally palatable, even among the basest and most depraved people of which history has preserved any memorial. If this were otherwise indeed-if a whole nation were utterly and entirely venal and corrupt, and each willing to wait his time of dishonourable promotion, things might go on with sufficient smoothness at least; and as such a nation would not be worth mending, on the one hand, so there would, in fact, be much less need, on the other, for that untoward operation. The supposition, however, is obviously impossible; and, in such a country at least as England, it may perhaps be truly stated, as the most alarming consequence of corruption, that, if allowed to go on without any effectual check, it will infallibly generate such a spirit of discontent, as necessarily to bring on some dreadful convulsion, and overturn the very foundations of the constitution. It is thus fraught with a double evil to a country enjoying a free government. In the first place, it gradually corrodes and destroys much that is truly valuable in its constitution; and, secondly, it insures its ultimate subversion by the tremendous crash of an insurrection or revolution, It first makes the government oppressive and intolerable; and then it oversets it altogether by a necessary, but dreadful calamity. These two evils may appear to be opposite to each other; and it is certain, that, though brought on by the same course of conduct, they cannot be inflicted by the same set of persons. Those who are the slaves and the ministers of corruption, assuredly are not those who are minded to crush it, with a visiting vengeance, under the ruins of the social order; and it is in forgetting that there are two sets of persons to be conciliated in all such questions, that the portentous fallacy which we are considering mainly consists. The government may be very corrupt, and a very considerable part of the nation may be debased terrible. Yet, the terror preponderates, for those who are to witness the catastrophe: and all reason, as well as all humanity, urges us to use every effort to avoid the crisis and the shock, by a timely reformation, and an earnest and sincere attempt to conciliate the hostile elements of our society, by mutual concession and indulgence.—It is for this reason, chiefly, that we feel such extreme solicitude for a legislative reform of our system of representation,-in some degree as a pledge of the wil lingness of the government to admit of reform where it is requisite; but chiefly, no doubt, as m itself most likely to stay the flood of ve nality and corruption,-to reclaim a part of those who had begun to yield to its seduc tions, and to reconcile those to the govern ment and constitution of their country, who had begun to look upon it with a mingled feeling of contempt, hostility, and despair. That such a reform as we have contemplated would go far to produce those happy effects, we think must appear evident to all who agree with us as to the nature and origin of the evils from which we suffer, and the dangers to which we are exposed. One of its immediate, and therefore chief advantages, however, will consist in its relieving and abating the spirit of discontent which is generated by the spectacle of our present condition; both by giving it scope and vent, and by the vast facilities it must afford to future labours of regeneration. By the extension of the elective franchise, many of those who are most hostile to the existing system, because, under it, they are excluded from all share of power or political importance, will have a part assigned them, both more safe, more honourable, and more active, than merely murmuring, or meditating vengeance against such a scheme of exclusion. The influence of such men will be usefully exerted in exciting a popular spirit, and in exposing the base and dishonest practices that may still interfere with the freedom of election. By some alteration in the borough qualifications, the body of electors in general will be invested with a more respectable character, and feel a greater jealousy of every thing that may tend to degrade or dishonour them: but, above all, a rigid system of economy, and a farther exclusion of placemen from the legislature, by cutting off a great part of the minister's most profitable harvest of corruption, will force his party also to have recourse to more honourable means of popularity, and to appeal to principles that must ultimately promote the cause of independ ence. By the introduction, in short, of a system of reform, even more moderate and cautious than that which we have ventured to indicate, we think that a wholesome and legitimate play will be given to those principles of opposition to corruption, monopoly, and abuse, which, by the denial of all reform, are in danger of being fomented into a decided spirit of hostility to the government and the institutions of the country. Instead of brooding, in sullen and helpless silence, over the vices and errors which are ripening into intolerable evil, and seeing, with a stern and vindictive joy, wrong accumulated to wrong, and corruption heaped up to corruption, the Spirit of reform will be continually interfering, with active and successful zeal, to correct, restrain, and deter. Instead of being the avenger of our murdered liberties, it will be their living protector; and the censor, not the executioner, of the constitution. It will not descend, only at long intervals, like the Avatar of the Indian mythology, to expiate, with terrible vengeance, a series of consummated crimes; but, like the Providence of a better faith, will keep watch perpetually over the actions of corrigible men, and bring them back from their aberrations, by merciful chastisement, timely admonition, and the blessed experience of purer principles of action. Such, according to our conviction of the fact, is the true state of the case as to the increasing weight and consequence of the people; and such the nature of the policy which we think this change in the structure of our society calls upon us to adopt. The people are grown strong, in intellect, resolution, and mutual reliance, quick in the detection of the abuses by which they are wronged, and confident in the powers by which they may be compelled ultimately to seek their redress. Against this strength, it is something more wild than madness, and more contemptible than folly, to think of arraying an additional phalanx of abuses, and drawing out a wider range of corruptions In that contest, the issue cannot be doubtful, nor the conflict long; and, deplorable as the victory will be, which is gained over order, as well as over guilt, the blame will rest heaviest upon those whose offences first provoked, what may very probably turn out a sanguinary and an unjustifiable vengeance. The conclusions, then, which we would draw from the facts that have been relied on by the enemies of reform, are indeed of a very opposite description from theirs; and the course which is pointed out by these new circumstances in our situation, appears to us no less obvious, than it is safe and promising.— If the people have risen into greater consequence, let them have greater power. If a greater proportion of our population be now capable and desirous of exercising the functions of free citizens, let a greater number be admitted to the exercise of these functions. If the quantity of mind and of will, that must now be represented in our legislature, be prodigiously increased since the frame of that legislature was adjusted, let its basis be widened, so as to rest on all that intellect and will. If there be a new power and energy generated in the nation, for the due application of which, there is no contrivance in the original plan of the constitution, let it flow into those channels through which all similar powers were ordained to act by the principles of that plan. The power itself you can neither repress nor annihilate; and, if it be not assimilated to the system of the constitution, you seem to be aware that it will ultimately overwhelm and destroy it. To set up against it the power of influence and corruption, is to set up that by which its strength is recruited, and its safe application rendered infinitely more difficult it is to defend your establishments, by loading them with a weight which of itself makes them totter under under its pressure, and, at the same time, affords a safe and inviting approach to the assailant. In our own case, too, nothing fortunately is easier, than to reduce this growing power of the people within the legitimate bounds and cantonments of the constitution; and nothing more obvious, than that, when so legalised and provided for, it can tend only to the exaltation and improvement of our condition, and must add strength and stability to the Throne, as well as to the other branches of the legis lature. It seems a strange doctrine, to be held by any one in this land, and, above all, by the chief votaries and advocates of royal power, that its legal security consists in its means of corruption, or can be endangered by the utmost freedom and intelligence in the body of the people, and the utmost purity and popularity of our elections. Under an arbitrary government, where the powers of the monarch are confessedly unjust and oppressive, and are claimed, and openly asserted, not as the instruments of public benefit, but as the means of individual gratification, such a jealousy of popular independence is sufficiently intelligible: but, in a government like ours, where all the powers of the Crown are universally acknowledged to exist for the good of the people, it is evidently quite extravagant to fear, that any increase of union and intelligence-any growing love of freedom and justice in the people-should endanger, or should fail to confirm, all those powers and prerogatives. We have not left ourselves room to enter more at large into this interesting question; but we feel perfectly assured, and ready to maintain, that, as the institution of a limited, hereditary monarchy, must always appear the |