Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public ChoiceAshgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006 - 335 ページ Voting is often the most public and visible example of mass collective decision-making. But how do we define a collective decision? And how do we classify and evaluate the modes by which collective decisions are made? This book examines these crucial ques |
目次
Defining a Collective Decision | 3 |
A Taxonomy of Collective Decision Procedures | 9 |
Economic Criteria for Evaluating Collective Decisions | 23 |
General Criteria for Evaluating Collective Decision Procedures | 35 |
Relative Advantages of Modes of Making Collective Decisions | 43 |
What is a Good Collective Decision? | 57 |
Voting | 75 |
An Overview of Voting | 77 |
The Arrow Theorem | 123 |
Strategic Voting and the GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem | 143 |
Criteria for Evaluating RankingBased VoteProcessing Rules | 149 |
Alternatives to Plurality | 165 |
Vote Processing Rules for Selecting One Option from a Continuum of One or More Dimensions When Votes Have Predetermined Weights | 245 |
Vote Processing Rules for Selecting More than One Candidate When Votes | 263 |
Vote Processing Rules With Endogenous Weights for SelfInterested | 289 |
Lessons from the Excursion | 321 |
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多く使われている語句
87 elections achieve alternative vote approval voting Arrow theorem Bucklin voting Chapter Clarke taxes coalition collective decision procedures components Condorcet consistency consensus continuum CPO-STV cycles cyclic anomalies demand-revealing process dimensions dominant option eliminated evaluating Example extortion Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem GOCHA set income effects independence of clones individuals invariant loss consistency majority rule matrix of majorities maximin rule mode monotonicity mutual majority consistency Nanson Nicolaus Tideman number of candidates number of voters outcome efficiency paired comparisons pairs of options Pareto percentages of voters perfect-tie responsiveness person plurality positive responsiveness possible preferences procedural efficiency properties pseudo-consensus R₁ random process range voting ranked pairs rule RBVPR resistance to strategy resolvability rule lacks rule possesses Schulze method Schwartz consistency sequence of rankings Single Transferable Vote single-peaked Smith consistency Smith set social welfare function Thompson insurance mechanism trade two-ballot majority universal domain vote-processing rule voting procedures weighted Condorcet rule winner winning option